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ARTICLES
TIME-BARS:  RICO-CRIMINAL  AND  CIVIL-FEDERAL
AND  STATE
G. Robert Blakey*
 2013 G. Robert Blakey.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William J. and Dorothy K. Professor of Law Emeritus, Notre Dame Law School;
A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School.  Professor
Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the United States Senate in 1969–1970 when Congress processed the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). Compare Kosak v.
United States, 465 U.S. 848, 856–57 & n.13 (1984) (Marshall, J.)  (“[I]t is significant
that the apparent draftsman of the crucial portion [of the statute so construed it,
and] it seems to us senseless to ignore entirely the views of its draftsman.”), with
Banque Worms v. Luis A. Duque Pena E Hijos, Ltda, 652 F. Supp. 770, 772 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Goettel, J.) (“The rather broad draftsmanship of RICO has resulted
in its expansive application.  A professor who served as a draftsman for the bill has
stated that this broad application is what he intended.  There is no indication,
however, that the Congress which passed the bill was adopting his intentions.”
(citation omitted)).  Courts are not so reluctant to accept the writings of other
professor-draftsmen.  See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226
(7th Cir. 1980); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 619 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1296 n.52 (2d Cir. 1973); Klein v. Computer
Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Goettel, J.); S.E.C. v. Lowe, 556
F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d, 472 U.S.
181 (1985); In re N.Y.C. Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing
James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29 (1959)).  The difference may lie, not so much in the source of the opinion,
but in its content; it ought to rest on the character of the reasons supporting the
opinion (or not).
This is the point at which an author must acknowledge the assistance he or she
has received from his or her students and others.  In this instance, my job is more
complicated than the usual simple expression of appreciation.  In 1979, I was a
professor of law and the director of the Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, which
in the summer of 1979 prepared a set of volumes on RICO.  I asked Mark Flanagan
1581
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(Virginia, 1981), one of the students working for the Institute, to prepare a draft of an
essay on RICO and the statute of limitations.  He soon returned and explained the
topic was too large for one person.  Eventually, I asked Michael S. Smith (Cornell
1981) and Bryan E. Pastuszenski (Cornell 1981) to help Mark; it resulted in the
publication by them of The Statute of Limitation in a Civil RICO Suit for Treble Damages,
in 1 CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME: MATERIALS ON RICO 974 (G. Robert
Blakey ed., 1980) [hereinafter MATERIALS].  In turn, Bryan interested the law review in
the topic, and it asked Mitchell A. Lowenthal (Cornell 1981) and Mark E. Greenwald
(Cornell 1981) to work with him on the topic; their joint effort resulted in the
publication of Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal
Rights of Action and State Statute of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011 (1980)
[hereinafter Cornell Limitations Project], an unprecedented ninety-four-page student
essay, an essay well worth studying on the topic. See infra note 150 for my use of the
Special Project.  I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Kevin W. Goering (Cornell
1981) for his insightful and enlightening The Character of Treble Damages: Conflict
Between a Hybrid Mode of Recovery and Jurisprudence of Labels, in MATERIALS, supra, at 428.
Cornell professor, colleague, and enduring friend, Kevin M. Clermont, the current
Robert D. Ziff Professor of Law, also helped me that summer.  He continued to guide
me afterwards, unselfishly with his time, in my efforts to get my mind around these
issues.  Since then, I have also been ably assisted by, in particular, Carli McNeill
(Notre Dame 2011) and in cite checking, Shepardizing, and finding obscure
references, by Monica Bordas (Notre Dame 2012), William McClintock (Notre Dame
2014), Kevin Murphy (Notre Dame 2014), Grace Fox (Notre Dame 2014), and the
staff of the Notre Dame Law School library, especially Patti Ogden.  To each of them,
I owe more than I can ever repay.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 3 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1583
a. Pattern Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1643 R
b. Use/Investment Violations and Acquisition/
Maintenance Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650 R
c. Conspiracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1652 R
D. Tolling of Criminal Statutes of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1654 R
1. Federal Tolling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1654 R
2. State Tolling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1660 R
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL RICO CASES . . . . . . . . . . . 1663 R
A. History and Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1663 R
B. Determining the Limitations Period for Civil RICO . . . . . . . . 1667 R
1. Federal RICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1667 R
a. Before Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Asssociates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1667 R
b. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1680 R
2. State RICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1685 R
a. When an Express Limitations Period Exists . . . 1685 R
b. When an Express Limitations Period Does Not
Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1686 R
i. Borrowing the Federal Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 1687 R
ii. Borrowing the State Antitrust Period . . . . . 1691 R
iii. Borrowing the Limitations Period Based on
the Alleged Predicate Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . 1693 R
iv. Borrowing the Limitations Period for
Penalties and Forfeitures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1694 R
v. Borrowing the Limitations Period for
Liability on a Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1698 R
C. Determining the Point of Accrual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 R
1. The Last Predicate Act Rule and Klehr v. A. O.
Smith Corp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1702 R
2. The Clayton Act Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1707 R
3. The Injury and Pattern Discovery Rule and Rotella
v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1711 R
4. Discovery Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1718 R
D. Tolling of Civil Statutes of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1730 R
1. Tolling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1730 R
2. Laches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1754 R
E. Case Study: Time-bars in Florida Under RICO . . . . . . . . . . . . 1759 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1779 R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 4 22-MAY-13 9:20
1584 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
“There is an appointed time for everything.”1
“Ripeness is all.”2
“Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind
for it is difficult to fit them into a completely logical and
symmetrical system of law. . . .  [They] find their justification in
necessity and convenience rather than in logic.”3
INTRODUCTION
Most people can easily enough grasp the basic idea behind time-
bars.4  The enterprise5 of law has as its purpose “justice,”6 whether
1 Eccl. 3:1.
2 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 5, sc. 2. (Dover Thrift Study ed.).
3 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1945) (Jackson, J.).
4 “Time-bars” here taken broadly include any legal mechanism using the passage
of time to impact the outcome of bringing a matter to adjudication.  They include
statutes of limitations, whether criminal or civil.  18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006) (“An indict-
ment for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limita-
tion.”); § 3282(a) (“In general.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed.”); 15 U.S.C. §15b (2006) (limiting civil antitrust
claims to a four-year period).  They include laches, a well-established equitable doc-
trine that functions as an equitable time-bar focusing one side’s legitimate reliance on
another side’s inaction; if invoked, it bars long-dormant claims for equitable relief.
See, e.g., Badger v. Badger, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 87, 94 (1865) (“[C]ourts of equity act
upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of society, anti-
quated demands, refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting
the claim, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.” (citation omit-
ted)).  They also include laws that claims possessed by a person were limited to the
life of the offender.  See United States v. Daniel, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 11, 14 (1848)
(holding that action of trespass on the case does not survive death of defendant, the
Court stated, “the action ar[ose] ex delicto”).  Similarly, they include laws permitting
claims surviving death.  For example, in Faircloth v. Finesod, the Fourth Circuit held
that a RICO claim for $4.3 million survived the death of the plaintiff.  938 F.2d 513,
516–18 (4th Cir. 1991) (“At common law, tort claims did not survive the death of the
plaintiff or defendant. . . . In short, civil RICO is a square peg, and squeeze it as we
may, it will never comfortably fit in the round holes of the remedy/penalty dichot-
omy.  Nonetheless, we must fit it as best we can.  Construing it liberally, as Congress
directed, we think that civil RICO claims should survive.  Certainly, the primary pur-
pose of the private right of action created by RICO is remedial. . . . In addition, . . .
murder is a RICO predicate act, and it would certainly be anomalous if a cause of
action based on death did not survive the death of the would-be plaintiff.  We cannot
conclude that Congress ignored the brutal history of organized crime by providing a
defense to criminals who have the foresight to kill their victims.  We hold that civil
RICO claims do not abate upon the death of the injured party.”).  We falsify legal
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history, when, as we often do, read modern distinctions back into legal history.  That
said, in Roman law, which did not reflect from its earliest times, our modern distinc-
tions, hardly an eternal verity, between “crime” and “tort,” civil actions, brought ex
delicto, for multiple damages (e.g., theft, robbery with violence, outrage, and wrongful
damage to property) did not survive against the offending party, but they did for an
heir of the offended party. G. INST. 4.112–13 (F. de Zulueta trans., 1946) (addressing
survival); id. at 6.189–215 (discussing the scope of delicts for multiple damages).  In
all probability, these early civil actions for multiple damages, which preceded and
remained after the formulation of comparable criminal offenses, DIG. 47.2.93
(Ulpian, Edict 37) (providing for either a criminal or a civil action), partially reflected
“compensation” for the loss of property and partially “compensation” for what the law
later called more generally “outrage” (iniuria) for its taking.  For the separate delict of
“outrage” or iniuria, see G. INST., supra, at 3.220–25; J. ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXT-
BOOK ON ROMAN LAW 321, 322–28 (1994).  The offended person had to bring his delict
for iniuria within a year. Id. at 326.  Beyond that period, the Roman law thought the
argument for  “outrage” specious.  Gaius wrote in the fifth century A.D.; for a descrip-
tion of his background and status in Roman law, including that of a major source for
Justinian’s Code, see id. at 44.  They include notions of prescription, that is, that after
a period of holding property, the right to hold the property is not subject to later
legal challenges.  In Roman law, for example, the Twelve Tables, supposedly a codifi-
cation of the customary law of the Roman people around the year 451 B.C., provided
in Table VI.3: “A prescriptive title arises after two year’s possession in the case of
realty; after one year’s possession, in the case of other property.” WILLIAM A. HUNTER,
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 62–63 (1921).  Prescription rested in a desire “to obvi-
ate the ownership of things being uncertain for too long . . . .” G. INST., supra, at 2.44.
On the other hand, prescription reflected numerous exceptions under the law at that
time. HUNTER, supra, at 63–64 (noting that good faith takers had protection; among
the items not included were things stolen, taken by violence, or in bad faith).  Mod-
ern historians no longer credit these mythic stories about the writing of the Tables
resulting from controversies between the patricians and the plebeians, in which the
plebeians demanded a written law, so that they might know what it was. See ALAN
WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 10–14 (1970) (expressing skepticism
about the traditional stories, particularly that the Greeks had a hand in the codifica-
tion, as no records exist of any embassy to Greece in Greek records, and the Romans
of the time had little knowledge of the Mediterranean outside of Italy).  Earlier, and
classic, examinations of ancient law uncritically relied on the stories. See, e.g., HENRY
SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 15–16 (Special ed., Legal Classics Library 1982)
(accepting the story of the role of the Greeks in the codification, but commenting
more accurately that it “mingled up religious, civil, and merely moral ordinances,
without any regard to differences in their essential character; . . . the severance of law
from morality, and of religion from law, belonging very distinctly to the later stages of
mental progress”).  Nevertheless, the stories unquestionably formed a crucial point in
the creation myths of the City, and they are an express part of the DIG. 1.2.24
(Pomponius, Manual) (telling the story of the Twelve Tables).  As with the common
law, “[i]n early [Roman] law the obligation [of a contract, ex contractu] lapsed when
the party subject to it died.  That remained the general position as regards delictual
liability [torts, ex delicto] but, as regards contracts, there was a gradual change towards
enforcing obligations against the heirs of a deceased party.” BORKOWSKI, supra, at
242.  Thus, the Roman law had little need for comprehensive time-bars, and the first
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general statute of limitation did not appear until 424 A.D. RUDOLF SOHM, THE INSTI-
TUTES OF ROMAN LAW 283 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907) (“Emperors
Honorius [395 to 423 A.D. in the West] and Theodosius [II 401 to 440  A.D. in the
East] . . . moved by obvious considerations of convenience, enacted . . . that all actions
should be barred within a certain period [that is, thirty years from the accrual of the
right].”).  The expiration of the period extinguished the remedy, not the right. Id. at
283–84.  Not all time-bars stemmed from legislation.  Common law time-bars include
the rule against perpetuities, the year and a day rule for murder, the presumptions of
death after seven years absence, and satisfaction on commercial paper after twenty
years of inaction.  For example, consider the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, [1682] 22 Eng.
Rep. 931 at 953, where the famous advocate Sir Orlando Bridgman, to circumvent an
eldest son’s mental deficiencies, set up an intermediate estate in trust to preserve
contingent remainders.  In his opinion, Lord Chancellor Nottingham (Heneage
Finch) famously responded to the classic objection that it would be impossible to
draw a line between here and other obviously undesirable outcomes: “Where will you
stop if you do not stop here?  I will tell you where I will stop: I will stop where-ever any
visible Inconvenience doth appear . . . .” Id. at 960.  The purpose of the rule against
perpetuities (that a contingent interest in land had to vest within twenty-one years and
a life in being) was to remedy the social concern with the inalienability of land for
extended periods of time.  Nottingham held that any future interest is good if based
on a contingency that must occur within lives in being, expressly leaving undecided
the question of “the utmost Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee.” Id. at 953.  That ques-
tion remained undecided for 150 years before Cadell v. Palmer, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 975
(H.L. 1833) settled it as a gross term of twenty-one years after a life or lives in being.
See generally, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915)
(describing the Rule Against Perpetuities); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,
463 (2001) (holding as constitutional the abrogation of the year and a day common
law rule and noting: “[T]he rule is generally believed to date back to the 13th century,
when it served as a statute of limitations governing the time in which an individual
might initiate a private action for murder known as an ‘appeal of death’; that by the
18th century the rule had been extended to the law governing public prosecutions for
murder; that the primary and most frequently cited justification for the rule is that
13th century medical science was incapable of establishing causation beyond a reason-
able doubt when a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the victim and
his death; and that, as practically every court recently to have considered the rule has
noted, advances in medical and related science have so undermined the usefulness of
the rule as to render it without question obsolete.”); Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist.,
198 U.S. 458, 469–71 (1905) (upholding against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge
the administration of estate of an absentee, who had been absent for more than seven
years and presumed dead, and noting that: “Whilst it may be that under the Roman
Law there was no . . . coherent system provided for the administration of the estate of
an absentee, it is nevertheless certain that absence, without being heard from for a
given length of time, authorized the appointment of a curator to protect and adminis-
ter an estate. . . . That in the ancient law of France, under varying conditions, the
same governmental right was recognized is also undoubted.  In the Code Napoleon
the subject is especially provided for under a title treating of absence, in which ample
provision is made for the administration of the property of the absentee, the law pro-
viding for, first, the provisional and ultimately the final distribution of such property
in accordance with the restrictions and regulations which the title provides. . . . And it
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may not be doubted that the power to deal with the estate of an absentee was recog-
nized and exerted not only by the common law of Germany, but also by the codes of
the various States of the continent of Europe.  Provisions similar in character to those
of the Code Napoleon were incorporated in the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1808 . . . .
Under the law of England, . . . a presumption of death arose from an absence of seven
years without being heard from, and whilst it is true, as we shall hereafter have occa-
sion to say, that such presumption was not conclusive and was rebuttable, nevertheless
the very fact of the presumption occasioned by absence, irrespective of the force of
the presumption, was a manifestation of the power to give legal effect to the status
arising from absence. . . . [T]he right to regulate the estates of absentees, both in the
common and civil law, has ever been recognized as being within the scope of govern-
mental authority, it must follow that the proposition that the State of Pennsylvania was
wholly without power to legislate concerning the property of an absentee, is without
merit . . . .” (citations omitted)); Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N.Y. 381, 384–85 (1884) (“It was
a rule of the common law that the payment of a bond or other specialty, would be
presumed after the lapse of twenty years from the time it became due, in the absence
of evidence explaining the delay, although there was no statute bar.  The rule is said
to have begun in courts of equity, but from an early time it has been recognized by
courts of law.  In this State it was frequently applied prior to any statute provision on
the subject, and in connection with other circumstances the presumption was allowed
to prevail within the period of twenty years.  In respect to simple contracts the same
presumption has been applied after the lapse of twenty years.  Lord Holt in . . . an
action on a bond, speaking of the presumption in that case said, ‘a fortiori upon a
note, if it be any considerable sum.’  In Duffield v. Creed, which was an action brought
in 1803, upon a note made in 1782, Lord Ellenborough said, ‘If this had been a bond,
twenty years would have raised a presumption of payment in which case he would
have left the presumption to the jury, and he thought, as this note was unaccounted
for, the same rule of presumption ought to apply.’  The presumption has been
applied to simple contracts in several cases in this country. . . . [M]any of the cases on
the presumption arising from lapse of time were referred to, and it was held that the
presumption was one of fact and not of law, and that it was for the jury to draw the
conclusion upon all the facts and circumstances of the case.” (citations omitted)).
5 Seeing law as a “purposeful enterprise” is a crucial insight in the writings of
Lon Fuller, but others reflect similar insights. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 145–51 (Rev. ed. 1969); ARISTOTLE, Physics reprinted in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 271 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) [hereinafter GREAT
BOOKS] (“[M]en do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it
. . . .”); FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, reprinted in 30 GREAT BOOKS, supra (recog-
nizing the utility of the Aristotelian concept of “final cause” or “purpose” in the “inter-
course of man with man”); KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 105–06
n.17 (3d ed. 1965) (“[O]ne might adopt the view that certain things of our own mak-
ing—such as clocks—may well be said to have ‘essences’, viz. their ‘purposes’ (and
what makes them serve these ‘purposes’) [, and they] might . . . be claimed by some to
have an ‘essence’, even if they deny that natural objects have essences.”).  Similarly,
Judge Learned Hand, a skeptic about objective truth about the nature of things in the
natural world, thought that in law “purpose . . . is the surest guide to . . . meaning.”
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); see
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY TOGETHER WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS 24–29 (3d
ed. 1989) (noting skepticism is the teaching of “experience”); accord United States v.
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criminal7 or civil.8  This much is beyond serious dispute.  At first
glance, a time-bar merely involves two points in time: the time of the
event, and the time of the initiation of the legal proceedings looking
Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J.) (explaining that “general purpose is
a more important aid . . . than . . . grammar or formal logic” in fixing a meaning in
the law).
6 See, e.g., J. INST. 1.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1917) (“Justitia est con-
stans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuens.  Justice is the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due.”); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF ENGLAND 167 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (“Est enim corona facere iustitiam et
iudicium, et tenere pacem, et sine quibus corona consistere non poterit nec tenere,” translated as,
“For to do justice, [give] judgment and preserve the peace is the crown without which
it can neither subsist nor endure.”).  Bracton, a priest, as were most lawyers of his
time, was a leading medieval English jurist; his De legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae is
one of the oldest systematic treatises on the common law.  The preamble to the
United States Constitution says it reflected a desire “to . . . establish Justice.” U.S.
CONST. pmbl.  Nevertheless, defining “justice” as giving every man “his due” is, as
Cardozo says, “only cloak[ing]” the “difficulty,” “for what is due must be defined.”
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 275 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
So saying, Cardozo fruitfully discusses, in broad outlines, the classic views of Plato,
Aristotle, Bentham, Mill, and others on “justice.” Id. at 271–90.  Martha C. Nuss-
baum, however, rightly challenges the classic views for not giving women full recogni-
tion as a subject of “justice” in her WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000), and the
exclusion of the disabled, the citizens of other nations, and animals from considera-
tion in modern contrarian thought (e.g., John Rawles’s “justice as fairness”) as sub-
jects of “justice” in her FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006).  In brief, our conversations
about “justice,” continue.
7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (“These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Sentencing,
too, must reflect, among other considerations, “just deserts.”  Congress requires fed-
eral courts to impose sentences in accordance with the purposes of the criminal law,
beginning with just deserts:
(a) The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion.  The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider . . .
(2) the need for the sentence imposed
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective man-
ner; . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2006) (emphasis added).
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts . . . [and] [t]hey should be construed
and administered to secure the just . . . determination of every action and proceed-
ing.” (emphasis added)).
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into the event.  Obviously, as these two points in time separate more,
the ability of any legal body accurately to resolve disputes about the
facts making up the event—a necessary precondition to giving each
person his or her due—becomes more problematic.  Testimony, or
the introduction of other evidence, is the basis for fact-finding in
court.  Yet, over time, memories fade.  Participants and other relevant
persons die or become unavailable.  Documents are mislaid, lost, or
stolen.  Physical evidence deteriorates.  Ultimately, “justice” between
two parties requires truth in fact-finding.  At some point, the passage
of time itself defeats “justice.”  This much, too, is beyond serious dis-
pute.  Then the lawyers get involved in the bedeviling details.9  How
9 “[D]oth it not often happen,” John Locke once noted, “that a man of an ordi-
nary capacity very well understands a . . . law . . . that he reads, till he consults an
expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by that time he hath done explaining . . . makes
the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.”  JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at
294.  “Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well,” Locke observed, “for
common conversation . . . . ” Id. at 286.  Common usage, however, does not serve so
well for more complex matters.  Locke commented:
[I]n the interpretation of laws . . . there is no end; comments beget com-
ments, and explications make new matter for explications; and of limiting,
distinguishing, varying the signification of . . . moral words there is no end.
These ideas of men’s making are, by men still having the same power, multi-
plied in infinitum.
Id. at 287.
Yet, Locke added:  “I say not this that I think commentaries needless; but to show
how uncertain . . .  [moral words] naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had
both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to
express their thoughts.” Id.  Echoing Locke, Edmund Burke observed:
The more deeply we penetrate into the labyrinth of art[ifical society as
opposed to natural society], the further we find ourselves from those ends
for which we entered it.  This has happened in almost every species of artifi-
cial society and in all times.  We found, or we thought we found, an inconve-
nience in having every man the judge of his own cause.  Therefore judges
were set up, at first, with discretionary powers.  But it was soon found a mis-
erable slavery to have our lives and properties precarious, and hanging upon
the arbitrary determination of any one man, or set of men.  We fled to laws
as a remedy for this evil. By these we persuaded ourselves we might know
with some certainty upon what ground we stood. But lo! differences arose
upon the sense and interpretation of these laws.  Thus we were brought back
to our old incertitude. . . . In this uncertainty, (uncertain even to the profes-
sors, an Egyptian darkness to the rest of mankind) the contending parties
felt themselves more effectually ruined by the delay than they could have
been by the injustice of any decision.  Our inheritances are become a prize
for disputation; and disputes and litigation are become an inheritance. . . .
The lawyers . . . have erected another reason besides natural reason; and the
result has been, another justice besides natural justice. They have so bewil-
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do you fix the metric of this far and no farther?  When do you start the
period?  When do you stop the period?  Should the law toll the period
based on the conduct of the complainant or the respondent?  Do
these time-bars affect the right or only the remedy, whatever that
hoary, Roman distinction means?
The law does not easily answer these questions.  The interests10
involved are complex, and they are at least triangular: the com-
dered the world and themselves in unmeaning forms and ceremonies, and
so perplexed the plainest matter with metaphysical jargon, that it carries the
highest danger to a man out of the profession, to make the least step without
their advice and assistance, Thus, by confining to themselves the knowledge
of foundation of all mens’ lives and properties, they have reduced all man-
kind to the most abject and servile dependence. . . . In a word, . . . the
injustice, delay, puerility, false refinement, and affected mystery of the law
are such, that many who live under it come to admire the and envy the
expedition, simplicity, and equality of arbitrary judgments.
1 Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society (1756) reprinted in THE WORKS OF THE
RIGHT HON. EDMOND BURKE 17–18 (Henry Rogers ed. 1837).
10 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959) suggests that the general interest in
security underlay statutes of limitations, first reflected in the maxim the “safety of the
people is the highest law,” id. at 292, but then developed to add the security of acqui-
sitions and the security of transactions.  “In an economically developed society [the
statute] takes on two other closely related forms, namely, a social interest of the secur-
ity of acquisitions and a social interest in the security of transactions.” Id. at 292–93
(footnote omitted).  On the other hand, Lord Mansfield, in the eighteenth century,
“under the influence of natural-law ideas,” “th[ought] of the statute[s] only as an
individual plea which enabled the individual interest of a plaintiff to [cost another his
individual] legal security;” thus, he “sought out numerous astute contrivances to get
around its most obvious provisions.” Id. at 293.  Modern courts, however, came to see
that something more was at stake than individual interests.  “[T]itles [should] not be
insecure by being open to attack indefinitely . . . .” Id. at 294.  “[T]ransactions of the
past [should] not be subject to inquiry indefinitely . . . .” Id.  It would “unsettle credit
and disturb business and trade.” Id.  In short, the general interest in security warrants
statutes of limitations.  Thus, from a broader perspective, time-bars were a “wise and
beneficial” policy. See Gabelli v. SEC, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1861 *11–*12 (decided Feb.
27, 2013 ) (“Thus the ‘standard rule’ [for limitations] is that a claim accrues ‘when
the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’ . . . That rule has governed
since the 1830s . . . . This reading sets a fixed date when exposure to the specified
Government enforcement efforts ends, advancing ‘the basic policies of all limitations
provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s oppor-
tunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.’ . . . Statutes of limitations
are intended to ‘promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared.’ . . .  They provide ‘security and stability to human
affairs.’ . . . . We have deemed them ‘vital to the welfare of society,’ . . . and concluded
that ‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten,’ . . . .”
(citations omitted)); M’Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 278–79 (1830) (“Of
late years the courts in England, and in this country, have considered statutes of limi-
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plaining party, the responding party, and society itself, represented by
the legal body that must resolve the dispute.  The interests of the par-
ties, too, may differ in criminal and civil proceedings.  Should they
differ if one of them is the representative of the sovereign?  The ques-
tions proliferate and perplex the legal mind.  Whatever commentators
or courts say of time-bars,11 the narrow foci of these materials are on
the concrete answers given and rationales proffered to these pressing
questions for criminal and civil RICO in federal and state proceed-
ings, which necessarily require a consideration of the scope of RICO
itself, as time-bars receive significant color and shape from their par-
ticular legal context.12
I. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
(RICO)
A. Enactment of RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act;
Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
tations more favorably than formerly.  They . . . tend to the peace and welfare of
society. . . . By requiring those who complain of injuries to seek redress . . . within a
reasonable time, a salutary vigilance is imposed, and an end is put to litigation.”); Bell
v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828)  (“It has often been matter of regret, in
modern times, that, in the construction of the statute of limitations, the decisions had
not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real objects of
the statute; that, instead of being viewed in an unfavourable [sic] light, as an unjust
and discreditable defence [sic], it had received such support, as would have made it,
what it was intended to be, emphatically, a statute of repose.  It is a wise and beneficial
law . . . to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction
may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or
removal of witnesses.  It has a manifest tendency to produce speedy settlements of
accounts, and to suppress those prejudices which may rise up at a distance of time,
and baffle every honest effort to counteract or overcome them.  Parole evidence may
be offered of confessions, (a species of evidence which, it has been often observed, it
is hard to disprove, and easy to fabricate[ ])[,] applicable to such remote times, as
may leave no means to trace the nature, extent, or origin of the claim, and thus open
the way to the most oppressive charges.”).
11 These materials only incidentally discuss other legal mechanisms that function
as time-bars.
12 That context is necessary to understanding in law is an old and well-established
principle. See, e.g., United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 123
(1850) (explaining the “whole context”); accord Perrine v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal
Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 172, 190 (1850) (“The rules for the construction of statutes . . .
are familiar and well established . . . . The meaning . . . must be determined from the
context . . . .”); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, 135 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) (“The principal determinant of meaning is context . . . .”).
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Organizations Act (“RICO”).13  Congress drafted Title IX to deal with
13 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006) [hereinafter RICO].  G. Robert Blakey and
Kevin P. Roddy collect the best law review commentary on RICO until 1996. See G.
Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernest & Young: Its Meaning
and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO,
33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1348 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter Blakey & Roddy].  Relevant
student articles since then include James M. Evans, Note, “Don’t Throw Me Into The
Briar Patch”: RICO and Rules of Evidence, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433 (1998); Michael J.
Gerardi, Note, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a RICO Test Suite, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2239 (2009); Julie Gunnigle, Note, “Birds of a Feather” RICO: Trying Part-
ners in Crime Together, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 41 (2006); Paul Edgar Harold,
Note, Quo Vadis, Association in Fact?  The Growing Disparity Between How Federal Courts
Interpret RICO’s Enterprise Provision in Criminal And Civil Cases (With a Little Statutory
Background to Explain Why), 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781 (2005); Carli McNeill, Note,
Seeing the Forest: A Holistic View of the RICO Statute of Limitations, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1231 (2010); Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the Proximate Cause Battle Extin-
guished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 257 (2000); Brian J. Murray, Note,
Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO From Chilling First Amendment Freedoms,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691 (1999); Benjamin Rolf, Note, The “Ends of Justice” Revis-
ited: How to Interpret RICO’s Procedural Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1225 (2005); Melissa A. Rolland, Case Comment, Forfeiture Wars, the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Excessive Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajiam, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1371 (1999); Adam M. Snyder, Note, Equitable Remedies in Civil RICO Actions: In Support
of Allowing District Courts to Order Disgorgement, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (2007); G. Ryan
Snyder, Note, “Preserving” Civil RICO: How the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act Affects
RICO’s Private Right of Action under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1767 (2011).  The White-Collar Crime Survey of the American Criminal Law Review
annually prints a helpful review of RICO jurisprudence. See, e.g., Corey P. Argust et
al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 961 (2010).
Thirty-five states have legislation patterned on RICO. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
2312–13-2315 (2010 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186–186.8 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-17-101–18-17-109 (West 2004 & Supp.
2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393–53-403 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1501–1511 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01–.09 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1–15 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 842-1–12
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7801–7805 (2004); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1–2 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.1–.3 (West 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.159f–.159x (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT.
Ann. §§ 609.901–.912 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1–11
(West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1351 (Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 207.350–.520 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1–6.2 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1–6 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–.80 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-
1–14 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-06.1-01–06.1-08 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2923.31–.36 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1401–19
(West 2003 & Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715– .735 (2011); 18 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 911 (West 1998 & Supp. 2012); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 971 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 7-15-1–11 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-12-201–210 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-10-1601–1609 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
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§§ 600–614 (1996 & Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-512 (2009 & Supp. 2012);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.001–.904 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 946.80–.88 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).  Some have statutes considerably more nar-
row than RICO. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1–/9 (West 2008) (narcotics
only); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4401–4410 (2007 & Supp. 2011) (specifying the nature of
the threat or promise that must be made to fall under RICO) (repealed 2010); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351–56 (2005 & Supp. 2012) (originally applicable only to
drug racketeering activity but amended in 1992, 1994, and 1995 to encompass a
broader range of predicate acts not related to drug racketeering activity).  The best
general analysis of these statutes is John E. Floyd’s ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
RICO STATE BY STATE (John Floyd, ed., 2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter ABA RICO SUM-
MARY].  As Floyd notes, some states have also used concepts derived from RICO, such
as “pattern” and “enterprise,” to target gangs. Id. at 9; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2321 (2010 & Supp. 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-103 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 186.20 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 18-23-101 (West 2004); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 616 (2007); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-951 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 874.01 (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-1 (2011); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-8502 (Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§5/33G-3 (West
2012) (The Illinois statute is not only of most recent, but also one of the most sophis-
ticated efforts to adapt the RICO ideas to the prosecution of street gangs); IND. CODE
§ 35-45-9-1 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-801 (LexisNexis 2012); MISS.  CODE
ANN. § 97-44-3 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.421 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-50.15 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.2-01 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.41 (LexisNexis 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-61-2 (2002) (repealed 1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. §16-8-210 (West Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A-1 (2006); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-9-801 (LexisNexis 2008).  Largely unnoticed in the brouhaha over
civil RICO and securities fraud on the federal level is the presence in these state rack-
eteering statutes of securities fraud predicates.  These state RICO statutes incorporate
the predicate acts from 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006), their own predicate acts, or a
combination of the two. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4)(b)(xviii)
(2010) (§ 1961(1) and state); CAL. PENAL CODE §186.2(a)(18) (West 1999 & Supp.
2012) (state); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-103(5)(b)(XIII) (West 2004 & Supp.
2011) (§ 1961(1) and state); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(a)(15) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2012) (state); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(9)(a) (2007) (§ 1961(1) and
state); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.02(1)(a)(7) & (1)(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012)
(§ 1961(1) and state); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-3(9)(A)(xxi) (2011) (§ 1961(1) and
state); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7803 (2004) (predicate acts from state law but lan-
guage, “any act which is chargeable or indictable under the following sections of the
Idaho Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes
under the laws of any other jurisdiction[,]” leaves ambiguity regarding whether the
Idaho Code includes § 1961(1) offenses); IND. CODE § 35-45-6-1(e)(1) (2008 & Supp.
2012) (state); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352(A) (2005 & Supp. 2012) (state); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.159g(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012) (§ 1961(1) and state);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(a)(2) (West 2011) (state); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1354(5)(h)
(Supp. 2010) (state); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.360(30) (LexisNexis 2012) (state).
Federal courts created some confusion by assuming federal securities fraud could be
included as predicate act. See Brown v. Kinross Gold U.S.A., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d
1234 (D. Nev. 2008); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1202
(D. Nev. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(a)(1)(p) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012)
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“enterprise criminality,”14 that is, “patterns” of –
(1) violence (e.g., murder, robbery, etc.),
(2) the provision of illegal goods and services (e.g., drugs, gam-
bling, prostitution, etc., including undocumented aliens),
(3) corruption in labor or management relations (e.g., bribery,
extortion, embezzlement, etc.),
(4) corruption in government (e.g., bribery, extortion, fraud
against the government, etc.), and
(5) commercial and other forms of fraud (schemes to defraud,
bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, etc.)
by, through, or against various types of licit or illicit enterprises.15
Because Congress found that the sanctions and remedies availa-
ble to control these offenses were unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact, it enacted RICO to provide enhanced criminal and civil sanc-
tions, including fines, imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions, and
treble damage relief for persons injured in their business or property
because of a violation of the statute.16
B. Organized Crime Myth
Its legislative history “demonstrates that the RICO statute was
intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an
(§ 1961(1) and state); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(A)(17) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp.
2011) (state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(2) (2011) (§ 1961(1) and state); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(f)(16) (2012) (state); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.31(I)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (§ 1961(1)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 22-1402(10)(x) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (state); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.715(6)(b) (2011) (§ 1961(1)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4)(iiii) (Lexis-
Nexis 2008 & Supp. 2011) (§ 1961(1)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(4)(v)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (state); and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(4) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2011) (§ 1961(1) and state).  Finally, while increasingly outdated, the U.S.
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sec-
tion, periodically publishes two useful publications: CRIMINAL RICO: 18
U.S.C.§§ 1961–1968, A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (5th ed. Oct. 2009) and
CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS (Oct. 2007).
14 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (defining “enter-
prise criminality” as consisting of “all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging]
from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar schemes to traditional
Mafia-type endeavors” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15 See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 300–06 (1982) [hereinafter Civil Fraud
Action] (categorizing diverse predicate acts).
16 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (“[T]he sanctions . . . available . . . are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. . . . [T]his Act . . . provid[es] enhanced
sanctions and new remedies . . . .”).
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assault upon organized crime and its economic roots.”17  The major
purpose of RICO was to address the “infiltration of legitimate business
by organized crime,” but Congress designed the statute to reach both
illegitimate and legitimate enterprises.18 Similar to the antitrust stat-
utes, on which Congress modeled RICO, Congress used in RICO “a
generality and adaptability [of language] comparable to that found to
be desirable in constitutional provisions.”19  “[C]oncepts such as
RICO ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ were simply
unknown to common law.”20 Significantly, “Congress drafted RICO
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking
many different forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetra-
tors operating in many different ways.”21  “The occasion for Con-
gress’[s] action was the perceived need to combat organized crime.
But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general stat-
ute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not
limited in its application to organized crime.”22  As the Supreme
Court observed, the contention that RICO is limited to “organized
crime” “finds no support in the Act’s text, and is at odds with the
tenor of its legislative history.”23  Nevertheless, RICO is similar to
other legislation enacted by Congress as general reform, aimed at a
specific target, but not limited to a specific target.24
17 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
18 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 592 n.14 (1981) (quoting Hearings on
Organized Crime Control Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 91st
Cong, 2d Sess., 170 (1970) (Dep’t of Justice Comments)).
19 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933), overruled in
part on unrelated issues by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984) (holding that a corporate subsidiary and its parent act as a single entity
and thus cannot conspire with each other for the purposes of the Sherman Act).
20 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987).
21 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248–49 (1989).
22 Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (Scheidler I), 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994)
(quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (explaining RICO is used
not just for “mobsters and organized criminals,” since legitimate enterprises “enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its
consequences”).
23 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 244.
24 RICO fits well, too, into the traditional pattern of federal legislation aimed at a
particular problem, but drafted in all-purpose language. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, April 20, 1871, ch 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified, relevant part, in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241–242 (2006) (criminal sanctions) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983–88 (2006) (civil sanc-
tions), is illustrative.  The aim of the 1871 Act was the night riding of the Klan, but
courts may impose its criminal and civil sanctions on “any person” who deprives
another of his civil rights; its sponsors aimed the Act at the Klan, but it applies today
to police officers anywhere.  See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“[The
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C. Criminal and Civil Proceedings
RICO’s two-track system of criminal and civil litigation that Con-
gress designed to achieve its remedial purposes fits well into the fed-
eral system of justice.25  RICO’s criminal and civil provisions are as
follows:
(1) §1961 of Title 18 sets out RICO’s building-block “definitions.”
They apply in all actions under RICO.
(2) § 1962 of Title 18 sets out RICO’s “standards” of “unlawful”
(not “criminal”) “conduct.”26  They apply in all actions under
RICO.
Civil Rights Act is] cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the
States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates.”), overruled on
other grounds, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 85–88 (1996) (reviewing the prosecution of the Los Ange-
les police officers under § 242 for the beating of Rodney King).  Subsequently, Rod-
ney King obtained $3.8 million dollars in a private settlement of his civil rights claim
under § 1983.  Charlie LeDuff, 12 Years After the Riots, Rodney King Gets Along, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at N22, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/
national/19king.html; see also Jennifer Medina, Rodney King Dies at 47; Police Victim
Who Asked “Can We All Get Along”, N.Y. TIMES, (June 17, 2012) http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/18/us/rodney-king-whose-beating-led-to-la-riots-dead-at-47.html?page
wanted=all (reporting that King drowned in his swimming pool).
25 See generally Gerardi, supra note 13 (reviewing varying concepts of “person” that R
defined the scope of perpetrators and victims in several federal statutory schemes that
provide for parallel criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms).
26 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006), entitled “Prohibited Activities,” contains three sub-
stantive provisions.  Each begins with the phrase “It shall be unlawful . . . .”  For exam-
ple, § 1962(c) provides that it is “unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise engaged in, or . . . affect[ing] interstate or foreign commerce to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .”  Significantly, the words “pro-
hibited” and “unlawful” do not mean “criminal.”  Separate sections provide for the
criminal sanctions (§ 1963) or civil remedies (§ 1964) for a violation of § 1962’s stan-
dard of “unlawful” conduct.  The Court in Sedima properly captured the distinction
when it referred to § 1962 as, “a failure to adhere to legal requirements.” Sedima, 473
U.S. at 489.  In most situations, the distinction between “criminal” and “unlawful” is a
distinction without a difference.  In three situations, however, the distinction is mate-
rial: (1) concurrent state court jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, (2) arbitration of
civil RICO claims, or (3) foreign court jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 (2006) provides that “district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the
United States.” (emphasis added).  If § 1962 reflected “offenses against the United
States,” jurisdiction over civil RICO claims would be exclusive in the federal courts.
They are not. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990) (upholding concurrent
jurisdiction and stating that “civil RICO claims are not ‘offenses against the laws of the
United States”’).  Similarly, arbitration over civil RICO claims would be impermissi-
ble.  It is not. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 17 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1597
(3) §1963 of Title 18 sets out RICO’s criminal sanctions for a viola-
tion of § 1962.
RICO’s criminal sanctions under §1963 require:
• A criminal trial;
• Instituted by the government;
• Through a grand jury indictment; and
• The testing of the government’s proof by the standard of
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”27
(4) §1964 of Title 18 sets out RICO’s civil sanctions for a violation
of § 1962.
RICO’s civil remedies under §1964 require:
• A civil trial;
• Instituted;
• Either by the government or a private plaintiff; and
• The testing of either the government’s or a private party’s
proof by the standard of “preponderance of the evidence.”28
Foreign court jurisdiction over civil RICO claims is a question of the conflict of laws of
the particular state, but the general rule is that one state will not enforce the “penal
laws” of another state. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289–90
(1888) (extending the doctrine that the penal laws of a country cannot be enforced
by the courts of another country to states).  If § 1962 reflected “offenses against the
United States,” it would be a “penal” law, and a foreign jurisdiction would not enforce
it.  This issue is unresolved. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Presses U.S. Bank Over Money
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2008, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/07/04/business/worldbusiness/04bony.html (“In a novel legal theory on
choice of law, the [Russian Customs Committee is] seeking to apply . . . RICO[ ]
against the [Bank of New York Mellon] in a Russian court.”).  The matter settled
before the Russian court ruled on the issue of jurisdiction.  Gregory L. White, Russia,
BNY Mellon End $22.7 Billion Suit: Settlement for $14 Million in RICO Case Clears the Way
for Bank to Open Lending Channels, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at C2, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB125619950075000879.html.
That said, the Court sometimes does not follow this precise terminology, as
reflected in Sedima, but inaccurately refers to § 1962 as “criminal provisions.” See, e.g.,
Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983, 987 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(“Section 1962, in turn, contains RICO’s criminal provisions.”); Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (“Section 1962 contains RICO’s crimi-
nal prohibitions.”).  More often, the Court accurately refers to the structure of RICO
comprehensively. See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006)
(“The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), prohibits cer-
tain conduct involving a ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’  § 1962 (2000 ed.).  One of
RICO’s enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action, available to ‘[a]ny per-
son injured in his business or property by reason of a violation’ of the Act’s substan-
tive restrictions.  § 1964(c).” (citation omitted)).
27 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
28 See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489 (“Section 1962 renders certain conduct ‘unlaw-
ful;’ § 1963 and § 1964 impose consequences, criminal and civil, for ‘violations’ of
§ 1962.  We should not lightly infer that Congress intended the term to have wholly
different meanings in neighboring subsections.”); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834
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D. Liberal Construction
Congress directed that courts liberally construe RICO to achieve
its remedial purposes.29  If RICO’s language is plain, it controls.30  If
its language, syntax, or context is ambiguous, courts must give it that
construction that would realize its remedial purpose of providing
“enhanced sanction and new remedies.”31  Courts must read its lan-
F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that in a private suit, the preponderance of
the evidence standard is required); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358
(7th Cir. 1974) (noting that in a government suit, the preponderance of the evidence
standard obtains).
29 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (“The provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). See G. Robert
Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO:  Reflections on Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White Collar
Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 526, 532 n. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Equitable Relief]
(reviewing the history and construction of liberal construction clauses).  They also
review the history of treble damages and its economic rationale. Id. at 531 n.17; see G.
Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages,
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 101–15 (1997) [hereinafter “Of Characterization”]
(tracing the history of multiple damages through Hebrew, Greek, Roman and early
English law and comparing that history with modern economic analysis).  The article
dispels confusion over the classification of treble damages as necessarily either
“actual” or “punitive” damages; they are neither; they are, as a matter of history, “accu-
mulative” damages whose purpose is remedial, not punitive. See, e.g., PacifiCare
Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003) (“Indeed, we have repeatedly
acknowledged that the treble-damages provision contained in RICO itself is remedial
in nature.  In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987), we stated that ‘[b]oth RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy eco-
nomic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s
fees.’ ([e]mphasis added.)  And in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 241, (1987) we took note of the ‘remedial function’ of RICO’s treble-dam-
ages provision.”).
30 See, e.g., Scheidler I, 510 U.S. 249, 261–62 (1994) (holding that, there, the ambi-
guity did not support the rule of lenity); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
249 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 606 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987); Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 29 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 n.10 (1981).
31 See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 465; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497–98; Russello, 464 U.S. at 27;
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587–88, 593. Congress’s statement of RICO’s remedial purposes
is found in its “Statement of Findings and Purpose,” Pub.  L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
922–23 (1970) (“[B]ecause the . . . remedies available . . . are unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact. . . . the purpose . . . [is to] provid[e] enhanced sanctions and new
remedies . . . .”). This statutory text saying its “purpose” was to provide “enhanced
sanctions and new remedies” answers Justice Blackmon’s supercilious query in Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993) (holding that “conduct” means “operation or
manage”; “clause [not] help . . . to determine what purposes”). Reves, too hardly
enhanced RICO’s sanctions and remedies:  it wrongfully narrowed the focus of the
statute.  See Justice Souter’s dissent. Id. at 189 (“Congress has given courts faced with
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guage in the same fashion, whatever the character of the suit.32  The
Supreme Court follows this outline.33
E. Criminal Enforcement
The criminal enforcement mechanism of RICO provides for
imprisonment, fines, and criminal forfeiture.34  RICO authorized
imprisonment of up to twenty years, or life, where the predicate
offense authorizes life.35  In conjunction with other sections of United
uncertain meaning a clear tiebreaker in RICO’s ‘liberal construction’ clause . . . . [I]n
this instance, the ‘liberal construction’ clause plays its intended part, directing us to
recognize the more inclusive definition of the word ‘conduct,’ free of any restricting
element of direction or control.  Because the Court of Appeals employed a narrower
reading, I would reverse.”).  Souter’s opinion, with its careful reliance on text, is, for
that reason, the more persuasive opinion.
32 See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236 (holding that the pattern “appl[ies] to criminal as
well as civil applications of the Act”); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489.  The principle is varia-
ble. See, e.g., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 501 n.6 (2000) (noting that the application
of conspiracy implicates both criminal “violation” and civil “conspiracy” principles);
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 188 (1997) (finding that different considera-
tions apply to civil and criminal statutes of limitations).
33 The Supreme Court’s principal RICO decisions are: Hemi Group, LLC v. City
of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009); Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537
(2007); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006); PacifiCare Health Sys.,
Inc., 538 U.S. 401; Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women (Scheidler II), 537 U.S. 393
(2003); Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158 (2001); Beck, 529 U.S.
494; Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000); Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299
(1999); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); Klehr, 521 U.S. 179; United States
v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995); Scheidler I, 510 U.S. 249; Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); Tafflin,
493 U.S. 455; H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. 229; Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617 (1989); Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. 143; Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc., 482 U.S. 220; Sedima, 473 U.S. 479; Russello, 464 U.S. 16; Turkette,
452 U.S. 576.
34 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006).
35 Under § 1963(a), RICO’s sentencing guideline level is nineteen (two-and-one-
half to three years), or the offense level of the underlying racketeering activity, which
includes all offenses that are reasonably foreseeable and are committed in jointly
undertaken activity.  See United States v. Jones, 209 F.3d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding the sentencing court’s attribution of one-and-one-half kilograms of cocaine
to defendant supported by defendant’s participation in drug operation).  The pres-
ence of “organized crime” in RICO violations is also a ground for an upward depar-
ture.  United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1209 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The motivation
for and the scope of a statute are often and here different things. . . . Had the guide-
line range for RICO offenses been set with the Chicago Outfit in mind, it would have
greatly overpunished the run of the mill criminal activities that are the routine grist of
RICO prosecutions. . . . The Chicago Outfit is the clearest possible example of a gang
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operating on such a scale, with such success, [and] over such a long period of time
that the danger which it poses to society is not adequately reflected in the guideline
range.  It is not your average criminal RICO violator.”); see United States v. Tocco, 200
F.3d 401, 432–36 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that leadership in organized crime family
warrants upward departure in RICO); United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir.
1993) (concerning the sentencing of mob boss, Raymond J. Patriarca); infra note 98
more generally on the commission prosecution; accord United States v. Acuna, 313 F.
App’x 283, 286, 297–300 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding as reasonable life for “enforcer”
of the Cuban Mafia, the “Corporation,” and upward departure from the guideline
range of forty-six-to-fifty-seven months to 188 months sentence for leader; pattern of
offenses included murder, arson, gambling and money-laundering; $1.54 billion and
$642 million in criminal forfeitures reasonable); United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d
524, 542–43 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding multiple sentences of one-hundred years and
consecutive twenty year sentences against Eighth Amendment objections for partici-
pants in the commission prosecution of the leadership group for the five families of
organized crime).  Upward enhancement is proper if the predicate offense included
other serious offenses (i.e. bribery (abuse of trust) or violence). See United States v.
Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 28 (1st Cir. 2001) (showing upward enhancement beyond the
normal range for murder); United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 947 (5th Cir.
1995) (showing upward enhancement within the normal range for bribery).  Thus,
RICO authorizes life terms for murder, but the jury must find special verdicts on the
death and its cause. See United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043–46 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding the term may not
be extended beyond authorized range without due process, fact-charging, and find-
ing), to life terms under RICO requires jury separately to find the death and its
cause), rehearing and clarifying, United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (stating that mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines are unconstitutional, but upholding the guidelines as discretion-
ary).  So, too, fines are subject to the Sixth Amendment. See S. Union Co. v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2347, 2350–51 (2012) (applying the rule of Apprendi to the
imposition of criminal fines, because its “core concern” of reserving to the jury the
determination of facts that warranted punishment for a specific statutory offense
applied whether the sentence was a criminal fine, imprisonment, or death).  Histori-
cal evidence showed in Southern Union Co. that juries routinely found facts that set the
maximum amounts of fines.  Thus, the trial court improperly made factual findings
that increased both the “potential and actual” fine imposed.
In 1970, when Congress enacted RICO, it “revived” for federal criminal law a
form of criminal, as opposed to civil, forfeiture. See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d
1235, 1241 (7th Cir. 1987).  As Justice Holmes noted, “[u]pon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.”  N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
Common law forfeiture of property is one of the earliest sanctions of Anglo Saxon
law. See generally James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished At
Last? 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977) (tracing forfeiture law to its biblical, Greek, and
Roman roots, and reviewing its English and early American history).  Historians dis-
tinguish three types of forfeiture: (1) statutory forfeiture, (2) forfeiture consequent to
a conviction and attainder (legal death), and (3) deodand.  Typically, the law used
statutory forfeitures in England as means of tax collection; the courts mainly enforced
them in admiralty by civil information brought in rem against a vessel and its untaxed
paid goods, as the owners were beyond the jurisdiction of the court. See 3 WILLIAM
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BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.  Under early English law, “felony” included any
breach of the feudal engagement. MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 234 (1936).  Text writers trace “felony” to the Anglo Saxon “fee” (estate) and
“lon” (price).  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *95–96.  The courts imposed
criminal forfeitures in personam on traitors and felons, who forfeited their personal
property to the king and their real property to their immediate lord. Id. at *374–81.
Under the law of deodand, an instrument of death replaced the slayer’s kin as an
object of vengeance; at first, the authorities sold it to buy masses for the victim; later,
it became part of the king’s revenue. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).  How much this common law practice obtained in America
is in dispute. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 163–65, at 116–17, §§ 187–97, at 135–43 (William S. Hein & Co.
5th ed. 1994) (1891).  The Constitution forbade bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3.  It also limited forfeiture of estate for treason. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.  In 1790,
Congress itself abolished forfeiture of estate for criminal convictions.  Act of Apr. 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)),
repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.
1837, 1987. See generally United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding forfeiture under RICO constitutional under Article III, as the 1790 statute
abolished only common law criminal forfeiture).  Following the American Revolution,
a variety of statutes imposed forfeitures, some criminal (in personam) and some civil
(in rem).  Legislative intent determined the form adopted. See United States v. 1960
Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 399 (1814).  The civil in rem/criminal in
personam distinction appears in United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 721 n.15
(7th Cir. 1988).  At the time of the Civil War, the authorities could not use criminal in
personam forfeitures because the Southerners were behind military lines and the
authorities could not arrest them; as such, they preferred civil in rem forfeitures. See
generally 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 416–17
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. rev. ed. 1987) (1926) (identifying cases concerning forfei-
ture against Southerners during the Civil War).  Following the Civil War, the Court, in
J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921) (discussing forfei-
ture in light of prohibition), aff’d by Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996)
(discussing forfeiture for gross indecency), affirmed the general constitutionality
under the due process clause of civil in rem forfeiture.  Today, the courts do not think
of civil in rem forfeitures as punitive under the double jeopardy clause. See United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).  They are, however, like criminal in personam
forfeitures, subject to the excessive fines clause. See Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993) (discussing forfeitures under RICO); Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 619–21 (1993) (discussing forfeitures for drug charges).  Procedural
due process protections, too, apply. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (holding that due process requires notice and opportu-
nity to be heard before real property seized).
Broadly, criminal forfeiture today is of two types.  The first deals with an interest
in an enterprise, lawful or unlawful, sometimes referred to as an “inside interest.”
United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1211 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Porcelli,
865 F.2d 1352, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th
Cir. 1987).  The second deals with an interest, not in an enterprise, but otherwise
related to specified unlawful activity, sometimes referred to as “interests outside.”
Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1362–63, 1365.  Outside interests include an interest acquired or
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maintained in violation of specific statutes, the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,
and an interest, not in, but affording a source of influence over, an enterprise.  Rus-
sello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20–22 (1983) (regarding outside interests under
RICO); United States v. Nelson, 851 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1988) (regarding a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise (CCE)); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276,
282–83 (7th Cir.) (regarding forfeiture under RICO), vacated, 464 U.S. 979 (1983),
aff’d as modified, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that criminal
forfeiture “requires [the violator] to forfeit . . . the total amount of the proceeds of his
racketeering activity, regardless of whether the specific dollars received from that
activity are still in his possession”).  “Inside interests” are subject to forfeiture without
statutory qualification. See Horak, 833 F.2d at 1242–44; Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1211 (fol-
lowing Horak); Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1364–65 (following Horak).  Constitutionally, how-
ever, they are subject to a proportionality review by the court under the excessive fine
clause. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 557–59; United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 552
(6th Cir. 2000) (noting that courts can reduce forfeiture to make it proportional to
the seriousness of the offense); United States v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that exclusive use warranted entire forfeiture).  “Outside interest” for-
feitures are subject to forfeiture under a statutory rule of proportionality.  “[A] causal
link [must exist] between the property forfeited and the RICO violation.”  United
States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (articulating a “but for” causal-
ity test); see also Horak, 833 F.2d at 1242–44 (articulating a but-for test).  Assuming the
causal relationship exists, courts then analyze the amount forfeited, which is governed
by the statutory rule of proportionality. See United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888,
910–11 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that in personam forfeiture in RICO action reached
only defendant’s interest, not entire property); United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d
296, 319 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court properly disregarded “show”
partnership agreement to order forfeiture of property), rev’d in part sub nom on other
grounds, Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000); Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1211;
Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1364–65.  Criminal forfeitures are mandatory. See United States v.
Vriner, 921 F.2d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 1991).  The decisions split on whether “outside
interests” are net or gross. Compare United States v. Simmons, 154 F.3d 765, 770 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding “gross receipts of the illegal activity”), and United States v. Lizza
Indus., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that proceeds are based on gross
profits, but subject to direct costs), with United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1370
(7th Cir. 1991) (holding net), and United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1116 (7th
Cir. 1976) (stating that income “could mean gross receipts or gross income.”), aff’d in
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). See also DeFries, 129 F.3d
at 1313–15 (holding that forfeited income is pretax).  The forfeiture provisions are
comprehensive; they extend to funds that pay for attorneys. See Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attor-
ney . . . .”); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 606 (1898).  In Alexander, the
Court also upheld, over First Amendment objections, the forfeiture, under RICO, of
the defendant’s assets, used in the adult entertainment business, based on a finding
that several items sold at several stores were “obscene;” the Court remanded the
appeal, however, to consider the claim, under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, that an in personam criminal forfeiture, atop a prison term and
a fine, was excessive in light, not of the number of items sold, but the extensive crimi-
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nal activity conducted by the defendant through his enormous racketeering enter-
prise over such a substantial period of time. Alexander, 509 U.S. 544.  Similarly, the
Court decided that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to in rem civil forfeitures under
other statutes. Austin, 509 U.S. at 606–21.  On the other hand, the Constitution does
not compel an innocent owner defense in an in rem forfeiture. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at
446–52 (holding that a wife is not entitled to the innocent owner defense to contest
abatement even if she showed she did not know her husband would use the car to
violate an indecency law).  Nor do civil forfeitures implicate double jeopardy. See
Ursery, 518 U.S. at 287–88; United States v. Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 590–91 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that a spouse does not have a community property interest in assets
acquired with proceeds from RICO operation).  The government need not trace
property subject to criminal forfeiture. See Masters, 924 F.2d at 1369 (using joint and
several liability); Nelson, 851 F.2d at 980–91 (using the net worth theory); Ginsburg,
773 F.2d at 801 (“Since RICO forfeiture is a sanction against the individual defendant
rather than a judgment against the property itself, ‘it follows the defendant as a part
of the penalty and thus it does not require that the government trace it, even though
the forfeiture is not due until after conviction.’” (quoting United States v. Conner,
752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir. 1985))).  While Congress circumscribed criminal forfeit-
ures with the procedural protections of a criminal trial, they are not elements of guilt,
but punishment. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1995) (finding an
instance of CCE).  The indictment must contain notice of the government’s intent to
seek forfeiture. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a); see United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322,
1347 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that under the prior form of the rule, “[b]arebones
pleading suffices so long as it puts the defendant on notice that the government seeks
forfeiture and identifies the assets subject to forfeiture with sufficient specificity to
permit the defendant to marshal evidence in their [sic] defense”).  The government
may change overly general forfeiture allegations by a bill of particulars. See United
States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1024 (2d Cir. 1980) (deciding such under prior
form of rule).  If a party timely requests that the jury hear and determine forfeiture,
the jury must return a special verdict on the extent of the defendant’s interest for-
feited. FED.  R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(5)(A); see Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 922 (finding under
prior form of rule that without a valid verdict of forfeiture, court cannot enter an
order of forfeiture).  Circuit courts of appeal split on the right to a jury trial on forfei-
ture as a statutory right, not a constitutional right. Compare United States v. Robinson,
8 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1993) (deciding a RICO statutory case), with United States v.
Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (11th Cir. 1984) (deciding a CCE constitutional case),
aff’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, Crimi-
nal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134, as recognized in
United States v. Elgersma, 929 F.2d 1538, 1544–45 (11th Cir. 1991).  Libretti resolved
the split. Libretti, 516 U.S. at 48–50 (holding that the right to jury in a forfeiture case
is a statutory one).  Circuit courts split on the bifurcation of the trial between guilt
and forfeiture. Compare United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 662 (9th Cir. 1988)
(determining that defendant is entitled to bifurcated proceedings), with United States
v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 367–68 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (determining that
bifurcation not required).  The burden of proof is preponderance, not beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 541–42 (2000) (using a pre-
ponderance burden); United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1199 (7th Cir. 1991)
(using a preponderance burden in a CCE case); Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 807 (using a
preponderance burden in a RICO case). But see United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d
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States Code, Title 18, RICO authorizes fines for RICO violations of up
to $250,000 if an individual is convicted,36 or, alternatively, twice the
gain or loss.37  Further, sentencing courts can order defendants to pay
restitution to victims of an offense.38
F. Civil Enforcement
The civil enforcement mechanism of RICO provides sanctions of
injunctions, treble damages, costs, and attorney fees.39  The govern-
ment and private parties may bring civil suits.  Private suits “provide a
significant supplement to the limited resources available to the
Department of Justice” to enforce the law.40
As in RICO’s model in the antitrust laws,41 RICO creates “a pri-
vate enforcement mechanism that . . . deter[s] violators and
deprive[s] them of [their illicit proceeds], and . . . provide[s] ample
compensation to the victims . . . .”42  In fact, RICO and the antitrust
statutes are well integrated.  The antitrust statutes protect against col-
lusion; RICO protects against violence and fraud in the market.
Together, they seek a free market characterized by integrity and
freedom.43
1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding under prior form of rule that reasonable doubt
where defendant’s guilty plea did not indicate basis for racketeering charge).  Under
administrative procedure, persons can address petitions for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture to the Attorney General.  18 U.S.C. § 1963(g) (2006); 28 C.F.R. §§ 8.10–9.9
(2011).
36 Section 1963(a) provides that violators “shall be fined under this title.”  Section
3571(b) provides for fines that a court may impose on an individual.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b) (2006).
37 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
38 See id. §§ 3556, 3663.
39 Id. § 1964.
40 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (discussing private suits as a
tool for enforcing antitrust laws).
41 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992) (“We have
repeatedly observed, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 150–151 (1987); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241
(1987); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985), that Congress modeled
§ 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton
Act . . . .”).
42 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (antitrust)
43 “There are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to: violence
(or the threat of it), deception, or market power.” CARL KAYSEN AND DONALD F. TUR-
NER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1959); see Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Restraint may be exerted
through force or fraud or agreement.”).
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G. Key Elements of RICO
Restated in plain English—with Supreme Court commentary in
the footnotes—RICO’s substantive elements provide:
(a) a “person”44 who has received income from a “pattern of racke-
teering activity”45 cannot invest that income in an “enterprise,”46
44 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006); see Gerardi, supra note 13 (offering a detailed
analysis of “person” in federal jurisprudence).
45 In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 230 (1989), the
Court, noting that it is a limitation, not a definition, clarified the term “pattern” in
§ 1961(5).  It acted in light of its legislative history to reflect a “relationship” between
the acts in the “pattern,” that is, that they were not isolated events, and must reflect
“continuity” or its threat.  The Court only required the threat of continuity where the
“pattern” did not go on for a “substantial period” (more than a few weeks or months);
at the same time, the Court noted that the regular way of doing business of an ostensi-
bly legitimate or a plainly illegitimate business might show a threat of continuity. H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 238–43.
A person may also violate § 1962 through “collection of an unlawful debt.”  18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2006); see United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 751 (1st Cir.
1994) (stating that a collection of unlawful debt alone is sufficient); United States v.
DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1211 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating “used, or aided and abetted
another person to use, implicit threats to collect a debt” is sufficient).
Two key elements of any RICO claim are “pattern” and “enterprise.”  Each is
unique to RICO.  The Court “clarified”—said advisedly in light to the various deci-
sions that followed the clarification—the “pattern” element in H.J. Inc., in which it
developed a precise, but simple, six-step process to use to determine the existence of
a “pattern” within the meaning of RICO. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238–43.  For an
excellent discussion of the linguistic difficulty inherent in any effort to define a pri-
mary concept like “pattern,” which is intuitively known by native speakers of the lan-
guage, but difficult to put into precise words, see Apparel Art International, Inc. v.
Jacobson, 967 F.2d 720, 722–24 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, C.J.).  For example, any aficio-
nado of football who watched Joe Montana and John Elway pass knew, without having
to have it explained to him or her, that Montana passed in a “pattern,” while Elway
improvised most of the time.
Two goals are crucial: relationship and continuity (or its threat).  See H.J. Inc.,
492 U.S. at 239 (explaining that “pattern” reflects relation and continuity).  Indeed,
failure to instruct on each of these elements may constitute prejudicial plain error,
obviating the need to object to defective instructions. See Cain, 671 F.3d at 284–90.
Evaluating whether a litigant satisfies these goals requires answering a series of
questions:
First, do the acts in the series (at least two) relate to one another; for example,
are they part of a single scheme? H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
The Court’s language in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242 (“A party alleging a RICO
violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of
related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.  Predicate acts
extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do
not satisfy this requirement . . . .”) most creditably reads in two sentences establishing
two separate ways of establishing a close-end pattern: (1) a series extending over a
substantial period, or (2) a series not extending over a substantial period, but contain-
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ing a threat of future conduct.  Thus, a threat of future conduct is not required in a
series extending over a substantial period; the pattern concept does not, therefore,
contain a “single scheme” exclusion.  Indeed, both the majority and the concurring
Justices unanimously agreed in H.J., Inc. that the Eight Circuit requirement of more
than a single scheme was not the law.  Strangely, in light of the Court’s unanimous
holding to the contrary, the courts of appeals created out of whole cloth an exclusion
from “pattern” for “single schemes.” See, e.g., Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 761 (10th
Cir. 2010) (finding that a single scheme to accomplish the discrete goal of transfer-
ring a mining interest to another corporation is not a pattern); Gamboa v. Velez, 457
F.3d 703, 705–09 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that RICO is concerned with eradicating
organized, long-term, habitual criminal activity, that “continuity” is a proxy for fre-
quent, habitual criminal conduct, and finding that multiple acts by police officers
extending from 1997 to 2002 aimed at obstructing justice in false homicide prosecu-
tion and concealing their participation was a one-time endeavor and was not a pat-
tern; acts of concealment do not extend pattern); Western Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v.
Market Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 633–36 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding a single
scheme over eight years to achieve a single real estate objective was not a pattern
(ironically citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239)); GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II v.
Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 549–51 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding a single scheme from the spring
of 1998 to November 1999 (date of complaint filing) with a built-in ending point was
not a pattern); Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding  no
threat of continuing activity existed and no pattern where bribery and extortion were
part of single boundary dispute during the limited period of time of a single year);
Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 14–20 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding a
single scheme of 21 months involving one partnership was not a pattern; factors
beyond time are relevant in determining whether a pattern exists).  A fair conclusion
from a reading of these cases is that the lower courts are not faithfully following the
teaching of the Court.  In sum, under the Court’s holding in H.J., Inc., “pattern”
neither requires nor prohibits single schemes.
Second, if not, are they related to an “external organizing principle that renders
them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged,’” for example, to the affairs of the enterprise?  H.J. Inc.,
492 U.S. at 238.  On the external organization point (an enterprise) and relationship
to it, see United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States v.
Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983). Second Circuit jurisprudence, however,
contains conflicting decisions on relationship. Compare Ianniello v. United States, 10
F.3d 59, 62–64 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697 (2d Cir.
1990) (requiring “horizontal relatedness”)) (holding that the acts must related to one
another and are not sufficient if only related to enterprise), with United States v.
Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that acts may relate to each other by
their relation to the enterprise—in the prosecution of mob boss John Gotti). Ian-
niello and Long do not square with the “external organizing principle” language of
H.J. Inc.; they are also inconsistent with Elliot and Sinito. The court attempted to
unwind the confusion in United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 374–76 (2d Cir. 2006);
whether it did so successfully is another matter.  See generally John Robert Blakey,
Could Prosecutors Convict John Gotti in the Fifth Circuit?: A Criticism of Heller v.
Grammco’s Approach to the Relatedness Requirement, 11 CIV. RICO REP. (LRP Publ’g,
Horsham, Pa.), Apr. 17, 1996, at 6 (criticizing the restrictive approach of Heller Fin.,
Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, 71 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1996), and Vild v. Visconsi, 956
F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1992)); Evans, supra note 13 (reviewing federal and Florida deci-
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sions under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) admitting other bad acts to show “enterprise” or a
“pattern of racketeering activity,” making a connection between “predicate acts,” or
proving an essential element of a “predicate act”).
If you answer either question in the affirmative, you must answer up to two addi-
tional questions:
Third, are the acts in the series open-ended, that is, do the acts have no obvious
termination point? See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241–43.
Fourth, if not, did the acts in the closed-ended series go on for a “substantial
period of time,” that is, more than a few weeks or months? Id. at 242.
If you answer either question in the affirmative, continuity is present.
If you answer both questions in the negative, you must answer up to two addi-
tional questions:
Fifth, could a jury infer a threat of continuity from the character of the illegal
enterprise? See id. at 242–43; see also United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,
1383–84 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (describing the character of on-going enterprises,
scilicet, commission of mob families in NYC).
Sixth, if not, could a jury infer a threat of continuity because the acts represent
the regular way of doing business (RWDB) of a lawful enterprise? H.J. Inc., 492 U.S.
at 243.
If you answer either question in the affirmative, a threat of continuity is present.
Some courts follow a rule of thumb that if the pattern does not continue for more
that twelve months, it does not constitute a “pattern.” See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 366–67 (9th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 609–11 (3d Cir. 1991). But see Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d
1523, 1528 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to adopt a per se rule).  Courts assess continuity
prospectively, not from hindsight, that is, after the “pattern” ends.  See United States v.
Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1112 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d
232 (6th Cir. 1991)).  You can show a threat of continuity by establishing that the
conduct is a RWDB. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chic. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290,
1296–97 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that coercing shareholders was RWDB). But see
Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 123 n.4 (5th Cir.
1997) (citing, but rejecting, for the Fifth Circuit Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago
Corp., 975 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1992) (where defendant used extortion every time it
wished to accomplish a goal in dealing with plaintiff, it reflected RWDB); Ticor Title
Ins. Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991) (three forgeries within thirteen
month period suggests a RWDB); United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1991) (where defendant misappropriated money whenever an expense was incurred,
it showed a RWDB); Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990) (pattern requirement
met as RWDB, with the filing of two allegedly false annual reports)).  You can also use
elements of the RICO violation beyond the racketeering activity in assessing con-
tinuity. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 921 F.2d 1530, 1544–45 & n.23 (11th Cir.
1991); Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383–84.  Finally, “pattern” must also be in the “affairs”
of the enterprise under § 1962(c). See United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 675–77
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting that relatedness exists where the offenses relate to the enter-
prise’s activities, even if they were not in furtherance of it or if the defendant commits
the acts solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise); accord United States v. Star-
rett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1542 (11th Cir. 1995) (describing related acts as those that reflect
an “‘effect upon the common, everyday affairs of the enterprise’” or that for which
the “‘facilities and services of the enterprise were regularly and repeatedly utilized’”
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(quoting United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1984))).  If not, liabil-
ity does not obtain. See Palmetto State Med. Ctr. v. Operation Lifeline, 117 F.3d 142,
148–49 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no evidence of conduct in the affairs of the enter-
prise). Justice Scalia’s call for a reexamination of the constitutionality of RICO’s “pat-
tern” in his concurrence in H.J. Inc. resulted in lower courts’ uniformly upholding it.
See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 255–56 (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at
256, with G. Robert Blakey, Is “Pattern” Void for Vagueness?, 5 CIV. RICO REP. (Buraff
Publications), Dec. 12, 1989, at 6 (arguing no).
46 The Court, in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–83 (1981), rejected an
attempt to confine § 1961(4)’s term “enterprise” to licit organizations, holding that in
light of the word “includes,” the definition of “enterprise” extended to licit and illicit
organizations of “any” type. See also Scheidler I, 510 U.S. at 259 n.5 (recognizing that
“enterprise” may play the role of perpetrator, instrument, prize, or victim in violations
of RICO).  As the Court recognized in Scheidler I, enterprises may play different
“roles” in different configurations of RICO claims.  The roles, not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive, include “victim” (e.g., where an otherwise innocent “enterprise” or its
members are injured or used); “prize” (e.g., where control is sought over an “enter-
prise” or its members); “instrument” (e.g., where an otherwise innocent “enterprise”
or its members are used); or “perpetrator” (e.g., where the “enterprise” or its mem-
bers are culpable). See generally Thomas S. O’Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enter-
prise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989) (discussing the history, definitions,
and functions of “enterprise”).
One of the more difficult concepts in RICO is that of an association-in-fact enter-
prise.  The Court clarified it in Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948–51 (2009),
holding that an association-in-fact has three elements, scilicet: purpose, relationship,
and longevity; while rejecting the contention that “structure” in a relationship is lim-
ited to an organization similar to a Mafia family.  Thus, the Court repudiated the
teachings of Bledsoe and its progeny.  See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665
(8th Cir. 1982) (“[A]n enterprise must have an ‘ascertainable structure’ distinct from
that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity.  This distinct struc-
ture might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of
crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was
necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes.  The command system of a Mafia family
is an example of this type of structure as is the hierarchy, planning, and division of
profits within a prostitution ring.” (citation omitted)).  Even so, the concept of “pur-
pose,” that is, “common purpose,” remains troubling to some.  The “common pur-
pose” requirement is necessary to avoid guilt by mere association, because the RICO
enterprise does not require a single conspiracy. See Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon
Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 996 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[Common purpose is] mandated ‘in
order to avoid the danger of guilt by association that arises because RICO does not
require a proof of a single agreement as in a conspiracy case . . . .’” (quoting United
States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987))).  The membership of an associ-
ation-in-fact may be in a “conspiracy;” a “conspiracy,” of course, requires an “agree-
ment” that as such embraces a “common purpose.”  See United States v. Felix, 503
U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992) (“[T]he ‘essence’ of a conspiracy offense ‘is in the agree-
ment or confederation to commit a crime.’” (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S.
532, 542 (1947))); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).  This is
basic hornbook law.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 12.2(a), at 622 (4th ed.
2003).  Nevertheless, the membership of an association-in-fact may not be in a con-
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spiracy, but may have a “common purpose” through “aiding and abetting.”  This, too,
is hornbook law. Id. at 624–25 (citing the leading case of State ex rel. Martin v. Tally,
15 So. 722 (Ala. 1894) (holding that a person who aids others in a conspiracy to
murder by stopping a warning to intended victim, wholly independent of the others,
is not a co-conspirator but an aider and abettor in the effort to kill the intended
victim)).  At the same time, the membership of an association-in-fact may not be in a
“conspiracy,” but may reflect a “common purpose” through innocent agency. See
United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72–73 (6th Cir. 1966) (“[An indictment need not
charge ‘causing’ to consider such membership because] [i]t has been beyond contro-
versy, . . . at least since the 1951 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), that the accused may
be convicted as causer, even though not legally capable of personally committing the
act forbidden by a [f]ederal statute, and even though the agent willfully caused to do
the criminal act is himself guiltless of any crime. . . . We can perceive no basis in
reason or policy to distinguish a case of willfully causing innocent police officers, ‘act-
ing under color of law’, to deprive another of his civil rights, from a case of willfully
causing an innocent bank clerk to mail a fraudulently obtained check, or causing a
lender to make a false report of prices paid for homes, or causing a union representa-
tive to receive money unlawfully from employers, or causing a licensed dealer in fire-
arms to fail to maintain required records . . . .” (citations omitted)).  This, too, is
hornbook law. See LAFAVE, supra, § 13.1(a), at 664–65.  How a court resolves the issue
of “common purpose” on a motion to dismiss, for example, depends on how the
plaintiff pleads the association-in-fact. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,
618 F.3d 300, 361–71 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a complex antitrust conspiracy and
RICO conspiracy association-in-fact were plausibly plead only in part, because the
plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a “rim” in a “hub-and-spoke conspiracy;” a “common
purpose” independent of “conspiracy” was not considered).  That said, a tendency
remains to confuse “common purpose” with “conspiracy.”  Thus, litigators and courts
often confuse the “common purpose” requirement for the membership of an associa-
tion-in-fact under RICO, which the Court articulated in Turkette; it arises when the
focus shifts between wholly illicit enterprises, as in Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579 (involving
a conspiracy for drugs, arsons, defrauding insurance companies, bribing police
officers, and influencing state court proceedings), and other enterprises, which are
basically lawful, but perverted by a subset of its members, as in United States v. Beasley,
72 F.3d 1518, 1522–23, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing a legitimate religious group
corrupted by a subset of its members who engaged in a pattern of murders).  Such
associations-in-fact have a “common purpose” (e.g., practice a religious faith) without
reflecting the elements of a “conspiracy” (e.g., agreement to murder as part of the
common faith).  It also arises where an enterprise is composed of witting and unwit-
ting members, as in Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1558–63 (1st
Cir. 1994), where an insurance company, a victim enterprise, was scammed by insiders
and outsiders of the company.  The victim may be part of the association-in-fact (e.g.,
sharing a common purpose of paying insurance claims) without agreeing to victimize
itself (e.g., paying insurance claims rooted in fraud).  The Second Circuit troubles
itself little over enterprises that includes among its members an “innocent instru-
ment” or “victim” of the pattern of racketeering activity. See DeFalco v. Bernas, 244
F.3d 286, 306–09 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a town run by corrupt officials was an
enterprise, stating that an enterprise is “often a passive instrument or victim of . . .
racketeering activity” (quoting Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1994))); accord United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 30 22-MAY-13 9:20
1610 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
236, 243 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding the Boston Police Department as the victim enter-
prise); United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d
356, 362 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he plaintiffs are free to allege that they or one of their
members is a RICO enterprise or part of a RICO enterprise.”); cf. Jacobson v. Cooper,
882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that an enterprise may include the victim).
In contrast, the First Circuit struggled with, but finally upheld, the allegation of “com-
mon purpose” in United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 81–89 (1st Cir. 2004). The
trouble in Cianci arose from an unexamined assumption that the enterprise (and its
various members) can only play the role of perpetrator(s), that is, in some sense be
“guilty” (guilty together, i.e., co-conspirators in a single conspiracy), even though,
while the enterprise is the center or organizing principle of RICO litigation, it is not
the defendant.  That is the best explanation of Justice (then Judge) Breyer’s opinion
in Ryan v. Clemente, 901 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating “‘associate[s]’ of a crimi-
nal enterprise must share a ‘common purpose’” (citations omitted)).  In addition,
seeing that the membership of the enterprise does not necessarily have to be in a
“conspiracy” (i.e., requiring an agreement as opposed to a common purpose among
its members) unpacks the palpable confusion, which then quickly dissipates. See gener-
ally United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 657 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Although individu-
als charged as an associated-in-fact enterprise often also will be charged with
conspiracy and will be codefendants, RICO does not require intentional or ‘pur-
poseful’ behavior by corporations charged as members of an association-in-fact.  Indi-
vidual corporations may be entirely legitimate and need not benefit from the
racketeering; in fact, the criminal activity charged may harm each individual corpora-
tion by looting it, or a corporation may be used by the defendant to line his or her
pockets.  Nor does RICO require that the association-in-fact be a conspiracy; there
must be an enterprise regardless of whether there is any conspiracy to engage in the
predicate acts of racketeering.  What RICO does require as a showing of common
purpose is ‘proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.’” (citations omit-
ted)).  For an illuminating discussion of the victim-enterprise issue, see Shapo v. Engle,
No. 98 C 7909, 1999 WL 1045086, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1999) (concluding that
nothing in Scheidler I means that an enterprise may not be a victim).  Indeed, an asso-
ciation-in-fact enterprise, although it must have a “common purpose,” may even con-
tain opposing factions, as in United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that an intra-organization conflict in an organized crime family does not
defeat the enterprise element). Accord United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199,
1222–23 (9th Cir. 2004), modified on unrelated grounds, 425 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2005).
Obviously, the contours of “common purpose” differ in different fact patterns, and a
case-by-case approach is best.  A leading treatise on organizations states:
An organizational goal[, that is, a common purpose,] is a desired state
of affairs that the organization attempts to realize. . . . A goal, then, is a state
that we seek, not one that we have.  Such future states of affairs . . . [are]
images . . . .
But whose image of the future does the organization pursue?  That of
top executives?  The board of directors or trustees?  The majority of the
members?  Actually none of these.  The organizational goal is that future
state of affairs that the organization as a collectivity is trying to bring about.  It
is in part affected by the aims of the top executives, those of the board of
directors, and those of the rank and file.  Sometimes it is determined
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through peaceful consultation, at other times it is the outcome of a power
play among the various organizational divisions, plants, cabals, ranks, and
“personalities.”
. . . .
How, then, does one determine what the goal of an organization is?  In
part, the participants may act as informants.  We may interview [them] . . . .
In interviewing them, however, we must carefully distinguish their per-
sonal goals from the goals of the collectivity. . . . [W]e can [also] analyze the
division of labor of the organization, its flow of work, and its allocation of
resources . . . .
. . . .
Virtually all organizations have a formal, explicitly recognized, some-
times legally specified organ for setting initial goals and for their
amendment. . . .
In practice, goals are often set in a complicated power play involving
various individuals and groups within and outside the organization . . . .
. . . .
Conflict goes on continually, but at the same time, persons and groups
bargain for some say in determining organizational goals, though often such
bargaining is implicit or “silent.”  The net result is that what happen to be
the goals of an organization at a particular time may be seen as the features
of a bargain struck among negotiators, or as the terms of a truce among
combatants.  The goals are always temporary, likely to be modified whenever
the power balance shifts, either inside the organization or in the
environment.
EDWARD GROSS & AMITAI ETZIONI, ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIETY 9–13 (1985) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
If it were true, as it is sometimes argued, that a “common purpose” means unitary
purpose among the membership of a putative organization, it would virtually preclude
the existence of most organizations in society (under RICO or otherwise), because
they would—in the real world of everyday life—have few, if any, “common” goals.
That cannot be the law, and it is not now, despite what some argue. See, e.g., United
States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[W]hatever private purposes
there may have been[,] there was also the requisite commonality of purpose between
the defendants to give form to the associational enterprise charged.” (emphasis
added)). Compare Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a company that wants lower wages, labor recruiters for illegal immigrants, and an
ethnic support group lacks the requisite common purpose), with Williams v. Mohawk
Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2006) (criticizing and rejecting Baker’s rea-
soning).  The reasoning of Williams is more persuasive than that of Baker.
While DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2001), had it “right” on “enter-
prise,” it got it flat “wrong” on another theory: civil aiding and abetting. Following
the unwise lead of Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 656–57 (3d
Cir. 1998) (relying on the reasoning of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank,
511 U.S. 164 (1994), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, without discussing United States v. Local 560,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985) (a civil matter
upholding civil adding and abetting under RICO), and holding that no private claim
for relief is in RICO for aiding and abetting a RICO violation), abrogated on unrelated
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grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000), DeFalco foreclosed relying on aiding
and abetting for civil RICO liability, 244 F.3d at 330.  Mistakenly, it applied Central
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171–90 to civil RICO; it did not recognize the basic legal
distinction between Title 15 of the United States Code, which is a non-positive law
title, where the Office of the Law Revision Counsel places securities and other trade
related provisions, and Title 18, where Congress enacted RICO directly into the federal
code. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 112, 204 (2006); J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 158–62 (7th ed. 1998); see also OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUN-
SEL, POSITIVE LAW CODIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES CODE, available at http://us
code.house.gov/codification/Positive%20Law%20Codification.pdf (explaining more
about the codification process).  Title 15 reflects separate acts of Congress enacted in
isolation one from the other; the Office of the Law Revision Counsel arranges them
in Title 15.  In contrast, Congress itself directly put RICO into Title 18, a legislatively
codified part of the United States Code.  In short, Congress enacted RICO (“Chapter
96 - Racketeering and Influenced and Corrupt Organizations”) and put it directly
into a codified Title 18.  Title 18 is a congressionally codified revision of federal crimi-
nal law, including as a crucial and integral part 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating, inter
alia, that someone who aids or abets an offense against the United States can be pun-
ished as a principal).  Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 2 expressly applies aiding and abetting theory
to each provision of Title 18, including RICO, criminally and civilly.  Reading one
chapter of an integrated book in isolation from another is simply a bad technique of
statutory interpretation.  In fact, the Third Circuit got it right in Local 560, 780 F.2d at
288 n.25, aff’g 581 F. Supp. 279, 332–34 (D.N.J. 1984) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2
governs civil aiding and abetting under RICO).  In substance, Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1016–21 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Central Bank’s reasoning and
recognizing aiding and abetting liability for 18 U.S.C. § 2333) also got it “right.”  On
finding aiding and abetting present in the teeth of a reliance to the contrary in Denver
Bank, see Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. (Boim II), 549 F.3d 685,
690–91 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009); Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1012–16 (7th Cir. 2002).  That said, other
courts disagree with my analysis on aiding and abetting, though they have not faced
these particular arguments. See, e.g., Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d
1006, 1028–31 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (following Central Bank’s reasoning and rejecting the
possibility of a private cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation).  Nev-
ertheless, for a holding that civil aiding and abetting applies to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a),
see Hernandez v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., No. C-10-67, 2010 WL 3359559, at *11
n.4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010).  Similarly, for an analysis that aiding and abetting
applies, not to the substantive sections of § 1962, but to the predicate offense them-
selves, see Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., No. 93 CIV 6876 LMM,
2000 WL 1694322, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000).  While the status of Lambert in
light of DeFalco is problematic, you can make a persuasive distinction between the
holdings.
Last, a standard motion by defense counsel in light of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), is to insist on
the pleading not only of the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise, but also of
its internal workings before the discovery process has begun.  Insightful courts should
reject it for what it is: a classic “Catch-22” ploy. See Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank,
N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“‘[I]t will not always be reasonable to
expect that when a defrauded plaintiff frames his complaint, he will have available
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(b) a “person” cannot get or keep control of an “enterprise” by a
“pattern of racketeering;”
(c) a “person”47 who is employed by or associated with an “enter-
prise” cannot “conduct”48 the affairs of the “enterprise” through a
“pattern of racketeering;” and
(d) a “person” cannot “conspire” to violate RICO.49
sufficient factual information regarding the inner workings of a RICO enter-
prise . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting Friedman v. Hartmann, No. 91 Civ. 1523
(PKL), 1994 WL 376058, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1994))); see also JOSEPH HELLER,
CATCH-22 52 (reprt. 1999) (1961) (“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22
. . . . Orr was crazy and could be grounded.  All he had to do was ask; and as soon as
he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions.  Orr would
be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly
them. . . . Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of . . . Catch-22
. . . .”).
47 The Court, in Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 162–63
(2001), while recognizing that the individual or entity that plays in § 1962(c) the role
of a “person” defendant cannot also play the role of an “enterprise,” held that the
“enterprise-person” rule did not preclude charging the individuals or entities
employed or associated with the “enterprise,” including its owner, as long as the indi-
viduals or entities were not also charged as the “enterprise.”  Compare Slaney v. Int’l
Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 598 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a person
charged with violating RICO must have participated in the operation or management
of the enterprise and must have asserted some control over the enterprise), and
United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an unwitting
janitor/handyman was excluded from those who operated and managed the enter-
prise), abrogated on unrelated grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997),
with Aetna Cas., 43 F.3d at 1559 (“By acting with purpose to cause Aetna to make
payments on false claims, appellants were participating in the ‘operation’ of Aetna.”).
48 The Court, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177–86 (1993), established
that “conduct” meant some part in the “operation or management” of the enter-
prise’s affairs. Compare Slaney, 244 F.3d at 598 (holding that person charged with
violating RICO must have participated in the operation or management of the enter-
prise and must have asserted some control over the enterprise), and Viola, 35 F.3d at
43 (excluding an unwitting janitor/handyman), with Aetna Casualty Sur. Co., 43 F.3d
at 1559 (holding that causing insurance payments to be made is included in
“operation”).
49 The usual rules relating to conspiracy apply as well to a RICO conspiracy under
§ 1962(d).  Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63.  Conspiracy is an inchoate offense separate from
the substantive offense. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (“‘It
has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that the commission of the
substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses.’”
(quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946))).  The essence of the
crime of conspiracy “is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”  Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).  The three classic ways directly to prove a conspiracy
are (1) by electonic surveillance of co-conspirator conversations or subpoenaing inter-
nal written records of corporations, unions, or other lawful entities, (2) flipping mem-
bers of the conspiracy against other members of the conspiracy by having them turn
states’s evidence, or (3) employing undercover agents to infiltrate the conspiracy.
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Because “[s]ecrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy,”
circumstantial evidence is also admissible indirectly to prove the conspiracy by focus-
ing on the concerted conduct of the conspirators.  Blumenthal v. United States, 332
U.S. 539, 556–58 (1947); see Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711–13
(1943); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (“Participation in a criminal
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may
be inferred from a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances.’”), superseded on
unrelated matters by FED. R. EVID. 104(a) as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 181 (1987).  See infra note 49 on the particular difficulty of using of only
circumstantial evidence to show conspiracy in white-collar offenses.  The main differ-
ence between traditional conspiracy and RICO conspiracy is the breadth of its objec-
tive, that is, through an enterprise to engage in a diverse pattern of offenses.  See
United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The focus is on the
agreement to participate in the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, not on the agreement to commit the individual predicate acts.  ‘A RICO conspir-
acy differs from an ordinary conspiracy in two respects: it need not embrace an overt
act, and it is broader and may encompass a greater variety of conduct.’” (quoting
United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 659 (11th Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted))). See
generally Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 963–64 (7th Cir.
2000) (explaining that a RICO conspiracy requires an agreement, not to commit, but
to facilitate a pattern of two or more statutorily enumerated predicate acts); United
States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991) (“That the many defendants
and predicate crimes were different, or even unrelated, [is] irrelevant, so long as it
[can] be reasonably inferred that each crime was intended to further the enter-
prise.”); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 562 (2d Cir. 1988) (“A RICO con-
spiracy is . . . by definition broader than an ordinary conspiracy to commit a discrete
crime . . . .”); United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 930 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Under the
RICO Act, . . . a series of agreements, which, pre-RICO, would constitute multiple
conspiracies, can form, under RICO, a single ‘enterprise’ conspiracy.”); United States
v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Congress intended to author-
ize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy . . . . The RICO
statutes permit the joinder into a single RICO count or counts several diverse predi-
cate acts . . . .”), modified on other grounds, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986).
Traditionally, that a particular defendant does not fall within the class that can
violate a substantive offense is no defense to aiding and abetting or conspiracy if the
person he aids or abets or with whom he conspires falls within the class. See United
States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (discussing conspiracy); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 447 (1895) (discussing aiding and abetting). Salinas reflects
these rules, 522 U.S. at 56. Accord RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
U.S. LLP, 682 F.3d 1043, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that you need not be
the person who operates if you agree to endeavor under § 1962(d) and citing Sali-
nas); Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 536–37 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that you need
not actually operate the corrupt enterprise, so long as the defendant facilitates the
scheme including the RICO enterprise); United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832,
857 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding Reves does not apply to § 1962(d) in light of Salinas);
Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1542 (holding Reves applies to criminal substantive RICO, but oper-
ation or management rule does not apply to conspiracy under § 1962(d)); United
States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1484–85 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that Reves “did not
address the principles of conspiracy law undergirding § 1962(d)”); cf. Handeen v.
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This “outline is deceptively simple, however, [because] each con-
cept is a term of art which carries its own inherent requirements of
particularity.”50
Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding attorneys not per se excluded
from RICO liability when they cross the line from traditional rendering of legal ser-
vices to active participation in directing the enterprise); RSM Prod. Corp., 682 F.3d at
1051–52 (holding attorneys merely providing legal services does not plausibly give rise
to inference of conspiracy; distinguishing Handeen); Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d
680, 683 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that investigators directed by attorneys play a part in
direction of affairs). See generally Nancy L. Ickler, Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO:
Expanding Traditional Conspiracy Law, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1983) (comparing
traditional conspiracy law and conspiracy under RICO).
The issue of intracorporate conspiracy also chevys RICO.  The circuit courts of
appeals are in conflict.  The majority correctly holds that the doctrine is not applica-
ble to RICO. Compare Kirwin v. Price Commc’ns Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1326–27 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine inapplicable to
§ 1962(d)), and Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a corporation can engage in a RICO conspiracy with its officers and
representatives), and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting application of intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to RICO conspiracy),
with Fogie v. THORN Ams., Inc. 190 F.3d 889, 898 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding the doc-
trine of intracorporate conspiracy applicable to § 1962(d)), and Detrick v Panalpina,
Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 544 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a RICO conspiracy under
§ 1962(d) cannot exist between a corporation and its officers).  The off-hand dicta in
Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) cannot over-
rule Ashland’s holding for the circuit; consequently, it does not state the law of the
Seventh Circuit.  RICO’s origins in antitrust law unnecessarily vex the issue, even
though it is the wrong body of law to examine on this issue.  That body is the general
federal criminal law. See LAFAVE, supra note 46, § 12.4(c)(3), at 657–58.  In brief, as R
long as the minimum of a plurality of human persons is present, the facts meet the
rationale of conspiracy law. Id. (citing Developments in the Law Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 920, 953 (1959)).  That should end the matter, absent congressional
direction otherwise.  While the Supreme Court has not directly faced the issue, this
conclusion ineluctably follows from Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63 (stating RICO criminal
conspiracy law follows general criminal conspiracy doctrine) and Cedric, 533 U.S. at
166 (stating that intracorporate conspiracy doctrine of antitrust law under Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), turns “on specific antitrust objec-
tives” inapplicable to RICO). Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) is distinguishable, as
no peculiar doctrine of civil conspiracy, which might arguably point to the contrary, is
relevant here. See generally Blakey & Roddy, supra note 13, at 1439–42 (discussing the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as it relates to identifying a plurality for RICO
purposes); Sarah N. Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1155 (1982) (discussing the same—best single piece on the issue).
50 Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989).  This plain language transla-
tion of RICO owes its origin to St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 439
(5th Cir. 2000).
Other courts have established other key issues that frequently arise in negotia-
tions to settle civil RICO litigation. See, e.g., McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 2000) (“[Fraud within bankruptcy] is not limited to misrepresenta-
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CRIMINAL RICO CASES
A. History and Justifications
At common law, the king could bring a criminal prosecution at
any time, as the rule was nullum tempus occurit regi.51  The first Ameri-
tion[ ] . . . . Fraud is a generic term, which embraces all the multifarious means which
human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by the suppression of truth.  No defi-
nite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and
it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which
another is cheated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Arm, 87 F.3d 1046,
1048–49 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding RICO damages are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy); Friedman v. Hartmann, 787 F. Supp. 411, 415–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding
that RICO permits neither contribution nor indemnity by analogizing RICO claims to
the antitrust claims in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981)).
51 United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489–90 (1878) (finding that no lapse
of time-bars the king).  Facing whether a state statute of limitations on a contract
bound the United States (and holding in the negative), the Court observed:
The rule of nullum tempus occurit regi has existed as an element of the
English law from a very early period.  It . . . has come down to the present
time. . . .
The common law fixed no time as to the bringing of actions.  Limita-
tions derive their authority from statutes.  The king was held never to be
included, unless expressly named.  No laches was imputable to him.  These
exemptions were founded upon considerations of public policy.  It was
deemed important that, while the sovereign was engrossed by the cares and
duties of his office, the public should not suffer by the negligence of his
servants.  “In a representative government, where the people do not and
cannot act in a body, where their power is delegated to others, and must of
necessity be exercised by them, if exercised at all, the reason for applying
these principles is equally cogent.”
When the colonies achieved their independence, each one took these
prerogatives, which had belonged to the crown; and when the national Con-
stitution was adopted, they were imparted to the new government as inci-
dents of the sovereignty thus created.  It is an exception equally applicable to
all governments.
Congress, like the British Parliament, has made a number of specific
limitations both in civil and criminal cases.  They will be found in the
Revised Statutes, and need not be here repeated.
Id. (citations omitted).
The reason underlying the principle, according to Justice Story, is “to be found
in the great public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from
injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers.”  United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas.
329, 330 (D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373); see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*238–40 (“Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his
political capacity, absolute perfection.  The king can do no wrong.  Which antient [sic]
and fundamental maxim is not to be understood, as if every thing [sic] transacted by
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the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things.  First, that
whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the
king, nor is he answerable for it personally to his people: for this doctrine would
totally destroy that constitutional independence of the crown, which is necessary for
the balance of power, in our free and active, and therefore, compounded, constitu-
tion.  And, secondly, it means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any
injury: it is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to
their prejudice. . . . IN farther pursuance of this principle, the law also determines that
in the king can be no negligence, or laches, and therefore no delay will bar his right.
Nullum tempus occurrit regi is the standing maxim upon all occasions: for the law
intends that the king is always busied for the public good, and therefore has not
leisure to assert his right within the times limited to subjects.” (footnote omitted));
accord HOLLAND, supra, note 42 at 307 (“The king, according to the maxim of the
common law can do no wrong, No action can be brought against him . . . or his
ambassador.”).  The reason underlying the principle under Amerian law, according
to Justice Story, is “to be found in the great public policy of preserving the public
rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public
officers.”  United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373).
The notion that time does not bar the king was first articulated by Bracton. See
BRACTON, supra note 6, f.55(b)–56, at 167 (stating “tempus a tali petitione regem non
excludit,” which is translated as “time does not bar the king from his action.” (empha-
sis added)); id. f.103, at 293 (stating “nullum tempus currit” which is translated as “time
does not run against [the king].” (emphasis added)).  Bracton rationalized private
time-bars “because of the impossibility of proof.” Id. f.102, at 293 (stating most pri-
vate actions are confined to “tempora limitantur pro defectu probationum” translated as
“fixed periods, because of the impossibility of proof.” (emphasis added)).  Pollock &
Maitland thought the maxim “wholesome,” but doubted that it had “been observed,”
and “doubt[ed] whether the kings themselves have made strenuous effort to main-
tain” it.  1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 572 (2d ed. 1899); see also 10 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 355 (1938) (“This prerogative principle has
wide and far-reaching effects.  One of the most important of these effects—an effect
which has sometimes worked great injustice—is the rule that no statutes of limitation
bind the Crown . . . . [A]nd it is still a principle of English law [unless otherwise
explicitly stated].”); ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES 168 (1957)
(“Bracton’s arguments . . . were purely juristic.  He explained . . . that things pertain-
ing to the king’s peace and jurisdiction were ‘things quasi holy,’ res quasi sacrae, which
could no more be alienated than could res sacrae pertaining to the Church.”).  In fact,
Parliament made a handful of exceptions in the area of criminal treason and quasi-
criminal actions brought by the king’s lawyers and private persons. Id. at 449.  Never-
theless, no general criminal or civil period of limitations bars the king in English law
today.  That said, the rule today in this country still exists, but it rests on radically
different considerations.  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132–33
(1938), where the Court observed:
The rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—that the sovereign is exempt from
the consequences of . . . the operation of statutes of limitations—appears to
be a vestigial survival of the prerogative of the Crown.  But whether or not
that alone accounts for its origin, the source of its continuing vitality where
the royal privilege no longer exists is to be found in the public policy now
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can criminal statute of limitations appeared in the Colony of Massa-
chusetts in 1652.52  The First Congress passed a similar law applicable
underlying the rule even though it may in the beginning have had a differ-
ent policy basis. . . . Regardless of the form of government and indepen-
dently of the royal prerogative once thought sufficient to justify it, the rule is
supportable now because its benefit and advantage extend to every citizen,
including the defendant, whose plea of laches or limitation it precludes; and
its uniform survival in the United States has been generally accounted for
and justified on grounds of policy rather than upon any inherited notions of
the personal privilege of the king.  So complete has been its acceptance that
the implied immunity of the domestic “sovereign,” state or national, has
been universally deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations
where the government, state or national, is not expressly included . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
While limitations did not bar the sovereign, he could take advantage of legal limita-
tions that barred others. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 515–16 (1893)
(“[W]hile the king is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein
by special and particular words, he may take the benefit of any particular act though
not named.  And, he adds, that the rule thus settled as to the British crown is equally
applicable to this government; and that so much of the royal prerogative as belonged
to the king in his capacity of parens patriae or universal trustee, enters as much into
our political state as it does into the principles of the British constitution.” (citing
Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873) (“[The king]
may . . . take the benefit of any particular act, though not named.  The rule thus
settled respecting the British Crown is equally applicable to this government . . . .”
(footnote omitted)))).  Thus, by settled law, Congress may create a claim for relief
without restricting the time to assert it. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 360, 367 (1977).  Unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise, no statute of
limitation or laches bars the Government. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S.
414, 416 (1940).
52 The statute provided:
It is Ordered by this Court.  That no Person shall be Indited, presented,
informed against[,] or Complained of, to any Court or Magistrate within this
jurisdiction, for the breach of any penall law, or any other misdemeanor, the
forfeiture whereof belongs to the Country, unles the said Inditement or
Complaint be made and exhibited within one year after the Offence be
Committed, and if any such Inditement, presentment, information[,] or
Complaint, be not made within the time limited, then the same shall be void
and of none effect.  Provided alwayes, this law shall not extend to any
Capitall Offences, nor any Crimes that may concerne loss of member or Ban-
ishment, or to any Treasonable Plots or Conspiracies against the Common
wealth, nor to any fellonies above ten shillings, nor shall it hinder any person
grieved or any wrong done to him or his wife, children[,] or servants, or
estate[,] real or personal[,] but that every such person, shall have such reme-
dies as formerly he might or ought to have.
WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (1889).
The laws and legal institutions of the colony reflected “the law of England”—the
colonists and colony’s leaders did not know any other law—but the prism by which
they viewed the law was Sacred Scripture, as understood by the “Puritans.”  “Puritans”
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and “the law of England” require clarification.  Misconceptions abound around the
use of “Puritan,” often arising from the tendency (“ignorance” or “prejudice”) to read
“back into history the attitudes or values of a later day.” GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW
AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 12 (1960).  In one version of a Whig’s view
of history, the writer sees the past as inevitably a progress toward an enlightened pres-
ence. See, e.g., MICHEL BENTLEY, MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY 64–5 (1999) (“Whigs
were predominantly Christian, predominantly Anglican, thinkers for whom the Refor-
mation supplied the critical theatre of enquiry when considering the origins of mod-
ern England.  When they wrote about the history of the English constitution, as so
many of them did, they approached their story from the standpoint of having Good
News to relate.”)  Thus, to understand “Puritans” we must put to one side our evalua-
tions of them.  In fact, “Puritanism was both a religious phenomenon and a political
movement.  Beginning as a way of life, it became a sect and later a political party.”
HASKINS, supra, at 13.  Religiously, the Puritans preeminently were reformers of the
Anglican Church (strip it of Roman Catholic visible vestiges (e.g., no stained glass
windows, statues of saints, etc.)), reformers of institutions (e.g., no popes, councils,
bishops, or priests, especially the Jesuits), and adopters of Reformation doctrines,
principally the teaching of John Calvin (e.g., sola scriptura (only scripture; no tradi-
tion), plain meaning of the text of the law of God in the Mosaic Code, the principle
guide to life, the doctrine of original sin or human depravity, requirement of Divine
grace to do good, election by God or predestination, theocracy, powerful ministers,
absolute control of individual conduct, etc.).  Politically, they also had a heavy hand in
the Revolution of 1642, and they ruled England during the Interregnum, the period
that began with the execution of Charles I in January 1649 and ended with the resto-
ration of Charles II in May 1660. See generally EAMON DUFFY, THE STRIPPING OF THE
ALTARS (1992) (discussing revisionist history); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE TYRANNI-
CIDE BRIEF (2005) (tracing the development of English liberties during the Puritan
Revolution); CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (1990) (discuss-
ing revisionist history).  Well before the Revolution, in 1628, the Massachusetts Bay
Company successfully established a colony in New England; about 20,000 people,
overwhelmingly Puritans, migrating to it in the 1630s.  The colony gained a Charter in
1629, but this Charter limited its law making powers, providing that the colony could
not make any laws contrary to the laws and statutes of the Realm. See Charter of Massa-
chusetts Bay: 1629, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/
mass03.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“And to make Lawes and Ordinnces for the
Good and Welfare of the saide Company, and for the Government and ordering of
the saide Landes and Plantacon, and the People inhabiting and to inhabite the same,
as to them from tyme to tyme shalbe thought meete, soe as such Lawes and Ordi-
nances be not contrarie or repugnant to the Lawes and Statuts of this our Reaime of
England.”).  As is “Puritans,” the phrase “not contrary to the laws and statutes of the
Realm” is ambiguous.  Mistakenly, most historians have read it to mean “the common
law;” that is, the law applied in the king’s courts.  Julius Goebel, Jr., King’s Law and
Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY
AMERICAN LAW 83, 84 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969).  In fact, the “English law” that the
colonists brought with them was “local custom” or the law of the “local courts.” Id.;
accord, George L. Haskins, The Legal Heritage of Plymouth Colony, in ESSAYS IN THE HIS-
TORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra, 121, at 127 (“[T]he legal center of gravity for the
average Englishman was the local court of the neighborhood—the borough court,
the court leet, and the county court.”).  That said, the dominant influence on the
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colonists was the reformer’s view of the Bible.  “While during the Middle Ages an
identity had been discovered by philosophers between the lex Mosis and the natural
law, it remained for the reformers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
task of attempting to put to lay uses the law of the Pentateuch.”  Goebel, supra, at 92
n.14.  Indeed, Calvin conceived of the Bible as “a manifestation of how the Christian
community should be organized to do God’s work on earth, [and] found in the Pen-
tateuch the law for effecting this achievement.” Id.  Significantly, that law bound the
ruler as well as the ruled.  The interest at stake was the “rule of law.” HASKINS, supra,
at 132–33 (claiming the notion of a rule was useful “to check the threatened usurpa-
tions of kings” and to “attack . . . the royal prerogative courts” in the seventeenth
century).  Because the Massachusetts magistrates—in function if not in power, they
were similar to justices of the peace in England—had wide discretion in the enforce-
ment of the law, “[a] popular demand for security against the arbitrary power of the
judiciary mark[ed] the early history of Massachusetts law.”  Richard B. Morris, Massa-
chusetts and the Common Law: The Declaration of 1646, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY
AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 135–36 n.2.  It was the dominant force behind the Declara-
tion of 1646. Id.  Further, it was the dominant force behind the justly famous Laws
and Liberties of 1648.  Thorp L. Wolford, The Laws and Liberties of 1648, in ESSAYS IN
THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 147, 148; accord HASKINS, supra, at 124
(“[T]he freemen did not believe that the magistrates could be counted upon to
decide fairly and to impose equitable penalties, in accordance with inherited ideas of
justice and fair play, unless the rules which were to guide their decisions were public
property. . . . [T]he colonists attached [importance] to stable and written laws and . . .
[they] distrust[ed] . . . discretionary justice.”); id. at 226–27 (“When the colony lead-
ers resorted to such devices as . . . discretionary penalties . . . there came into promi-
nence a countervailing pressure . . . . This pressure was especially evident in the
agitation of the deputies [in the General Court] for written laws and for clearly pre-
scribed penalties, which resulted in the enactment of the [Laws and Liberties] of
1648.”).  Indeed, historians mark the Laws and Liberties of 1648 as “an important
milestone in the effort to curb, by written law, the discretionary power of” those who
enforce the law.  Wolford, supra, at 151.  In particular, the Act of 1648 influenced the
law of other colonies. See George L. Haskins & Samuel E. Ewing, The Spread of Massa-
chusetts Law in the Seventeenth Century, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN
LAW, supra, at 186, 186, 191 (citing its adoption in part or in whole in Connecticut
and New Haven in 1650 and 1657, respectively, and its influence in the Provinces of
New York and New Jersey and Pennsylvania).  In turn, John Adams, its principal
draftsmen, enshrined the idea of “the rule of law” in the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780, the oldest functional constitution in the world. See MASS. CONST. art. XXX,
available at malegislature.gov/Laws/Constitution (“[T]o the end it may be a govern-
ment of laws and not of men.”).  Moreover, in turn, the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 served as a model for the United States Constitution, drafted in 1787, and made
effective in 1789; similarly, the Bill of Rights, effective in 1791, reflects its language, as
it—to close the circle—reflected the language of the Declaration of Independence of
1776.  Significantly, however, the Act of 1648 excludes from its period of limitations
capital offenses and felonies above ten schillings.  Capital offenses then encompassed
(1) worshiping any God, but the Lord God, (2) being a witch, that is, a person who
consulted with a familiar spirit, (3) blasphemy, (4) murder, (5) manslaughter (sud-
den slaying in anger), (6) sodomy with a man or beast, (7) adultery, (8) man-stealing,
(9) false witnessing that resulted in death, (10) treason against the Commonwealth,
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(11) cursing parents, if above 15 years old with sufficient understanding, (12) rebel-
ling against a father, if more than 16 years old and with sufficient understanding, and
(12) rape or sex with a child above 10. THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS
5–6 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1982) (citing scripture for each offense); see also id. at
A2–A3 (drafting in light of God’s “[g]overnment among his people Israel[,]” “accord-
ing to the rules of his most holy word[,]” “a modell of the Iudiciall lawes of Moses”
and “the clear light of nature in civil nations” “to satisfie” “frequent complaints for
want of such a volume to be published in print: wherin (upon every occasion) you
might readily see the rule which you ought to walke by[,]” and so that “no man’s life”
or otherwise “be taken” from him “by the vertue” of “some expresse law of the Coun-
try warranting” it).  The Act omits the common law felonies of larceny, robbery,
arson, and burglary in its list of capital offenses.  Otherwise, the list is more compre-
hensive than the common law, particularly in light of its religious offenses.  Accord-
ingly, viewed in the light of these materials, the period of limitations in the Act of
1652 probably reflected, not so much staleness or judicial efficiency—two of our mod-
ern interests—but a desire to curb the extraordinary discretion of the magistrates in
their “misdemeanor” jurisdiction.  In fact, the jurisdiction was extraordinary.  “[A]t
that time not yet established as a word of classification in the common law, [‘misde-
meanor’ was] used [in colonial law] to describe conduct, the criminal character of
which the magistrate was to determine.”  Goebel, supra, at 110.  Indeed, the “magis-
trate was given virtually an ordinance power in respect to specifying misdemeanors.”
Id. at 112.  “These provisions vesting so large a discretion in the magistrates appear to
be of a religious origin.” Id. at 110 n.45.  Apparently, it “was introduced by Cal-
vin[ists] into the law of Geneva.” Id.  That said, Calvin himself thought the judiciary
should “be restrained by fixed laws.” Id. at 111 n.45.  Moreover, larceny above 12 d.
was capital in England, as was robbery and burglary.  In addition, the open-textured
character of the possible penalties was in sharp contrast with English law of the time.
Id.  Thus, the Act went considerably beyond both Calvin and the English common
law, however understood.  Rightfully, “many colonists were fearful of violating the
Charter by enacting laws possibly repugnant to the laws of England.”  Wolford, supra,
at 150.  In fact, “[a] 1692 act . . . against counterfeiting or clipping of coins was disal-
lowed [by the Privy Council] . . . on the ground that the crimes were not punished as
in England.”  Joseph H. Smith, Administrative Control of the Courts of the American Planta-
tions, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 281, 331.  The Privy
Council took similar action against statutes that deal with treason and witchcraft. Id.
To defend the Act of 1646, the colonist drew up a “Parallels” that purported to show
the source of each provision in the Act.  Morris, supra, at 137.  At the time and later,
people apparently took the Parallels for the 1646 Act (and by extension the similar
parallels that appear with 1648 Act) at face value. Id.  Scholarship that is more recent
finds them deficient in what they included and what they excluded. Id. at 139–45
(providing a detailed examination of the Parallels).  In fact, they were “apologetic,”
“disingenuous,” and “not a fair presentation of fundamental law.” Id. at 145.  Seem-
ingly, however, the tactic worked to ward off objections, as the Council did not disal-
low the Act, or the Act of 1648. Id. at 146.  Apparently, too, nobody in Massachusetts
or England raised an objection to the criminal period of limitations in Act of 1652.  In
contrast, the Council (at the stimulation of the Board of Trade) was particularly solici-
tous as to civil statute of limitations that touched on commercial interests. Smith,
supra, at 330 & n.198.  Evidently, the groundbreaking Act of 1652, because it dealt
with minor criminal matters, did not warrant notice or objection by the Privy Council,
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to federal offenses in 1790.53  This first federal criminal statute of limi-
tations set a short limitations period—two years for non-capital
offenses and three years for capital offenses (willful murder and for-
gery excepted).54  Congress has extended this general period over the
years,55 and now, various crimes specify a different, usually longer,
limitations period.56
but it set in motion the modern concept that codes carrying penalties ought contain
periods of limitations.  No longer could the Sovereign do no wrong.  That simple
notion morphed into the complex of values reflected in modern statutes of limita-
tions. See generally Gabelli v. SEC, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1861 *11–*12 (Feb. 27, 2013)
(“Thus the ‘standard rule’ [for limitations] is that a claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff
has a complete and present cause of action.’ . . . That rule has governed since the
1830s . . . .  This reading sets a fixed date when exposure to the specified Government
enforcement efforts ends, advancing ‘the basic policies of all limitations provisions:
repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for
recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.’ . . . Statutes of limitations are
intended to ‘promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared.’ . . . They provide ‘security and stability to human affairs.’
. . . We have deemed them ‘vital to the welfare of society,’ . . .  and concluded that
‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten,’ . . . .” (cita-
tions omitted)).
53 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (“And be it further enacted, That
no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried[,] or punished for treason or other
capital offence aforesaid, wilful murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for
the same shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the treason or
capital offense aforesaid shall be done or committed; nor shall any person be prose-
cuted, tried[,] or punished for any offence, not capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture
under any penal statute, unless the indictment or information for the same shall be
found or instituted within two years from the time of committing the offence, or
incurring the fine or forfeiture aforesaid: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice.”).
54 Id.
55 The current general limitations period for non-capital federal crimes is five
years.  18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed.”). See generally Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Crimi-
nal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 128–31 (2008) (discussing the
purposes behind criminal statutes of limitations).  I found Powell’s essay extraordina-
rily helpful in preparing these materials.  For example, Powell includes a valuable
chart titled “Appendix: Timeline of the Rule and its Exceptions” that traces the con-
gressional action through the rules, amendments, and their exceptions. Id. at
154–55.
56 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2006) (extending the limitations period to ten years
for violations of certain statutes including § 1344 (bank fraud) and § 1963 (RICO; “to
the extent that the racketeering activity involves [bank fraud]”)).
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Criminal statutes of limitations limit the exposure of an individ-
ual to prosecution to a certain period following the commission of the
crime.57  The purpose of criminal statutes of limitations is to balance
57 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).  The rationale of Toussie is
preeminently that of a “continuing offense” limitation; finding that “continuing
offenses” were exceptional and not routinely implied into statutes, it held that failure
to register for the draft was not a continuing offense.  Ironically, Congress rejected
the Court’s result on registering for the draft. See United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d
1287, 1296–99 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Pub. L. No. 92-129, Title I, § 101(a)(31), 85
Stat. 348, 352–53 (1971) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(d) (2006))
(providing that a person may be prosecuted for failing to register for the draft as late
as five years after he attains the age of 26)).  “[S]ection 462(d) compels the conclu-
sion that the duty to register is a continuing one, thus supplying the indication of
congressional intent found lacking by the Supreme Court in Toussie, and that failure
to fulfill that continuing duty is a continuing offense.” Id.  Thus, Toussie’s teaching,
still valid, is that a court should not lightly determine that any crime, including RICO,
is a continuing offense. See United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 134 (3d Cir.
1980) (citing Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114–15) (“[T]he federal judiciary must regard asser-
tions that a crime is a continuing offense [with disfavor]”).
Nevertheless, federal courts consistently recognize that the pattern element in
RICO, where it is applicable, makes RICO a “continuing offense” within the meaning
of Toussie. See, e.g., United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (“RICO,
however, is a continuing offense under the Toussie definition.  It criminalizes a ‘pat-
tern’ of activity that can include predicate acts separated in time by as much as ten
years.  Therefore, the nature of the offense is such that Congress must have intended
it to be a continuing one, and thus an exception to the normal start of the limitations
period.”); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1367 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because the
limitations period is measured from the point at which the crime is complete, a defen-
dant may be liable under substantive RICO for predicate acts the separate prosecu-
tion of which would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, so long as that
defendant committed one predicate act within the five-year limitations period.  Simi-
larly, a defendant is liable for participation in a RICO conspiracy for predicate acts
the separate prosecution of which would be time-barred, so long as that defendant
has not withdrawn from the conspiracy during the limitations period.” (citations omit-
ted)); United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Toussie and
holding that because RICO does not require proof of an overt act, “the indictment
satisfies the requirements of the statute of limitations if the conspiracy is alleged to
have continued into the limitations period”); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55,
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a RICO prosecution is not time-barred if at least one
of the purported predicate acts occurred within five years of the indictment), aff’d
without opinion 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978).
If it is a continuing offense, which normally it is, for criminal purposes, it is also a
continuing tort for civil purposes. See Isaacs v. Deutsch, 80 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1995)
(finding a breach of a duty to support a child to be a continuing offense and noting
that “in the case of an obligation payable by instalments [sic], ‘the statute of limita-
tions [sic] runs against each instalment [sic] from the time it becomes due; that is,
from the time when an action might be brought to recover it.’” (quoting Limitations of
Actions, 34 AM. JUR. §142 at 114)); Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 809 So.
2d 13, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]he alleged fraud was . . . ongoing . . . . [E]ach
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the interest of the government in prosecuting crimes against the inter-
est of the defendant in not having to answer “overly stale criminal
charges”58 along with general considerations of fairness and effi-
ciency.59  The state possesses a strong interest in prosecuting crimes
for the protection and maintenance of society, and in recent years,
legislators have placed more emphasis on just deserts as a justification
for criminal punishment as well as on victims’ rights.60  Statutes of
yearly premium payment by the appellants resulted in consequent injury to them by
virtue of their reliance on the representations of Union Central.”); State Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (find-
ing environmental pollution to be a continuing offense that does not trigger the stat-
ute of limitations until it desists); see also Perera v. Wachovia Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33618, at *5–*10 (S.D. Fla. Mar 15, 2010) (recommending a finding that civil
theft and conversion claims are not barred by the statute of limitations under Flor-
ida’s continuing torts doctrine), adopted by 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33759 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
6, 2010). In addition, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on the nature of sexual
abuse is instructive. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1186 (Fla. 2000)
(“Reasons in favor of application of the doctrine [of delayed discovery] in the case of
childhood sexual abuse are as follows.  First, it is widely recognized that the shock and
confusion resultant from childhood molestation, often coupled with authoritative
adult demands and threats for secrecy, may lead a child to deny or suppress such
abuse from his or her consciousness.  Second, the doctrine is well established when
applied, for example, in cases involving breach of implied warranty or medical mal-
practice; it would seem patently unfair to deny its use to victims of a uniquely sinister
form of abuse.  Accordingly, application of the delayed discovery doctrine to child-
hood sexual abuse claims is fair given the nature of the alleged tortious conduct and its
effect on victims, and is consistent with our application of the doctrine to tort cases
generally; thus, we hold that the doctrine is applicable to childhood sexual abuse
cases.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
58 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966); accord WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 903 (5th ed. 2009) (“But foremost is the desirability of
requiring that prosecutions be based upon reasonably fresh evidence so as to lessen
the possibility of an erroneous conviction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (“[Statutes of limitations]
represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in
administering and receiving justice . . . .”).
60 Powell, supra note 55, at 137–40.  Congress also requires federal courts to
impose sentences in accordance with the purposes of the criminal law, beginning with
just deserts:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall con-
sider—
. . . .
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
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limitations by their nature prevent punishment, sometimes “arbitrar-
ily”61 allowing a criminal to escape prosecution.  Thus, many people
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
61 Those who write on time-bars, whether in judicial opinions, scholarly essays, or
for law reform commissions, inevitably brand them with the label “arbitrary.” See, e.g.,
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (describing statutes of limitations as “inescapably arbitrary”); Powell,
supra note 55, at 117 (noting the “fundamental arbitrariness” of limitations periods); I
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
281 (1970) (labeling statutes of limitations as “largely arbitrary”).  For a lawyer who is
a member of a legal profession that prides itself on its reasons, few labels are more
odious.  Thus, a word in favor of line drawing as reasonable is in order.  “Arbitrary”
means “based on random choice or impulse.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 37
(Paperback ed. 2002).  If that is an appropriate definition of “arbitrary,” and it is,
whatever statutes of limitations are, they are not “based on random choice or
impulse.”  They are, in Justice Story’s words, “wise and beneficial.”  Bell v. Morrison,
26 U.S. 351, 360 (1828).  How then are they “arbitrary?”  They are not.  Justice
Holmes, in dissent, put it aptly in Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,
41 (1928):
When a legal distinction is determined . . . between night and day, child-
hood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line
has to be drawn . . . . Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity
behind it the line or point seems arbitrary.  It might as well or nearly as well
be a little more to one side or the other.  But when it is seen that a line or
point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of
fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted . . . .
Id. at 41; accord Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he great body of the law consists in drawing such lines . . . .”); Domin-
ion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 269 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“If . . . the
distinction is justifiable, . . . the fact that some cases . . . are very near to the line makes
it none the worse.”); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631–32 (1906) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Most distinctions [are questions of degree], and are none the worse for
it. . . . When a crime is made burglary by the fact that it was committed thirty seconds
after one hour after sunset . . . the act is a little nearer to midnight than if it had been
committed one minute earlier, and no one denies that there is a difference between
night and day.” (citation omitted)); Ranney v. Whitewater Eng’g, 122 P.3d 214, 221
(Alaska 2005) (“As with all line drawing, . . . the precise point where the line is drawn
may seem arbitrary, and there may be ‘close cases at the margins.’  But this does not
mean that line drawing is impermissible.  This kind of line drawing-which involves
balancing the benefits of greater precision against its costs . . . is within the legisla-
ture’s competence.  We decline [the] invitation to substitute our judgment for the
legislature’s.” (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 182–83 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Normally, in our system we leave the inevitable process of arbitrary line
drawing to the Legislative Branch, which is far better equipped to make ad hoc com-
promises.  In the past, we have therefore given great deference to legislative decisions
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mistakenly see statutes of limitations as only preventing criminals from
receiving their just deserts and as a barrier to vindicating victims’
rights.
If the government’s interest in prosecuting crimes, and the goals
of just deserts and victims’ rights were the only considerations, statutes
of limitations might well be “arbitrary,” but other weighty considera-
tions argue in favor of having time-bars to prosecution.62  As time
passes after the commission of a crime, and “basic facts . . . [are]
obscured by the passage of time,”63 just deserts is no longer a valid
consideration, and victims’ rights are problematic.  In fact, the pre-
sumption is that a “fair”—either in the sense of accurate or consis-
tent with a proper balance between the power of the state and the
individual in a free society—trial is not possible.64  Even if a fair
in cases where the line must be drawn somewhere and cannot be precisely delineated
by reference to principle.  This Court has involved itself in the sticky business of sepa-
rating cases along a continuum only when the Constitution clearly compels it to do so
and when the legislature has plainly defaulted.”))); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 224 (1983) (discussing line-drawing for burglary, a
crime which must take place at night, and explaining how “antiently the day was
accounted to begin only at sunrising, and to end immediately upon sunset; but the
better opinion seems to be, that if there be daylight or crepusculum [twilight] enough,
begun or left, to discern a man’s face withal, it is no burglary.”); Burke, supra note 9,
at 123 (“No lines can be laid down for civil or political wisdom.  They are a matter
incapable of exact definition.  But, though no man can draw a stroke between the
confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon the whole tolerably distin-
guishable.”); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ACADEMICA 585 (E.H. Warmington ed., H.
Rackham trans., 1974) (“[I]n no matter whatsoever—if we are asked by gradual
stages, is such and such a person a rich man or a poor man, famous or undist-
inguished, are yonder objects many or few, great or small, long or short, broad or
narrow, we do not know at what point in the addition or subtraction to give a definite
answer.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 210, 233 (1920) (“[Only] a tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where
you are going to draw the line . . . .”).  Inevitably, most time-bars are ad hoc legislative
compromises; whatever they are, they are not, merely because they draw lines,
“arbitrary.”
62 See Powell, supra note 55, at 139.
63 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970); see also Pub. Schs. v. Walker,
76 U.S. 282, 288 (1869) (“[Statutes of limitations] are made for the repose of society
and the protection of those who may, in that time, have lost their means of
defence.”).
64 See Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (“[Statutes of limitation] provide predictability by
specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539
U.S. 607, 615 (2003) (“[A] statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that,
after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.  And that judg-
ment typically rests, in large part, upon evidentiary concerns—for example, concern
that the passage of time has eroded memories or made witnesses or other evidence
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trial were possible, when a long time passes between the commission
of a crime and its prosecution, the perpetrator may have reformed
his life and become a productive member of society, or changed
so drastically that he is, at least arguably, in a psychological sense,
not the “same” person who committed the crime.65  In that case,
unavailable.” (citation omitted)).  Further, the purpose of a trial is to “ascertain the
truth.”  See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (holding that trials after memo-
ries have faded and evidence has disappeared does not further the interest of truth).
In fact, it is usually no longer possible to determine “the truth.”  “To the contrary, the
passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”  Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403–04 (1993) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491
(1991) (“[W]hen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the ‘erosion of
memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time’ prejudice the
government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.” (quoting
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986)))).  For an insightful and lapidary
consideration between justice as just deserts or moral worth and justice as political
fairness between persons in a liberal society, see JOHN RAWLES, JUSTICE AS FARIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT 72–74 (2001).
65 See DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECU-
TION OF OLD CRIMES 30–34 (2000).  For example, the perpetrator may have commit-
ted the crime many years ago, as a juvenile, but now is a responsible adult, or the
perpetrator may have committed the crime many years ago, as a healthy adult, but
now suffers from dementia.  Nevertheless, any argument that a person has changed so
drastically that he or she is no longer the same individual is objectionable, because it
undermines the principle of personal responsibility that is essential to the criminal
justice system and society today.  To hold a person responsible in the future for any of
his past actions (whether a murder or wedding vows), society must view a person as a
continuous individual, the same self today as yesterday and tomorrow. See id. at 33.
Locke, too, recognized the significance of a resolution of the issue of our “personal
identity” that is at the foundation of “all the right and justice of reward and punish-
ment.”  Locke, supra note 9 at 225.  This makes all the more problematic his turn to
materialism with only—literally—a deus ex machina to justify it.  Here, Shuman and
Smith accept, as they must for their argument, one (not necessarily the only one)
resolution of the classic problem of “identity.”
According to Greek legend:
The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned [from
Crete] had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the
time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they
decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that
this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logi-
cal question as to things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained
the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.
1 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 22–23 (A.H. Clough trans. 1911) (footnote omitted).
Thus, Plutarch raises the question at what point in change, if any, does one entity
become another, as whether Thesus’s ship would remain the “same,” even if, piece by
piece, none of the original boards were in the refurbished ship.  Often known as
Thesus’s Paradox, it has troubled philosophers from the beginning of reflective
thought.  The issue is the pervasive character of change.  As Bertrand Russell says,
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“[t]he search for something permanent is one of the deepest of the instincts leading
men to philosophy.” BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 45
(1945).  Heraclitus taught famously: “You cannot step twice into the same river . . . .”
Id.  Is nothing, therefore, permanent?  “[While] Heraclitus maintained that every-
thing changes[,] Parmenides retorted that nothing changes.” Id. at 48.  Thus, the
thinkers of the Greek Enlightenment sought a resolution of their bewilderment.  Aris-
totle sought a middle way, distinguishing four “causes” (aitia) in things: the material
(bronze in a statute, that out of which the sculptor makes it); the formal (the shape of
the finished statue, the expression of what it is); the efficient (the sculptor, the means
by which he makes it); and the final end or telos (the purpose for which the sculptor
made the statute). ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at 271.  This
final end (“telos”) gave rise to the term “teleology,” the study of ends or purposes of
things. SIMON BLACKBURN, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 374 (1996).  For Aris-
totle, Theseus’s Paradox resolves itself without difficulty.  The formal cause (the
“ship”) does not change, while the material cause (the “boards”) easily changes as the
shipbuilder replaces old boards.  In any event, Aristotle’s word aitia, usually translated
as “cause,” misleads our ears, because modern minds understand “cause,” not as “pur-
pose,” as Aristotle understood “cause,” but in the sense that we use it in modern phys-
ics, that is, “mechanical.” See generally Richard Taylor, Causation, in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 56 (1967) (discussing Aristotle’s four causes, the tradi-
tional problems of efficient causation, and the contemporary problems of causation).
Today, we naturally think of things as machines, a materialistic bias we probably owe
to Descartes and his division of mind and body into an immaterial substance and a
material body.  Thus, if you understand the parts of a machine, you understand the
machine.  The word that Aristotle used, aition, is the neuter nominative singular form
(aitia is its plural form) of the adjective aitios, best translated as “blamed,” “charge,”
or “allegation.” JAMES DONNEGAN, A NEW GREEK AND ENGLISH LEXICON 32 (1845).  For
lawyers, the best translation is “cause of action” or “claim for relief,” that is, who, what,
where, when, how, and, in particular, the why of a thing in a court proceeding. See
ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at 275 (“[T]he number [of
causes is answered by] the question ‘why.’”); see also ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, in 8
GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at 501 (“[T]he ‘why’ is reducible finally to the definition,
and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and principle . . . .”).  Aristotle’s key concept, how-
ever, was final cause, or telos, best translated as “end,” “completion,” or “perfect
state.”  Donnegan, supra, at 755; see generally Alan Gotthelf, Aristotle’s Conception of Final
Causation, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ARISTOTLE’S BIOLOGY 204 (Allan Gotthelf &
James G. Lennox eds., 1987).  For Aristotle, the essence of a thing was its end, pur-
pose, or perfection, abstracted by a person by conception from particular things,
apparent to the person through their sensible attributes. See ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, in 8
GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at 271 (“[M]en do not think they know a thing till they
have grasped the ‘why’ of it . . . .”).  Understanding nature from a biologist’s view-
point, Aristotle’s theory of the “causes” posits a nature characterized by “purpose,”
hardly the modern view that tends to see nature governed, if at all, by chance, not
purpose, materially, not transcendentally, determined, without freedom, and devoid
of an ultimate efficient cause, agnostic, if not atheist, and no final cause (thus reduc-
ing Aristotle to two causes: immediately efficient and material), presuppositions that
have a crucial difficulty handling the problem of identity.  Locke, a believing Puritan,
but in his turn away from medieval scholasticism (Aristotle synthesized with Christian-
ity and ossified), became the modern father of an empiricism of a materialist bent.
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a prosecution is arguably unfair, and might do more harm than
good.66
See RUSSELL, supra, at 604, 609 (describing Locke’s “dislike[ ]” of “scholasticism” and
status as the “founder of empiricism”).  Locke, however, never took his thought as far
as David Hume, his intellectual heir in empiricism/materialism, but a determinist, an
atheist, and a skeptic. See id. at 672–73 (“[Hume] arrives at the disastrous conclusion
that from experience and observation [-all an empiricist has-] nothing is to be learnt.
There is no such thing as a rational belief . . . . Subsequent British empiricists rejected
[Hume’s] skepticism without refuting it . . . . The growth of unreason throughout the
nineteenth century . . . is a natural sequel to Hume’s destruction of empiricism.”).
Moreover, because of their thoroughgoing commitment to reductionist materialism,
neither Locke nor Hume was able, in terms of materialism, to solve the problem of
personal identity. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, app. at 675 & 678
(Ernest C. Mossner ed., 1969) (“But upon a more strict review of the section concern-
ing personal identity, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I
neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consis-
tent. . . . For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this
difficulty is too hard for my understanding.”); Locke, supra note 9, at 223 (“be best
resolved into the goodness of God”).  Locke saw the significance of a possible failure
to do it on “reward and punishment” in society; thus, his appeal to God; Hume, an
atheist, lacked that out by a god on a machine, as the Greek playwrights presented it
in tragedy, a plot device aptly criticized by Aristotle in his Poetics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS,
supra note 5, at 689 (“[T]he denouement should arise out of the plot and not
“depend on a stage-artifice, as in [Euripides’s] Media [who the gods saved from her
arguably just fate.”).  Thus, giving up Aristotle and adopting materialism, Locke and
Hume left themselves with an unresolved Theseus’s Paradox on the issue of personal
identity, an embarrassment for the presuppositions for human reward and punish-
ment.  More, too, is at stake, because for Hume, at least, “[m]orals . . . are not so
properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment.”  David Hume, AN
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in 35 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at
509.  Human good or evil becomes subjective, not even the fit subject of rational
discussion (Who seriously argues the difference between vanilla and chocolate ice
cream?  The morality of the Holocaust becomes a matter of taste!).  In sum, Hume’s
view of life is a dead end that need not attract us for reasons that go beyond their
failure to resolve Thesus’s Paradox, which, in any case, is beyond these materials. See
generally THE WANING OF MATERIALISM (Robert C. Koons & George Bealer eds. 2010)
(examining the various versions of materialism, finding them seriously defective; and
featuring arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the
person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge).
66 Society can justify punishing reformed individuals based on just deserts for
their previous bad acts or general deterrence of others, but the goals of rehabilitation
and incapacitation are not served by punishing individuals who are already reformed
or who no longer pose a threat to others.  Nevertheless, deciding that a possible
offender has rehabilitated himself and that, for that reason alone, the prosecution
should not go forward is a matter for the sound discretion of the prosecutor. See
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (“[In a strict liability offense
context,] the good sense of prosecutors . . . must be trusted.  Our system of criminal
justice necessarily depends on ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers
. . . .’” (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (Holmes, J.))).
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Statutes of limitations benefit society as well as the accused.  They
encourage “law enforcement officials promptly to investigate sus-
pected criminal activity,”67 to devote their limited resources to solving
recent crimes that pose an immediate threat to society, because of
repetition, as from recidivists come most offenses.68  Statutes of limita-
tions also incentivize law enforcement efficiency by keeping stale cases
out of over-taxed court systems69 and providing a bright-line rule guid-
67 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.
68 Recidivism is an ever-present fact of the criminal justice system. See THE PRESI-
DENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 45 (1967) (“The most striking fact about offenders
who have been convicted of the common serious crimes of violence and theft is how
often how many of them continue committing crimes.  Arrest, court, and prison
records furnish insistent testimony to the fact that these repeated offenders constitute
the hard core of the crime problem.”).  The typical offender is different from the
professional offender, as is the juvenile offender. Id. at 46.  Nevertheless, overall
“roughly a third of the offenders released from prison will be reimprisoned, usually
for committing new offenses, within a 5-year period.” Id. at 45.  Yet the most disheart-
ening fact is that little has changed in more than forty years except the calendar.
Various recent data are at BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=gsearch (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). See Patrick A. Langan and David J.
Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NO. NCJ 193427, at 1 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/con
tent/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.  (“Within [three] years from their release . . . 67.5% of the
prisoners were rearrested for a new offense . . . .”).  Everything changes; everything
remains the same.
69 See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945).  Justice Jackson’s
opinion in Chase contains a characteristically concise, insightful, and comprehensive
statement of the theory and most of the issues posed by the statutes.  He observed,
Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind for it is diffi-
cult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of law.
There has been controversy as to their effect.  Some are of [the] opinion
that like the analogous civil law doctrine of prescription limitations statutes
should be viewed as extinguishing the claim and destroying the right itself.
Admittedly it is troublesome to sustain as a “right” a claim that can find no
remedy for its invasion.  On the other hand, some common-law courts have
regarded true statutes of limitation as doing no more than to cut off resort
to the courts for enforcement of a claim.  We do not need to settle these
arguments.
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and conve-
nience rather than in logic.  They represent expedients, rather than princi-
ples.  They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from
litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has
been lost.  They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and una-
voidable delay.  They have come into the law not through the judicial pro-
cess but through legislation.  They represent a public policy about the
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ing when a prosecutor can and cannot bring a case.70  Finally, statutes
privilege to litigate.  Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is
called a “fundamental” right or what used to be called a “natural” right of
the individual.  He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it
exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by
legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control.
Id. at 313–14 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
70 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 79–81 (2005) (discussing the effi-
ciency justifications for statutes of limitations). But see Powell, supra note 55, at
143–45 (rightly arguing that statutes of limitations do not necessarily promote effi-
ciency and predictability, because they lead to a multitude of complicated legal ques-
tions).  In fact, statutes of limitation in the common law tradition had their origins
not in considerations so utilitarian as efficiency, but in deeply rooted notions of a
distrust of the exercise of official discretion, ironically in the area of minor offenses.
An absolute time limitation on such prosecutions was a necessity to protect liberty
from the exercise of arbitrary power.  Nevertheless, the common law system in Great
Britain, even to this day, has not developed a general limitation of the power of a
royal prosecutor to secure an indictment.  In this country, separated from royal power
in London by more than 3,000 miles of not easily traversed oceans, our Puritan forefa-
thers were fearful of any unlimited form of governmental power, including the power
exercised by their own magistrates in their colony in the area of misdemeanor and
minor offenses.  Most felonies, punishable by death, had no period of limitations, as
today.  They wanted the power of the magistrates circumscribed by law, and they
wanted the law plainly set out, so that all could see it.  One aspect of their aspiration
for a government of law, not men, was the first general statute of limitations on minor
offenses.  It was a forerunner of the first federal statute of limitations. See supra note
52.  In sum, a point exists beyond which a person should rest at peace with his or her
government.  Swords of Damocles are the instruments of despotic, not free,
governments.
In fact, as Cicero so delightfully tells the tale, the sword hung over the head of a
flatterer, Damocles, who the tyrant Dionysius sought to teach a lesson that a king is
never happy, no matter what he appears to have, because his subjects are ever ready to
overthrow him.  Cicero uses the story to make his point that the tyrant’s treatment of
his people meant that the ruler could not rest easily, and what was worse, “it was not
even open [to him] to return to justice . . . . As a young man at a thoughtless age, he
had entangled himself in errors, and had done things such that he could not be safe if
he should come to his senses.” CICERO, TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS II & V 113 (A.E.
Douglas ed. & trans., 1990).  His point is that justice is a precondition to security in
person and possessions, real and intangible, both for ruler and ruled.  See Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1967) (“The petitioner . . . [does not retain]
his liberty by this prosecution merely because its [indefinite] suspension permits him
to go ‘whithersoever he will.’  The [indefinite] pendency of the indictment may sub-
ject him to public scorn and deprive him of employment, and . . . force curtailment of
his speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes.  By indefinitely pro-
longing this oppression, as well as the ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation,’ the criminal procedure condoned in this case . . . denies the petitioner
the right to a speedy trial . . . .”).  In Klopfer, the fear was of an indefinite suspension of
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of limitations offer repose to society, the alleged perpetrator, and the
victim.71  In the United States, most jurisdictions have statutes of limi-
tations that bar prosecution after the stated period elapses.72  In deter-
an indictment.  How much more so would be the fear of an indefinite, pending inves-
tigation, and a possible indictment for an unknown charge at an unknown date?  It is
rightly every civil libertarian’s worst nightmare.  It would surely be of Kafkaesque
proportions.
71 See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (“[C]riminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally
interpreted in favor of repose . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518,
522 (1932); United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968))); Bridges v. United
States, 346 U.S. 209, 215–16 (1953) (“[There is] a longstanding congressional ‘policy
of repose’ that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law.”); see also Doggett
v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 668 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur legal sys-
tem has long recognized the value of repose, both to the individual and to society.
But that recognition finds expression not in the sweeping commands of the Constitu-
tion, or in the common law, but in any number of specific statutes of limitations
enacted by the federal and state legislatures.  Such statutes not only protect a defen-
dant from prejudice to his defense[,] . . .  but also balance his interest in repose
against society’s interest in the apprehension and punishment of criminals.”).
72 While the federal government has a general criminal statute of limitations.  18
U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006) (stating that the federal criminal statute of limitations for
non-capital crimes is five years after commission of the offense).  Of the states, only
South Carolina and Wyoming do not have any criminal statutes of limitations,
although all states allow the prosecution of murder at any time, as did our Puritan
ancestors. See supra note 52.  Nevertheless, the states differ in how they characterize
their statutes. Compare People v. Gwinn, 627 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding that a defendant who fails to raise the statute of limitations as a defense
before trial waives that defense), with People v. Ware, 39 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Colo. App.
2001) (“Under Colorado law, the statute of limitations in criminal matters operates as
a jurisdictional bar to prosecution that cannot be waived.”).  The Supreme Court’s
view is that of Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917), holding that
“[t]he statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted on the trial by the
defendant in criminal cases . . . .”
Whether courts characterize statutes of limitations as waivable affirmative
defenses or as jurisdictional is crucial in the context of a trial for murder where a jury
might convict on a time-barred lesser offense, if the court views the statute of limita-
tions as waivable. See generally Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limita-
tions with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 206 (1995) (arguing that,
based on their history and purposes, criminal statutes of limitations are not absolute
jurisdictional bars, and courts ought to allow defendants knowingly to wave them).
Significantly, it also affects the decisions of prosecutors and defense counsels
when they decide whether to waive the statute and to enter into negotiations to
resolve criminal matters without an indictment.  Not indicted is better than winning a
jury trial.  Being a witness is most of the time better than being a defendant.  Those
kinds of resolutions come from talking to the prosecutor.  Short “time-fuses” should
not get in the way of the negotiation to settle matters, criminally, or, for that matter,
civilly.  If you can waive a statute of limitations, and settle a civil matter, it is usually
better than extensive motion practice and intensive preparation before trial, but set-
tling on the courthouse steps.  Affected, too, is how after the negotiations break
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down, and the prosecutor procures an indictment, the defense counsel handles the
issue of a time bar.  The comprehensive and concise review of the law in United States
v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097
(2005), bears quoting at length:
Thurston argues that the trial court erred in not granting his post-ver-
dict Rule 29 motion for acquittal, because the government had not proved
an overt act during the limitations period, and in not sua sponte instructing
the jury on the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations for 18 U.S.C. § 371 crimes is the general five-
year statute of limitations contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3282.  Here, that five
years ran back from January 22, 1998, the date of the indictment, less the six
weeks during which Thurston agreed to toll the limitations period.  The gov-
ernment, therefore, had to prove an overt act was done on or after Decem-
ber 11, 1992.  The indictment properly alleged at least eight overt acts within
the limitations period.
Thurston did not raise the defense of statute of limitations either before
or at trial, did not request an instruction on the defense, and did not object
when the judge instructed without addressing the issue.  Thurston first
raised the issue by Rule 29 motion after the verdict.  The government says
Thurston raised the issue too late.  There is a preliminary question of when
such a motion should be raised, a question affecting our standard of review.
“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted on the trial
by the defendant in criminal cases . . . .”  Biddinger v. Comm’r of Police, 245
U.S. 128, 135 (1917).  Here the indictment adequately pled facts to establish
that the crime was within the limitations period.  Thurston was not required
to raise the defense before trial under Rule 12(b)(3), FED. R. CRIM P.  Nor
would it have made sense for him to do so, since the defense depended on
what the government proved or failed to prove at trial.  In a criminal case a
defendant need only plead as to the accusation of guilt in the indictment
and need not raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense before
trial.  Thurston mistakes these truisms for an argument that he need not
raise the limitations defense at all before the jury delivers a verdict of guilt.
The government says Thurston has waived the issue and may not raise it
at all.  Absent an explicit agreement to waive the defense, we treat the issue
as a forfeiture and not a waiver, contrary to the government’s argument.
This was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right, the definition of a waiver.  The issue of failure to assert the defense was
viewed as forfeiture in United States v. O’Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 23 n.1 (1st Cir.
1993).  The rule we use—that the defense of statute of limitations must be
raised at trial and, if not, is forfeited but not waived—is the rule in most
circuits. See United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is
widely accepted that a statute of limitations defense is forfeited if not raised
at the trial itself.”) (citing cases).
Thurston has indeed forfeited the defense that the government did not
prove facts that an overt act occurred within the limitations period.  The
defense should have been raised at trial.  Waiting until after the jury has
rendered a verdict of guilt to raise a limitations defense for the first time is
inconsistent with the characterization of the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense and would unfairly sandbag the government.
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mining the appropriate period of limitations, when the limitations
period should accrue, and when it should toll, courts, and legislatures
ought to take into account the factors that militate for and against
having a period of limitations for any set period.  Every extension of
the limitations period, every tolling rule, and every accrual rule that
starts the limitations period running later tends to undermine the
purposes of having statutes of limitations in the first place.73  The pub-
lic interest demands thoughtful care.
Because this was a forfeiture and not a waiver, there is still plain error
review available under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731–32 . . . (1993).  Our conclusion is straightforward.  The govern-
ment’s evidence established overt acts by the conspirators within the limita-
tions period, so there was no error at all as to the statute of limitations, much
less plain error.
Id.
In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the defendant in a capital murder case
refused to waive the statute of limitation for lesser-included offenses where the statute
of limitations had run on those defenses. Id. at 450.  The trial court declined to
instruct on these offenses. Id.  On appeal the defendant argued to no avail that the
trial court’s refusal violated Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), which held that in a
capital case, a lesser-included offense instruction was required for a fair trial. Id. at
452.  The Court disagreed and held that the defendant would have to be satisfied with
a “choice between having the benefit of the lesser included offense instruction or
asserting the statute of limitations on the lesser included offenses.” Id. at 456.
73 For example, Iowa, like many states over the past two decades, has revised its
statute of limitations for sexual abuse crimes against children.  Prior to 1990, the limi-
tations period was four years after the commission of the offense. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 802.2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (amended 1990, 1994, 2000, 2005, and 2007) (pro-
viding older language in an annotation to the current statute).  Currently, it is “ten
years after the person upon whom the offense is committed attains eighteen years of
age,” or, if DNA evidence exists, three years after the government identifies the per-
son who is the source of the DNA by name, whichever is later. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 802.2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012).  Arguably, Iowa’s extension of the limitations
period for child sexual abuse cases frustrates the legitimate goals of the limitations
periods.  The extension allows old cases to go to court, when witnesses may have dis-
appeared, and memories will surely have faded.  Several decades after the crime, the
perpetrator may have reformed or become senile.  The decision to prosecute later
may put the prosecutor between the victim’s demand for justice and the exigencies of
justice.  Hard choices make bad prosecutions.  In fact, law enforcement officials will
have less incentive to investigate the crime as vigorously when they are fresh, espe-
cially after gathering and preserving DNA evidence when the limitations period
extends indefinitely.  Courts will become enmeshed in older cases where justice is
hard to do, when their priorities ought to be to settle fresher ones fairly.  Finally,
repose for society, the perpetrator, and, in fact, too, the victim, will not result.  At the
same time, a longer limitations period promotes the society’s interest in prosecuting
heinous crimes, and, particularly with DNA evidence, it allows the government justly
to punish and incapacitate child molesters who otherwise will recidivate.  Moreover,
the longer limitations period allows victims to come forward as adults to vindicate
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 55 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1635
B. Determining the Limitations Period for Criminal RICO
1. Federal RICO
An examination of RICO and its legislative history sadly reveals
that it does not contain a provision for a statute of limitations specifi-
cally designed to take into account the unique character of a RICO
investigation and prosecution.74  Thus, the catchall five-year statute
their rights whereas the fixed, previous four-year limitations period undoubtedly
expired while many victims were still children.  Presumably, the Iowa legislature
decided that the interest of the society in prosecuting suspected child molesters out-
weighed the justifications for having a shorter limitations period—an imminently
defensible conclusion, as long as the legislature took into account each aspect of the
threefold balance of court, victim, and perpetrator.
74 The text of RICO is silent on the issue of a statute of limitations.  An abbrevi-
ated version of the legislative history appears in G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009, 1014–1021 (1980); a more detailed legislative history
appears in Civil Fraud Action, supra note 15, at 249–80.  When Senator Roman Hruska
and Congressman Richard Poff introduced the bills that formed the template for
RICO’s language that primarily dealt with the infiltration of organized crime into
legitimate business, they appropriately included provisions for a statute of limitation.
Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1015 & n.27, 1016–17.  The American Bar Association
endorsed them. Id. at 1016 & n.29.  Had those provisions passed, they would have
been the “end of the matter.”  Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
Nevertheless, when Senator John McClellan and Senator Hruska introduced the bill
that was the immediate forerunner of RICO, the private civil provisions were not
included in the bill.  Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1017–18 & n.45 (referring to § 1861,
which had “a broader purpose; it was directed at all forms of ‘enterprise criminal-
ity”’).  Section 1861 did not include these private civil provisions, because at the time
that I drafted the new bill, I did not know enough about them to make an appropriate
recommendation to Senator McClellan for their inclusion in the pending legislation,
and I made no recommendation to Senator McClellan when I did not sufficiently
understand the relevant provisions.  I had too much respect for him.  Those who
knew the Senator know why. SHERRY LAYMAN, JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, UNITED STATES
SENATOR, FEARLESS (Tate Publishing 2011) renders with great skill McClellan’s charac-
ter, his sense of integrity, and the personal tragedies that touched his life as well as his
exemplary public service to his region and to the nation.  The John L. McClellan I
knew was a great man.  Nor had I fully understood the implications of the blended
legislation.  Senator McClellan’s prior bill aimed at Mafia-like criminal organizations,
while Senator Hruska’s bill focused on legitimate businesses. See Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 13, at 1666–69.  I took the general period of limitations at face value. See
Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1017.  The Senate Judiciary Committee incorporated
§ 1861 in the Organized Crime Act as Title IX.  The Committee reported out the
amended bill; it passed the Senate; and the House of Representatives assigned it to
the House Judiciary Committee.  Id. at 1019–21.  Senator McClellan assigned his Sen-
ate Subcommittee staff, including me, to work with Congressman Poff, the second
ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee who did not have a Commit-
tee staff to work for him.  Senator McClellan (and Senator Hruska) and Congressman
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for non-capital federal offenses governs criminal RICO cases.75  This
Poff kept in daily touch while processing the legislation in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee.  Thus, at the end of the process in the Committee and on the House floor, the
key senators had had their input to the bill.  In fact, it turned out to make unneces-
sary a House Senate conference on the House amendments.  Even though bills were
before the House Judiciary Committee that included statutes of limitations, id. at
1020 & n.63, the House sent the legislation back to the Senate with various changes,
including civil provisions, but no period of limitations. Id. at 1020 & n.63, 1021.  The
Senate sent it to the President, because the end of Second Session of the Ninety-first
Congress was near, the Senate bill was largely intact, and prospects of fruitful negotia-
tions over any differences with the House were dismal. Id. at 1021 & nn.68–69.  In
fact, Senator McClellan considered most of the House amendments as minor changes
of “clarifying and strengthening” effect.  116 CONG. REC. 36,293 (1970).  Senator
Hruska agreed; the House changes were “not of major significance.” Id.  The Presi-
dent signed the legislation on October 15, 1970. Id. at 37,264.
That said, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the blended legislation
expressly classified RICO as a “continuing offense” under particular circumstances. S.
REP. NO. 91-617, at 23, 159–60 (1969) (discussing in detail criminal and civil limita-
tions in light of the doctrine of continuing offenses).  The House Judiciary Commit-
tee omitted the provision.  See Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1020 (describing the
provisions to be “unnecessary language”); H. REP NO. 91-1549, at 123 (1970) (provid-
ing no explanation for the omission).
On “contintuing offenses,” see supra, note 57.  I regret that I was unsuccessful
when I worked for Congressman Poff at Senator McClellan’s instructions to secure a
limitations period in the bill reported out by the House Judiciary Committee.  Had I
been successful then, I would not have to write this Article.  On the other hand, I
would not have learned what writing this Article taught me.
75 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006).  Section 3282 governs the limitations period
except “to the extent that the racketeering activity involves a violation of section 1344
[bank fraud].”  18 U.S.C. § 3293(3) (2006).  Then, a ten-year limitations period
applies. Id. The inclusion of a murder predicate offense does not change the result,
because under RICO, its maximum punishment is life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a) (2006).  Nevertheless, separately indicting the murderer, where the facts
warrant it, for murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2006) implicates
the death penalty, for which Title 18 provides that murder is “without limitation.” Id.
§ 3281; see also United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2010) (following
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 8 (1959), which held that charging the statute rather
than facts warranting death invokes the unlimited period of limitations).
Prospects for life imprisonment or death tend to lead even the head of an organ-
ized crime family to cooperate with law enforcement, a radical turn of events in the
history of the mob. See ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE LAST GODFATHER 285 (2006)
(“So it was that one of the most seismic events in law enforcement’s long struggle
against organized crime got underway.  [Joseph] Massino[, the boss of the Bonanno
crime family,] was a beaten man.  He faced not only the certainty of life in prison[, for
the RICO charges, because they involved six listed murders and a $10 million dollar
forfeiture,] . . . but also the prospect that he could be executed if convicted—a strong
likelihood—in the next year’s trial for the murder of Gerlando Sciascia.  It seemed
clear to Massino that he had one card left to play and that was to [cooperate] . . . .
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 57 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1637
statute, too, requires liberal interpretation of repose,76 a policy not
necessarily in accordance with the unique character of RICO.
Before courts reached the consensus that RICO was governed by
the catchall five-year period, courts held that, where the racketeering
activity under § 1961(1)(a) must be “chargeable under [s]tate law,”
the state statute of limitations should apply.77  This contention was a
misinterpretation of RICO.  Courts correctly read “chargeable” to
incorporate only the substantive definitions of state law, not statutes of
limitation, or other procedural rules.78  A contrary holding would
[The] reality was now the fact that in a coffin was the only way Massino would get out
of prison.”).
76 See supra note 57.
77 United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 721, 723 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rev’d, 560
F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
78 United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977) (“To interpret
state law offenses to have more than a definitional purpose would be contrary to the
legislative intent of Congress and existing state law.” (citing United States v. Revel,
493 F.2d 1, 2–3 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir.
1971))); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977); accord
United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he words ‘chargeable
under State law’ in § 1961(1)(A) mean ‘chargeable under State law at the time the
offense was committed.’”); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 418 n.22 (5th Cir.
1977) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the running of state statutes of limitations for
predicate offenses barred prosecution); cf. United States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058,
1060 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[A] defendant can be charged under the [federal] Lacey Act
even when the statute of limitations for the predicate state offense has run.”).
Even when it incorporates the language of state law, RICO does not sanction vio-
lations of state law; it sanctions violations of federal law.  The difference between
RICO and state law was well articulated in Brown v Cassens Transport Co., 675 F.3d 946
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a right to recover compensation in Michigan worker’s
compensation scheme is “property” within RICO, despite effort to exclude federal
remedy):
Although RICO’s predicate of mail fraud is similar to the underlying
fraud that affects a state-recognized interest [in its worker’s compensation
scheme], mail fraud is a distinct offense. . . . [Because of] the Supremacy
Clause, Michigan does not have the authority to declare a state remedy
exclusive of federal remedies. . . . Regardless of whether RICO preempts
[the state compensation scheme], RICO provides a distinct cause of action
. . . .
The flaw with the defendants’ argument [that the state scheme is the
exclusive remedy] is that the predicate offense for the RICO action is mail
fraud, not the denial of worker’s compensation.  “The gravamen of [a]
RICO cause of action is not the violation of state law, but rather certain
conduct, illegal under state law, which, when combined with an impact on
commerce, constitutes a violation of federal law.  Therefore, it is not alleged
that [the defendants are] subject to ‘liability under’ the [state law]; their
liability . . . stems from RICO.”  The district court here erred when it stated
that this case does not “involve[ ] a separate and independent tort (theft or
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make the definition of pattern, which includes a ten-year period,
“meaningless.”79
2. State RICO
Following the enactment of federal RICO, many states enacted
their own RICO statutes.80  Of the thirty-five state RICO statutes that
create criminal offenses, thirteen contain a limitations period, or
conversion or some similar claim)” because the plaintiffs “cannot disentan-
gle their RICO claim from their underlying claim for benefits.”  Admittedly,
the plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the alleged fraud only if they were
actually entitled to worker’s compensation and were not properly compen-
sated, which is a question of state law.  But this fact shows an overlap in
sanctioned conduct, not a dependency relationship between state and fed-
eral law.  It is well established that “[t]he fact that a scheme may violate state
laws does not exclude it from the proscriptions of the federal mail fraud
statute.”  It follows that mail fraud is still criminal even when the existence of
fraud varies according to whether a state prohibits conduct or whether it
affords entitlements.  Thus, mail fraud is a sanctionable offense even when it
resembles a state tort. . . . A federal civil RICO claim and a state claim for
worker’s compensation are legally distinct, even though they share factual
underpinnings.
Id. at 953–55 (citations omitted).
Section 1961(1) provides that “ ‘racketeering activity’ means (A) any act or threat
involving murder . . . bribery, [or] extortion . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006)
(emphasis added).  Thus, it includes “conspiracy,” United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d
1199, 1259 (9th Cir. 2004), “attempt,” United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d 285, 297–99
(2d Cir. 2003), “solicitation,” United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir.
1981), and “facilitation” of murder, United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 674–75 (2d
Cir. 1997).  The section’s language incorporates “generic” state offenses. S. REP. NO.
91–617, at 122 (1969); H. REP. NO. 91–1549, at 56 (1970).  It serves solely a “defini-
tional purpose.”  United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1997).  To deter-
mine if a particular state offense fits with its generic form, typically, a court looks at
analogous federal and state statutes existing in 1970 as well as the provisions of the
Model Penal Code. See Scheidler II, 537 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2003) (citing United States
v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1969) (finding that “extortion” within 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 includes “blackmail” in § 1961)); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,
42–45, 49 (1979) (finding that “bribery” within 18 U.S.C. § 1952 includes “commer-
cial bribery” in § 1961, even though it did not at common law).  On the other hand,
because it lacks a comparable state of mind, “manslaughter” is not within “murder.”
United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 100–01 (2d Cir. 1999).
79 Fineman, 434 F. Supp. at 194.
80 Thirty-five U.S. jurisdictions now have “little” RICO statutes. See supra note 13.
The title “little” is inappropriate.  To be sure, the states often modeled their statutes
on federal RICO, copying without change RICO’s language, but not always, for some-
times their drafts represent a reconception of the issues (e.g, Florida, which is, in fact,
the model for other state statutes, (e.g., Georga)); often, too, they are broader or
narrower than federal RICO, as these materials show.  In sum, they stand on their
own, demanding careful attention to the language of the particular statute.
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another part of the code specifies a limitations period (usually five
years).81  Another nineteen “little RICO” statutes do not specify a limi-
tations period.  Determining the limitations period for these statutes,
then, is similar to determining the limitations period for the federal
statute—courts should apply the state’s catchall criminal statute of
limitations unless the legislature unequivocally intended otherwise.82
C. Determining the Point of Accrual
1. Accrual and Commencement of Prosecution in Criminal Cases
Criminal statutes of limitations accrue when the perpetrator com-
mits the crime and run until the government commences the prosecu-
tion.  Thus, determining whether a prosecution is timely involves two
questions83: First, when did the perpetrator commit the offense; and
second, when did the government begin the prosecution?  If the gov-
ernment does not begin the prosecution within the statutorily pre-
scribed period after the commission of the crime, then the statute
bars prosecution.
When an offense was “committed” is not always obvious.  While
courts generally consider most offenses committed when they are
complete,84 certain offenses are continuing offenses.85  For continu-
81 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-403(a) (2013) (five years); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.05(10) (West 2000) (five years); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-8 (2011) (five years);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1356(H) (2005) (five years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(8)
(West 2011) (five years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.520 (West Supp. 2012) (five
years); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.725(11) (West 2011) (five years); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5552 (West Supp. 2012) (five years); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 971(c) (2003)
(no limitations; ten years for predicate acts); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-17(b) (2002) (ten
years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-206(h) (West 2010) (five years); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.04.080(1)(d) (2012) (six years for violations of § 9A.82.060 or § 9A.82.080); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 946.88(1) (West 2008) (six years).
82 All nineteen jurisdictions have catchall criminal statutes of limitations except
for Virginia, which does not have statutes of limitations for felonies. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13–107 (2010); COLO.  REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-401 (West Supp. 2011);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205 (2013); HAW.  REV. STAT. ANN. § 701-108 (LexisNexis
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-402 (Supp. 2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5 (West
Supp. 2012); IND. CODE § 35-41-4-2 (West 2010); IOWA CODE § 802.3 (West Supp.
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 628.26(k) (West Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6 (West Supp. 2012); N.M.
STAT. § 30-1-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney
Supp. 2012); N.D. CENT.  CODE § 29-04-02 (Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.13 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA.  STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152 (West Supp. 2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302 (LexisNexis 2008); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3541 (2003).
83 I leave aside for now the question of tolling. See infra Part II.D.
84 See United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 452 (1878) (“Whenever the act or series
of acts necessary to constitute [the crime] have transpired, the crime is complete, and
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ing offenses, the statute of limitations does not begin to run when the
perpetrator has satisfied each of the elements of the offense.  Rather,
the statute of limitations begins to run when the criminal course of
conduct ends.  Conspiracy is an example.  In United States v. Kissel, the
Court held that a conspiracy is a continuing offense that does not ter-
minate until the co-conspirators abandon it or achieve their aim.86  In
later cases, the Court held that a conspiracy continues until the defen-
dant shows the contrary by, for example, abandonment,87 and that
from that day the Statute of Limitations begins to run . . . .”); see also Pendergast v.
United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943) (“Statutes of limitations normally begin to run
when the crime is complete.”).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (holding that an
escape from prison is a continuing offense and the prisoner was under a continuing
duty to return); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he
mere continuance of the result of a crime does not continue the crime.  But when the
plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without
the continuous coo¨peration of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is such con-
tinuous coO¨peration, . . . [it is a continuing offense.]” (citation omitted)).  Accord-
ingly, once the judgment is made to treat an offense as continuing, it is improper to
divide it into segments to make it separate offenses: “[I]t is a perversion of natural
thought and of natural language to call such continuous coo¨peration a cinemato-
graphic series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one.” Id.  See
generally M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run
Against Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution for Conspiracy, 62 A.L.R.2d 1369 (1958) (dis-
cussing how several courts treat conspiracy as a continuing offense).
The general subject of continuing offenses besets the courts.  On “continuing”
offenses” generally, see supra note 58.  The possession decisions are illustrative.
Arguably, the decisions reach contradictory results. Compare People v. Grant, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 579, 594–96 (Ct. App. 2003) (interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (a) (West
Supp. 2013) and holding that there was sufficient evidence of concealing stolen prop-
erty, a continuing offense, when a stolen computer was found in the mother’s car in
garage, and the defendant testified that he bought it for a low price), with State v
Webb, 311 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (interpreting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 811.16 (currently codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.031 (2007)) and holding that
the theft of radio equipment and its installation at a radio station where the manager
had knowledge that it was stolen was not a continuing offense of receiving and con-
cealing stolen property). See generally Possession of Stolen Property as Continuing Offense,
24 A.L.R. 5th 132 (1994) (examining the case law determining whether possession of
stolen property counts as a continuing offense).
86 Kissel, 218 U.S. at 607–08.  In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), the
Court held that the defendant had to take “affirmative action” abandoning the con-
spiracy. Id. at 369–70 (1912) (“Having joined in an unlawful scheme, having consti-
tuted agents for its performance, . . . until he does some act to disavow or defeat the
purpose he is in no situation to claim the delay of the law.”); see also Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946) (affirming the holding from Hyde that aban-
donment of a conspiracy requires affirmative action).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)
(“When defendants are shown to have settled into a continuing practice or entered
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frustration, as well as success or abandonment, could terminate a con-
spiracy.88  Thus, for a conspiracy prosecution where you do not have
to show an overt act,89 the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the conspirators abandon it, something frustrates the goals of
the conspiracy, the conspirators accomplish their goals, or withdraw
from the conspiracy.90  For a conspiracy prosecution where an overt
into a conspiracy violative of antitrust laws, courts will not assume that it has been
abandoned without clear proof.”); Local 167, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934) (“In the absence of definite proof to that effect, abandon-
ment will not be presumed.”).  In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), the
Court considered whether acts of concealment, as an implied objective of all conspira-
cies, continue a conspiracy. Id.  The Court held that the acts of concealment in that
case did not continue the conspiracy. Id. at 406.  But the issue is fact dependent:
By no means does this [holding] mean that acts of concealment can never
have significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy.  But a vital distinction
must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after
these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering
up after the crime.
Id. at 405.
88 See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946) (finding that admissions
or confessions by a conspirator frustrate the conspiracy—terminating it “[s]o far as
each conspirator who confessed was concerned”).
89 At common law, an overt act was not an element of the offense of conspiracy.
Hyde, 225 U.S. at 359.  Today, the rule obtains, unless the statute specifically requires
an overt act. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63–66 (1997) (holding that
usual conspiracy rules apply to RICO; no over act is required, because none is speci-
fied by statute); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340 (1945) (holding that a
conspiracy to violate the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 does not require
an overt act); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (holding that a Sher-
man Act antitrust conspiracy does not require an overt act).
90 See United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1023 (2d Cir. 1980) (dealing
with a conspiracy to import and distribute controlled substances).
A conspirator can also end his participation in a conspiracy by withdrawal where
“[she] prove[s] she took affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objectives of the conspiracy,
to disavow or to defeat the conspiratorial objectives.”  United States v. Acuna, 313 F.
App’x 283, 293–94 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding cessation of one activity is not sufficient
to establish withdrawal from a multi-objective conspiracy).  “Additionally, the defen-
dant must have either made a reasonable effort to communicate those steps to her co-
conspirators or disclosed their scheme to law enforcement authorities.” Id. See gener-
ally United States v. Spero, 331 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting and citing deci-
sion on conspiracy withdrawal from the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits); WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
§ 6.6 f 12.4(b) at 558–60 (5th ed. 2010) (noting withdrawal requires successfully
bringing home, in a reasonable manner, to each of the coconspirators the withdrawal
or informing law enforcement; withdrawal ends participation; it is not an affirmative
defense to liability); see also Development in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 959 (1959).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 62 22-MAY-13 9:20
1642 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
act is an element of the crime, the statute begins to run at the comple-
tion of the last overt act by any one of the co-conspirators.91
After determining when the perpetrator committed the offense,
the next question one must answer is whether the prosecutor timely
initiated the prosecution.  To answer this question, you must know
what, by law, triggers the beginning of a prosecution.  A prosecution
generally begins when the grand jury indicts the suspect or when the
prosecutor issues an information.92  Nevertheless, depending on the
jurisdiction, a prosecutor may commence a prosecution in several
other ways: by filing a complaint,93 by issuing a warrant,94 or by the
return of a presentment.95  Once the prosecutor commences the pros-
ecution, the statute of limitations tolls.96
A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense not cognizable on
appeal unless raised by the defendant in the trial court and submitted to the jury on
proper instructions; raising it at a later time does not give the court time to formulate
and give the jury instructions; thus, the defendant “waives or forfeits” it. Spero, 331
F.2d at 60 n.2; see also United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Failure
to comply with the statute of limitations, however, is an affirmative defense which the
defendant waives if not raised at trial.”).
91 See Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 216; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 401 (1912).
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006).
93 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-42-4 (2004) (“All actions referred to in §§ 23A-
42-1 to 23A-42-3, inclusive, shall be deemed commenced by the filing of a complaint,
information or indictment with any committing magistrate or clerk of any court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the offense.”).
94 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(e) (West Supp. 2012) (“Except as otherwise
provided by general rule adopted pursuant to section 5503 (relating to commence-
ment of matters), a prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or
an information under section 8931(b) (relating to indictment and information) is
issued, or when a warrant, summons or citation is issued, if such warrant, summons or
citation is executed without unreasonable delay. ”).
95 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-104 (Supp. 2011) (“A prosecution is commenced,
within the meaning of this chapter, by finding an indictment or presentment, the
issuing of a warrant, the issuing of a juvenile petition alleging a delinquent act, bind-
ing over the offender, by the filing of an information as provided for in chapter 3 of
this title, or by making an appearance in person or through counsel in general ses-
sions or any municipal court for the purpose of continuing the matter or any other
appearance in either court for any purpose involving the offense.”)
96 See United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Wilsey, 458 F.2d 11, 12 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (“The filing of an indictment
results in a tolling of the statute upon the charges embraced.”).  The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure permit an indictment to be sealed. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4).  The
expiration of the statute of limitation after the issuance of the indictment, but before
its unsealing, will not invalidate an indictment, so long as the delay between the seal-
ing and unsealing of the indictment does not prejudice the defendant.  United States
v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1041–42 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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2. Accrual Problems in Criminal RICO Cases
In RICO litigation, the point at which the limitations period
begins to run depends on which section of RICO is the basis for the
charge.
a. Pattern Violations
Section 1962(c) prohibits the operation of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity.97  Because § 1962(c), if it requires a
pattern, is a continuing offense, the statute of limitations runs from
the last predicate act of racketeering in the pattern.98  Thus, where
Similarly, “John Doe” indictments allow prosecutors to avoid statute of limitations
problems by indicting individuals identified only by their DNA profiles. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(b):
(b) DNA Profile Indictment.—
(1) In General.—In any indictment for an offense under chapter 109A for
which the identity of the accused is unknown, it shall be sufficient to
describe the accused as an individual whose name is unknown, but who has a
particular DNA profile.
(2) Exception.—Any indictment described under paragraph (1), which is
found not later than 5 years after the offense under chapter 109A is commit-
ted, shall not be subject to—
(A) the limitations period described under subsection (a); and
(B) the provisions of chapter 208 until the individual is arrested or served
with a summons in connection with the charges contained in the
indictment.
18 U.S.C. 3282(b) (2006).
A John Doe indictment legally commences the prosecution, thus, tolling the stat-
ute of limitations, even though the accused’s name is unknown. See generally Meredith
A. Bieber, Note, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using “John Doe” Indictments Based on
DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (2002) (discussing how
the government employs the John Doe indictments to toll the statute of limitations).
97 Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
98 See United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (“RICO, however,
is a continuing offense under the Toussie definition.  It criminalizes a ‘pattern’ of
activity that can include predicate acts separated in time by as much as ten years.
Therefore, the nature of the offense is such that Congress must have intended it to be
a continuing one, and thus an exception to the normal start of the limitations
period.”); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1366 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Both substan-
tive RICO and RICO conspiracy offenses are continuing crimes.”); United States v.
Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[I]n order to satisfy the statute of limita-
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one predicate act of racketeering in a pattern of racketeering falls
tions for section 1962(c), the government must demonstrate that a defendant com-
mitted at least one predicate racketeering act within the limitations period.”).  On
“continuing offenses,” see, supra, note 57.
To the degree that the rule of Persico envisions that any act committed by any co-
defendant counts, it is similar to the usual rule for continuing offenses  (e.g., conspir-
acy.). Hyde stands for the rule that each co-conspirator is responsible for the acts of
each other co-conspirator: “The statute cuts through such puzzles and make the [first
and last overt] act of a conspirator . . . the legal inception of guilt inculpating all and
subjecting all to punishment.”  Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 362 (1912). One
overt act in any jurisdiction anywhere makes each coconspirator subject to trial in that
place.  The opinion states:
Let him meet with his fellows in secret and he will try to do so; let the place
be concealed, as it can be, and he and they may execute their crime in every
State in the Union and defeat punishment[, as they would if the trial could
only be held in the place where they hatched the  conspiracy] . . . . We see
no reason why a constructive presence should not be assigned . . . and do
with it as with other crimes which are commenced in one place and contin-
ued in another.
Id. at 363–64.
If the conspiracy continues, the court measures the period of limitation for each
co-conspirator from the last overt act by any one of the co-conspirators, even if a
particular conspirator does not commit an over act within the period.  “[If one con-
spirator does] not do anything within the . . . period but [understands] that further
acts should be performed, they, if performed, would be his acts and would have the
same effect against him as if he had done them himself.”  Id at 368 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Each conspirator is an agent for each other conspirator until
the conspiracy ends or he affirmatively withdraws from the conspiracy.  “As he has
started evil forces he must withdraw his support from them or incur the guilt of their
continuance.”  Id. at 369–70; see also Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62–66
(1997).
To the degree that it envisions, as it does explicitly, a personal act by each defen-
dant within the period of limitations, as it does, it indefensibly goes well beyond the
usual rules for continuing offenses; it is squarely inconsistent with the language, ratio-
nale, and holding in Salinas, which held that no personal act was required for sub-
stantive or conspiracy under RICO. Id.  It is an anachronism left over from the period
in which a minority of circuits followed the personal act rule. See id. at 61–62 (citing
United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d. Cir 1984); United States v. Winter,
663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981)).  Neither Winter nor Ruggiero involved a limita-
tions issue, but the “two personal acts” rule of Ruggiero lead to the result in Persico on
the issue of limitations. Persico, 832 F.2d at 713 (citing Ruggiero on the two personal
act requirement).  In turn, the two personal acts requirement stemmed from lan-
guage (not a holding) in United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978), that
summarized the language of the statute itself for a restatement of the elements of a
violation, but nothing in Elliot said anything about a personal act requirement. See
Civil Fraud Action, supra note 16, at 290 n.151 at 296–97 (tracing the evolution of rule
in dicta, to a rule of evidence, to a rule of law, and finally to a rule with a limited
rationale).  The only trouble was that the brief rationale offered in Winter, “protection
to those who might otherwise be convicted through guilt by association,” was perverse
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in terms of the objective of RICO itself.  663 F.2d at 1136.  Compare the Winter
Court’s holding to United States v. Neapolitan, which held that:
The crime chieftains . . . have developed the process of ‘insulation’ to a
remarkable degree. . . . Convicting[them] of crimes . . . is usually extremely
difficult and sometimes is impossible, simply because the top-ranking crimi-
nal has taken the utmost care to insulate himself from any apparent physical
connection with the crime or with his having to commit it.
Neapolitan v. United States, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. NO. 89-72, at 2 (1965)
(reported by Senator John L. McClellan, the principle sponsor of RICO)).
Whatever Congress designed RICO for, or however private litigants use it now,
facilitating the conviction of upper level bosses in organized crime families was
unquestionably a core concern.  If you require bosses to engage in personal acts
under RICO, but not under general conspiracy jurisprudence, you perversely further
insulate them from conviction.  Indeed, one rationale behind the organizational
structure of the families of organized crime in a hierarchical structure was to separate
the higher-level members from the crimes themselves to make it difficult to convict
them.  Another rationale included insulating the bosses from violence within the fam-
ily; mere members do not associate with the high-level bosses.  The low-level members
and their non-member associates personally commit the crimes.  Thus, as designed,
the bosses do not “get their hands dirty.” See generally, DENNIS N. GRIFFIN & ANDREW
DIDONATO, SURVIVING THE MOB (2010).  Construing RICO to require “dirty hands”
for the bosses, as Ruggiero, Winter, and Persico do, turns the statute’s rationale upside
down.
The importance of the point requires a detailed examination of Persico’s two
major sections, the fountainhead of the personal act agreement requirement in RICO
conspiracy context and the requirement of a personal act within the period of
limitations.
(1) In Persico, the circuit observed on the question of the running of the statute
on a conspiracy count,
The government argues . . . the statute of limitations for RICO conspir-
acy should not begin to run until the accomplishment or abandonment of
the objectives of the conspiracy.  We agree. . . . By his agreement, a RICO
defendant signals his membership in a conspiracy to conduct the affairs of
the charged enterprise.  Thus, the RICO conspiracy statute is most closely
analogous to other conspiracy statutes pursuant to which overt acts in fur-
therance of the conspiracy need not be pleaded or proven.  Under such stat-
utes, ‘[f]or limitations purposes, the conspiracy may be deemed terminated
when, in a broad sense, its objectives have either been accomplished or
abandoned, not when its last overt act was committed.’ . . .
The limitations period is measured from the point at which the crime is
complete.  Because the RICO conspiracy statute does not require proof of
an overt act, we believe that the crime of RICO conspiracy is not complete
until the purposes of the conspiracy either have been accomplished or aban-
doned.  Although proof of a RICO conspiracy requires a demonstration that
a defendant agreed to commit two or more predicate acts, rather than a simple
showing that the defendant agreed to join the conspiracy, the agreement
proscribed by section 1962(d) is conspiracy to participate in a charged enter-
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prise’s affairs, not conspiracy to commit predicate acts.  We perceive no valid
reason why the RICO conspiracy statute should be analyzed in a manner
inconsistent with other conspiracy statutes not requiring proof of overt acts.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the statute of limitations for
the RICO conspiracy charges at issue here did not begin to run at least until
the filing of the indictment. . . . [T]he government amply demonstrated that
the conspiracy to conduct the affairs of the Colombo Family continued until,
and well after, April 4, 1985, the date the superseding  indictment was filed.
Persico, 832 F.2d at 713–14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Ruggiero, 726
F.2d at 921 and a collection of cases).
On the contrary, under Salinas, each co-conspirator need not agree that he will
commit personally two predicate acts; it is only necessary that he agree that someone in
the conspiracy will commit two predicate acts. See United States v. To, 144 F.3d 737,
744 (11th Cir. 1998) (“‘[T]he focus is on the agreement to participate in the enter-
prise through the pattern of racketeering activity, not on the agreement to commit
the individual predicate acts.’ . . . In this case, . . . the government could prove [the
defendants’] agreement to participate in either of two ways. . . . [T]he government
could show an agreement on an overall objective.  An agreement on an overall objec-
tive may be proved ‘by circumstantial evidence showing that each defendant must
necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate in the same
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.’”); United States v. Vaccaro, 115
F.3d 1211, 1221 (5th Cir. 1997) (“To be guilty of a RICO conspiracy, the conspirator
‘must simply agree to the objective of a violation of RICO; he need not agree person-
ally to violate the statute.’”) (quoting United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1196
(5th Cir. 1996)); MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 980
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]  defendant may conspire to violate section 1962(c) if [he]
agreed ‘to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity,’ and ‘it is only necessary that the defendant agree to the com-
mission of [at least] two predicate acts on behalf of the conspiracy.’ The defendant
need not have agreed to actually commit the predicate acts [himself] or even to par-
ticipate in the commission of those acts so long as [he] agreed that the acts would be
committed on behalf of the conspiracy.” (quoting Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 498)).  In
light of these rulings, no reason appears to require a personal participation in a last
predicate act, overt act, or other conduct to show that the conspiracy continued into
the period of the statute.  Each member of a RICO conspiracy is liable for the acts of
the other members of the RICO conspiracy; personal conduct (beyond agreement to
the RICO objective) is not required; vicarious liability, based on conduct of others,
meets the test of the law under Salinas, 522 U.S. at 62–66.
(2) In Persico, the circuit observed on the question of the running of the statute
on a substantive count:
The district court determined that the statute of limitations . . . should begin
to run from the last overt act committed by any member of the group
charged. . . .
. . . .
[I]n order to establish a defendant’s violation of section 1962(c), the
government must prove that the defendant committed two or more predi-
cate offenses, at least one of which occurred within the federal five-year stat-
ute of limitations for non-capital offenses.  In rejecting [the] claim that the
evidence indicated only that a co-defendant had committed a timely predi-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 67 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1647
cate act, we emphasized that there was sufficient evidence that [the defen-
dant] also had committed the act.  Central to our analysis was the fact that
[the defendant] himself had participated in a timely predicate act. . . .
Even if we were to assume that [the case] involved single defendants,
under the government’s statute of limitations analysis it would have been
sufficient for us to determine whether any unindicted member of the enter-
prise had committed timely predicate acts, a search that we did not under-
take.  Instead, we focused solely on the defendant who raised the limitations
defense and determined that he had committed one predicate act within the
limitations period.
Based on the reasoning of our prior decisions, we conclude that in
order to satisfy the statute of limitations for section 1962(c), the government
must demonstrate that a defendant committed at least one predicate racke-
teering act within the limitations period. . . . Therefore, because the govern-
ment failed to demonstrate that either [defendant] committed a predicate
act within the five-year statute of limitations, we reverse their convictions
under section 1962(c).
832 F.2d at 714 (emphasis added) (“Such a conclusion comports with the structure of
section 1962, which treats conspiracies to violate RICO and substantive RICO offenses
separately. The focus of section 1962(c) is on the individual patterns of racketeering
engaged in by a defendant, rather than the collective activities of the members of the
enterprise, which are proscribed by section 1962(d). We reject the government’s
attempt to analyze section 1962(c) as if it were a second RICO conspiracy statute.”).
On the contrary, each person in a § 1962(c) charge need not commit personally
two predicate acts; it is only necessary that someone involved with him in the violation
commit two predicate acts. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 62–66 (holding that no personal
act required for substantive or conspiracy under RICO).  If that is the law, as it is, then
Persico is not the law.  Moreover, this analysis does not treat §§ 1962 (c) and (d) as if
each were a conspiracy provision, but properly treats each section as a continuing
offense, and applies continuing offense (or tort jurisprudence) to them in their crimi-
nal and civil manifestations. On “continuing offenses,” see, supra note 57.
Sadly, Perscio had an immediate and adverse impact in one of the most important
criminal prosecutions ever brought under RICO.  In United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d
524, 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1989), the government brought a RICO prosecution against the
organized crime commission that sat over the five families in New York City. See S.
REP. NO. 91-617, at 36–43 (1969) (identifying six of eleven individual indicted in 1984
as a focus of RICO); N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1984, at 1 (reporting on the indictment
under RICO of eleven mob leaders, six of whom on commission and heads of New
York City area families). Salerno’s only competition in the “most significant” category
might be United States v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521, 535 (7th Cir. 2012), which dealt with the
prosecution under RICO of the “Outfit,” the lineal descendant of Al Capone’s gang.
In Schiro, the court noted: “If anyone doubted that the Chicago Outfit during its hey-
day ranked as one of the most dangerous and reprehensible criminal organizations in
our nation’s history, the record compiled in this case would put those uncertainties to
rest.” Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).  Yet, Schiro comes in a distant second to Salerno.  Chi-
cago, after all, is the “Second City.”  In Salerno, the grand jury indicted Anthony
Indelicato, a “capo” in the Bonanno crime family, for § 1962(d) (conspiracy) and
§ 1962(c) (substance) on November 19, 1985.  868 F.2d at 534.  Each of his racketeer-
ing acts (the simultaneous murders of Carmine Galante and two associates) occurred
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 68 22-MAY-13 9:20
1648 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
in 1979. Id.  In United States v. Indelicato, the Second Circuit held that the murders
were part of a pattern of racketeering acts.  865 F.2d 1370, 1383–85 (2d Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (“Though the murders were . . . simultaneous, they . . . constituted more than
one act. . . . [T]he three murders were . . . related since . . . each was [for the]
facilitation of the desired change in leadership of the Bonanno crime family. . . .
[B]oth the nature of the Commission . . . and the . . . Bonanno family, control of
which the murders were designed to achieve, [showed] that there was a threat of
continuing racketeering activity.” (citing G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, supra
note 74, at 1030 & nn.97–101 (1980))).  The period of limitations was five years. See
supra note 75.  Following Persico, as it had to as a panel, the Salerno court held that the
five years for the conspiracy ended “only when the purposes of the conspiracy have
either been accomplished or abandoned.” 868 F.2d at 534.  It added “withdraw[al].”
Id. at 534 n.4.  On the other hand, for a substantive offense, the statute barred a
prosecution “as to any defendant unless that defendant committed a predicate act
within the five-year . . . period.”  Id. at 534.  The court reviewed the jury instructions
on § 1962 (d) that required a finding that Indelicato continued as an “associate or
conspirator” of the “enterprise” and that any one of the coconspirators committed a
racketeering act after November 19, 1980. Id.  It then upheld the verdict on the con-
spiracy conviction. Id.  “On the other hand, since all predicate acts committed by
Indelicato occurred prior to November 19, 1980, [the court held that] Persico
require[d] reversal of his conviction” for § 1962(c). Id.  Had Salinas been the law
then, the court would have rightly upheld the convictions. See United States v. Piz-
zonia, 577 F.3d 455, 464–67 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Pizzonia held the rank of captain in the
Gambino crime family.  In that capacity, he sat on a special committee that sought to
increase family revenues from the Gambinos’ assorted criminal activities.  It is difficult
to imagine evidence that could more convincingly demonstrate a defendant’s agree-
ment to participate in the affairs of the charged enterprise through a pattern of con-
tinuing criminal activity.”); United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 44–58 (2d Cir.
2008) (“The jury was entitled to view the offers [of the officers] to provide assistance
to members and associates of organized crime as general and open-ended—as was
alleged in the Indictment—and thus as encompassing defendants’ conduct [after
retirement] in Las Vegas, which included [defendant’s] offers and attempts to laun-
der the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and . . . [the former officers’] involvement in
narcotics trafficking . . . to induce would-be investors to give them money for a film in
whose funding members of organized crime were integrally involved.  The district
court’s narrow focus on the agreement of [the defendants] to provide confidential
law enforcement information as the be-all and end-all of the enterprise and of the
conspiratorial agreement was thus inconsistent with the allegations of the Indictment
and disregarded or discounted the above evidence [in the record]. . . . Where a given
partnership has offered a variety of services to a defined category of customers, it is
not entitled to a ruling that as a matter of law its services do not constitute a pattern
simply because the offered services were varied.  Finally, as to the need to prove con-
tinuity or the threat of continuity . . . ‘the threat of continuity is sufficiently estab-
lished where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part of a
long-term association that exists for criminal purposes.’  Plainly, the evidence described
above was sufficient to permit the jury to find that . . . [the defendants] operated as
part of just such an association.  The fact that there was a gap of some eight years
between proven racketeering acts [in New York] did not as a matter of law preclude a
finding of pattern or continuity, for Congress expressly defined pattern to include two
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or more acts of racketeering activity within a period (excluding any period of impris-
onment) of 10 years.” (citations omitted)); Morris v. City of New York, 16 Misc. 3d
126A, 847 N.Y.Y.2d 903 (2007) (holding that notice of claim was untimely because of
lack of equitable tolling where administratrix of murder victim killed by police
officers); cf. United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2008) (uphold-
ing a post-Salinas RICO conspiracy conviction, even though the government proved
organized crime family membership based on defendant’s criminal conduct outside
of the limitation period, because it showed the continuation of an organized crime
family and defendant’s membership into the period of the statute; the court did not
recognize that Salinas eliminated the personal act rule of Persico for substantive
offenses, and it obviated most of its discussion drawing distinctions between
§§ 1962(d) and (c)).
On the importance of the Commission Case and related RICO prosecutions, see
supra and infra note 382. See also PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S.
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Federal Government’s Use Of The RICO Statute And
Other Efforts Against Organized Crime, S. REP. No. 101-407, at 31–32 (1990) (“[Depart-
ment of Justice and FBI] should continue . . . their innovative and effective use of the
enterprise theory of investigation, the task force approach, and the provisions of the
RICO statute.”); Effectiveness of the Government’s Attack on La Cosa Nostra,Organized
Crime: 25 Years after Valachi: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 505 (1988) (statement of David C. Wil-
liams, Director, Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/102051.pdf (“Prior to the passage of [RICO],
attacking an organized criminal group was an awkward affair.  RICO facilitated the
prosecution of a criminal group involved in superficially unrelated criminal ventures
and enterprises connected only at the usually well-insulated upper levels of the organ-
ization’s bureaucracy . . . . Before the act, the government’s efforts were necessarily
piece-meal, attacking isolated segments of the organization as they engaged in single
criminal acts.  The leaders, when caught, were only penalized for what seemed to be
unimportant crimes.  The larger meaning of these crimes was lost because the big
picture could not be presented in a single criminal prosecution.  With the passage of
RICO, the entire picture of the organization’s criminal behavior and the involvement
of its leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and presented. . . .”); see
also Selwyn Raab, A Battered and Ailing Mafia Is Losing Its Grip on America, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1990, at A1, A12 (“Law-enforcement officials generally credit a long-term
strategy adopted by the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in the early 1980’s: developing cases against the top leaders of organized-crime fami-
lies and relying largely on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
or RICO, as a courtroom tool.  By concentrating on enterprises rather than individu-
als, [f]ederal prosecutors in the last five years have removed the high commands of
families through the convictions and long prison sentences of almost 100 top Cosa
Nostra leaders.”); Robert D. McFadden, The Mafia of 1980’s: Divided and Under Siege,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A1; Stewart Darell, Busting the Mob, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 3, 1986, at 24; Special Report, The Mob on Trial, NEWSDAY, Sept. 7, 1986, at 4.
For civil materials on continuing torts, see Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546,
1553 n. 9, 1554–62 (6th Cir. (1997) (“[A] claim for continuing trespass is not
defeated where the defendant’s last affirmative act of wrongdoing precedes the filing
of the complaint by a period longer than the statute of limitations. . . . [U]nder Ohio
law, a claim for continuing trespass may be supported by proof of continuing damages
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within the period of limitations, the entire pattern of racketeering is
subject to prosecution, even though earlier acts of racketeering might
not be subject to prosecution as separate offenses.99  Where no act of
racketeering occurs within the period of limitations, courts properly
reverse convictions.100  Where multiple parties engage in racketeering
offenses, the statute of limitations for each defendant runs from the
last act of racketeering he commits, the cases wrongfully teach, not from
the last act of racketeering committed by any member of the group.101
b. Use/Investment Violations and Acquisition/Maintenance
Violations
Section 1962(a) prohibits the use or investment of income
derived from a pattern of racketeering.102  Use or investment occurs
and need not be based on allegations of continuing  conduct.” (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 161 cmt. b, 899 cmt. d, and 930(1) (1965)))); Rapf v. Suffolk
County, 755 F. 2d 282, 284–90, 293 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a suit for injunction
to requiring the county to desist from a nuisance that threatens to destroy homes by
not maintaining “groins” leading to erosion that swept away up to fifty homes bars
only claim for injunction, not damages); I CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 7.4.11 Continuing Injury, at 600–01 (1991) (“[A] continuing injury tort does not
accrue, nor does the statute of limitation begin to run until the wrong terminates.
Such injury results from continued unlawful acts and differs from the continuing ill
effects of an original violation. . . . Postponement of the date of accrual until termina-
tion of a continuing wrong permits the inclusion of damages for the duration of the
violation.  When the injuries are not continuous but recurring, the statute of limita-
tion begins to run from the occurrence of each injury.” (footnote omitted)).
99 As the court stated in United States v. Wong:
[T]his court has held in the statute-of-limitations context that jurisdiction
over a single RICO predicate act confers jurisdiction over other predicate
acts, including some that could not be prosecuted separately.  Because the
limitations period is measured from the point at which the crime is com-
plete, a defendant may be liable under substantive RICO for predicate acts
the separate prosecution of which would be barred by the applicable statute
of limitations, so long as that defendant committed one predicate act within
the five-year limitations period.
United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1367 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407, 419–20 (1987) (reversing con-
viction where no act of racketeering occurs within the period of limitations).
101 See Persico, 832 F.2d at 714; United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 525
(1st Cir. 1988).
102 Section 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a princi-
pal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
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after the pattern of racketeering from which the perpetrator derived
income.  Accordingly, the period of limitations runs, not from the last
act of racketeering in the pattern, but from the use or investment.103
Unless the violation of § 1962(a) requires some element beyond the
act of use or investment, the offense is complete with the use or
investment.
Section 1962(b), on the other hand, prohibits the acquisition or
maintenance of an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering.104  Here, the crucial element is the “acquisition or mainte-
nance” of an interest in an enterprise.  Accordingly, the period of
limitations would run, not from the last act of racketeering in the pat-
tern, but from the last act of “acquisition or maintenance.”  No court
of appeals case exists involving the accrual of the statute of limitations
under § 1962(b).  Nevertheless, in United States v. Castellano,105 the dis-
trict court reasonably suggested in some circumstances that § 1962(b)
could be a continuing offense.106  If so, the limitations period would
not accrue until the criminal course of conduct ceases.  If not, the
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.  A purchase of securities on the open mar-
ket for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so,
shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
103 United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1196 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[The offense
defined in § 1962(a)] is only consummated by the . . . act of use or investment, hence
the statute [of limitations] with respect to subsection (a) is only triggered by the last
such act charged.”).
104 Section 1962(b) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”  18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2006).
105 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
106 Id. at 1408 (reasoning that § 1962 (b) is arguably (at least in some circum-
stances) a continuing offense because ‘maintenance’ of an enterprise implies contin-
uous activity); see S. REP No. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (“The infiltration of legitimate
business normally requires more than one ‘racketeering activity’ and the threat of
continuing activity to be effective.”).
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limitations period would accrue when all the elements of the offense
were otherwise satisfied.
c. Conspiracy
Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracies to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c).107  Section 1962(d) does not
107 Section 1962(d) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”  18 U.S.C
§ 1962(d) (2006).
One question vexing about §§ 1962(a), (b), and (d) is whether an injury by a
predicate act under § 1961 rather than a “use or investment” or “acquisition or main-
tenance” injury suffices to state a civil claim for relief under §1962(d).  In Beck v.
Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 501–502 (2000), the Court looked to “well-established common
law of civil conspiracy” to decide its meaning in §1962(d). Id.  The Court held that a
“predicate” act—as opposed to an overt act—had to cause injury where § 1962(c) was
the object of the conspiracy. Id. at 506–507.  At common law, a plaintiff could recover
for a civil conspiracy only if his or her injury resulted from an act itself unlawful or
tortuous. Id. at 501.  Overt acts—not required under Salinas under § 1962(d) for
criminal liability—are neither unlawful nor tortuous, that is, they acquired their
unlawful character only by their inclusion in Title 18 as criminal offenses.  Thus, the
Court found mere overt act injury insufficient.  The Court refused to reach, however,
whether special standing rules existed to sue for a conspiracy to violate §§ 1962(a) or
(b). Id. at 505–506 n.10 (“[W]e do not resolve whether a plaintiff suing under
§ 1964(c) for a RICO conspiracy must allege an actionable violation under
§§ 1962(a)–(c), or whether it is sufficient for the plaintiff to allege an agreement to
complete a substantive violation and the commission of at least one act of racketeer-
ing that caused him injury.”).  Under this analysis, a plaintiff need plead for civil lia-
bility under § 1962(d), only that his or her injury stemmed from “racketeering
activity” under § 1961.  To require more for a civil RICO “conspiracy,” that is, a viola-
tion of the completed offense under §§ 1962(a)–(b), either that the defendants com-
pleted them (or at least substantially completed them) in a particular fashion, would
read § 1962(d) out of RICO, making § 1962(d) redundant of §§ 1962(a) and (b). See
Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 606, 629 (1989) (“We do not agree . . . [because] the
. . . interpretation . . . would render that language redundant.”).  Such a holding is
also inconsistent with the well-established rule that a conspiracy and the substantive
offense are separate offenses.  United States v. Callanan 364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1960).
A claim under § 1962(d) to (a) (or, for that matter § 1962(d) to (b)) is appropriate,
therefore, when a plaintiff is injured by “racketeering activity” in the course of a con-
spiracy by the defendant to violate § 1962(a) (or § 1962(b)). See Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 13, at 1465–59 (rejecting contrary decisions).  Moreover, post Beck, the
legal premises of those prior cases not imposing more that overt act injury “remain
sound.”  Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Inves., Inc., 454 Fed. Appx 353, 367 n. 13 (3d
Cir. 2008).  Courts properly should refrain from adding unnecessary judicial gloss to
the statute’s plain language. Salinas, 522 US at 63.  As Justice Cardozo put it well: “[A
court’s] duty is done when . . . [it] enforce[s] the law as it is written.”  Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 228-29, 128 N.E. 185, 186 (1920).
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require the commission of an overt act.108  Accordingly, the period of
limitations does not run until the conspiratorial purposes have been
abandoned or accomplished.109  Subsections (a), (b), and (c) are sub-
ject to the general conspiracy statute110 that requires an overt act.111
If the government charged a defendant with conspiracy to violate sub-
108 The text of § 1962(d) does not include an overt act requirement. See S. REP.
No. 91-617, at 159 (1969) (“The section does not require an overt act for the offense
of conspiracy.  It punishes conspiracy ‘on the common law footing.’  Hence the
indictment is sufficient if the words ‘or conspire to do so’ extend to all conspiracies to
commit offenses against the Act. . . . We think that construction is grammatically
permissible and conforms with the legislative scheme.” (citing Singer v. United States,
323 U.S. 338, 340–41 (1945))).  No grounds exist to require an overt act.  On the
other hand, United States v. Sutherland suggested that § 1962(d) requires an overt act.
656 F.2d 1181, 1186 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).  The Court rejected the Sutherland position
in Salinas.  See 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (holding that § 1962(d) does not require an
overt act).  The language and legislative history of RICO compelled that result.
109 United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124–25 (11th Cir. 1983) (following
United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.1981)).  In reversing the district
court that dismissed a RICO indictment for a failure to allege an overt act, the circuit
observed:
The applicable statute of limitations provides . . . [for five years after com-
mission of the offense].
It is the question of when a crime is complete that is the raison d’etre
. . . whether a RICO conspiracy requires the commission of an overt act. . . .
[A] conspiracy requiring an overt act is deemed complete for statute of limi-
tations purposes at the time of completion of the last overt act. . . . With
respect to conspiracy statutes that do not require proof of an overt act, the
indictment satisfies the requirements of the statute of limitations if the con-
spiracy is alleged to have continued into the limitations period.  The conspir-
acy may be deemed to continue as long as its purposes have neither been
abandoned nor accomplished.
Both in the indictment and at the pretrial hearing, the government con-
sistently alleged that the conspiracy continued well into the limitations
period. . . . [T]he district judge ignored this, fixing his mind . . . on the
nonexistence of a presumptively required overt act. . . .
Since both the conspiracy itself and its enduring nature may be proven
circumstantially, any indictment alleging facts in the time period close to the
commencement of the limitations period could support an inference that
the conspiracy continued into the limitations period. . . . [T]he district court
should not require the government to launder its evidence in the presence
of the defendant prior to trial.
Id. at 1124–25 (citations omitted).
110 The general federal conspiracy statute, in pertinent part, provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
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sections (a), (b), or (c) under the general statute, the period of limita-
tions would run from the last overt act done to affect the objective (or
abandonment, frustration, or withdrawal) of the conspiracy.112  This
last overt act would not necessarily be an act of racketeering, because
it is a completed offense, and an overt act can be innocent in itself.113
When determining whether a prosecution is timely, you have to
take into account not only the length of the limitations period and
when it accrues, but also any rules that toll the running of the limita-
tions period.  For example, the government can commence a RICO
conspiracy prosecution under § 1962(d) more than five years after the
conspiracy has terminated if a tolling rule suspends the running of the
limitations period.
D. Tolling of Criminal Statutes of Limitations
1. Federal Tolling Rules
Federal law reflects two major tolling rules.  The first is that the
commencement of a prosecution tolls the limitations period.114  This
rule is significant, because if the government later dismisses a timely
indictment (or information), it can still obtain a new indictment not
barred by the statute of limitations.115  Similarly, if the government
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (emphasis added).  Section 1962(d) does not require an overt
act, and its sanctions extend to twenty-year or life imprisonment plus forfeiture.  Sec-
tion 371, on the other hand, requires an overt act, and its sanction extends to five
years imprisonment.  Thus, the differences between the two conspiracy statutes are
considerable.
111 See United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 236 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e find that
in the RICO provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), Congress created an offense different
from the preexisting general conspiracy statute in 18 U.S.C. § 371, and intended to
allow cumulative punishments.”).
112 See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (“The statute of limita-
tions, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of the con-
spiracy.” (footnote omitted)).
113 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333–34 (1957) (holding attendance at
a meeting constitutes a last overt act); cf Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387–88
(1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that an overt act need not amount to an
attempt of the substantive offense).
114 See supra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.
115 For example, if the government indicts a defendant for a RICO conspiracy
four years and eleven months after the conspiracy terminated, the indictment is
timely.  If the court dismisses that indictment two months later for a technical prob-
lem, the government has a month to re-indict the defendant, because the limitations
period did not run during the two months while the initial indictment was pending.
Actually, in a situation like that, federal law extends the time to indict—generally by
six months:
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 75 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1655
discovers a problem with the initial indictment, it can obtain a super-
seding indictment116 that is not time barred, so long as it does not
broaden or substantially amend the charges from the original
indictment.117
The second major federal tolling rule has existed since the first
federal statute of limitations.118  It provides, “No statute of limitations
shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.”119  The justification
for this rule is that a person who leaves the jurisdiction where the
Whenever an indictment or information charging a felony is dismissed for
any reason before the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limita-
tions has expired, and such period will expire within six calendar months of
the date of the dismissal of the indictment or information, a new indictment
may be returned in the appropriate jurisdiction within six calendar months
of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, or, in the event of
an appeal, within 60 days of the date the dismissal of the indictment or infor-
mation becomes final, or, if no regular grand jury is in session in the appro-
priate jurisdiction at the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations,
within six calendar months of the date when the next regular grand jury is
convened, which new indictment shall not be barred by any statute of limita-
tions. This section does not permit the filing of a new indictment or informa-
tion where the reason for the dismissal was the failure to file the indictment
or information within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limi-
tations, or some other reason that would bar a new prosecution.
18 U.S.C. § 3289 (2006); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3288 (applying when the indictment or infor-
mation is dismissed after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations
has expired).  In United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1976), the
defendants were indicted on various federal charges.  The court dismissed the first,
timely indictment, and the grand jury did not return the second indictment until
after the five-year limitations period had run. Id. at 353.  The court held, however,
that the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations, because the second
indictment was returned within six months of the dismissal of the first indictment
under § 3288. Id. at 353–55.
A related federal statute applies under much more narrow circumstances.  When
the government dismisses certain counts of an indictment or information under a
plea agreement, and the defendant’s guilty plea is subsequently vacated on the
motion of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3296 enables the government “to reinstate the
dismissed counts within 60 days of the date on which the order vacating the plea
becomes final” regardless of the statute of limitations.  18 U.S.C. § 3296(a)(4) (2006).
116 A superseding indictment “refers to a second indictment issued in the absence
of a dismissal of the first.”  United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 237 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
117 United States v. Schmick, 904 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The return of a
timely indictment tolls the statute of limitations as to the charges alleged therein.  A
superseding indictment filed while the initial indictment is pending is timely unless it
broadens or substantially amends the charges made in the original indictment.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
118 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
119 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2006).
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crime is committed or goes into hiding to avoid prosecution should
not benefit from his wrongful flight.120  Still, a person who flees from
justice does not completely forfeit the protection of the statute of limi-
tations.  If that person openly returns and resumes his life, he is no
longer “fleeing from justice,” and the statute of limitations no longer
tolls.121  Courts generally interpret the phrase “fleeing from justice”
broadly.122  An intent requirement tempers that broad interpretation.
120 Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 133 (1895) (“[A]ny person who takes
himself out of the jurisdiction, with the intention of avoiding being brought to justice
for a particular offense, can have no benefit of the limitation . . . .”).  This tolling
provision is consistent with the balance the statutes of limitations was attempting to
achieve between the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and the defendant’s
interest in not having to defend himself against overly stale charges: “where the defen-
dant impedes the discovery and prosecution of his criminal conduct by ‘fleeing from
justice,’ his right to avoid prosecution for distant offenses is diminished while the
government’s need for additional discovery time is strengthened.”  United States v.
Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1988).  In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
413–14 (1980), the Supreme Court relied, in part, on § 3290 to hold that escape from
custody is a continuing offense.  Courts are reluctant to label crimes “continuing,”
because doing so undermines the goals of statutes of limitations by, in effect,
extending the limitations period.  Nevertheless, the Bailey Court dismissed this con-
cern, because the limitations period did not run “for the period that the escapee
remain[ed] at large,” because “an escaped prisoner is, by definition, a fugitive from
justice ” Bailey, 444 U.S. at 414 & n.10.  On “continuing offenses,” see supra note 57.
121 United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613, 616–17 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.), abro-
gated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2010).
122 In Streep v. United States, the Court favored a broad interpretation of “fleeing
from justice” over a more narrow interpretation favorable to the defendant when the
Court held that a person is “fleeing from justice” within the meaning of the statute
even if no indictment or complaint was pending and no prosecution had begun.
Streep, 160 U.S. at 133.  Following the Court’s lead in Streep, the courts of appeals
broadly interpret § 3290, as they did its predecessors.  For example, an accused is
“fleeing from justice” within the meaning of the statute, even if he has not left the
jurisdiction where the crime was committed:  “Physical absence from the jurisdiction
is not . . . essential to toll the statute of limitations under section 3290.  It is enough
that an accused leaves his usual place of abode and conceals himself for the purpose
of avoiding arrest or prosecution.”  United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that the government does not have to prove that the defendant left the jurisdic-
tion for § 3290 to apply).  The statute of limitations for a federal crime is even tolled
under § 3290 when the defendant is fleeing from prosecution for a different crime
committed in another jurisdiction.  United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050,
1052–53 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496–99
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the statute of limitations for the federal crime at issue
tolled when the federal crime occurred while the defendant was fleeing from unre-
lated state charges).
James Bulger’s flight from justice is classic. See Ray Gustini, How the FBI Captured
Whitey Bulger, The Atlantic Wire, Jun. 23, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/
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national/2011/06/how-fbi-feds-captured-whitey-bulger/39160/ (“FBI agents arrested
South Boston mobster James ‘Whitey’ Bulger last night in Santa Monica, ending a 16-
year manhunt for the fugitive Winter Hill Gang leader wanted . . . [for RICO involv-
ing 19 murders].  [The Bureau, in fact, finally] focused on Bulger’s girlfriend and
traveling partner Catherine Greig. . . .  [A]ds highlighted Greig’s frequent visits to the
dentist . . . and fondness for plastic surgery.”).  The capture of Bulger brings to its
denouement a tawdry chapter in the history of organized crime and federal law
enforcement in Boston, Massachusetts.  Indeed, the first motion brought by Bulger
resulted in an extraordinary review and removal of the selected trial judge, a former
federal prosecutor, to safeguard the appearance, not fact, of impartial justice. In re
Bulger, 2013 U.S. App LEXIS 5142 **13–14 (Mar. 14, 2013, 1st Cir.) (reciting a pleth-
ora of successful prosecutions over a substantial period; “[A]t relevant times the
defendant . . . controlled . . .  the Winter Hill Gang, and . . . [he] agreed with FBI
agents to act as confidential informant . . . about . . .  La Cosa Nostra . . . . The period
. . . overlapped . . . the dates of the activity alleged in the . . . indictment and the years
that . . . [the District Court] held supervisory positions in the federal prosecutor’s
office.” (citations omitted)).  Traditionally, two organized crime groups cooperated
for the control of the rackets in Boston: the Winter Hill gang, an Irish group, and a
regime of the Raymond Patricara Family of the mob, an Italian group.  As if to prove
that trust does not exist among thieves, Bulger entered into an unholy alliance with
the F.B.I, in particular Special Agent John J. Connonlly, Jr., for immunity in exchange
for information against Gennaro Angiulo, the leader of the Italian group.  In fact, his
information gave the probable cause needed to obtain an order to place bugs that
resulted a series of successful prosecutions. STEPHEN FOX, BLOOD AND POWER 400–05
(1990) recounts the facts of the surveillance from its surreptitious entry on a cold
winter evening in the North End of Boston to its final successful raid.  Among other
successful cases, it underwrote a comprehensive and illustrative organized crime pros-
ecution in United States v. Anguilo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1176, 1179 (1st Cir. 1990) (deal-
ing with, among other matters, electronic surveillance, voice identification, expert
testimony, coconspirator statements, conspiracy and accessory liability, and upholding
RICO convictions, while holding “pattern” not vague, despite Justice Scalia (see,
supra, note 45) on an as applied basis to mob family; “The evidence introduced
against defendants . . . was, in large part, the product of court-authorized electronic
surveillance conducted at 98 Prince Street and 51 North Margin Street in Boston’s
North End during the period January-May 1981.  Through a combination of audio
and video surveillance, FBI agents monitored the arrivals and departures of persons
from these premises, as well as their conversations on the premises.  Tapes and tran-
scripts from this surveillance were introduced at trial, accompanied by material seized
during the execution of various search warrants. . . . Defendants were . . .  members of
the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra.  Gennaro Angiulo was the underboss . . . in
charge of its day-to-day operations.  Immediately beneath him in the command hier-
archy were “Capo Regimes” (captains) Samuel Granito and Donato Angiulo.  Beneath
the Capo Regimes, the organization consisted of soldiers and then of associates.  Fran-
cesco Angiulo was a soldier, and . . . served as accountant for the organization’s gam-
bling and loansharking businesses.  Michele Angiulo was an associate.  The
organization was headquartered at 98 Prince Street and engaged in widespread racke-
teering, gambling, and loansharking activities[;] the statute is not . . . unconstitution-
ally vague . . . because . . . uncertainty exists regarding the . . . reach of the statute in
marginal fact situations . . . . Rather, in the absence of first amendment [sic] consider-
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Most of the courts of appeals hold that, for a person to be “fleeing
from justice” within the meaning of the statute, the person must act
with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution.123
ations, vagueness challenges must be examined in light of a case’s particular facts. . . .
Thus, for defendants’ vagueness challenge to succeed, they must demonstrate that . . .
RICO’s “pattern” . . . vague as to their conduct at issue here. . . . [T]hey must show that
persons of ordinary intelligence in their situation would not have had adequate
notice that the gambling, loansharking and conspiracy offenses at issue here consti-
tuted a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ under RICO. . . . [F]or if anything is clear
. . . , it is that . . . [RICO] is intended to encompass the activities of organized crime
families. . . . [W]e have no doubt that the murder conspiracies and the gambling and
loansharking operations . . . here are precisely the type of activity that Congress
intended to reach through RICO. . . . A person of ordinary intelligence could not
help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall within the ambit
of . . . [RICO].”).  The rank specious character of the vagueness argument is aptly
brought out in a conversation overheard at 98 Prince Street. See United States v.
Cintolo, 818 F. 2d 980, 984–85 (1st Cir. 198 (quoting Gennaro Angiulo: “Under RICO,
no matter who we are, if we are together, they will get everyone of us.”). DICK LEHR &
GERARD O’NEILL, IN BLACK MASS (2000), recount the tragic story of the corrupt rela-
tion between the law enforcement officer and the Irish mobster from their common
origins in housing projects in the most insular of Irish neighborhoods in South Bos-
ton.  The corrupt relation also resulted in United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 444 (1st
Cir. 2003) (upholding of a RICO conviction of the principal FBI agent in the corrupt
alliance).  Widows and the estates of murdered federal informants brought wrongful
death actions, because the FBI revealed the identities of various informants in the
Boston area to Irish mobsters and protected the mobsters from state or federal prose-
cutions for murder and other racket offenses.  One succeeded.  McIntyre ex rel.
Estates of McIntyre v. United States, 545 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2008).  One failed, because
the widow failed to file her suit within two years after she knew or should have known
of the existence and cause of her injury in light of public hearings on the unholy
alliance widely published in the Boston press.  Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d
444, 452–55 (1st Cir. 2005)(“A plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when she knew or
should have known of a causal connection between her injury and the government.”).
123 While the Court in Streep avoided squarely addressing the issue of the state of
mind (if any) under § 3290, it indicated fleeing from justice required an intent of
avoiding prosecution, though not of avoiding prosecution in a specific court or juris-
diction.  160 U.S. at 133–34.  Most courts of appeals, based on Streep, will not toll the
statute of limitations unless the accused acted with the intent to avoid arrest or prose-
cution. See e.g., United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he
defendant’s intent to avoid arrest or prosecution must be proved in order to trigger
the tolling provisions of Section 3290.”); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 486 F.2d 442, 444 (2d
Cir. 1973) (“[T]he government must show an intent to flee from prosecution or
arrest before the statute of limitations is tolled.”).  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit do not require any state of mind under § 3290:  If the accused leaves
the jurisdiction where the crime occurred, he is “fleeing from justice,” and the statute
of limitations tolls.  King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1944) (relying
on Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97 (1885) (extradition) and Appleyard v. Massachu-
setts, 203 U.S. 222, 231 (1906) (extradition)); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d
791, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (relying on Roberts, 116 U.S. at 80).  The circuit courts in
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Two other federal statutory tolling rules only apply in special cir-
cumstances.  First, when the United States is at war, the statute of limi-
tations for certain crimes involving “war frauds of a pecuniary nature
or of a nature concerning property”124 is suspended “until 5 years
after the termination of hostilities.”125  Second, when evidence of a
King and McGowen misinterpreted Streep.  The Court in Streep pointed to the federal
extradition statute as a guide in that, under each statute, a person flees justice, even if
the government had not begun a prosecution or did not anticipate an immediate
prosecution. 160 U.S. at 133–35.  The Streep Court did not hold that the tolling statute
and the extradition statute were identical.  The Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
ignore the distinction and apply the longstanding rule from extradition cases—that
no state of mind is required—to toll cases in spite of contrary language in Streep. The
decisions are unpersuasive.
124 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 216 (1953).
125 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. V 2011).  Currently, this Section, in pertinent part,
provides:
When the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific authori-
zation for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)), the running of any statute of
limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud
against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by
conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection with the acquisition,
care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any real or personal prop-
erty of the United States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotia-
tion, procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing,
cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcon-
tract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the prosecu-
tion of the war or directly connected with or related to the authorized use of
the Armed Forces, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any
war contractor or Government agency, shall be suspended until 5 years after
the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation,
with notice to Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.
In Bridges, the Court appropriately interpreted § 3287 narrowly based on its pur-
pose—to protect the United States from fraud in wartime situations where the gov-
ernment’s “gigantic and hastily organized procurement program” provides an
unusual opportunity to defraud the United States and makes the detection and prose-
cution of fraud more difficult. Bridges, 346 U.S. at 216–18.
At the time Bridges was decided, § 3287 provided for a three-year limitations
period, and the Court interpreted that version.  18 U.S.C. § 3287  (1952); see 346 U.S.
at 217 n.15.  The language on which the Court relied provided:
When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations
applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the
United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy
or not, or (2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling,
custody, control or disposition of any real or personal property of the United
States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement,
award, performance, payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other
termination or settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order
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crime is (or reasonably appears to be) in a foreign country, the district
court can suspend the running of the statute of limitations while the
United States attempts to obtain the evidence through an official
request.126  Under this tolling provision, suspension cannot exceed
more than three years.127
2. State Tolling Rules
Tolling rules for criminal statutes of limitations vary from state to
state, but several common tolling provisions deserve mention.  As on
the federal level, when the government commences a prosecution, the
statute of limitations tolls.128  If a court later dismisses the indictment,
which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the war, or with any
disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or Government
agency, shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostili-
ties as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of
Congress.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1952)).
126 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2006).  This Section provides:
(a) (1) Upon application of the United States, filed before return of an
indictment, indicating that evidence of an offense is in a foreign country,
the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to investigate the
offense shall suspend the running of the statute of limitations for the offense
if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an official request
has been made for such evidence and that it reasonably appears, or reasona-
bly appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was,
in such foreign country.
(2) The court shall rule upon such application not later than thirty days
after the filing of the application.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a period of sus-
pension under this section shall begin on the date on which the official
request is made and end on the date on which the foreign court or authority
takes final action on the request.
(c) The total of all periods of suspension under this section with respect
to an offense—
(1) shall not exceed three years; and
(2) shall not extend a period within which a criminal case must be initi-
ated for more than six months if all foreign authorities take final action
before such period would expire without regard to this section.
(d) As used in this section, the term “official request” means a letter
rogatory, a request under a treaty or convention, or any other request for
evidence made by a court of the United States or an authority of the United
States having criminal law enforcement responsibility, to a court or other
authority of a foreign country.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., State v. Underwood, 92 S.E.2d 461, 463 (N.C. 1956) (“In criminal
cases where an indictment or presentment is required, the date on which the indict-
ment or presentment has been brought or found by the grand jury marks the begin-
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the government can re-indict without regard to the statute of limita-
tions,129 or if the first indictment is defective in some way, the govern-
ment can issue a timely superseding indictment.130  In many states,
ning of the criminal proceeding and arrests the statute of limitations.”); State v.
Jennings, 657 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Wis. 2003) (“[I]t appears that the six-year statute of
limitations begins to toll at the earliest point at which criminal proceedings may be
commenced.”).  Some courts, however, hold that a defective indictment that will not
support a valid conviction does not toll the statute of limitations (unless a statute
specifically provides otherwise), because such indictment is a nullity. See Common-
wealth v. Cardonick, 292 A.2d 402, 406–07 (Pa. 1972). But see State v. Stewart, 438
A.2d 671, 674–75 (reviewing the split among states on this point and holding that,
based on the wording of the Vermont statute of limitations, an indictment tolls the
running of a statute of limitations whether the indictment is valid or not).  The rule
set forth in Cardonick prevents the government from re-indicting a suspect when the
court dismisses an indictment after the limitations period has run, even though the
initial indictment was timely.  Arguably, this rule is unduly restrictive given the pur-
poses of statutes of limitations, because it allows fortunate defendants to escape prose-
cution because of a technical error, even though the initial indictment put them on
notice that the grand jury had charged them with a particular crime, allowing them to
preserve evidence and begin preparing a defense within the limitations period.
129 Within many states, a statute governs the amount of time that the government
has to re-indict after a court dismisses the original indictment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.15(4)(c) (West Supp. 2012):
If, however, an indictment or information has been filed within the time
period prescribed in this section and the indictment or information is dis-
missed or set aside because of a defect in its content or form after the time
period has elapsed, the period for commencing prosecution shall be
extended 3 months from the time the indictment or information is dis-
missed or set aside.
130 The superseding indictment cannot broaden the original charges. See, e.g.,
State v. Jennings, 928 A.2d 541, 546 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (“When . . . the state files
an amended or substitute information after the limitations period has passed, the first
information will toll the statute if the amended or substitute information does not
broaden or substantially amend the charges made in the first information.”); State v.
Eppens, 633 P.2d 92, 95–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an amended infor-
mation relates back to the original information so long as it does not broaden the
charges against the defendant).
In many states, statutes limit amendments to specified circumstances. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009 (West 2008):
An indictment, accusation or information may be amended by the district
attorney, and an amended complaint may be filed by the prosecuting attor-
ney, without leave of court at any time before the defendant pleads or a
demurrer to the original pleading is sustained.  The court in which an action
is pending may order or permit an amendment of an indictment, accusation
or information, or the filing of an amended complaint, for any defect or
insufficiency, at any stage of the proceedings, or if the defect in an indict-
ment or information be one that cannot be remedied by amendment, may
order the case submitted to the same or another grand jury, or a new infor-
mation to be filed.  The defendant shall be required to plead to such amend-
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criminal statutes of limitations also toll when the accused is absent
from the state,131 is not ‘usually and publicly’ a resident within the
state,132 is fleeing from justice,133 or when the accused conceals him-
self.134  Some states toll certain criminal statutes of limitations until
the discovery of the crime, especially for crimes that are difficult to
detect.135  Finally, some states have special statutes, similar to tolling
provisions that allow the federal government to prosecute certain
ment or amended pleading forthwith, or, at the time fixed for pleading, if
the defendant has not yet pleaded and the trial or other proceeding shall
continue as if the pleading had been originally filed as amended, unless the
substantial rights of the defendant would be prejudiced thereby, in which
event a reasonable postponement, not longer than the ends of justice
require, may be granted.  An indictment or accusation cannot be amended
so as to change the offense charged, nor an information so as to charge an
offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.  A
complaint cannot be amended to charge an offense not attempted to be
charged by the original complaint, except that separate counts may be
added which might properly have been joined in the original complaint.
The amended complaint must be verified but may be verified by some per-
son other than the one who made oath to the original complaint.
131 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(d) (West 2008):
If the defendant is out of the state when or after the offense is committed,
the prosecution may be commenced as provided in Section 804 within the
limitations of time prescribed by this chapter, and no time up to a maximum
of three years during which the defendant is not within the state shall be a
part of those limitations.
132 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-103 (2010) (“No period during which the
party charged conceals the fact of the crime, or during which the party charged was
not usually and publicly resident within the state, is included in the period of
limitation.”).
133 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-110(9) (West Supp. 2010) (“The time limita-
tions prescribed in this section shall not extend to any person fleeing from justice.”).
134 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-2(h) (West 2012) (“The period within which
a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which: (1) the
accused person is not usually and publicly resident in Indiana or so conceals himself
or herself that process cannot be served . . . .”).
135 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(c) (West Supp. 2012):
A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not commence to run
until the discovery of an offense described in this subdivision.  This subdivi-
sion applies to an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, a material ele-
ment of which is fraud or breach of a fiduciary obligation, the commission of
the crimes of theft or embezzlement upon an elder or dependent adult, or
the basis of which is misconduct in office by a public officer, employee, or
appointee . . . .
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offenses long after the usual limitations period has run based on the
government’s possession of identifying DNA evidence.136
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL RICO CASES
A. History and Justifications
Civil statutes of limitations were not a part of English common
law, but were creatures of the legislature.137  The first English statutes
of limitations did not specify a time beyond which they barred actions.
Instead, the English Parliament chose “certain notable times;”-like the
beginning of the reign of Henry I, the return of John from Ireland, or
the coronation of Richard I-and barred civil actions involving realty
that accrued before that date.138  In 1540, during the reign of Henry
VIII, the Parliament, recognizing the limitations of the old system,
136 See, e.g., FLA.  STAT. ANN. § 775.15(16)(a) (West 2010):
In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution
for any of the following offenses may be commenced at any time after the
date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been
established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence
collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is pre-
served and available for testing by the accused:
1. Aggravated battery or any felony battery offense under chapter 784.
2. Kidnapping under s. 787.01 or false imprisonment under s. 787.02.
3. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.
4. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04, s. 825.1025, or s.
847.0135(5).
5. A burglary offense under s. 810.02.
6. A robbery offense under s. 812.13, s. 812.131, or s. 812.135.
7. Carjacking under s. 812.133.
8. Aggravated child abuse under s. 827.03.
137 1 HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND
IN EQUITY § 2, at 4 (Dewitt C. Moore ed., Matthew Bender & Co., 4th ed. 1916)
(1882).  In a few situations, something like a statute of limitations existed in the com-
mon law.  For instance, in early English law, for torts, the time limit for an heir to
claim property for relief died with either party. Id. at 4–5 (“[T]he maxim, ‘actio per-
sonalis moritur cum persona,’ applied [to tort claims]. . . .”).
138 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 123–24
(photo. reprint 1987) (1713); see also 1 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67
(referring to events “time out of mind” or “time whereof the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary,” that is, ancient customary law or the common law of the king-
dom); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 312 & n.2
(Little, Brown & Company, 5th ed. 1956) (1275) (articulating that the “time of legal
memory” was the date of Richard I’s coronation, September 3, 1189, fixed by the
statute of Westminster I, c. 39 (“beyond the time of King Richard, Uncle to King
Henry, Father to the King that now is”).
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passed a permanent statute of limitations that created civil limitations
periods.139  In 1623, the Parliament finally enacted a comprehensive
statute of limitations that became a model for American civil statutes
of limitations.140
Many of the same justifications that animate criminal statutes of
limitations also apply to civil statutes of limitations.  Civil statutes of
limitations save defendants from having to defend themselves against
stale charges141 and keep those stale cases out of court.142  They pro-
vide repose for the parties143 and certainty by notifying potential
defendants of the length of their exposure to liability,144 and they give
139 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1540).
140 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (1623).
141 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348–49 (1944) (“Statutes of limitation . . . are designed to promote justice by prevent-
ing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”); see
also Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913) (“The policy of
statutes of limitation is to encourage promptness in the bringing of actions, that the
parties shall not suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappearance of witnesses,
destruction of documents or failure of memory.”).
142 See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[C]ourts ought to
be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his
rights.”); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“[Statutes
of limitations] are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation
of stale claims . . . .”).
143 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); see also Wood v. Carpen-
ter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (“[Statutes of limitations] promote repose by giving
security and stability to human affairs.”).
144 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938) (“The statute
of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to protect the citizens from stale and
vexatious claims, and to make an end to the possibility of litigation after the lapse of a
reasonable time.”).
“Repose” is, however, often a technical word. Whether a statute is a “statute of
limitations” or a statute of “repose” is crucial to the application of tolling doctrines.
Tolling doctrines, for example, do not apply to statutes of repose.  Tello v. Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc. 410 F.3d 1275, 1279 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2005) (examining a securities
statute of repose of five-years).  Similarly, the application of other defenses turns on
how the bar is conceptualized, for example, “recoupment” of moneys had and
received by way of defense, or using as a counterclaim, a claim for relief otherwise
time-barred.  The answer in each case turns on whether the statute barred “the right
or the remedy.” See, e.g., Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 415–17 (1998)
(“The Beaches concede that any right they may have had to institute an independent
proceeding for rescission under § 1635 lapsed in 1989, three years after they closed
the loan with the bank, but they argue that the restriction to three years in § 1635(f)
is a statute of limitation governing only the institution of suit and accordingly has no
effect when a borrower claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a ‘defense in recoup-
ment’ to a collection action. They are, of course, correct that as a general matter a
defendant’s right to plead ‘recoupment, a defense arising out of some feature of the
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plaintiffs an incentive to litigate claims without unreasonable delay.145
Legislatures must balance these justifications for civil statutes of limita-
tions with the interests of the injured party and give the party a fair
chance to litigate a valid claim.146  As with criminal statutes of limita-
transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded,’ survives the expiration of
the period provided by a statute of limitation that would otherwise bar the recoup-
ment claim as an independent cause of action. . . .  [A] defendant may raise a claim in
recoupment even if he could no longer bring it independently . . . . [T]he object of a
statute of limitation in keeping ‘stale litigation out of the courts[ ]’ would be distorted
if the statute were applied to bar an otherwise legitimate defense to a timely lawsuit,
for limitation statutes ‘are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of particular
issues in lawsuits[.]’ . . .  The Beaches come up short, however, on the question
whether this is a case for the general rule at all.  The issue here is not whether limita-
tion statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation,
that is, ‘whether [it] operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is
the foundation for the claim’ or ‘merely to bar the remedy for its enforcement.’  The
‘ultimate question’ is whether Congress intended that ‘the right shall be enforceable
in any event after the prescribed time,’ and in this instance, the answer is apparent
from the plain language of § 1635(f). . . .  The terms of a typical statute of limitation
provide that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain period of
time. . . .  To be sure, a limitation provision may be held to be nothing more than a
bar to bringing suit . . . .  Section 1635(f), however, takes us beyond any question
whether it limits more than the time for bringing a suit, by governing the life of the
underlying right as well.  The subsection says nothing in terms of bringing an action
but instead provides that the ‘right of rescission [under the Act] shall expire’ at the
end of the time period.  It talks not of a suit’s commencement but of a right’s dura-
tion, which it addresses in terms so straightforward as to render any limitation on the
time for seeking a remedy superfluous.” (citations omitted)); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1991) (“The 1934 Act [on
securities claims for relief] contained a number of express causes of action, each with
an explicit limitations period.  With only one more restrictive exception, each of these
includes some variation of a 1-year period after discovery combined with a 3-year
period of repose.  In adopting the 1934 Act, the 73d Congress also amended the limita-
tions provision of the 1933 Act, adopting the 1-and-3-year structure for each cause of
action contained therein.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1327 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “repose” as “[a] statutory period after which an
action cannot be brought in court, even if it expires before the plaintiff suffers any
injury”).
145 See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868) (“[Statutes of
limitations] are founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims, which
are valid, are not usually allowed to remain neglected. . . . The policy of these statutes
is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.”); Wood v. Carpenter,
101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (“[Statutes of limitations] stimulate to activity and punish
negligence.”)
146 Legislative failure to give plaintiffs a reasonable time to sue raises constitu-
tional issues. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) (holding that a one-
year limitations period for paternity suits for illegitimate children denied these chil-
dren equal protection of the law); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ohio
1987) (holding that a limitations statute that barred the medical malpractice claims of
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tions, legislatures must strike a balance.  Plaintiffs should be able to
sue for compensation when injured, but at some point the defen-
dant’s “right to be free of stale claims . . . comes to prevail over the
[victim’s] right to prosecute them.”147
plaintiffs before they could reasonably discover their injuries violated the right-to-a-
remedy provision of the state constitution).
147 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
The court in Allen v. United States, 542 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1976), summarized the
purposes of statutes of limitations:
Time-bars serve different purposes in different contexts.  Some statutes of
limitations serve to protect the courts from the necessity for adjudicating
stale claims, and the litigants from the potential for error inherent in such
adjudications.  Others serve to strike a balance between the need for cer-
tainty and predictability in legal relationships and the role of the courts in
resolving private disputes.  Still others, such as short time periods for taking
appeals, reflect the need for prompt termination of the uncertainty in legal
relationships caused by the pendency of litigation.
Id. at 179.
As noted, with characteristic insight and clarity of expression, Justice Jackson
summarized the concerns behind of statute of limitations in Chase Securities Corp., 325
U.S. at 313–14:
Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind for it is
difficult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of law.
There has been controversy as to their effect.  Some are of opinion that like
the analogous civil law doctrine of prescription limitations statutes should be
viewed as extinguishing the claim and destroying the right itself.  Admittedly
it is troublesome to sustain as a “right” a claim that can find no remedy for
its invasion.  On the other hand, some common-law courts have regarded
true statutes of limitation as doing no more than to cut off resort to the
courts for enforcement of a claim.  We do not need to settle these
arguments.
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and conve-
nience rather than in logic.  They represent expedients, rather than princi-
ples.  They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from
litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has
been lost.  They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and una-
voidable delay.  They have come into the law not through the judicial pro-
cess but through legislation.  They represent a public policy about the
privilege to litigate.  Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is
called a “fundamental” right or what used to be called a “natural” right of
the individual.  He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it
exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by
legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control.
Id. (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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B. Determining the Limitations Period for Civil RICO
Usually, determining whether a civil action is timely involves
three questions148: (1) what is the period of limitations, (2) when does
the period accrue, and (3) when did the plaintiff commence the suit?
The period of limitations is easy to determine where the legislature
has specified it in the statute, but, with federal RICO and many state
RICO statutes, the legislatures did not designate a limitations period.
1. Federal RICO
a. Before Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
Before 1987, when the Court decided Agency Holding Corp. v. Mal-
ley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,149 federal civil RICO cases did not have an
applicable limitations period.  Except in rare circumstances, when a
federal claim for relief lacks an express limitations period, federal
courts adopt the most closely analogous limitations period provided
by state law.150  In theory, at least, adopting state limitations periods151
148 I leave aside, for now, the issue of tolling. See infra Part III.D.
149 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).  In
Malley-Duff, the Court, shifting its usual approach of going to state law to borrow the
period of limitations, instead borrowed the four-year limitations period from the Clay-
ton Act (antitrust) and applied it to civil RICO. Id. at 156.  The statute of limitations
for the Clayton Antitrust Act, enacted in 1955 after years of confusion over the proper
period of limitation for antitrust, now appears at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006):
Any action to enforce any cause of action under section 15, 15a, or 15c of
this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued.  No cause of action barred under existing law
on the effective date of this Act shall be revived by this Act.
150 What limitations period, if any, to apply to federal claims for relief when Con-
gress does not specify a limitations period is a problem that has plagued the federal
courts for over 175 years.  For an extraordinarily comprehensive and insightful exami-
nation of the issues, see Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Brian E. Pastuszenski, and Mark E.
Greenwald, Special Project, Time-bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of
Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1025–42 (1980) [here-
inafter Cornell Limitations Project] (describing the development of the practice of
adopting state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action).  When, however,
“Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created,
[that] is [the] end of the matter.  The Congressional statute of limitation is defini-
tive.”  Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).  On the other hand, when
Congress does not explicitly designate a limitations period, courts, at least in theory,
face numerous options.  Traditionally, federal courts analogize the federal claim for
relief to a state claim for relief for which the state legislature provided a limitations
period and then adopt that limitations period for the federal claim for relief. See, e.g.,
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976) (applying a two-year Virginia state stat-
ute of limitations to a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).  Initially, courts
believed the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (codified as amended at 28
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ensures that some limitations period will apply to bar stale federal
claims, implementing by judicial judgment a policy that rightly
belongs with the legislature.152  In practice, however, the adoption of
state limitations periods tends to undermine the purposes of statutes
of limitations (e.g., certainty) and leads to forum shopping and
unfairness.153  These frustrating and entangled problems were on
U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)), required federal courts to adopt state limitations periods. See
M’Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270, 277 (1830).  Later, the Court came to belief that
when a federal statute is silent, fashioning a limitations period is left to “judicial deter-
mination.” See Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395; see also DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 462 U.S. 151, 158–63 (1983) (discussing how federal courts generally borrow
state limitations periods, but are not required to).  In particular, the Court now holds
that lower federal courts should decline to borrow a state limitations period when that
period will frustrate the objectives of the federal statute.  See Occidental Life Ins. Co.
v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).  If a court decides that adopting a state limitations
period is inappropriate, it has several options.  It can adopt a federal limitations
period by analogy. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 156.  It can apply the doctrine of laches.
Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396–97.  It can judicially create a limitations period (something
courts are reluctant to do).  UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703–04
(1965).  Alternatively, it can opt to apply no limitations period. Occidental, 432 U.S. at
368–72; see 28 U.S.C. §1658 (2006); see also Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 170 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that if state law does not supply an appropriate
limitations period, then courts should apply no limitations period).  Fortunately, in
1990, Congress adopted a catchall four-year civil limitations period.  28 U.S.C. § 1658
(2006).  Thus, federal courts will not have to go through the complicated process of
choosing a limitations period when a federal statute is silent.  Nevertheless, this catch-
all limitations period is not retroactive.  It only applies to federal causes of action
created after December 1, 1990.  For claims for relief already in existence, the federal
courts will have to engage in the frustrating struggle to find an appropriate limitations
period.
151 State limitations periods vary based on the claim for relief.  Property claims
tend to have long limitations periods, while personal injury claims tend to have short
limitations periods. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5530 (West 2004) (establish-
ing a twenty-one year period of limitation for “[a]n action for the possession of real
property”), with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (West 2004) (establishing a two-year
period for “[a]n action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution or malicious abuse of process”).  Limitations periods for penalties and
forfeitures are often only one year. See, e.g., COLO.  REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103(1)
(d) (West 2005) (regarding “[a]ll actions for penality for forfeiture of any penal
statutes”).
152 Moreover, because courts consistently applied state statutes of limitations to
federal actions that lack limitations periods since at least the M’Cluny decision in
1830, it is arguably a fair inference that “Congress intends by its silence that [courts]
borrow state law.” Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147.  By not objecting, Congress at least
acquiesced in the practice.
153 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 n.25 (1985) (“[T]here is ‘uncertainty,
confusion, and lack of uniformity in selecting the applicable statute of limitations in
§ 1983 suits.’”) (quoting Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations is
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stark display when, before Malley-Duff, federal courts adopted for vary-
ing, and not always consistent, reasons a variety of state statutes of
limitations to apply to civil RICO cases.
To determine which state claim for relief, if any, was most analo-
gous to civil RICO, federal courts had to “characterize” civil RICO
claims.154  Courts could characterize civil RICO based on the alleged
Applicable to Civil Rights Action Brought Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 45 A.L.R. FED. 548,
554 (1979)).  First, because limitations periods vary from state-to-state, the application
of state statutes of limitations to a federal claim for relief will necessarily lead to
diverse limitations periods applying to the same federal claim for relief depending on
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  This, however, is the least of the complications.  The
statute of limitations for a given federal claim for relief may also vary among different
districts within states and even case-to-case depending on how the federal district
courts characterize the claim for relief and apply state borrowing statutes. See Lowen-
thal et al., Cornell Limitations Project, supra note 150, at 1057–84, 1095–1104.  This
uncertainty and lack of uniformity can make it almost impossible for plaintiffs to
determine by when they must file their claim for relief and for defendants (and soci-
ety) to benefit from the salutary benefit that statutes of limitations rightly provide. See
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275 n.34 (“On a human level, uncertainty is costly to all parties.
Plaintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their claims, having
wrongly postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute.  Defendants cannot
calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their delicts
lie in repose.”).  Moreover, this legal complexity leads to more, not less, litigation, and
unnecessarily delays a final decision on the merits of the case—a feature that statutes
of limitations, as bright-line rules, supposedly prevent. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275
(“Congress intended the identification of the appropriate statute of limitations to be
an uncomplicated task for judges, lawyers, and litigants, rather than a source of uncer-
tainty, and unproductive and ever-increasing litigation.”).  Finally, adopting state stat-
utes of limitations can lead to forum shopping and its consequential unfairness.  For
example, two plaintiffs may have identical claims, accruing at the same moment,
under the same federal statute, yet, a statute of limitations bars one claim, while the
other moves forward, not based on the merits of the claim, appropriately discounted
by the passage of time, but on the forum that the plaintiff selected.  Forum shopping
for the best law seldom produces just results across claims for relief and parties.
154 The “categorizing” process involves several discrete steps.  Initially, the court
must decide which state’s laws govern for limitations purposes (horizontal choice of
law).  Next, the court must “categorize” the “character” of the federal claim for relief.
To do this, the court must make another choice of law decision: the court has to
decide whether to “categorize” a federal claim by federal law or state law (vertical
choice of law).  After making this vertical choice of law, the court must decide
whether to “categorize” the federal claim for relief by looking to the facts of the indi-
vidual case before it or uniformly to “categorize” all claims for relief under the given
statute.  If the court decides uniformly to “categorize” all claims arising under a stat-
ute, then, instead of looking at the facts of the case before it (or the alleged predicate
acts in the case of civil RICO), the court can look to the character of the substantive
elements of the federal claim for relief, as a whole, to the character of the relief
requested, or to the purposes behind the federal claim for relief.  After “categorizing”
the federal claim for relief, the court can finally choose the most analogous limita-
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predicate offenses, the nature of the relief requested, or as a distinc-
tive separate offense.  Many courts looked to the predicate acts alleged
by the plaintiff, analogizing these to state law claims for relief.155  The
decision to “categorize” civil RICO based on the character of the pred-
icate offenses was problematic, however, because of the wide variety of
possible predicate offenses that a civil RICO complaint could include,
many of which, taken individually, have different periods of limita-
tions under state law.156  Thus, under this approach, civil RICO cases,
brought in the same state, could have different limitations periods,
and within a single case, more than one limitation period arguably
might apply.157
To avoid this lack of uniformity and uncertainty, other federal
courts sought consistently to categorize all civil RICO claims based on
the character of the relief requested.158  Accordingly, courts deter-
mined whether RICO’s treble damages provision was “punitive” or
tions period from state law. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268 (detailing the “categorizing”
process).  Given the variety of choices courts have to make in the “categorizing” pro-
cess, it is little wonder that using analogous limitations periods from state law leads to
a complete lack of uniformity between jurisdictions, within jurisdictions, and from
case-to-case.
155 See, e.g., Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079, 1083–84
(6th Cir. 1986) (finding that the fraud cliam was barred due to a four year statute of
limitations); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (finding that the fraud claim was barred due to a five year statute of limita-
tions); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 843–45 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding that the
securities fraud claim was barred due to a three year statute of limitations).
156 See Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 348–49 &
n.14 (3d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
157 For example, many RICO complaints at that time included allegations of wire
fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud.  Under state law, securities fraud often had a
different limitations period than common law fraud.  Thus, courts either had to
choose between two limitations periods that seem equally analogous or apply both
limitations periods in the same case.  Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011,
1014 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Either the one-year common law fraud period or the two-year
securities fraud period—or both, one to each count—might be said to apply.”).  To
provide a uniform limitations period for all civil RICO claims within a given state, a
court of appeals could uniformly characterize all civil RICO claims based on a com-
monly alleged predicate act (e.g., fraud).  This approach would lead to uniformity
within jurisdictions, but it also could lead to a situation where the state statute of
limitations for fraud governs a civil RICO suit containing no allegations of fraud.
Given the variety of potential predicate acts, it is not accurate to characterize all civil
RICO claims as analogous to fraud. Malley-Duff, 792 F.2d at 351 (“We . . . are reluc-
tant to elevate one predicate act among many to the status of a uniform RICO
characterization.”).
158 See, e.g., Tellis v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 745–46 (7th Cir. 1986)
(characterizing a civil RICO claim as an action for treble damages and applying the
two-year state limitations periods for penalties and forfeitures), vacated, 483 U.S. 1015
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“remedial.”159  They then used that characterization to arrive at a uni-
form limitations period to apply to all civil RICO claims in a given
state.  Courts that chose this avenue of analysis found themselves
embroiled in a mass of inconsistent case law.  A comparison of two
cases decided within the same federal circuit, State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Estate of Caton160 and Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.161 show the difficulties and flaws inherent in this approach.
In State Farm, the Northern District of Indiana performed an
exhaustive analysis of the text, legislative history, and case law involv-
ing the treble damage provision of RICO to hold that a civil RICO
action is remedial.162  In State Farm, the defendant argued that civil
treble damages under RICO are “penal” and did not survive the death
of the wrongdoer.163  Appropriately, the defendant analogized RICO
treble damages to the treble damages recoverable under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, which served as RICO’s model.164  Noting that many cir-
cuit courts held that only “actual” damages under § 4 are “remedial,”
and the trebled portion of the damages were “penal,” the defendant
plausibly argued that the award of treble damages in a civil RICO
claim for relief is “punitive.”165  After a thorough analysis, the court
appropriately rejected the defendant’s argument.
The court began by noting, “[m]ultiple damage provisions are
difficult to categorize under the traditional headings of compensatory
or punitive.  There are essentially two varieties of multiple damage
provisions: those designed as punishment for statutory violation; and
those designed to compensate the harmed individual by providing liq-
uidated compensation for accumulated harm.”166  Although RICO’s
(1987). But see Malley-Duff, 792 F.2d at 351–52 (refusing to apply the civil penalty or
forfeiture state statute of limitations to a civil RICO claim).
159 Often, courts see multiple damages as either “punitive” or “remedial,” but
those are not the only options.  Damages awards serve a variety of purposes, and not
all damages that exceed actual damages are “punitive.” See generally Blakey, Of Charac-
terization, supra note 29 (tracing the history and economic analysis of damages, multi-
ple and otherwise).  For an insightful and enlightening analysis of the problem, see
Kevin W. Goering, The Character of Treble Damages: Conflict Between a Hybrid Mode of
Recovery and Jurisprudence of Labels, in MATERIALS, supra note * at 428.
160 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982), overruled by Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656
F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
161 805 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987).
162 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 682.
163 Id. at 678.  At common law, actions for a penalty did not survive the death of
the wrongdoer. See Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884).
164 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 678.
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) and MATERIALS,
supra note *).
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treble damage provision is within a section of the Act entitled “Civil
remedies,”167 the court found the text of the treble damage provision
to be “silent” on the issue of the character of the civil treble damage
award.168  Consequently, the court turned to an analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the statute, which it found “specific” and of value.169
The court first examined the legislative history’s treatment of the
relationship between RICO and the Clayton Act.  The court con-
cluded from its survey of the legislative history:
Certainly [§] 1964(c) was modeled after [§] 4 of the Clayton Act.  It
was, however, cast as a separate statute intentionally to avoid the
restrictive precedent of antitrust jurisprudence.  The members of
Congress piloting this proposed legislation changed it so that it
complied with the ABA’s antitrust section’s report suggesting the
expedience of separate legislation.  Further, the equitable remedies
applied in the antitrust area have always been available to the Court.
Therefore, to burden RICO with restrictive antitrust precedent
would be contrary to the express legislative history.170
In short, the court determined that the character of treble damages
under § 4 of the Clayton Act was not persuasive in determining the
character of treble damages under civil RICO.
The State Farm court next applied the Seventh Circuit’s analysis
from Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corp.171 to determine
whether RICO treble damages are “penal” for survival purposes.  In
Smith, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a claim for
relief under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)172 survived the death of
the debtor-plaintiff.173  Even though Congress and the Supreme Court
167 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).  The Section is not entitled “Civil remedies and penal-
ties,” and none of the other provisions in that Section is feasibly “penal.”  In fact, the
plaintiff in State Farm argued that the Seventh Circuit already held that §§ 1964(a)
and (b) were “remedial” and not punitive in United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1974). State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 679.
168 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 679.  The court later noted, however, that, in
§ 904(a) of Title IX, “Congress has explicitly denominated RICO remedial, a determi-
nation which is ‘governed by . . . statutory direction.’” Id. at 681 (quoting Helwig v.
United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903)).  Section 904(a) provides, “The provisions of
[Title IX] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”  Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (empha-
sis added).
169 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 679.
170 Id. at 680.
171 615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled by Pridegon v. Gates Credit Union, 683
F.2d 182, 194 (7th Cir. 1982).
172 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006 and & Supp. V. 2012)).
173 Smith, 615 F.2d. at 413.
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had labeled TILA “penal,” the Smith court noted that “the term
‘penal’ is used in different contexts to mean different things.”174
Thus, the Smith court had to determine independently whether TILA
was “penal” for survival.175  In holding that the action under the TILA
was “remedial” rather than “penal,”176 the Smith court established a
three factor test for determining whether an action is penal for the
purposes of survival: “(1) whether the purpose of the action is to
redress individual wrongs or wrongs to the public; (2) whether recov-
ery runs to the individual or to the public; (3) whether the authorized
recovery is wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered.”177
The district court in State Farm applied this three-factor test to
civil RICO and found (1) that the purpose of civil RICO’s civil treble
damages provision (§ 1964(c)) was to redress individual wrongs; (2)
that recovery runs to the individual; and (3) that the authorized recov-
ery was not disproportionate to the harm suffered.178  The State Farm
court supported its conclusion that civil RICO is “remedial,” not
“penal,” by citing the statutory construction provision from § 904(a)
of Title IX.179  The court also found it significant that the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Cappetto180 already held that RICO
§§ 1964(a) and (b) were “remedial” and not “punitive.”181
174 Id. at 414.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 415.
177 Id. at 414.
178 Specifically, the court stated,
Section 1964(c) specifically provides that any injured person may sue to
recover damages he sustained due to a violation of [§] 1962.  The plain
import of the section is to redress wrong suffered by the individual.  Further,
the recovery runs to that individual with the obvious purpose of making him
whole.  The multiple damage provision might give rise to the conclusion
that the award is wholly disproportionate to the harm.  However, the treble
damages provided by the statute serve to liquidate uncertain actual damages
and encourage the victim to bring suit to redress the violation.
State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 681.
179 See supra note 168.
180 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
181 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 681. The court quoted the statement in Cappetto
that “A civil proceeding . . . is not rendered criminal in character by the fact that the
acts are also punishable as crimes.” Id. (quoting Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1357).  That
RICO offenses are punishable criminally with both fines and forfeitures as well as with
incarceration suggests that RICO’s civil provisions apply, in addition to the criminal
sanctions, are remedial; additional penal sanctions arguably would be excessive under
the Eighth Amendment.  In his dissent in Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
805 F.2d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987), Judge Ripple found
“disturbing . . . the court’s characterization of RICO as no more than a federal
surcharge against conduct already forbidden under state law.” Id.  Similarly dis-
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Finally, the State Farm court suggested that the mandatory nature
of treble damages under RICO182 confirms that such damages are
essentially remedial.  Viewing mandatory trebling as remedial “reflects
a policy of compensating injured persons which would be thwarted by
abatement.”183  The court argued that:
[A] construction of RICO which would insulate the assets of organ-
ized crime from treble damage claims, for example, where a nomi-
nee was killed, would frustrate the purposes of the act.  To allow
organized crime to profit by the fortuitous death of a principal
defendant or alleged wrongdoer at the expense of the injured civil
litigant would subvert the objectives of RICO, making its remedial
and deterrent purposes impotent.  In short, it would encourage the
murder of the nominee or principal wrongdoer if the criminal
organization were allowed to preserve its ill-gotten gains and avert
the disgorgement contemplated by RICO.184
Based on this exhaustive analysis, the court concluded that an
action for treble damages brought under § 1964(c) is remedial for
survival.185
In the same case, the State Farm court also had to determine the
proper limitations period for the civil RICO claim.  The defendant
argued that the court should adopt the two-year state limitations
period for statutory penalties.186  Based largely on its prior finding
that civil RICO’s treble damages are “remedial,” the court refused to
apply the two-year statute of limitations for statutory penalties.
The Seventh Circuit in Tellis v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.187
sought to determine the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to
treble damages claims for relief under civil RICO.  As with the ques-
tion of whether a civil RICO claim abates with the death of the wrong-
doer, the primary issue in State Farm, the Tellis court saw that its
choice of a proper limitations period turned on the court’s “character-
ization” of RICO’s treble damages provision as either “penal” or
“remedial.”  The Tellis court also saw the issue as whether it should
“characterize” civil RICO claims for relief uniformly as a whole in light
turbing is the notion that Congress would attempt to enact further penal sanctions on
RICO activity under the guise of “Civil remedies.”
182 The text of § 1964(c) provides: “Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of [§] 1962 . . . may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
183 State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 682 (emphasis added).
184 Id. (citation omitted).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 685.
187 805 F.2d 741, 742 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987).
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of the statute itself or whether it should characterize civil RICO claims
for relief on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts of each
case.188  The court held that “[t]he strong interests in uniformity and
certainty and the desire to avoid time-consuming litigation . . . war-
rant[ed] an adoption of the uniform-characterization approach.”189
Having decided to characterize civil RICO claims for relief as a
whole, the court thought it had to choose an appropriate statute of
limitations from Illinois state law.  The court narrowed it down to
three options—the two-year statute of limitations for statutory penal-
ties, the five-year statute of limitations that applied to common law
fraud, and the catchall period for all other civil claims for relief.190
The court began the process of choosing between these limitations
periods by surveying the decisions of other federal courts:
Our sister circuits have differed in their characterization of civil
RICO claims and thus in their selection of statute of limitations for
civil RICO claims.  The Second and Ninth Circuits have both
selected a three-year period for actions based on a statute; neither
court discussed other alternative characterizations.  The Third Cir-
cuit has selected a six-year “catchall” limitations period, i.e., a statute
of limitations for actions not governed by a more specific period of
limitations.  Several district courts have also selected catchall limita-
tions periods.  Other district courts have noted that a large number
of civil RICO claims are based on fraud, and have selected the
appropriate limitations period for actions based on fraud.191
The Tellis court, however, determined that these decisions were
of limited value, because the limitations periods available for federal
courts to choose from varied depending upon the courts’ determina-
tion of the applicable state’s law.192  Thus, the Tellis court felt it had to
characterize civil RICO claims for relief with little guidance from
precedent.
Based on its finding that “[t]he treble damages provision is the
most significant aspect of civil RICO,” the Tellis court decided that it
should characterize civil RICO claims as claims for relief for treble
damages.193  The court then concluded that claims for relief for treble
damages under civil RICO were “penal.”  Thus, the two-year limita-
188 Tellis, 805 F.2d at 744.
189 Id.
190 See id. at 745 (explicitly considering the first and second options and mention-
ing the third as what the Third Circuit had selected).
191 Id. (citations omitted).
192 See id.
193 Id. (citation omitted).
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tions period for statutory penalties applied.194  The court relied upon
the parallel between the provision for RICO treble damages under
RICO and the provision for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
Because the circuit had held that the treble damages provision under
an antitrust suit was “penal” for the statute of limitations,195 the court
held that a treble damage provision for a claim for relief under RICO
was “penal” for the purpose of limitations.  That said, the district court
in State Farm considered and found unpersuasive parallels between
RICO and the Clayton Act that the Tellis court found compelling.196
Significantly, the Tellis majority opinion does not make a single refer-
ence to State Farm, even though a district court in its own circuit issued
it less than five years earlier.197  As Tellis illustrates, the decision to
characterize RICO’s treble damages provision as “penal” undermines
the congressionally mandated remedial purposes of RICO because it
194 Id. at 746.  The Tellis court analyzed civil RICO only from the perspective of a
limitations question.  The conclusion drawn in Tellis ought not to find mechanical
acceptance in other areas, as that in State Farm (i.e., whether a treble damage award is
“penal” for the purpose of abatement upon the death of the wrongdoer).  A case-by-
case analysis of that issue is more appropriate on the issue of survival for the defen-
dant or the plaintiff. See Blakey, Of Characterization, supra note 29, at 108 n.51 (argu-
ing that a uniform characterization-driven rule across issues is over and under-
inclusive; a better line of attack is a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of each issue in light
of the varying purposes behind the rules that differs from rule (e.g., limitations) to
rule (e.g., abatement for plaintiff or defendant); it is also more consentient with mod-
ern (factor-based) Supreme Court jurisprudence rather than nineteenth century
(analytical) Supreme Court jurisprudence).
195 Tellis, 805 F.2d at 746 (citing Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer Coal
Co., 191 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1951)). Hoskins became obsolete when Congress enacted
a statute of limitations for antitrust claims under the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(2006).
196 The Tellis court’s discussion of the parallels between RICO and the Clayton Act
is limited:
The treble damages provision in § 1964(c) is virtually identical to the dam-
ages provision in the antitrust laws.  This parallelism is not merely coinciden-
tal, as Congressman Poff explained in his summary of the House version of
RICO: “[RICO] represents, in large measure, an adaptation of the machin-
ery used in the antitrust field to redress violations of the Sherman Act and
other antitrust legislation.”  Both the Supreme Court and this Court have
noted in other contexts the strong parallel between the treble damages rem-
edy in antitrust law and the treble damages remedy under civil RICO.
Tellis, 805 F.2d at 746 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  This abbreviated
analysis compared unfavorably with the State Farm court’s extensive and nuanced anal-
ysis of the relationship between the two statutes.
197 Judge Ripple made the only reference to State Farm in dissent, and he only cites
it for its description of Congress’s failure to enact a limitations period for civil RICO.
Tellis, 805 F.2d at 747 n.2 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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leads to circumscribing civil RICO with the short limitations periods
that states typically establish for penalties and forfeitures.198  These
periods are inappropriate in light of the necessary time it takes prop-
erly to investigate, analyze the evidence of, and prepare for compli-
cated civil RICO litigation199—hasty RICO filings serve neither the
plaintiff, the defendant, nor the court—and prevent the effective and
fair “private attorneys general” from bringing valid RICO claims to
enforce civilly the provisions of RICO.200  Moreover, the analysis in
Tellis is demonstratively mistaken.  The language and legislative his-
tory of RICO show that the treble damages provision is “remedial,”
not “punitive.”201
Characterizing RICO as a distinct offense202 was the best option
for courts trying to choose an appropriate state limitations period pre-
Malley-Duff.  It avoided the widespread and debilitating uncertainty of
the predicate act approach and generally led to more generous limita-
tions periods than the relief-requested approach.  Still, this method
was not ideal, because it was difficult for courts to find an analogous
state claim for relief with an express limitations period,203 and if no
analogous claim for relief and no state catchall limitations period
198 See supra note 188.
199 The RICO suit is different from other suits.  While a plaintiff may know of his
injury (and can sue the defendant under other theories), he may be—through no
fault of his own—wholly unaware that the defendant has engaged in a “pattern of
racketeering activity” or operates through complex “association-in-fact enterprises”
and is subject to suit under RICO.  Sometimes, only an indictment will duly inform
him, an indictment that may not come until right before the five-year criminal statute
runs, as it often does; even then, Assistant United States Attorneys often find it neces-
sary to supersede their indictments as more evidence unfolds in the criminal litigation
process through plea bargaining and turned defendants.  By that time, the statute of
limitations for civil RICO bars his claim for relief.  A short statute of limitations is a
bewitchment.
200 Congress designed the treble damage provision (1) to encourage private plain-
tiffs to file suits, (2) to deter criminal activity, and (3) to provide for monetary relief
for the usual legal damages, but also for inestimable accumulative injury. See generally,
Blakey, Of Characterization, supra note 29 (analyzing the history, economic analysis,
and rationale of multiple damages).  A short statute of limitations inhibits each of
these goals.
201 See supra text accompanying note 186.
202 See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 718 (2d Cir. 1987) (liability on
statute, three years), overruled on other grounds by Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127
(2d Cir. 2012); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (liability on
statute, three years); Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 554 F. Supp. 684, 690 n.2 (N.D.
Ga. 1982), aff’d, 743 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1984) (state RICO, five years); Ingram Corp.
v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.4 (E.D. La. 1980) (antitrust, one
year), rev’d on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983).
203 As the Court observed in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,
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were present, then this approach would yield no analogous or applica-
ble limitations period.  Moreover, this approach shared with the other
two approaches the flaws that necessarily follow from adopting state
limitations periods for federal claims for relief.  Specifically, the flaws
follow from the lack of uniformity state-to-state, because different
states have different limitations periods for comparable claims for
relief and because an analogy to a certain claim for relief in one state
may not apply in another state.  For example, a federal court applying
Georgia law could analogize federal RICO to Georgia RICO, but a
federal court applying Alabama law would not have that option,
because no state RICO statute is present in Alabama.  Accordingly,
this lack of uniformity leads to uncertainty, unfairness, and forum
shopping.204
Forum shopping is of special concern in civil RICO cases.
Because of the breath of “pattern” in RICO and joinder and venue
rules in federal law, RICO plaintiffs are often appropriately able to sue
in several jurisdictions.  Under RICO’s nationwide service of pro-
cess205 and venue provisions,206 plaintiffs can sue wherever a defen-
dant resides, is located, has an agent, or transacts business.  Under the
[E]ven RICO claims based on ‘garden variety’ business disputes might be
analogized to breach of contract, fraud, conversion, tortious interference
with business relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competi-
tion, usury, disparagement, etc., with a multiplicity of applicable limitations
periods.”  Moreover, RICO is designed to remedy injury caused by a pattern
of racketeering, and “[c]oncepts such as RICO ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of
racketeering activity’ were simply unknown to common law.
483 U.S. 143, 149–50 (1987) (quoting Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown life Ins.
Co., 792 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1986)).
204 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. R
205 Section 1965(d) provides, “All other process in any action or proceeding
under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such
person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.” For a comprehensive,
insightful, and persuasive review of the text of RICO, bewildering and conflicting
court decisions, and relevant policy considerations, see generally Rolf, supra note 13
(containing a comprehensive and insightful analysis of RICO’s service of process and
venue provisions providing for nationwide service of process and venue).  That said,
not all circuits agree in their reading of RICO’s service of process and venue provi-
sions. See, e.g., Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1229–34 (10th Cir. 2006)
(noting split between the circuits on whether § 1965(d) provides for nationwide ser-
vice of process, registering disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
“interest of justice” in § 1965(b); holding that the period of limitation begins on
“knowing or should have known” of injury; and finding that injury occurred when
plaintiff received defective building equipment not when the building collapsed).
206 Section 1965(a) provides, “Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter
against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any
district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 99 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1679
general venue statute, a RICO plaintiff can sue wherever “a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”207
Because RICO requires a pattern of racketeering activity and effect on
interstate or foreign commerce, “predicate acts will often occur in sev-
eral States.”208  Thus, a “substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim”209 can occur in several jurisdictions, and a
RICO plaintiff can select from among these.  Moreover, once venue
and jurisdiction are satisfied for one defendant, the court can bring
other defendants into the litigation in the interests of justice.210  More
generally, adopting state limitations periods for civil RICO (and other
federal causes of action) is problematic, because when state legisla-
tures establish limitations periods for state claims for relief, they do
See generally Rolf, supra note 205, at 1236–37 (explaining “RICO’s general venue
provision).
207 28 U.S.C.A § 1391(b) (West Supp. 2011), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdic-
tion and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–63 § 202, 125 Stat. 763
(2011):
A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defen-
dant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district
is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in
which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
In City of New York v. Cyco.net, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 526, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the
court held that “[a plaintiff] may properly lay venue in accordance with either 18
U.S.C. 1965 or 28 U.S.C 1391 . . . [because] Congress intended the civil RICO venue
provisions to be a liberalization to the federal venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”
208 Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154.
209 For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), see supra note 207.
210 Section 1965(b) provides:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the
United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other
parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court
may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may
be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.
Compare Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2006) (“When a
civil RICO action is brought in a district court where personal jurisdiction can be
established over at least one defendant, summonses can be served nationwide on
other defendants if required by the ends of justice”; rejecting Butcher’s on meaning of
“ends of justice”), with Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535,
539 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the “right to nationwide service in RICO suits is not
unlimited” and that “merely naming persons in a RICO complaint does not, in itself,
make them subject to section 1965(b)’s nationwide service provisions”). Cory is the
more persuasive analysis on the meaning of “ends of justice,” particularly where Con-
gress mandates “liberal” construction. See supra, notes 29–31 (liberal construction).
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not take into account national interests.211  For example, when a state
legislature decides on a limitations period for fraud, it does not con-
sider the broad remedial purposes of RICO or the complicated nature
of a RICO claim for relief based on fraud.  Thus, the application of
state statutes of limitations to civil RICO claims for relief undermines
the purposes of the statute by not giving potential plaintiffs a uniform
and fair amount of time to vindicate their rights under RICO.212
b. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
In light of these problems associated with adopting state statutes
of limitations for civil RICO claims for relief, the Court provided a
uniform limitations period in Malley-Duff.213  Two important decisions
paved the way for Malley-Duff: DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters214 and Wilson v. Garcia.215
In DelCostello, the Court determined what limitations period gov-
erned a federally created claim for relief.  The Court combined two
suits by employees against their employers for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and against their unions for inadequate repre-
sentation.216  The Court observed that in the absence of an express
federal period, courts generally adopt state limitations periods.217  Sig-
nificantly, the Court stressed that nothing in federal law requires the
adoption of state limitations periods.218  Thus, if applying state limita-
tions periods would obstruct the “purpose or operation of federal sub-
stantive law,”219 a federal court is free to adopt “timeliness rules drawn
from federal law”220 that better meet the purposes behind the federal
statute.221  Accordingly, the DelCostello Court eschewed various unsatis-
factory state law options and adopted the nearest analogous federal
211 See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (“State legisla-
tures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is
the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frus-
trate or interfere with the implementation of national policies.”).
212 See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154.
213 Id. at 156.
214 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
215 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
216 DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155–58.
217 Id. at 158–59.
218 See id. at 159 n.13.
219 Id. at 161.
220 Id. at 162.
221 The Court summed up its reasoning:
[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer anal-
ogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and
the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
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limitations period, the six-month limitations period provided by
§ 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.222
Two years after DelCostello, the Court faced an analogous situation
in Wilson v. Garcia when it determined an appropriate limitations
period for another federal claim for relief, civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.223  Nevertheless, unlike the DelCostello Court, the Wilson
Court chose to adopt state limitations periods.224  The Court began by
identifying the steps in the characterization process:
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from
state law.
Id. at 172.
222 Id. at 169; 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
223 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 262 (1985).
224 The Wilson Court chose this approach under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Section 1988,
in relevant part, provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the pro-
tection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are defi-
cient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the con-
stitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2006) (the current statute is identical to the 1985 version inter-
preted in Wilson except “the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes”
formerly read “the provisions of this Title, and of Title ‘CIVIL RIGHTS,’ and of Title
‘CRIMES,’” in 1985).  According to the Wilson Court:
The language of § 1988, directs the courts to follow “a three-step process” in
determining the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims: “First,
courts are to look to the laws of the United States ‘so far as such laws are
suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.’  If no
suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering
application of state ‘common law, as modified and changed by the constitu-
tion and statutes’ of the forum state.  A third step asserts the predominance
of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because
Congress did not establish a limitations period, § 1988 directed courts to adopt state
limitations periods unless they undermined federal policy. Id. at 266–67.  To the
degree that RICO does not contain a provision similar to § 1988, Wilson is of limited
value in reading RICO.
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In order to determine the most “most appropriate” or “most
analogous” [state] statute to apply to the [plaintiff’s] claim, we must
answer three questions.  We must first consider whether state law or
federal law governs the characterization of a § 1983 claim for statute
of limitations purposes.  If federal law applies, we must next decide
whether all § 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way,
or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon
the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in
each individual case.  Finally, we must characterize the essence of
the claim in the pending case and decide which state statute pro-
vides the most appropriate limiting principle.225
Going through these steps, the Court held that, because 42
U.S.C. § 1988 directs courts to turn to federal law first,226 federal law
governs characterization of § 1983 claims for statute of limitations
purposes.227  Next, the Court focused on the federal interests in “uni-
formity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation,”228
and held that a uniform characterization of § 1983 claims that led to a
single limitations period within each state best promoted those inter-
ests instead of a fact intensive case-by-case approach.229  Finally, the
Court held that personal injury claims for relief are the closest state
analogies to § 1983 claims for relief, and the state limitations periods
for those actions applies, therefore, to all § 1983 claims.230
As with § 1983 claims, so, too, with RICO, a strong interest in
“uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation”
stands out.  Without uniformity, “the legislative purpose to create an
effective remedy for the enforcement of federal [law] is obstructed . . .
for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collat-
eral matters.”231  Thus, the cogent rationales that led the Court in Wil-
son to adopt a uniform limitations period for § 1983 claims applied to
225 Id. at 268.
226 See supra note 25.
227 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268–69.
228 Id. at 275 (“We conclude that the statute is fairly construed as a directive to
select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983
claims.  The federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnec-
essary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored this simple
approach.”).
229 Id. at 272 (“[P]ractical considerations help to explain why a simple, broad
characterization of all § 1983 claims best fits the statute’s remedial purpose.  The
experience of the courts that have predicated their choice of the correct statute of
limitations on an analysis of the particular facts of each claim demonstrates that their
approach inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that is foreign
to the central purposes of § 1983.”).
230 See id. at 276.
231 Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
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civil RICO.  Nevertheless, the method the Court used in Wilson to
achieve a uniform limitations period for § 1983 claims did not fit com-
fortably within civil RICO.232  As with RICO, § 1983 provides a federal
remedy for a broad spectrum of conduct,233 but the conduct at issue
in § 1983 claims is more easily analogized to a single common law
claim for relief than the conduct prohibited by RICO.234  Because no
appropriate state law analogy stands out for civil RICO claims for
relief, the best approach for achieving a uniform limitations period
for civil RICO, the Malley-Duff Court thought, was borrowing the
period from federal law, as the Court did in DelCostello.
Two obstacles stood in the way of selecting a uniform limitations
period for federal RICO.  First, courts usually looked to state law.  Sec-
ond, the legislative history of RICO appeared—on one reading—to
reject a uniform federal rule.235  The bills that preceded RICO
included an express period of limitations.236  In addition, when the
House of Representatives considered RICO, Representative Steiger
offered an amendment that would have provided for an express
period of limitations.237  Finally, in succeeding Congresses, members
232 Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) does not apply to RICO.
233 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272–73 (“Almost every § 1983 claim can be favorably analo-
gized to more than one of the ancient common-law forms of action, each of which
may be governed by a different statute of limitations.”). But see infra note 234.
234 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 152
(1987) (“While ‘[t]he atrocities’ that led Congress to enact 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘plainly
sounded in tort,’ there is no comparable single state law analogue to RICO. . . . [T]he
predicate acts that may establish racketeering activity under RICO are far ranging,
and unlike § 1983, cannot be reduced to a single generic characterization.” (quoting
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 277)).
235 The Court in DelCostello indicated the relevancy of a statute’s legislative history
when courts choose a limitations period:
In some instances, of course, there may be some direct indication in the
legislative history suggesting that Congress did in fact intend that state stat-
utes should apply.  More often, however, Congress has not given any express
consideration to the problem of limitations periods.  In such cases, the gen-
eral preference for borrowing state limitations periods could more aptly be
called a sort of fallback rule of thumb than a matter of ascertaining legisla-
tive intent; it rests on the assumption that, absent some sound reason to do
otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow their previous
practice of borrowing state provisions.
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 n.12 (1983).
236 See, e.g., S. 1623, 91st Cong. § 4, (1969) (including a four-year provision).
237 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (statement of Rep. Sam Stei-
ger).  Significantly, Mr. Steiger withdrew his amendment; it was not defeated, because
the floor leaders from the Judiciary Committee acted under an informal agreement to
oppose any floor amendments.  Neither Mr. Poff nor Mr. Steiger wanted to create
adverse legislative history to a particular approach to a limitation’s period.  Similarly,
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unsuccessfully offered amendments to RICO that included express
periods of limitations.238  Accordingly, Congress, at least arguably,
opted against uniformity and certainty and wanted plaintiffs through
their choice of forum to select the period of limitations.
The Court in Malley-Duff, however, dismissed that legislative his-
tory argument.  According to the Court, Congress did have several
opportunities to enact a limitations period for civil RICO, but its fail-
ure to do so was by no means an unequivocal directive to courts to
adopt state limitations periods.239  Thus, the Court was judicially free
to determine an appropriate limitations period for civil RICO apart
from state law.240  Echoing DelCostello, the Court reasoned that the
antitrust statute was the most closely analogous federal statute, “a far
closer analogy to RICO than any state law alternative.”241  Not only was
the Clayton Act the best analogy for civil RICO, but also adopting the
four-year limitations period for civil RICO claims would lead to uni-
formity, consistency, and less litigation, the goals the Court achieved
in Wilson.242  Finally, adopting the four-year limitations period from
antitrust law “avoid[ed] the possibility of the application of unduly
short state statutes of limitations that would thwart the legislative pur-
the failure to enact an uniform period did not occur for lack of support, but time to
process the legislation in the House. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 74, at 1020
n.67.
238 In 1972, the Judiciary Committee reported S. 16, 92d Cong. (1972).  It passed
in the Senate.  118 CONG. REC. 29,379 (1972).  In 1973, the Judiciary Committee
reported S. 13, 93d Cong. (1973).  It passed the Senate.  119 CONG. REC. 10,319
(1973).  S. 16 and S. 13 were, in relevant part, identical.  S. 16 and S. 13 provided a
period of limitations for RICO.  The House Judiciary Committee took no action, not
because of opposition, but because of the press of other business. See supra note 237.
239 See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154–55.
240 See id. at 156.
241 Id. at 150.  Congress used the Clayton Act as the model for civil RICO,
designed the two acts to accomplish similar general objectives, and the major current
in the legislative history of RICO was its reliance on the Clayton Act model. See id. at
150–52.
242 The Malley-Duff Court noted that the federal courts had not adopted a consis-
tent approach to selecting limitations periods for civil RICO claims: “Indeed, an
American Bar Association task force described the current state of the law regarding
the applicable statute of limitations for civil RICO claims as ‘confused, inconsistent,
and unpredictable.’” Id. at 148 (quoting REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 391
(1985)).  The Court concluded that, as with § 1983 claims, civil RICO claims required
“a uniform statute of limitations . . . to avoid intolerable ‘uncertainty and time-con-
suming litigation.’” Id. at 150 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)).
Dissimilar to the Wilson Court and the circuit court in Tellis, the Malley-Duff Court did
not attempt a uniform characterization of RICO; instead, the Court simply borrowed
from federal law. Id. at 156.
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pose of creating an effective remedy.”243  Accordingly, the Court
applied the four-year limitations period of the Clayton Act to civil
RICO.
2. State RICO
a. When an Express Limitations Period Exists
Unfortunately, states with some versions of their RICO statutes
now face many of the same problems encountered under federal
RICO, including determining the length of the limitations period and
establishing the point at which the period will accrue.  Thirty-five
United States jurisdictions have RICO statutes; twenty-nine have provi-
sions for bringing civil claims for relief.244  Eleven with civil claims for
243 Id. at 154.  It also, necessarily, reflected the “federal policies that lie behind
RICO and the practicalities of RICO litigation.” Id. at 156.
As with a criminal defense of statutes of limitation, a civil defendant who seeks to
rely on a statute of limitations defense, because it is an affirmative defense, must raise
it in his answer or the court will consider it waived.  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d
128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Parties are generally required to assert affirmative defenses
early in litigation, so they may be ruled upon, prejudice may be avoided, and judicial
resources may be conserved.”).  The rule is variable.  Its application turns on
prejudice; absent prejudice, a court will recognize it even after trial. See Cetel v. Kir-
wan Fin. Grp., 460 F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006).  Rarely, a defendant can raise the
issue under Rule 12(b)(6), if the plaintiff “pleads himself out of court” by alleging on
the face of his complaint sufficient facts to show that his claim for relief is time-
barred.  Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.
2009) (“The statute of limitations for a civil RICO cause of action is a fairly generous
four years.  It begins to run when the plaintiffs discover, or should, if diligent, have
discovered, that they had been injured by the defendants.  A plaintiff does not need
to know that his injury is actionable to trigger the statute of limitations—the focus is
on the discovery of the harm itself, not the discovery of the elements that make up a
claim.  Dismissing a complaint as untimely at the pleading stage is an unusual step,
since a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the
statute of limitations.  But dismissal is appropriate when the plaintiff pleads himself
out of court by alleging facts sufficient to establish the complaint’s tardiness.” (cita-
tions omitted)); accord Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d
244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
244 California RICO only allows criminal forfeiture. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 186.3–186.5 (West 1999).  Connecticut RICO, too, only allows criminal forfeiture.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-397 (West 2007).  Michigan RICO allows civil in rem for-
feiture, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.159m (West 2004), but no civil claim for relief.
Id. at § 750.159u.  Nebraska’s “Public Protection Act” does not provide a civil cause of
action. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1351 (Supp. 2010).  New York RICO allows civil forfei-
ture, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.70 (McKinney 2008), and equitable relief initiated by the
court, the attorney general, or a district attorney. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1353 (McKinney
1997).  Virginia RICO only allows civil forfeiture. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-515(B)
(2009).
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relief do not include a special limitations period for civil RICO.245
The other eighteen include special limitation periods in the text of
RICO or elsewhere in their code.246  Most provide for a five-year
period.  As with federal law, when the state legislature expressly pro-
vides a special statute of limitations, it governs.  Thus, determining the
proper limitations period is only an issue when the RICO provisions
do not contain special provisions.
b. When an Express Limitations Period Does Not Exist
In eleven of the jurisdictions that have a civil RICO, but which
lack an express statute of limitations for RICO, the legislature pro-
245 The jurisdictions are Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Rhode Island. For the
citations, see supra note 14.  In Colorado, a statute of limitations is present that refers
specifically to civil actions under the Colorado RICO statute. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-80-103.8(1)(d) (West 2005) (“The following actions shall be commenced
within five years after the claim for relief accrues, and not thereafter: . . .  (d) All civil
actions brought pursuant to article 17 of title 18, C.R.S.”)  (The Colorado RICO stat-
ute appears in article 17 of title 18).  Nevertheless, §13-80-103.8’s title is “Limitation of
civil forfeiture actions related to criminal acts,” so the five-year limitations period may
only apply to civil forfeiture proceedings under Colorado RICO.  Moreover, this stat-
ute of limitations provision has been in the Code since 1990, yet no Colorado case
references it. See Todd Holding Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 874 P.2d 402, 405
(Colo. App. 1993) (indicating that no express statute of limitations governs Colorado
RICO).
246 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2314.04(F), 13-2314(I) (2010) (three years after
the violation was or should have been discovered or ten years after the events giving
rise to the cause of action, whichever comes first; civil actions by the state must be
commenced within seven years after actual discovery of the violation); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1505(f) (2007) (five years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(10) (West 2000)
(five years); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-8 (2011) (five years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:1356(H) (2005) (five years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(8) (West 2011) (five
years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.520 (LexisNexis 2006) (five years after the viola-
tion occurs or after the plaintiff sustains injury whichever is later); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75D-9 (2011) (five years after violation of provision terminates or claim for relief
accrues, whichever is later); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05(7) (2012) (within seven
years after actual discovery of a violation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.34(J) (Lexis-
Nexis 2010) (within five years after the unlawful conduct terminates or the claim for
relief accrues or within any longer statutory period of limitations that may be applica-
ble); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1409(E) (West 2004) (no private civil claim for relief
but five years for actions brought by the state); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.725(11) (2012)
(five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-206(h) (2010) (five years); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-1605(9) (LexisNexis 2008) (three years); V.I. CODE ANN. tit.  14, § 607(h)
(1996) (five years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.100 (7) (West 2009) (within three
years after the pattern of criminal profiteering activity was or reasonably could have
been discovered); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.88(1) (West 2005) (six years).
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vides a general catchall limitations period.247  In these eleven jurisdic-
tions, the federal experience teaches that the courts should use the
catchall limitations period, make an analogy to the state antitrust pro-
vision, or adopt the provision for liability based on a statute.  Persua-
sive arguments exist for each of them.  The principal determining
factor should be the length of the period of the limitation.  As the
Court in Malley-Duff observed, “[It is necessary to avoid] the possibility
of the application of unduly short state statutes of limitations that
would thwart the legislative purpose of creating an effective remedy.”248
No matter which one the court selects, it must afford the RICO claim
for relief sufficient time for the required extended investigation, for a
period of prudent decision-making, and for adequate time for careful
research and drafting of what is often an extensive pleading.  However
apparently reasonable each one of the choices is, the choice of one or
the other is not translucent.  For example, often catchall limitations
periods only apply when no other statute of limitations applies.249  A
party to a civil RICO suit who does not want the court to use the state
catchall limitations period or another might plausibly argue that
because another statute of limitations is a better fit for RICO, it
applies.
i. Borrowing the Federal Period
Other than applying the catchall period, an outlier possibility
exists for a party to argue and for state courts to borrow the four-year
federal limitations period from Malley-Duff.  This is the course chosen
by a New Jersey court in In re Integrity Insurance Co.250  In Integrity, the
247 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102(1)(i) (West 2005) (two years); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 657-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (six years); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-224 (Lex-
isNexis 2010) (four years); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-205 (West 2011) (five
years); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-1-2 (West 2011) (ten years); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 614.1(4) (West 1999) (five years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(g) (West 2005) (five
years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (LexisNexis 2010) (four years); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5527(b) (West 2004) (six years); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5294 (1991) (fifteen
years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (West 1997) (ten years).
248 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)
(emphasis added).
249 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-224 (LexisNexis 2010) (“An action for relief not
hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause
of action shall have accrued.”).  How much flexibility a court has in choosing a statute
of limitations to apply to a state RICO claim depends on the wording of the statutes.
If, for example, a statute of limitations applies only to antitrust claims, it might be
inappropriate to apply that statute to RICO claims if the statutes also have a catchall
statute of limitations.
250 584 A.2d 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
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court had to determine the appropriate limitations period for New
Jersey state civil RICO claims.251  Because New Jersey RICO closely
resembles federal RICO (actually, substantial differences exist, for
example, definition of person,252 use of “incident” rather than “act” in
“pattern,”253 etc.), the court decided to borrow “the four year federal
statute of limitations” that the Supreme Court borrowed from the fed-
eral antitrust statute in Malley-Duff.254  In so doing, the Integrity court
ignored the state catchall limitations period for the criminal code, not
in favor of some other, more applicable, state law statute of limitations,
but in favor of a federal limitations period—one that Congress did not
enact, but the Supreme Court borrowed from another federal statute
in default of congressional action.
The New Jersey state limitations period for claims for relief in the
Criminal Code at issue reads, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
code, no civil action shall be brought pursuant to this code more than
five years after such action accrues.”255  “[T]his code” in the catchall
statute refers to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice where the
statute appears and where the New Jersey RICO statute, including its
civil remedies provisions, appears.256  No other meaning easily comes
to mind.  Thus, this statutory period applies to New Jersey civil RICO,
and it sets a five-year limitations period for its civil RICO claims for
relief.  Nevertheless, the court in Integrity, though aware of the provi-
sion, simply chose to ignore it.257  The court also chose to ignore
other state limitations periods and adopted the limitations period
from federal RICO.258  The decision is indefensible.  The state legisla-
251 See id. at 286 (“There are apparently no reported decisions from New Jersey
State Courts determining the applicable statute of limitations.”).
252 Maxim Sewerage Corp. v. Monmouth Ridings, 640 A.2d 1216, 1221 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (declining to follow the federal enterprise-person rule
based on inclusion of enterprise within the New Jersey RICO definition of “person”).
253 State v. Ball, 661 A.2d 251, 263–64 (N.J. 1995) (noting that “incident” covers a
broader spectrum than that within the federal “act”; relationship, but not continuity
required, as in the federal act).
254 Integrity, 584 A.2d at 287.  The court reasoned that because the state legislature
borrowed Federal RICO’s “structure, purpose and remedies,” the court was justified
in borrowing “the new federal statute of limitations as well.” Id.
255 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(g) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
256 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-4(c) (West 2005).
257 In a footnote, the court dismissed the catchall statute: “[a]ttention is directed
to [the catchall statute] which may impose a five year statute of limitation.  This court
is not deciding the applicability of that statute to the case at bar.” Integrity, 584 A.2d at
286 n.1.  The court’s conclusion begs the question: “Why not?”
258 The Integrity court noted that New Jersey had an antitrust act with a four-year
limitations period. Id. at 287 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-14 (West 2001)).  Instead
of analogizing New Jersey’s RICO statute to New Jersey’s antitrust statute (reproduc-
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ture created a catchall limitations period to apply to certain civil
actions, namely, New Jersey RICO, which the Code did not otherwise
cover.  Nevertheless, the court ignored the legislature’s direction.
In construing another statute of limitation challenge, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Jen Electric, Inc. v. County of Essex259 observed
of the duty of every court in reading statutes:
ing the Court’s analysis in Malley-Duff), the court borrowed the federal limitations
period and stated that the reason it adopted the federal limitations period was
because no appropriate state law analogy existed. Id. at 288.  The court’s comment
hardly withstands careful analysis.
259 964 A.2d 790 (2009).  Far stranger still is the decision of the Third Circuit in
Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., 460 F.3d 494, 505–10 (3d Cir. 2006).  In Cetel, the circuit
faced a claim for relief under N.J. Civil RICO.  The district court followed Integrity
(four years); plaintiffs on appeal urged general statute of limitation of New Jersey
claims (six years). Id. at 510.  No one argued the Code statute (five years).  The Cetel
court reasoned:
To support this claim, plaintiffs rely on State v. Ball, in which, according to
plaintiffs, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to interpret NJRICO
coextensively with federal interpretations of RICO, instead opting to inter-
pret NJRICO as governed by state law principles. We disagree.  A close read-
ing of Ball suggests, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, that the New Jersey
Supreme Court believed the New Jersey RICO statute was and should be
consistent with the federal RICO statute. Ball, 661 A.2d at 258 (“[B]ecause
the federal statute served as an initial model for [the NJRICO statute], we
heed federal legislative history and case law in construing our statute.”).
Moreover, subsequent New Jersey cases belie plaintiffs’ contention that the
New Jersey RICO is somehow divergent from the federal RICO statute. In
any event, nothing in Ball, or any other case, stands for the proposition that
claims under the New Jersey RICO statute possess a six-year statute of limita-
tions, as opposed to the commonly applied four-year limitations period for
federal RICO claims.  There is no evidence that the New Jersey RICO statute
possesses a different statute of limitations from the federal RICO statute and
we refuse to adopt such a rule.  Thus, for the reasons above, and because
plaintiffs were on notice of their claims, we will affirm the dismissal of the
NJRICO claim on the ground of statute of limitations.
Id. at 510 (citations omitted).
While the text of its opinion reads as if the circuit had applied the federal antitrust
period, it added a footnote arguing the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow the
Malley-Duff analogy and adopt the N.J. antitrust period. Id. at n.11 (citing Integrity).
In fact, the N.J. RICO statute differs from the federal statute explicitly in several
respects.  The Ball court in full observed:
[T]he federal and New Jersey RICO statutes are similar.  Indeed, as origi-
nally introduced in the Assembly in February 1980, the New Jersey RICO
statute paralleled federal RICO.  The Legislature, however, came to perceive
purposes and goals to be achieved by the proposed anti-racketeering statute
distinct from those of the federal statutory scheme.  Consequently, in many
respects our Legislature departed from the federal example.  Nevertheless,
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[O]ur task is to determine the Legislature’s intent . . . . In that task,
we are guided by well-settled standards of statutory construction.  As
we recently noted, “[g]enerally, under those standards, the intent of
the drafters is to be found in the plain language of the enact-
ment[,]” and “[i]f the language is clear, then the interpretative pro-
cess will end . . . .” We are guided by first principles: our analysis
begins with the plain language of the statute. . . . That said, we also
have made clear that “[t]hroughout, our analysis is informed by the
injunction that words and phrases shall be read and construed with
their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly
indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to
the approved usage of the language.”260
In sum, Integrity’s decision is not consistent with the general
teachings of New Jersey’s own Supreme Court in County of Essex.
The ten jurisdictions which have civil RICO claims for relief do
not provide special limitations periods for RICO.  Each has a general
state catchall statute of limitations.  A party can make a credible argu-
ment, for example, for borrowing the state antitrust statute, but the
court’s choice is between it, the catchall period, and the period for
liability on a statute.  Going to federal law is indefensible.  No court
should follow the lead of Integrity.
because the federal statute served as an initial model for our own, we heed
federal legislative history and case law in construing our statute.
661 A.2d at 258 (emphasis added) (footnote ommited).
“Heed” does not mean follow without regard to the text of the NJ statutes.  In fact, the
N.J legislature staked out positions different from federal law, at least, on “enterprise,”
the enterprise-person identity rule, and “pattern,” and the N.J. courts recognize the
differences. See id. at 261, 263–65 ( analyzing that “enterprise” need not have an
ascertainable structure as at federal law; articulating that “incident” in “pattern”
rather than “act,” as in federal RICO, evinced “an intent to cover a broader spectrum
of behavior”; describing “relationship” required, but not “continuity,” as in federal
law); Maxim Sewerage Corp., 640 A.2d at 1221 (presence of “enterprise” in the defini-
tion of “person” indicated an intent not to follow enterprise-person identity rule of
federal law).  How the circuit failed to see these differences when it read Ball is unex-
plained.  Because the circuit cites Integrity, it is also chargeable with knowledge of the
period of limitations set out in the N.J. Criminal Code (five), even though it was not
argued; as with Integrity, it ignores the Code limitations and goes inexcusably to inap-
plicable case law. Integrity followed the federal antitrust position.  The circuit cites
Integrity for support of its prediction that the state supreme court would adopt the
state antitrust statute.  One does not follow from the other. Cetel offers no reason for
this line of analysis.  The circuit’s opinion borders on incoherency.  A five-year statute
might have made a difference to some, if not all, of the plaintiffs.  No thoughtful
court should blindly follow the lead of Integrity or Cetel.  They are wrongfully decided.
260 Jen Elec., Inc., 984 A.2d at 709–10.
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ii. Borrowing the State Antitrust Period
A second option for courts in states like New Jersey is to follow
the Court’s analysis in Malley-Duff on the state level, analogize the state
RICO statute to the state antitrust statute, and adopt the limitations
period from the antitrust statute.  The idea is attractive, and a court
should seriously consider this option.  The policies behind the two
statutes are similar.  Thus, similar statutes of limitations are good pol-
icy.  Nevertheless, whether this approach is appropriate, as always,
depends on the phrasing of statutes.  Take Illinois, for example.  Illi-
nois has a state antitrust statute with a treble damages provisions and a
four-year statute of limitations.261  So far, so good.  The Illinois RICO
statute contains a treble damages provision,262 a liberal construction
clause, and a requirement that courts read its provisions consistent
with the federal statute.263  So far, even better.  Based on these provi-
sions, the contention is open to a party credibly, if not powerfully, to
argue, that, as the federal courts read the federal statute to adopt the
antitrust statute of limitations, because of the similarity between anti-
trust and civil RICO, so, too, should the state court follow the
Supreme Court’s lead, and adopt the state antitrust limitations
provision.
Nonetheless, powerful counter considerations argue against, at
least in Illinois, adopting the state antitrust limitations period.  First,
the Illinois Appellate Court in People ex rel. Fahner v. Climatemp, Inc.
held that treble damages under the state antitrust act are “penal.”264
Accordingly, the state could not bring both a treble damages claim for
261 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 2010).  This section, in pertinent
part, provides:
In an action for damages, if injury is found to be due to a violation of subsec-
tions (1) or (4) of Section 3 of this Act, the person injured shall be awarded
3 times the amount of actual damages resulting from that violation, together
with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
. . . .
Any action for damages under this subsection is forever barred unless
commenced within 4 years after the cause of action accrued . . . .
262 725 ILL.  COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/6(c) (West 2009) (“Any person injured in his
business, person[,] or property by reason of a violation of this Act may sue the violator
therefor in any appropriate circuit court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the action, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
263 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/8 (West 2009) (“It is the intent of the General
Assembly that this Act be liberally construed so as to effect the purposes of this Act
and be construed in accordance with similar provisions contained in Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, as amended (18 U.S.C. 1961–1968).”).
264 People ex rel. Fahner v. Climatemp, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981).
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relief and a claim for civil penalties without subjecting the defendant
to punishment twice for the same act.265  While this decision did not
involve the statute of limitations, its characterization of antitrust treble
damages as a “penalty” might arguably extend to RICO along with
adoption of its antitrust limitation period.266  As these materials
show—beyond any serious quibble—federal RICO is “remedial,” not
“penal.”  Thus, the extension of a “penal” characterization to state
RICO is inconsistent with the legislature’s intent to keep the construc-
tion of the two statutes parallel.
A second objection to adopting the antitrust limitations period
for Illinois RICO is the Supreme Court’s reliance in Malley-Duff on
legislative history.267  While the states may adopt the language and
concepts from a federal act, they do not necessarily adopt legislative
history.  The Illinois statute is illustrative.  Its scope is limited, focusing
only on narcotics racketeering.268  An argument that both acts run
parallel strains each statute by suggesting that the antitrust laws, writ-
ten for “legitimate” businesses that stray from the proper path but do
not go entirely over the line, are the closest analogy to a RICO statute,
limited to wholly illegitimate, narcotics-trafficking.  Something is
wrong with this picture.
Nevertheless, the most powerful objection to following the Malley-
Duff approach in Illinois is that, when the Court decided Malley-Duff,
federal law did not have a general catchall statute of limitations for
civil actions.269  In Illinois, the legislature provides a five-year catchall
limitations period.270  The Court in Malley-Duff would not have disre-
garded a federal catchall statute of limitations.271  Moreover, and it is
265 Id. at 1099.
266 This is what the Seventh Circuit did in Tellis v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d
741 (7th Cir. 1986).
267 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
268 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/3 (West 2009).  The statute is the “Narcotics
Profit Forfeiture Act.” Id. at 175/1.
269 See supra note 151.
270 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-205 (West 2011):
Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the “Uniform Commercial Code”,
approved July 31, 1961, as amended, and Section 11-13 of “The Illinois Pub-
lic Aid Code”, approved April 11, 1967, as amended, actions on unwritten
contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to recover
damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the
possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion
thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced
within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.
271 See, for example, Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377–82
(2004), where the Court was eager to apply 28 U.S.C. § 1658, the federal catchall
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crucial, the Illinois antitrust statute of limitations, by its terms, only
refers to “action[s] for damages under this subsection,”272 where the
catchall statute of limitations refers to “all civil actions not otherwise
provided for.”273  Given restrictive antitrust precedent, the limited
nature of Illinois RICO, and, most important, the language of the gen-
eral statute of limitations, Illinois courts should not apply the reason-
ing of Malley-Duff and therefore should not adopt the state antitrust
limitations period.  Courts and attorneys in other states should care-
fully examine the language of each state statute before borrowing it.
iii. Borrowing the Limitations Period Based on the Alleged
Predicate Offenses
States that choose not to rely on their catchall statute, antitrust,
or liability on a statute will have little choice but to select a limitations
period based on their evaluation of the character of RICO predicate
offenses.  The overwhelming problem with this approach, as federal
courts found out pre-Malley-Duff,274 is the lack of uniformity, certainty,
and fairness.  RICO claims would have different limitations periods
based on which predicate acts plaintiffs alleged.  Conceivably, the
plaintiff might have two or more periods applicable to one RICO
claim for relief where a plaintiff alleges different predicate violations.
Litigation, however, should be simple and inexpensive.  It ought not
to involve “‘uncertainty and time-consuming litigation;’”275 it ought
to be a “straightforward matter.”276  RICO is complicated enough as it
is.  Whichever statute of limitations applies, it should quickly cut off
stale claims.  It should not be an occasion for more costly and compli-
cated litigation.  For example, courts might face two or more compet-
ing limitations periods depending on the character of the predicate
acts.  In Colorado, for example, a three-year limitation period governs
contract claims and fraud claims.277  Nevertheless, a two-year period
governs tort actions, including “tortious breach of contract” and
“interference with relationships.”278  The two-year period also governs
“actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of
statute of limitations and read it broadly to avoid many of the problems associated
with borrowing state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action.
272 See supra note 261 (emphasis added).
273 See supra note 270.
274 See supra note 150–212 and accompanying text.
275 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987)
(quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)).
276 Id. at 154 (citation omitted).
277 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-101(1)(a)–13-80-101(1)(c) (West 2005).
278 Id. § 13-80-102(1)(a)
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a public or governmental entity.”279  Tort actions involving “[a]ssault,
battery, false imprisonment, [and] false arrest” and “[a]ll actions
against sheriffs, coroners, police officers, firefighters, national guards-
men, or any other law enforcement authority” have a one-year limita-
tions period.280  Finally, a Colorado court would have to face the
questionable application of the five-year limitations period found in
§ 13-80-103.8(1)(d).281  Given the complexity, confusion, and uncer-
tainty necessarily implicated by the interaction of so many potential
limitations periods, state courts should learn from the experience of
the federal courts and avoid borrowing a limitations period based on
predicate acts.  They should limit the range of choice to the catchall
period, antitrust, or liability on a statute.
iv. Borrowing the Limitations Period for Penalties and
Forfeitures
The Supreme Court teaches unquestionably that the treble dam-
ages provision in federal RICO is “remedial.”  It is beyond serious
question.  In Malley-Duff, specifically in the statute of limitation con-
text, the Court emphasized the “remedial” character of RICO’s treble
damages.  For example, the Court said, “RICO is designed to remedy
injury caused by a pattern of racketeering.”282  Moreover, in taking its
cue from Congress’s modeling RICO on the Clayton Act, the Court
observed,
Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy eco-
nomic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs,
and attorney’s fees.  Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of “pri-
vate attorneys general” on a serious national problem for which
public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mecha-
nism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and
RICO is the carrot of treble damages.  Moreover, both statutes aim
to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show
injury “in his business or property by reason of” a violation.283
279 Id. § 13-80-102(1)(h).
280 Id. § 13-80-103(1)(a)–13-80-103(1)(c).
281 Id. § 13-80-103(1)(d).  But see Rogers v. Nacchio, 241 F. App’x 602, 608–09
(11th Cir. 2007) (barring Colorado claims on statute of limitations grounds without
discussion of these alternatives).
282 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 149–50
(1987) (emphasis added).
283 Id. at 151 (emphasis added).  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the Court indicated that the treble damages provision
of the Clayton Act is primarily “remedial.”  It said:
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In a paragraph on the legislative history of RICO’s treble damage
provision, the Court referred to the treble damages provision as a
“remedy” no less than eight separate times.284  Moreover, the Court
observed, “[A]pplication of a uniform federal limitations period
Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, the treble-dam-
ages cause of action conferred on private parties by § 4 of the Clayton Act
. . . seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for
that injury.
“Section 4 . . . is in essence a remedial provision.  It provides treble damages to
‘[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .’  Of course, treble damages also
play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing,
as we also have frequently observed. . . . It nevertheless is true that the treble-
damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties,
and measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is
designed primarily as a remedy.”
Id. at 635–36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1977)).
284 Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 151–52.  While the Senate bill at that time did not have
a treble damage provision, the Senate Committee characterized the RICO concept—
using criminal and civil remedies, one punitive, the other remedial—in unequivocal
terms. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 160 (1969) (emphasis added):
Section 1964 provides civil remedies for the violation of section 1962 . . . .
Subsection (a) contains broad remedial provisions for reform of corrupted
organizations.  Although certain remedies are set out, the list is not exhaus-
tive, and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of
removing corrupting influence and make due provision for the right of
innocent persons. . . . [T]he action is remedial, not punitive . . . .
The House Judiciary committee added the treble damage provision back to the Sen-
ate bill, reflecting how its sponsors had initially drafted it. See Civil Fraud Action, supra
note 16, at 258–61 (quoting Senator Hruska: The “‘criminal provision . . . [was]
intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provisions’” that he “‘considered[ed] . . .
the more important feature’” of the bill; it then included provisions for private equi-
table relief and treble damages).  The House Report is not as elaborate—here as else-
where—as the Senate Report.  Nevertheless, it does not contradict the Senate Report
on the remedial character of RICO’s civil remedies, including the treble damage pro-
vision. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 57–58 (1970). See also Sicolo v. Prudential Sav.
Bank of Brooklyn, 157 N.E.2d 284, 286 (N.Y. 1959) (“The words ‘penalty or forfei-
ture’ when used in a Statute of Limitations refer to something imposed in a punitive
way for an infraction of a public law and do not include a liability created for the
purpose of redressing a private injury, even though the wrongful act be a public
wrong and punishable as such . . . . ‘[When] a statute gives accumulative damages to the
party grieved, it is not a penal action.’  It is the intrinsic nature of the exaction that
counts and . . . [here the] suit is essentially one for compensation to a person injured
through a defendant’s fault.  The successful plaintiff is awarded his proven damages
with a minimum recovery of $1,000.  That the recovery may exceed in some instances
the actual loss does not make the liability truly penal in nature . . . .” (emphasis
added) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892)).
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avoids the possibility of the application of unduly short state statutes
of limitations that would thwart the legislative purpose of creating an
effective remedy.”285
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,286 an opinion issued
prior to Malley-Duff,287 the Court again taught that RICO’s treble dam-
ages provision is “remedial.”  In determining whether the plaintiff’s
RICO treble damage claim is subject to arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act, the Court examined RICO’s legislative history, includ-
ing its reliance on the Clayton Act as a model.288  The Court found
that “[t]he legislative history of § 1964(c) reveals the same emphasis
[as the Clayton Act] on the remedial role of the treble-damages provi-
sion.”289  In 2003, the Court again examined the character of RICO’s
treble damages provision; once again, teaching it is “remedial.”290
The debate over whether RICO’s treble damages provision is “reme-
dial” or “penal” played out in State Farm and Tellis291 is yesterday’s
news.  The Court has resolved the debate in favor of State Farm.
That federal RICO’s treble damages provision is “remedial”
argues powerfully that state RICO statutes are also remedial.  Con-
sider, for example, the Idaho state RICO statute.  That statute does
not specify a limitations period.  To get the court to apply the short,
two-year limitations period for “penalties and forfeitures,”292 a defen-
dant could argue that treble damages under Idaho RICO are
“penal.”293  As with the federal statute, the more persuasive argument
is that treble damages under Idaho RICO are “remedial.”  First, the
section that provides for treble damages is entitled “Racketeering-Civil
Remedies.”294  This contrasts to the previous section entitled, “Prohib-
285 Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
286 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
287 Malley-Duff was decided June 22, 1987, while Shearson was decided June 8, 1987.
288 See Shearson, 482 U.S. at 240–41.
289 Id. at 240.
290 PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003) (“Indeed, we
have repeatedly acknowledged that the treble-damages provision contained in RICO
itself is remedial in nature.”)
291 See supra text accompanying notes 161–201 (analyzing the two decisions). R
292 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-219(2) (2010) provides: “Within two (2) years: . . . 2.  An
action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to an indi-
vidual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it
prescribes a different limitation.”
293 Idaho RICO provides for treble damages:  “A person who sustains injury to his
person, business[,] or property by a pattern of racketeering activity may file an action
in the district court for the recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and
the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
7805(a) (2004).
294 Id.
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ited Activities-Penalties.”295  If treble damages were “penal,” no serious
reason suggests itself why a legislature would locate them in a section
entitled “remedies” rather than the section entitled “penalties.”  Some
say you cannot judge a book by its cover, but, in fact, titles on
medicine vials, bottles of alcohol, etc., usually convey the accurate
information.  Without hesitation, we drink based on them every day.
The legislature went to the trouble to title the section.  Not taking it at
its word is senseless.296  Moreover, the exact quantum of damages
caused by RICO violations may be difficult to discern.  Thus, treble
damages under both federal and Idaho RICO are not “penal” but
“accumulative”—designed to compensate plaintiffs for injuries that
legal damages do not adequately cover.297  This analysis applies
295 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7804 (2004).
296 At the beginning of the Republic, Chief Justice Marshall wisely described the
process of statutory interpretation. He observed:
It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition of statutes,
that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be
extracted from the whole.  It is also true, that where great inconvenience will
result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided,
unless the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case it must be
obeyed.
On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing legislative acts,
no difference of opinion can exist.  It is only in the application of those
principles that the difference discovers itself.
As the enacting clause in this case, would plainly give the United States the
preference they claim, it is incumbent on those who oppose that preference,
to shew [sic] an intent varying from that which the words import.  In doing
this, the whole act has been critically examined; and it has been contended
with great ingenuity, that every part of it demonstrates the legislative mind to
have been directed towards a class of debtors, entirely different from those
who become so by drawing or indorsing bills, in the ordinary course of
business.
The first part which has been resorted to is the title.  On the influence which
the title ought to have in construing the enacting clauses, much has been
said; and yet it is not easy to discern the point of difference between the
opposing counsel in this respect.  Neither party contends that the title of an
act can controul plain words in the body of the statute; and neither denies
that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities.  Where
the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction.  Where the mind labours
to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid
can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have
its due share of consideration.
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (emphasis added).
297 See Blakey, Of Characterization, supra note 29, for a full discussion of “accumula-
tive” damages; accord Sicolo v. Prudential Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 157 N.E.2d 284, 286
(N.Y. 1959) (“The words ‘penalty or forfeiture’ when used in a Statute of Limitations
refer to something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law and do
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equally to other state RICO statutes modeled after federal RICO and
having similar treble damage provisions.  Accordingly, courts should
not apply the state limitations period for “penalties” to state RICO
claims.  They should limit the range of choice to the catchall period,
antitrust, or liability on a statute.
v. Borrowing the Limitations Period for Liability on a
Statute
An additional option exists for courts seeking a limitations period
other than the catchall period for state RICO claims.  Some states
specify a limitations period for actions or liabilities created by a stat-
ute.298  Pre-Malley-Duff, several federal courts borrowed state statutes
of limitations for liabilities created by a statute and applied them to
federal RICO claims.299  This statute of limitations usually applies in
situations where no liability would exist but for the statute.300  Thus, it
not include a liability created for the purpose of redressing a private injury, even
though the wrongful act be a public wrong and punishable as such. . . . ‘[When] a
statute gives accumulative damages to the party grieved, it is not a penal action.’  It is
the intrinsic nature of the exaction that counts and . . . [here the] suit is essentially
one for compensation to a person injured through a defendant’s fault.  The success-
ful plaintiff is awarded his proven damages with a minimum recovery of $1,000.  That
the recovery may exceed in some instances the actual loss does not make the liability
truly penal in nature . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 688 (1892))).
298 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-218(1) (2010):
Within three (3) years:
An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or
forfeiture.  The cause of action in favor of the state of Idaho or any
political subdivision thereof, upon a surety bond or undertaking pro-
vided for or required by statute shall not be deemed to have accrued
against any surety on such bond or undertaking until the discovery by
the state of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof of the facts consti-
tuting the liability.
299 See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 718 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding liability
on statute of three years), overruled on other grounds by Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding
liability on statute of three years).  The circuit courts in Cullen and Compton did not
explain in detail their reasons for choosing the state statute of limitations for liability
created by statute.
300 See Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 750 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (N.Y.
2001).  According to the court in Gaidon,
[The statute of limitations for liability created by statute] does not automati-
cally apply to all causes of action in which a statutory remedy is sought, but
only where liability “would not exist but for a statute.”  Thus, [the statute of
limitations for liability created by statute] “does not apply to liabilities
existing at common law which have been recognized or implemented by
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does not apply to claims for relief that existed at common law but that
the legislature subsequently codified.301  RICO statutes create civil lia-
bility for engaging in a pattern of predicate acts by, through, or
against an enterprise.  Though many of RICO’s predicate acts have
common law origins, how Congress integrated them in the configura-
tions of RICO is far more than a mere codification of their common
law origins.  Plaintiffs have to prove crucial additional elements to pre-
vail on a RICO claim beyond those required simply to allege a com-
mon law claim for relief, for example, fraud.  In short, RICO is a
statutory creation, and it has no precise common law analogue.  Thus,
in addition to the catchall, the statute of limitations for liability cre-
ated by statute is an appropriate choice for civil RICO claims where
the legislature did not create a special RICO period of limitations.
Before courts apply this catchall limitations period to civil RICO
claims, they must consider what other limitations periods are availa-
ble.  Borrowing the federal limitations period is inappropriate when
the state provides a catchall period.  Similarly, borrowing the limita-
tions period from state antitrust laws may be inappropriate due to the
scope of the state RICO statute, the language of the statutes of limita-
tions, and the possibility of the application of restrictive antitrust pre-
cedent to RICO.  Borrowing limitations periods based on the
predicate offenses that the plaintiff alleges leads to complexity, lack of
uniformity, uncertainty, and unfairness.  Borrowing the statute of limi-
tations for penalties and forfeitures is simply a mischaracterization of
RICO’s treble damages provision.  The only statute of limitations
(other than the antitrust provisions or the general catchall provision)
that courts should appropriately borrow is the statute of limitations
for liability created by statute.  No common law analogue to civil
RICO exists.  Thus, when a state RICO statute does not provide for a
special limitations period, courts should consider the state antitrust
period, the statute of limitations for liability created by statute, or the
state general catchall statute.  Each of these three provisions provides
statute.” When this is the case, the Statute of Limitations for the statutory
claim is that for the common-law cause of action which the statute codified
or implemented.
Id. (quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 492 N.E.2d 386, 388 (N.Y. 1986)); see
also Shewry v. Begil, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A liability cre-
ated by statute] is a liability that would not exist but for the statute.”); State v. Ada
Cnty. Dairymen’s Ass’n, 159 P.2d 219, 220 (Idaho 1945) (“A ‘statutory liability’ is one
that depends for its existence on the enactment of the statute, and not on the con-
tract of the parties.” (quoting Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 154 P. 626, 628
(Idaho 1916))).
301 See Gaidon, 750 N.E.2d at 1082.
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an attractive uniform limitations period consistent with the remedial
purposes of RICO.  The main issue in the choice is the length of the
limitation period; it must not be too short that it gives a plaintiff inad-
equate time to discover his injury, determine its relation to a pattern
of unlawful conduct, select counsel, consider the law and facts, and
draft an appropriate complaint, which are no easy tasks.  Preparing
for RICO litigation is not something a rational actor should undertake
lightly.  One should anticipate expensive and time-consuming motion
practice.  One should not think that merely adding a RICO count
would secure a quick or more favorable settlement.  Better to fron-
tload the process and guarantee it is a wise decision.  Deciding not to
bring a RICO claim is equally as important as deciding to bring a
RICO claim.  Wisely deciding not to bring a RICO case takes a large
load off the work of a putative defendant and the considered court.
In sum, the period of limitations ought to give thoughtful plaintiffs
ample time to make a wise decision.
C. Determining the Point of Accrual
The most carefully chosen limitations period is meaningless with-
out reference to when it begins to run.302  Thus, rules of accrual that
specify when the limitations period begins must also further the goals
of statutes of limitations generally.303  In particular, accrual rules must
provide plaintiffs with adequate time to sue, while at the same time
ensuring that they act diligently, not recklessly sitting on their rights.
In light of these considerations, a statute of limitations should begin
to run as soon as events occur that enable a plaintiff to maintain a suit
under the particular claim for relief, but no sooner.304  This gives
plaintiffs the full limitations period, as noted, to file their claim after it
302 Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 199 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[A]ny period of limitation is utterly meaningless without specification of the event
that starts it running.  As a practical matter, a 4–year statute of limitations means
nothing at all unless one knows when the four years start running.  If they start, for
example, on the 10th anniversary of the injury, the 4-year statute is more akin to a 14-
year statute . . . .”).
303 See supra notes 196–212 and accompanying text. R
304 Certainly, the statute of limitations should not begin to run before a plaintiff
can legally sue. See Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 56 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“That a statute of limitations cannot begin to run against a plaintiff before the
plaintiff can maintain a suit in court seems virtually axiomatic.”).  In Bay Area Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192 (1997), the Court stated
that “[a] limitations period ordinarily does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a
‘complete and present cause of action.’” Id. at 195 (quoting Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S.
96, 98 (1941)).  According to the Court, “[u]nless Congress has told us otherwise in
the legislation at issue, a cause of action does not become ‘complete and present’ for
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arises.  Unfortunately, this straightforward principle of accrual is too
simple to apply in all situations.  For instance, a plaintiff may be able
in theory to sue, because the events comprising the claim for relief
have occurred, but, realistically, the plaintiff may be unable to sue,
because (through no fault of his own) he is unaware that he has suf-
fered an injury, unware of its cause, or unaware of who did it.305  In
situations like this, fairness demands that the statute of limitations
should not begin until the plaintiff discovers (or should have discov-
ered through the exercise of reasonable diligence) his injury, its
cause, and who did it.
Had Congress specified in the RICO statute when a civil claim for
relief accrues, then courts would have followed Congress’s direction.
Congress, however, remained silent on the period of limitations as
well as accrual.  Thus, federal courts have had to decide not only the
period of limitations, but also the appropriate point of accrual for civil
RICO claims.  Different federal courts developed several different
accrual rules, including the last-predicate-act rule, the injury-discovery
rule, the injury-and-pattern discovery rule, and the antitrust rule.  This
split among the lower federal courts undermines the certainty, uni-
formity, and fairness that the Court sought when it borrowed the four-
year limitations period from the Clayton Act for civil RICO in Malley-
Duff.  Nevertheless, the Court in Malley-Duff avoided adopting a uni-
form accrual rule, even though it confronted the issue then and on
two later occasions, first in Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp.306 and three years
later in Rotella v. Wood.307
limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. at 201
(quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993)).
305 The classic example is medical malpractice. See, e.g., Stoleson v. United States,
629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted), where the court observed,
In the usual case, the fact of injury provides adequate notice of the cause of
the injury and of the possibility that one’s legal rights have been invaded.
This general rule, however, is often inapplicable to medical malpractice
claims.  The reason for the exception is essentially the same as for the gen-
eral rule, i.e., a patient often has little or no reason to believe his legal rights
have been invaded simply because some misfortune followed medical treat-
ment.  Sometimes a patient may remain unaware for many years that he has
suffered injury or he may recognize his injury but not its cause.  Indeed, the
facts necessary to discover the causal relation between treatment and injury
may be within the exclusive control of the physician or at least very difficult
to obtain.  In medical malpractice cases, therefore, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until after the patient discovers or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should discover his injury and its cause.
306 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
307 528 U.S. 549 (2000).  In Malley-Duff, the Court expressly declined to decide
when a civil RICO claim accrues.  Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
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1. The Last Predicate Act Rule and Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp.
An accrual rule initially used by a handful of district courts was
the last-predicate-act rule.  The courts fashioned it from criminal con-
spiracy jurisprudence; under it, a civil claim for relief under RICO
accrues when the last predicate act of racketeering occurred.308  The
last predicate act rule is not a rule of separate accrual.309  As long as
the defendant commits a predicate act within the four-year limitations
period, the plaintiff can recover for each of the injuries he sustained
as a result of the defendant’s pattern of racketeering—regardless of
when the injuries occurred or when the plaintiff discovered the inju-
ries.  A district court in the Seventh Circuit first used this accrual rule
in County of Cook v. Berger.310  The Berger court emphasized the “contin-
uing” character of RICO, relying on a criminal case from the South-
ern District of New York that properly characterized criminal RICO as
a “continuing offense” under a criminal statute of limitations.311  The
Berger court reasoned that because Congress designed civil RICO to
remedy harms caused by a “continual and related” pattern of racke-
teering “it would be incongruous to bar . . . recovery for predicate acts
taking place outside the limitations period and permitting recovery
only for those within the limitations period.”312  Precisely as RICO
defendants incur criminal liability for each predicate act in a continu-
ing pattern of racketeering, so, too, should they be civilly liable for
each predicate act in the pattern as long as the pattern continued into
the applicable civil limitations period.
No circuit court adopted the Berger court’s version of the last-
predicate-act rule, but the Third Circuit in Keystone Ins. Co. v. Hough-
ton313 adopted a variation of the last-predicate-act rule, adding to it a
discovery element.  In Keystone, the court adopted an accrual rule that
took into account the continuing nature of a RICO offense (i.e. its
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156–57 (1987) (“Because it is clear that Malley-Duff’s RICO claims
accrued within four years of the time the complaint was filed, we have no occasion to
decide the appropriate time of accrual for a RICO claim.”).  In addition, the Court
granted certiorari in a case before Klehr to deal with the accrual issue, but later dis-
missed the writ as improvidently granted.  Grimmett v. Brown, 519 U.S. 233 (1997).
308 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
309 See infra note 376.
310 648 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
311 Id. at 434 (citing United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff’d mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978)).
312 Id. at 435.  Other district courts in the Seventh Circuit also applied the last-
predicate-act rule. See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 703 F. Supp. 1322, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(collecting other cases).  The Seventh Circuit later rejected the last-predicate-act rule
cited in Norris in McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1464 (7th Cir. 1992).
313 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988).
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pattern element).314  It held that accrual did not occur and the statute
of limitations start running until each of the elements of the claim for
relief existed.315  Nevertheless, it recognized that the plaintiff could
recover from each act in the pattern that injured him as long as he
sued within the period of limitations.  Under the rule the court devel-
oped, the limitations period would start to run:
[F]rom the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the
elements of the civil RICO cause of action existed unless, as a part
of the same pattern of racketeering activity, there is further injury to
the plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which case the
accrual period shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which
is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity.316
The court carefully observed, “The last predicate act need not have
resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part of the same pattern”
to extend the limitations period.317  Similar to the version of the last-
predicate-act rule used in Berger, under the Keystone accrual rule, the
plaintiff can recover for each injury caused by the pattern of racke-
teering.  This is so even if the injuries occurred or plaintiff did not
discover them for more than four-years before he filed the claim.  It is
only necessary that the last predicate act occurred within the limita-
tions period.318
Both the Berger and Keystone versions of the last-predicate-act rule
offer substantial advantages over a simple discovery accrual rule.  They
appropriately recognize the continuous character of a RICO
offense—criminally or civilly—in light of its pattern requirement.  As
a result, they do not start the limitations period running until the pat-
tern of racketeering ends (Berger) or until the plaintiff reasonably dis-
covers the last predicate act that marks the end of the pattern
314 Id. at 1129–30.
315 Id. at 1130 (“It would appear fundamental that the four-year statute of limita-
tions for civil RICO may not begin to run until each of the elements of the cause of
action exist.”).  The court continued:
Conceptually there is no requisite RICO “injury” until the damage impacting
the plaintiff becomes part of a pattern of racketeering activity.  Prior to that
point there is no RICO injury and the statute of limitations may not begin to
accrue.  “Because a potential plaintiff has not been injured under RICO
until the pattern element has been satisfied, it is inappropriate to start the
limitations period before the pattern is fully developed.”
Id. at 1131 (quoting Michael Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise,
71 MINN. L. REV. 827, 879 (1987)).
316 Id. at 1130.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 1130–31.
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(Keystone).  Moreover, with either version of the last-predicate-act rule,
no danger exists that the limitations period will start running before a
RICO violation occurs; thus, plaintiffs can recover for each of his inju-
ries caused by the pattern of racketeering.  The Keystone court persua-
sively argued that this accrual rule was necessary to achieve the broad,
remedial purposes of RICO, especially when the offense may harm
many victims, and it is consistent with the text of RICO, in particular
its liberal construction mandate.319  In sum, the rule has much to rec-
ommend it.  None of the alternative rules takes into consideration so
many aspects of the statute so sensitively.  Nevertheless, but for its ulti-
mate rejection by the Court, it would stand high above its competitors
in its persuasive character.
The last-predicate-act rule, however, has its critics who also make
persuasive arguments, illustrating the need for a court carefully to bal-
ance the competing considerations.  Those who oppose the rule argue
that it focuses too much on the continuous nature of RICO and not
enough on the injury component of a civil claim for relief.320  They
point out that civil RICO is essentially remedial.321  The purpose of
civil RICO is not to punish those who violate § 1962.322  A person can
engage in racketeering activity, but he does not incur civil liability
unless the predicate acts injure a person “in his business or prop-
erty.”323  Thus, while injury is irrelevant under criminal RICO, it is
crucial under civil RICO, and the choice of a point for the running of
the statute of limitation must consider the differences, that is, focus
more on the injury factor.  Because the last-predicate-act rule solely
focuses on the continuous character of a RICO violation, it arguably
violates the principle that a statute of limitations should begin to run
as soon as the events occur that enable a plaintiff to sue.324  For exam-
ple, a defendant engages in a pattern of predicate acts in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  His predicate acts injured people in their busi-
ness or property.  From their perspective, the RICO civil claim for
relief is complete, and they can properly sue to recover for their inju-
ries under civil RICO.  Nevertheless, under the last-predicate-act rule,
319 Id. at 1131–33.
320 See Paul B. O’Neill, “Mother of Mercy, Is this the Beginning of RICO?”: The Proper
Point of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 172, 221–25 (1990)
(criticizing the last predicate act rule).
321 See supra notes 29–33 (dealing with liberal construction), 39–43 (dealing with
enforcement), and accompanying text.
322 To the critics of the last-predicate rule, that is the purpose of criminal RICO.
323 § 1964(c) (arguably only allowing recovery for injuries to business or
property).
324 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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because the defendant continues to commit predicate acts against the
same or, more strikingly, other people, the statute of limitations does
not start to run as to the people already injured, even though the
events for a valid civil RICO claim for relief exist.  Even if the injured
parties are fully aware of their injuries, and of the presence of each of
the elements of their RICO claim for relief, the statute of limitations
does not run against them.  Metaphorically, they can sit on their
hands and watch the parade of predicate acts pass by whether they
injure them or others, as long as the defendant continues to engage in
his pattern of predicate acts.  Thus, the argument goes, the period of
limitations for them potentially extends indefinitely without a ratio-
nale for an extended time for those plaintiffs to sue.  The extension,
arguably, is unjustified as a matter of sound social policy.  Those val-
ues behind a statute of limitations that focus on repose for the defen-
dant or staleness from the perspective of the court receive, arguably,
insufficient weight—indeed, no weight whatsoever.  The treble dam-
age suit is supposed to stimulate litigation, but the last predicate act
rule cuts the other way.  Understandably, the possibility that the limi-
tations period could be extended indefinitely without any major coun-
tervailing benefits was the principal reason why the Court in Klehr v.
A. O. Smith Corp.325 rejected Keystone’s last-predicate-act rule.  In Klehr,
the Court granted certiorari to address the circuit split that developed
on the appropriate accrual rule for civil RICO.326  The only accrual
rule that saved the plaintiff’s claim in Klehr was Keystone’s last-predi-
cate-act rule.327  The Court held that it was “not a proper interpreta-
tion of the law” for “two basic reasons.”328  First, the separate accrual
rule “lengthens the limitations period dramatically,” because a pattern
of predicate acts “can continue indefinitely.”329  The Court concluded
that Congress could not have contemplated so dramatic an extension
of the limitations period.330  Because the rule extended the period so
long, it undermined the purpose of repose underlying statutes of limi-
tations, heedlessly allowing plaintiffs to sit on their rights, while mem-
325 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
326 At the time, some circuit courts applied the injury-and-pattern-discovery rule,
others applied the discovery rule, while only the Third Circuit applied the last-predi-
cate-act rule from Keystone.  See id. at 185–86.  The Eighth Circuit also applied an
injury-plus-source-plus-pattern rule. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 239 (8th
Cir. 1996) (asserting plaintiffs’ notice of fraud would also indicate the “existence,
source, and pattern of the injury for their RICO claim”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 179 (1997) .
327 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 186.
328 Id. at 187.
329 Id.
330 Id. (“[T]he last predicate act rule creates a limitations period that is longer
than Congress could have contemplated.”).
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ories fade and evidence erodes.331  The second reason was that the
Keystone rule was “inconsistent with the ordinary Clayton Act rule,
applicable in private antitrust treble damages actions,”332 under which
the period runs from each injurious act.333  Incongruently, the Court
argued from the Clayton Act rule, but did not adopt it for civil
RICO.334  The Court merely used it to contrast with the last-predicate-
act rule’s perceived flaws.  Specifically, the Court disapproved of how
the last-predicate-act rule allowed a plaintiff to “use an independent,
new predicate act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other
earlier predicate acts that took place outside the limitations
period.”335  As a separate-accrual rule, the Clayton Act rule does not
allow for recovery for injuries that occur outside the limitations
331 Id. (“It thereby conflicts with a basic objective—repose—that underlies limita-
tions periods.  Indeed, the rule would permit plaintiffs who know of the defendant’s
pattern of activity simply to wait, ‘sleeping on their rights,’ as the pattern continues
and treble damages accumulate, perhaps bringing suit only long after the ‘memories
of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost.’  We cannot find in civil RICO a compensa-
tory objective that would warrant so significant an extension of the limitations period,
and civil RICO’s further purpose—encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently
to investigate, suggests the contrary.”  (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)).
332 Id. at 188.  The Court added:
We recognize that RICO’s criminal statute of limitations runs from the
last, i.e., the most recent, predicate act.  But there are significant differences
between civil and criminal RICO actions, and this Court has held that crimi-
nal RICO does not provide an apt analogy [Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 155–56 (1987)] (declining to apply crimi-
nal RICO’s 5-year statute of limitations to civil RICO actions and noting
“competing equities unique to civil RICO actions or, indeed, any other fed-
eral civil remedy”).
Id.
333 See infra note 339 (setting out the accrual rule for claims under the Clayton
Act).
334 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 188.  The Court qualified its use of the analogy:
We do not say that a pure injury accrual rule always applies without
modification in the civil RICO setting in the same way that it applies in tradi-
tional antitrust cases.  For example, civil RICO requires not just a single act,
but rather a “pattern” of acts.  Furthermore, there is some debate as to
whether the running of the limitations period depends on the plaintiff’s
awareness of certain elements of the cause of action.  As we said earlier, how-
ever, for purposes of evaluating the Third Circuit’s rule we can assume
knowledgeable parties.  Hence the special problems associated with a discovery
rule, are not at issue.  And we believe, in these circumstances, the Clayton
Act analogy is helpful.
Id. (cross references omitted).
335 Id. at 190.
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period.336  Thus, though the Klehr Court relied on a Clayton Act rule
analogy to reject Keystone’s rule, it did not select the Clayton Act’s
rule—or any other accrual rule—for civil RICO claims.337  In sum, the
Court eliminated one possible accrual rule, but the Court left the cir-
cuit courts split, basically, between a version of the discovery rule and
the injury-and-pattern discovery rule.
2. The Clayton Act Rule
While the majority in Klehr was reluctant to decide finally on an
accrual rule for civil RICO, Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion
argued for the adoption of the Clayton Act or the injury-occurrence
accrual rule.338  In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,339 the
Court set out the accrual rule for claims under the Clayton Act:
[A] cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a
defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s business.  In the
context of a continuing conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws, . . .
this has usually been understood to mean that each time a plaintiff
is injured by an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to
him to recover the damages caused by that act and that, as to those
336 Id. at 189–90.
337 See id. at 192–93 (declining to choose a single accrual rule for civil RICO).
The Court explained its decision:
[W]e believe we should not consider differences among the various dis-
covery accrual rules used by the Circuits.  The legal questions involved may
be subtle and difficult.  Compare [Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231,
238 (8th Cir. 1996)] (claim accrues with discovery of existence and source of
injury, plus pattern), with [Bivens Gardens Office Bldg, Inc. v. Barnett Bank,
906 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990, abrogated by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S.
549 (2000) (claim accrues with discovery of injury and pattern); see also
[Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp, 920 F.2d 446, 451 (1990)] (describing dif-
ferences among various discovery rules  and doctrines of “equitable tolling”
and “equitable estoppel”).  And the facts of this case do not force focused
argument as to how the traditional Clayton Act “injury” accrual rule, princi-
ples of equitable tolling, and doctrines of equitable estoppel should interact
in circumstances where the application of one, or another, of these different
limitations doctrines would make a significant legal difference.  To say this is
not, as the concurrence claims, to advocate a ‘mix-and-match’ statute of limi-
tations theory.  Rather, it is to recognize that the Clayton Act’s express stat-
ute of limitations does not necessarily provide all the answers.  We shall, at
the very least, wait for a case that clearly presents these or related issues,
providing an opportunity for full argument, before we attempt to resolve
them.
Id. (citations omitted).
338 Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring).
339 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
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damages, the statute of limitations runs from the commission of the
act.  However, each separate cause of action that so accrues entitles
a plaintiff to recover not only those damages which he has suffered
at the date of accrual, but also those which he will suffer in the
future from the particular invasion, including what he has suffered
during and will predictably suffer after trial.340
The Zenith Court made one exception to this accrual rule.  If a
plaintiff cannot recover future damages, because they are too specula-
tive, “the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur, will
accrue only on the date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may
sue to recover them at any time within four years from the date they
were inflicted.”341  The Court reasoned that without this exception,
plaintiffs could not prove future damages within the limitations
period, they would be unrecoverable, and that outcome would be con-
trary to congressional intent.342  Thus, unless an exception applies,
under the Clayton Act rule, the statute of limitations begins to run
from the date of the unlawful act that injures the plaintiff’s busi-
ness.343  Thus, the Clayton Act accrual rule, as decided in Zenith, is a
340 Id. at 338–39 (citations omitted).
341 Id. at 339.
342 Id. at 340.
343 In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1103–04 (2d Cir. 1988), the
court suggests that the Clayton Act accrual rule includes a discovery principle.  Since
Bankers, the Second Circuit has uniformly applied the Zenith rule—the statute runs
from the defendant’s unlawful act. See, e.g., Higgins v. N.Y.S.E., Inc., 942 F.2d 829,
832 (2d Cir. 1991).  That said, an anomaly requires a comment: In re Copper Antitrust
Litig., 436 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2006) (regarding antitrust and discovery rule).  While
Judge Wood is an extraordinarily careful jurist, her opinion in the Copper Litigation
decision framed an accrual issue in an antitrust case as, “[w]hether the district court
selected the proper accrual date depends on the application of the discovery rule to
these facts.” Id. at 789 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court continued:
[P]laintiffs’ antitrust claims are subject to a four-year statute of limita-
tions. Generally, an antitrust “cause of action accrues and the statute begins
to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s business.”
As in other areas of the law, however, in the absence of a contrary directive from
Congress this rule is qualified by the discovery rule, which “postpones the beginning of
the limitations period from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he
discovers he has been injured.”  “This principle is based on the general rule that
accrual occurs when the plaintiff discovers that ‘he has been injured and who caused
the injury.’’’
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). No other circuit court decisions take her
position.  Neither Judges Cudahy nor Rovner, who were also on the panel, and
equally careful jurists, commented on Judge Wood’s error. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189
(“[B]y the time civil RICO was enacted, the Clayton Act’s accrual rule was well estab-
lished.” (citing Crummer Co. v. DuPont, 223 F.2d 238, 247–48 (5th Cir. 1955)); Foster
& Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742, 750–51 (9th  Cir. 1936); Bluefields
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“separate-accrual” rule.  Each time the defendant injured the plaintiff
by reason of a violation of the statute, he has a new claim for relief
with a separate limitations period.  Under the “separate-accrual,” as
applied to RICO, if a defendant injures a plaintiff multiple times by
the same pattern of racketeering, he may only be able to recover for
part of those injuries, depending on when he files his claim and vari-
ous estoppel or tolling rules.
In spite of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Klehr, no circuit
court currently applies the Clayton Act accrual rule to civil RICO.344
That said, the pure Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule remains an
“arguable fit” for RICO.  Congress, after all, modeled RICO on the
Clayton Act.  So far; so good.  On the other hand, the Court applies
the modeling argument in light of the presence of other fit-factors, as
in Malley-Duff for the length of the limitations period, but not, as in
Tafflin on the antitrust parallel on whether federal jurisdiction for
RICO is, in reference to the states, “exclusive” or “concurrent.”  Anti-
trust is; RICO is not.345  Thus, by itself, the modeling argument is
plausible, but neither determinative nor persuasive.
Under the Clayton Act rule, a victim of a RICO violation has a
four-year period within which he may sue for his injury to business or
property.  Moreover, if five years after a RICO violation, a plaintiff suf-
fers injuries to his business or properties that previously were too spec-
ulative to prove, he could then sue for those injuries.346  So far, so
good.  Nevertheless, considered as a whole, a “pure”—not carefully
modified and tailored to RICO—Clayton Act or an injury-occurrence
rule is not aptly suited to civil RICO, principally because it does not
include a sufficient consideration of the pattern and enterprise ele-
ments, a point the Court alluded to in Klehr.347
First, under the pure Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule, the
statute of limitations for RICO could potentially begin to run against
S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 20 (3d Cir. 1917)); accord 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN,
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6.5.5.1 (1991) (“[S]uch accrual originates when a defendant
commits an act resulting in injury to the plaintiff’s business.” (citing Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321 (1970)); 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTI-
TRUST LAW ¶ 320b (2000) (“As a general rule, ‘a cause of action accrues and the
statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s busi-
ness.’” (quoting Zenith, 401 U.S. at 338)).
344 Less than a handful of district courts take this position. See, e.g., Gilbert Family
P’ship v. Nido Corp., 679 F. Supp. 679, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Wabash Publ’g Co. v.
Dermer, 650 F. Supp. 212, 216–17 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
345 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 462–63 (1990).
346 See supra note 343 (collecting the relevant decisions).
347 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 188 (“[C]ivil RICO requires not just a single act, but rather a
‘pattern’ of acts.”).
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the possible RICO plaintiff before the plaintiff possesses a valid RICO
claim, an absurd result.348  Assume a racketeer bombs the plaintiff’s
business to show to another business his power in an extortion plot on
the other’s business.  The possible RICO plaintiff knows he is injured,
but not who did it.  Nor does he know why the bomber did it.  He has
no reason to look for a pattern, an enterprise, etc. “to trade up” his
claim for relief under the common law to a RICO claim for relief.  Try
as diligently as possible, he may never know who bombed him or why,
particularly if the other business pays off the racketeer.  Putting aside
tolling doctrines that might take care of the “who,” under the pure
Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule, the statute runs from the
injury, not discovery of the injury and the perpetrator.  Moreover,
RICO requires a “pattern” of racketeering activity.349  In H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,350 the Court indicated that two acts are
“necessary,” but not necessarily “sufficient” to form a “pattern.”351
Thus, the pure Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule—unless modi-
fied, but then it would cease to be the Clayton Act rule—arguably
starts the statute running on the plaintiff’s injury, and it is quite possi-
ble that four years will pass before he knows that the racketeer was
behind the series of bombings, either in the possible plaintiff’s com-
munity or elsewhere.  That information he may not know until the
government indicts the bomber after the civil statute, but not the
criminal statute, expires.  Similarly, the defendant can injure the
plaintiff before the defendant engages in sufficient predicate acts to
constitute a “pattern.”352  The defendant could also direct the acts
against businesses that are strangers to the possible RICO plaintiff.
Moreover, if the perpetrator commits the predicate acts more than
four years apart (nevertheless part of a related and continuing series,
a theoretical, but not a practical possibility), a victim who the defen-
348 The general rule is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the plaintiff can sue. See supra note 304.  Indeed, failing to give a plaintiff reasonable
time to sue raises serious constitutional considerations. See supra note 145; see also
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 718 (2d Cir. 1987) (giving similar reason for find-
ing liability on statute of three years), overruled on other grounds by Lore v. City of Syra-
cuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012).
349 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
350 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
351 Id. at 237 (“‘[T]hat while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.’”
(quoting Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985))).
352 Thus, violating the basic principle that a statute of limitations should not begin
to run until the events occur that enable the plaintiff to sue. See Cullen v. Margiotta,
811 F.2d 698, 718 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding liability on statute of three years), overruled
on other grounds by Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012); supra note
348.
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dant injures by the first predicate act stands barred from bringing a
civil RICO claim.  Even if a victim is injured by subsequent, pattern-
forming predicate acts, the victim, unless the Court modifies the rule,
will be unable to recover under RICO for his initial injury under the
separate accrual rule (presumably part of the Clayton Act or injury-
occurrence rule under consideration), even though it is part of the
same “pattern.”  Nothing in the language of RICO, its legislative his-
tory, or its policies creates this artificial barrier to RICO recovery.  The
plaintiff is diligent in trying to vindicate his rights.  The putative
defendant can plausibly claim no warranted policy of repose.  The
court cannot legitimately complain of staleness.  Thus, under the pure
Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule—and that is the rule at issue
here—victims may not recover for their RICO injuries, even though
they are part of the same pattern that injured them, and some victims
with RICO injuries will not recover under RICO at all.  In sum, unless
the Court substantially modifies and tailors the pure Clayton Act rule
or injury-occurrence to RICO, it is a poor fit for RICO, despite its
modeling on the Clayton Act.  To make it work, the Court must add
discovery principles, including separate accrual, and tolling doctrines
to the pure injury-occurrence rule, but then, the new rule morphs
into something else and not the Clayton Act rule.  We are back to
some form of the discovery rule, which is where the circuits are now.
3. The Injury and Pattern Discovery Rule and Rotella v. Wood353
Under the injury-and-pattern discovery rule, “a civil RICO cause
of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reason-
ably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his
injury and that the injury is part of a pattern.”354  Before Rotella, four
circuit courts used some form of this rule for civil RICO.355  The
injury-and-pattern discovery rule is a good fit for civil RICO.  It war-
rants careful consideration by any court considering the issue without
binding precedent settling the question.  Because it takes into account
the pattern element of RICO, the statute of limitations does not run
before a RICO violation actually occurs.356  Moreover, unlike the last-
353 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
354 Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554–55
(11th Cir. 1990).  As in the case of the Clayton Act rule and the discovery rule, this
rule is also a separate accrual rule.
355 See id.; Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 238 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521
U.S. 179 (1997); Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 619–20 (6th Cir. 1994);
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820–21 (10th Cir. 1990).
356 This action is in contrast to the Clayton Act rule. See supra notes 338–357 and
accompanying text.
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predicate-act rule, the injury-and-pattern discovery rule includes the
doctrine of separate accrual.  It does not permit plaintiffs to sit on
their hands and watch the pattern parade pass by them; it does not let
the heedless plaintiffs keep their claims for relief, while the interests
of the defendants in repose or the courts in staleness languish.  Once
the plaintiff is aware (knows or should have known) that he has suf-
fered an injury from a pattern of racketeering activity, he has his four-
year limitations period (and no longer) within which to investigate his
claim fully, do painstaking research on the law, draft his complaint
(however complex) well, and to sue under RICO.  To be sure, the rule
frontloads the costs of RICO litigation, but the burden belongs there
in the first instance.  Not affording him adequate time raises the spec-
ter of hastily prepared RICO complaints or time-barring valid com-
plaints.  Neither the defendant nor the court should relish
unnecessarily arguing over whether the plaintiff has a valid RICO, or
has it, but did not draft it well enough to pass muster on its first itera-
tion.  That is the most time consuming, unnecessarily expensive, and
ultimately frustrating aspect of RICO litigation.  If a plaintiff’s claim
for relief is time-barred under the injury-and-pattern discovery rule,
he did not exercise reasonable diligence to discover the elements of
his claim or he was aware of his claim but heedlessly let it languish.
No one interested in all facets of justice on the limitations issue
should shed a tear for him.
Unfortunately, the Court in Rotella v. Wood rejected the injury-
and-pattern discovery rule.357  As in the situation in Klehr three years
earlier, only one accrual rule in Rotella could save the plaintiff’s claim
(now the-injury-and-pattern discovery rule).358  Once again, as in
Klehr, the Court rejected the accrual rule but did not decide on any
accrual rule for civil RICO.359  The Court mistakenly rejected the
injury-and-pattern discovery rule for three unpersuasive reasons.  First,
the Court found that the rule violated the policies behind statutes of
limitations, including repose and curtailing stale claims360 by, in many
357 Rotella, 528 U.S. at 551.
358 Id.
359 After the Court rejected the last-predicate-act rule in Klehr and the injury-and-
pattern discovery rule in Rotella, some version of the discovery rule was the only one
not rejected. Id. at 554.  Nonetheless, the Rotella Court refused to “settle upon a final
rule,” leaving open the possibility of applying the injury-occurrence rule in a future
case RICO. Id. at 554 n.2.  It explained: “[T]he parties have not focused on this
[injury-occurrence] option, and we would not pass upon it without more attentive
advocacy.” Id.
360 Id. at 555.  The Court also argued that the rule would result in uncertainty
“about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.”
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 133 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1713
circumstances, extending the limitations period “well beyond the time
when a plaintiff’s cause of action is complete.”361  Second, the Court
found that the injury-and-pattern discovery rule was an unjustified
extension of the traditional injury discovery rule.362  When a statute
does not specify when a claim for relief accrues, federal courts nor-
mally apply a discovery accrual rule.363  Under this rule, the “discovery
of the injury, not [the] discovery of the other elements of a claim, is
what starts the clock.”364  Because the normal federal discovery rule
governs other claims for relief where the elements of the claim are
potentially difficult to ascertain (e.g., medical malpractice), that a
RICO pattern is difficult to identify is not enough to justify departing
from the normal discovery rule.365  Third, the Court, again stressing
the Clayton Act analogy, found that the injury-and-pattern discovery
rule is inconsistent with the Clayton Act’s injury accrual rule.366  In
particular, the Court argued that one of the purposes behind the civil
361 Id. at 558.  Missing in the Court’s analysis is a weighing of the cases where this
would be true against the cases in which this would not be true.  The Court is sacrific-
ing the valid cases where this would not be true to protect interests of the defendant
in cases where it would be true.  By hypothesis, the plaintiff is a victim of RICO con-
duct and the defendant is a perpetrator of RICO conduct.  The balance should go to
the victims, not the perpetrator, unless the plaintiff intentionally waited until filing
“late” to gain an unfair advantage (e.g., waiting until an elderly exonerating witness
died).  That, however, is factoring in a value not present in the formulation of the
present rule.
362 Id. at 555–57.  The Court commented:  “How long is too long is, of course, a
matter of judgment based on experience, and it gives us great pause that the injury
and pattern discovery rule is an extension of the traditional federal accrual rule of
injury discovery, and unwarranted by the injury discovery rule’s rationale.” Id. at 555.
But see supra note 261.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 555–57.  Sadly, the Court here (and below) fails fully to justify its decision
by looking at and evaluating the substantial differences between RICO and other
claims for relief (e.g., Congress’s command that the statute receive liberal construc-
tion in favor of remedy, etc.) and saying why these differences do not tip the scale in
favor of a different rule, save for only the Court’s own ipse dixit.  That is not how a
Supreme Court opinion ought to read if the Court wants to persuade those who study
the law, a goal the Court must meet if it is to remain legitimate in our society.  The
Court has in our tripartite form government only the power of its reasoning fully
articulated by its pen, for, as noted long ago, it has neither the sword nor the purse.
See FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) in 43 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5,
at 230 (“The Executive not only dispenses honors, but holds the sword of the commu-
nity.  The Legislator not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which
the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary . . . [has]
neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment”).
366 Id. at 557.
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provisions in RICO and the Clayton Act is “to supplement Govern-
ment efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited prac-
tices.”367  The Clayton Act’s accrual rule better accomplishes this
purpose by forcing plaintiffs to file their claims earlier, allowing the
public benefit to accrue sooner.368  Thus, the Court leaves civil RICO
with some form of the discovery rule.  The issue of which form of dis-
367 Id. The Court summarized its analysis:
Both statutes share a common congressional objective of encouraging
civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the
respectively prohibited practices.  The object of civil RICO is thus not merely
to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, “private attorneys
general,” dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity. . . . (civil RICO spe-
cifically has a “further purpose [of] encouraging potential private plaintiffs
diligently to investigate”).  The provision for treble damages is accordingly
justified by the expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an
object pursued the sooner the better.  It would, accordingly, be strange to
provide an unusually long basic limitations period that could only have the
effect of postponing whatever public benefit civil RICO might realize.  The
Clayton Act avoids any such policy conflict by its accrual rule that
“[g]enerally, a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a
defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s business,” and the Clayton
Act analogy reflects the clear intent of Congress to reject a potentially longer
basic rule under RICO.
Id. at 557–58 (citations omitted).
368 Id.  The Court summarized its judgment:
In sum, any accrual rule softened by a pattern discovery feature would
undercut every single policy we have mentioned.  By tying the start of the
limitations period to a plaintiff’s reasonable discovery of a pattern rather
than to the point of injury or its reasonable discovery, the rule would extend
the potential limitations period for most civil RICO cases well beyond the
time when a plaintiff’s cause of action is complete, as this case shows.
Rotella does not deny that he knew of his injury in 1986 when it occurred, or
that his civil RICO claim was complete and subject to suit at that time.  But
under Rotella’s rule, the clock would have started only in 1994, when he
discovered the pattern of predicate acts (his assumption being that he could
not reasonably have been expected to discover them sooner).  A limitations
period that would have begun to run only eight years after a claim became
ripe would bar repose, prove a godsend to stale claims, and doom any hope
of certainty in identifying potential liability.  Whatever disputes may arise
about pinpointing the moment a plaintiff should have discovered an injury
to himself would be dwarfed by the controversy inherent in divining when a
plaintiff should have discovered a racketeering pattern that might well be
complex, concealed or fraudulent, and involve harm to parties wholly unre-
lated to an injured plaintiff.  The fact, as Rotella notes, that difficulty in iden-
tifying a pattern is inherent in civil RICO, only reinforces our reluctance to
parlay the necessary complexity of RICO into worse trouble in applying its
limitations rule.  A pattern discovery rule would patently disserve the con-
gressional objective of a civil enforcement scheme parallel to the Clayton Act
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covery the rule takes and how the Court balances the character of
RICO—in particular, the pattern requirement, though its weight is
less after Rotella—the interests of the plaintiff in his claim for relief,
the interests of the defendant in repose, and the interests of the court
in staleness remains for decision in yet another RICO case.369
regime, aimed at rewarding the swift who undertake litigation in the public
good.
Id. at 558–59 (citations omitted).  As if not to ignore completely the thrust of Rotella’s
major points, the Court concluded:
We have already encountered his argument that differences between
RICO and the Clayton Act render their analogy inapt, and we have
explained why neither the RICO pattern requirement nor the occurrence of
fraud in RICO patterns is a good reason to ignore the Clayton Act model.
Here it remains only to respond to Rotella’s argument that we ourselves
undercut the force of the Clayton Act analogy when we held that RICO had
no racketeering injury requirement comparable to the antitrust injury
requirement under the Clayton Act.  This point not only fails to support but
even cuts against Rotella’s position.  By eliminating the complication of any-
thing like an antitrust injury element we have, to that extent, recognized a
simpler RICO cause of action than its Clayton Act counterpart, and RICO’s
comparative simplicity in this respect surely does not support the adoption
of a more protracted basic limitations period.
Finally, Rotella returns to his point that RICO patterns will involve fraud
in many cases, when he argues that unless a pattern discovery rule is recog-
nized a RICO plaintiff will sometimes be barred from suit by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), which provides that fraud must be pleaded with partic-
ularity.  While we will assume that Rule 9(b) will exact some cost, we are wary
of allowing speculation about that cost to control the resolution of the issue
here.  Rotella has presented no case in which Rule 9(b) has effectively
barred a claim like his, and he ignores the flexibility provided by Rule
11(b)(3), allowing pleadings based on evidence reasonably anticipated after
further investigation or discovery.  It is not that we mean to reject Rotella’s
concern about allowing “blameless ignorance” to defeat a claim; we simply
do not think such a concern should control the decision about the basic
limitations rule.  In rejecting pattern discovery as a basic rule, we do not
unsettle the understanding that federal statutes of limitations are generally
subject to equitable principles of tolling, and where a pattern remains
obscure in the face of a plaintiff’s diligence in seeking to identify it, equita-
ble tolling may be one answer to the plaintiff’s difficulty, complementing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3).  The virtue of relying on equitable
tolling lies in the very nature of such tolling as the exception, not the rule.
Id. at 559–61 (citations omitted).
369 The Court in Rotella bristled at Petitioner’s hypothetical (calling it “specula-
tion”) and charred counsel because he “presented no case.” Id. at 560. But see id. at
554 (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997), in which the Court did not
present a case, but posed a hypothetical “pattern” composed of criminal acts, with up
to ten years between them, extending indefinitely, without an intervening suit by the
victim or a criminal prosecution by the government).  Testing the possible scope of
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rules by varying hypotheticals is the standard practice of law professors, as it is for
judges in oral argument. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS
AND ORAL ARGUMENTS § 3.3 (2d ed. 2003) (“In the ‘hot’ courts, the Socratic method
comes storming back at you with a ferocity that that you have not experienced in
years.”); Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 922 (1996)
(describing the task of the law professor as “framing questions, responding with more
questions, and guiding discussion in a way that students will discover answers for
themselves”).  In fact, no practical alternatives exist for RICO and time-bars.  While
Congress enacted RICO in 1970, litigation in significant numbers under civil RICO
did not begin until the after the Court’s decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479 (1985).  Even then, the number and variety of cases involving time-bars is
relatively miniscule on the criminal or civil side.  In 2011, for example, the United
States filed 79,197 criminal cases, 30 (.038%) of which were criminal RICO cases, an
unusually low number.  Meanwhile, plaintiffs filed 294,336 civil cases in federal court,
only 917 (.31%) of which were civil RICO cases, about how they typically appear.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 46–48,
80–82 tbls C-2, D-2 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Federal
JudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2011.aspx.  Moreover, for
the last eighteen years, the number of civil RICO complaints as compared to overall
civil complaints became proportionally smaller.  Between 1993 and 2011, the number
of civil filings in federal district courts increased from 229,850 to 294,336, while the
number of civil RICO cases filed remained effectively the same, increasing from 903
to only 917. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1997 at 131–133
tbl. C-2A (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
JudicialBusiness1997.aspx; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra, at 46–48 tbl. C-2.  In sum, despite popular myth, if these
data are correct (they depend on counting only the count marked by plaintiff’s coun-
sel as the principle count, and they do not count counterclaims; thus, they may under-
state the real numbers, but by how many, we do not know) the federal courts do not
face an inundation of RICO litigation, criminal or civil. Thus, we must carefully guard
against generalizations from unrepresentative samples or samples that lack a statisti-
cally sufficient number for valid generalizations.  Otherwise, our generalization will
give rise to a logical fallacy. S. MORRIS ENGEL, FALLACIES AND PITFALLS OF LANGUAGE
74 (1994) (defining the “fallacy of hasty generalization” as the use of “an isolated or
exceptional case . . . as the basis for a general conclusion that is unwarranted”); accord
D. Q. MCINERNY, BEING LOGICAL 84 (2004) (describing the need for a large enough
number of observations in order to make a “reliable generalization[ ]”).  Neverthe-
less, we simply do not know how a representative sample of time-bar defenses in the
context of civil or criminal RICO litigation would look, even if we could derive it from
the current data.  Impressionist generalizations by people familiar with RICO litiga-
tion across the country, at least, are possible.  In fact, they are probably not terribly
different from 1986 when I did a more systematic study on the civil side. Equitable
Relief, supra note 29, at 619–22.  If we look at reported decisions (concededly,
“reported” is less than “filed,” and we do not know if “reported” are representative of
“filed;” likely as not, they are not representative, because they are generally invalid;
valid RICO cases tend quickly to settle at least after general motion practice initiated
by defense counsel, the plaintiff wins a motion for summary judgment against him,
and the case is set for trial without publically reported decisions) from a procedural
perspective, when courts dismiss civil RICO cases, they do it under pleading issues, since
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Twombly in 2007 and Iqbal in 2009, generally for lack of “plausibility.” See generally
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (dismissing under pleading issue); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (dismissing under pleading issue).  Alterna-
tively, under Rule 9(b), courts dismiss pleadings that lack the “particulars” of fraud.
Thus, these two pleading issues remain the grounds for most dismissals.  From a sub-
stantive perspective (the categories are not mutually exclusive), since 1989, the date of
the Court’s decision in H.J. Inc., the largest percentage of dismissals rest on a failure
to plead a valid “pattern” under H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229
(1989).  Two other common grounds for dismissal are failures to meet either the
enterprise-defendant rule or current restrictive proximate cause standards under
RICO.  In sum, the problem is not, most assuredly, clients who strategically wait for
the period of the limitations almost to run (however calculated) before filing, seeking
to gain an unfair advantage because the defendant will lack the ability to prove his
defense(s), but plaintiffs who either bring cases too soon, bring cases before they meet
the “continuity” test for “pattern,” lack learning in the substantive law, or misjudge
the proximate cause issue.  Courts must frame issues with the standard case in mind.
Sweeting v. Am. Knife Co., 123 N.E. 82, 83 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (“The average
and not the exceptional case determine the fitness of the remedy.”).  The legal
maxim is Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accident, non quae ex inopinato (The
law ought to be made with a view to the cases that happen most frequently, and not to
those that are unexpected.).  To this crucial point is the Court’s wholly misleading use
of an “indefinite” misunderstanding of  “pattern” under the language of § 1961(5).
On the contrary, § 1961(5) does not function as a traditional “definition” (either
denotative (this and only this) or ostensive (this and this at least)), but as a limitation,
as the Court itself recognized in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (“[The definitions section]
does not so much define a pattern of racketeering activity as state a minimum neces-
sary condition for the existence of such a pattern . . . . It thus places an outer limit on
the concept of a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .”).  In fact, the Court also did not
recognize this powerful point in either Klehr or Rotella, arguably recognizing silently
that it would have impeded its analyses.  Developing a coherent body of precedent
requires attention to such detail. PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 188 (Meridian ed. 1961) (calling for “solidity and strength of work-
manship” in the opinions of the Supreme Court).  In sum, RICO does not authorize
an “indefinite” pattern or validate a “pattern” with “acts occurring at up to 10-year”
intervals. Klehr, 521 U.S. at 187. H.J. Inc. requires that a valid “pattern” have a logical
connection (“relation”) between the acts and that they reflect substantial duration
(“continuity”) or, depending on the circumstances, its threat.  492 U.S. at 239.  Thus,
RICO requires that the acts in the “pattern” reflect a logical relationship and substan-
tial temporal extension.  Only a fanciful imagination posits acts ten years apart having
a logical connection between them and reflecting continuity. But see supra note 98.
Few courts, at least on the civil side, would uphold it.  For reprehensive ways court
treat pattern questions, see, e.g., Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Andy Warhol, 119
F.3d 91, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff did not plead a pattern since
“[e]ven if there were actionable fraudulent activity, the fraudulent acts were either
not sufficiently related or continuous to sustain a RICO conspiracy claim”); Feinstein
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 44–45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[The] plaintiffs’ RICO
claim founders on the bald assertion that these two episodes, nearly two years apart in
time, hundreds of miles apart in space, and involving two largely distinct groups of
participants were part of a unitary scheme.”).  In sum, the Court’s misleading illustra-
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4. Discovery Rule
The discovery rule is the judicially formulated general federal
accrual rule, and courts usually apply it when a statute does not spec-
ify, as too often they do not, when a claim for relief accrues.370  Under
the discovery rule, as usually applied to civil RICO, a claim for relief
accrues when the plaintiff knows (or should have known) of his
injury.371  The usual form of the rule also includes the separate
accrual doctrine, that is, for each “new and independent injury” that
the plaintiff suffers, a separate claim for relief and a separate period of
the statute of limitations accrues.372  In Compton v. Ide,373 the Ninth
tion of an “indefinite” pattern, crucial to its argument, is unpersuasive, particularly in
its ignoring the distinct possibility of an intervening suit by the victim or, equally or
more plausibly, an indictment by the government; it is purely and solely notional.  To
borrow a phrase from Judge Learned Hand, “[i]t is an unreal dream.”  United States
v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).  Policy ought not to perch so precariously
on such a gossamer web of imagination.  Even then, the  Court could easily have rem-
edied the supposed defect by adding to its rule the doctrine of separate accrual, as the
lower courts have done with some regularity in RICO litigation. See infra note 376.
That alone would disincentivize the plaintiff from a late filing, one of the Court’s
central concerns to the exclusion of the justness of the claim.  Changing the point of
accrual itself is hardly necessary to remedy an unlikely distortion in the operation of
the rule.  In addition, the hypothetical fails to include any evaluation of whose con-
duct in fact makes the “pattern” “indefinite;” it focuses on the victim’s conduct in
waiting to file his suit, and it ignores the defendant’s conduct in creating a pattern of
repetitive, lengthy criminal conduct of a RICO dimension.  On the Court’s supposi-
tion, he is an ongoing, serial offender, for whom little regard is justly due.  Contour-
ing a time bar is a matter of balancing many interests, as these material amply show.
The Court does not strike any balance here.  In brief, the Court’s evaluation of its
analysis is considerably less than persuasive.  As Judge Learned Hand described Jus-
tice Cardozo: “like John Stuart Mill, he would often begin by stating the other side
better than its advocate had stated it himself.” LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
131 (Irving Dillard ed., reprt. 3d ed. 1989) (1974).  These two opinions do not reflect
Cardozo’s estimable standards of analysis.  Equally important, Judge Hand also said of
criticisms of the judiciary: “Let . . . [us] be severely brought to book, when . . . [we] go
wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to understand.” Id. at 110.  This Article
seeks to understand.  As Hand again commented, “it is also fair to ask that before the
judges are blamed they should be given credit of having tried to do their best.” Id.
Neither of these opinions is characteristic of Justice Souter or Justice Breyer, both of
whom are generally careful and thoughtful.  Justices (as well as judges) have too little
time to do the most demanding work.  Time pressures alone can produce less than
stellar work.  In fact, it is remarkable how well the Court does its work.  It deserves and
merits our respect and gratitude.  A professor writes at times and places of his or her
own choosing.  The judiciary does not. See infra notes 625–27.
370 See, e.g., La Porte Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bayshore Nat’l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256
(5th Cir. 1986).
371 See, e.g., Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996).
372 Id.
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Circuit was the first circuit to face the issue and to adopt the discovery
rule.  Finding no authority for when a civil RICO action accrues, it
imposed the general accrual rule that the period runs from when the
plaintiff knows (or has reason to know) of his injury.374  In Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades,375 the Second Circuit further developed the rule
by duly modifying it by the separate accrual doctrine.376  Even though
the Court in Rotella refused to anoint the discovery rule in light of
373 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on unrelated grounds by Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (adopting a uniform four-year
limitations period for civil RICO claims).
374 Id. at 1433.
375 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
376 The opinion provides this succinct explanation of the separate accrual rule:
[A] plaintiff’s action accrues against a defendant for a specific injury on the
date that plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that injury.  At a later
date, when a new and independent injury is incurred from the same viola-
tion, the plaintiff is again “injured in his business or property” and his right
to sue for damages from that injury accrues at the time he discovered or
should have discovered that injury.
Id. at 1103 (citations omitted).  Relying on the Court’s analysis of the antitrust accrual
rule in Zenith, the Bankers Trust court also held that RICO plaintiffs could recover for
future damages, but only those damages that were not too speculative; otherwise, the
claim for relief for them did not accrue until they suffered the damages. Id. at 1104
(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971)).
Not all circuit courts agree with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Zenith. In
Grimmett, the Ninth Circuit observed:
[W]e disagree with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Zenith. Zenith
dealt with lost future profits, which cannot be calculated until they are
incurred—the uncertainty arose because future market conditions, upon
which damages depended, had yet to unfold.  In Bankers Trust, however, the
RICO plaintiff had sustained a definable injury—the uncertainty in that case
involved whether and to what extent the known injury would be mitigated by
a bankruptcy court.  In one, the injury is speculative because it is not known
whether it will occur at all; in the other, the injury has occurred and is
known, but it is speculative whether the damages might be reduced or even
eliminated by alternative recovery efforts.  We believe it would be error to
equate the two.
Grimmett, 75 F.3d at 517.
In sum, the court draws a distinction between uncertainty as to the fact of dam-
ages, which is fatal to the claim, and uncertainty as to the extent of damages, which is
not fatal.  Instead, the court usually uses another measure of the damages.  Thus, the
fact of damages must not be speculative, but the court used a relaxed standard for
proving the amount of damages, as a defendant should not be able to profit from an
uncertainty created by his own illegal conduct.  See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981) (accepting uncertainty as to the amount of
damages in an antitrust setting).  Before the 1971 Zenith decision referred to above,
the Court had previously heard the matter, and in the course of remanding the case
to the Seventh Circuit, the Court recognized that the amount of damages in an anti-
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Justice Scalia’s support of the injury-occurrence rule, that is, the pure
Clayton Act rule; in contrast, the circuits uniformly follow the duly
modified discovery rule for civil RICO.377
The discovery/separate accrual rule is eminently preferable to
the pure Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule.  To be sure, RICO
took the Clayton Act’s language to implement the treble damage con-
cept in its version of a private enforcement mechanism.  At the same
time, the objectives are kindred: a marketplace where freedom, not
collusion, is the goal (antitrust) and violence and fraud are the excep-
tion, not the rule (RICO).  The parallelism is substantial, and readily
conceded, but crucial differences remain; they come to the forefront,
too, at the point of accrual.  While I briefly considered the evaluation
of the choice of law problem facing state courts under state RICO
statutes without special statutes of limitation and an evaluation of the
two individual accrual rules already rejected by the Court, they merit a
more extensive review at this point against the backdrop of either the
pure Clayton Act or injury-occurrence rule or a modified (separate
accrual) discovery rule.  First, the substantive elements to which the
Clayton Act adds its treble damage remedy are distinctly dissimilar
from RICO’s substantive elements, in particular in RICO’s unique
requirements of “enterprise” and “pattern,” for which the antitrust
statutes have no counterpart.  For that matter, neither does medical
malpractice, the Rotella Court’s invocation of it as an analogy to the
contrary notwithstanding.378  Second, having differing substantive ele-
ments is only one aspect of the difference.  However disparate the sub-
stantive elements, proof of them is where the theoretical becomes the
trust setting will be unclear, but that this does not prevent recovery.  Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 123–24 (1969).
377 See Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., 460 F.3d 494, 507 (3d Cir. 2006); Living Designs,
Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 365 (9th Cir. 2005); Barry Avia-
tion Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2004);
Taylor Grp. v. ANR Storage Co., 24 F. App’x 319, 325 (6th Cir. 2001); Pac. Harbor
Capital, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 252 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2001) (assuming
that the discovery rule applies without deciding); Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d
765, 774–75 (5th Cir. 2000); Lares Grp., II v. Tobin, 221 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2000);
Lanza v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig.), 154 F.3d 56, 58
(2d Cir. 1998) (citing Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d at 1102); Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc.,
108 F.3d 529, 537 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
503 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555
(2000)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (W.D. Ark. 2000)
(demonstrating application of the discovery rule by a district court within the Eighth
Circuit). But see Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2006)
(declining to decide between discovery rule or injury occurrence rule).
378 See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 556.
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practical, thinking becomes doing.  Proof of injury to business or
property is relatively straightforward.  It is, after all, injury to your busi-
ness or property.
Typically, the rest of the story is hardly straightforward in a
sophisticated RICO case.  A private investigation is largely limited to
searching public electronic databases, asking questions, often of wit-
nesses who do not want “to get involved,” and seeking access to books
and papers.  Other people have no duty to cooperate with you.  Devel-
oping investigative hypotheses are easy enough; they require only
experience in the fields of endeavor and imagination.  (That said,
imagination is often in scarce supply.)  In any event, proof of them—
that will stand up in court—is another matter.  Suspicion is not
enough.  Under Rule 8, allegations must ring “plausibly.”379  A plain-
tiff is, of course, as Rotella indicates, free to plead, under Rule
11(b)(3), facts on evidence reasonably anticipated upon further inves-
tigation after discovery.  Nevertheless, those facts are likely limited to
electronic or paper records (e.g., daily diaries, travel records, and rou-
tine e-mails, toll records, etc.) or other matters required by normal
accounting standards for regularly run businesses (e.g., requisition
requests or justifications, cancelled checks, check ledgers, account
books, and accountant’s or tax consultant’s papers, etc.).  Absent a
whistle-blower—the unusual case in white-collar fraud—to establish
the inner workings of conspiracies, as a rule, requires the plaintiff to
rely on circumstantial evidence.380  In sum, in modern times, the
pirates of white-collar crime do not sign “articles of agreement” or a
379 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556–58 (2007).
380 See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556–58 (1947) (asserting that
because “[s]ecrecy and concealment are essential features of [a] successful conspir-
acy,” circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove a conspiracy); see also Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974) (“[T]he jury was entitled to conclude that the
individual petitioners, as corporate officials directly concerned with the activities of
their organizations, were aware of the mail solicitation scheme, and of the contents of
the brochure.  The evidence is likewise sufficient to establish the existence of a con-
spiracy to mail the obscene brochure.  The existence of an agreement may be shown
by circumstances indicating that criminal defendants acted in concert to achieve a
common goal.”).  Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence, in white-collar type offenses,
often points in different directions; unlawful conspiracy, yes; but also, routine lawful
conduct.  For example, prosecutors have found proof of knowledge or belief of the
stolen character of property in fencing investigations and trials particularly vexing.
Ostensibly, the transaction looks no different than a lawful exchange of property.
How do you show the state of mind of the fence?  In a narcotics investigation and
trial, the character of the drugs usually speaks for itself; the offender seldom has a
similar lawful transaction to act as a front for his unlawful conduct.  Circumstantial
evidence alone is seldom sufficient to point to criminality.  Additional evidence is
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pirate’s code.381  The tools of private civil investigation compared to
necessary. See generally, G. Robert Blakey & Michael Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution
of Stolen Property: The Need for Law Reform, 74 MICH. LAW REV. 1511, 1562–92  (1974).
381 That criminals would sign articles of agreement is—to say the least—counter-
intuitive.  Yet eighteenth century pirates apparently drafted, signed, and posted them,
usually on the door of the grand cabin.  They used them to settle among them the
basic exigencies of their voyages, including leadership roles, discipline, specifications
for each crewmate’s share of treasure, and compensation for the injured.  Few articles
survive, as the pirates typically destroyed them before capturing naval crews could
seize them.  CHARLES JOHNSON, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES & MURDERS OF
THE NOTORIOUS PIRATES 180–81, 278, 314 (David Cordingly, ed. 1998) (1724) collects
or reconstructs “Articles of Agreement” for several infamous pirates; they are absorb-
ing to read.  At first, historians thought of Johnson’s book, an instant best seller, as a
mixture of fact and fancy.  Time corroborated most of his stories.  Thus, we may safely
say, “[T]he majority of facts in Johnson’s History have proved to be accurate.”  David
Cordingly, Introduction to JOHNSON, supra, at vii, ix.
The nearest equivalent in modern times is street gangs that have written codes of
conduct.  The extensive code of the Latin Kings is illustrative. United States v. Olson,
450 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming RICO murder and drug convictions)
describes the Latin Kings’ code:
The Latin Kings are a national criminal organization (often called the
“Nation”) based in Chicago, with chapters in many states.  The chapters fol-
low a written Constitution and Manifesto (collectively, the “Manifesto”) that
set forth the rules for membership and a code of conduct to which members
must adhere.  The Manifesto describes, among other things, the hierarchy
that rules the national and local chapters of the organization, the colors and
symbols that are to be worn and displayed by members, and certain hand
gestures that indicate allegiance to the group.  A five-pointed crown is the
national emblem of the Latin Kings; black and gold are the official colors of
the group.  According to the Manifesto, a fist on the heart is the national
salute, a gesture meaning, “I die for you.”  Another Latin Kings gesture
known as “the crown” involves displaying the fingers of one hand in a config-
uration that resembles a crown.  The Latin Kings have a national flag, several
official prayers, and a set of trial procedures to be used when a member
commits an offense.  The Latin Kings code of honor denies membership to
anyone who has killed a member of the group or killed a relative of a mem-
ber.  The Manifesto also ostensibly excludes as members rapists and men
who are addicted to heroin.
On the national level, the Latin Kings are led by an executive commit-
tee known as the Crown.  The Crown is headed by the Sun King, a leader
chosen by the Crown as a whole.  The Crown has the authority to make laws
for the entire Latin Kings organization, which is further subdivided into
chapters.  Each chapter is led by an Inca who has the authority to make rules
for his own chapter but not for the Nation.  So long as he abides by the
Nation’s laws, the Inca has absolute authority over his chapter and also bears
responsibility for the actions of his chapter.  Next in command at the chap-
ter level is the Cacique (also called the Casinca), whose duty is to make cer-
tain that the Inca’s orders are carried out.  The Cacique takes on the Inca’s
role if the Inca is imprisoned or dies, although the Inca retains ultimate
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authority if his absence is due to imprisonment.  The Inca and Cacique are
elected by the members of the chapter.  Each chapter also has an Enforcer, a
Treasurer and a Secretary, each appointed by the Inca and Cacique.  The
Enforcer is in charge of “security” for every member of the chapter and
ensures that members obey the Nation laws and the orders of the Inca and
Cacique.  Any member who publicly discredits the Inca or Cacique may be
charged with conspiracy and treason.  Latin Kings may not wear anything
that can be construed as being an emblem of another organization.  Mem-
bers are admonished to protect the lives and reputations of all other Nation
members, not to discuss Nation business with outsiders, and not to submit to
lie detector tests.  The Nation is apparently wary of the press but not entirely
opposed to publicity; one rule forbids giving press interviews on Nation busi-
ness without prior approval.  According to the Manifesto, any member who
cooperates with the police will be expelled from the group.  In practice, that
expulsion invariably is accompanied by beatings (called “violations” in Latin
Kings parlance) and is sometimes accomplished by murder.  The Manifesto
also mandates that “No King shall stand idle when another King is in need of
assistance.”
Id. at 661–62.
In October 1968, William G. Lambert, an investigative reporter for Life Magazine,
learned from a government official of a financial relationship between Justice Abe
Fortas and Louis Wolfson, the financier.  Lambert pieced together that Mr. Fortas
accepted a $20,000 fee from Wolfson’s family foundation.  In fact, the contract
required Wolfson, through the front of the Foundation, to pay $20,000 a year for
Fortas’s life and then for his wife’s life for unspecified advice.  According to Lam-
bert’s Life article, Fortas received the money and kept it for eleven months, but
returned it after a grand jury indicted Wolfson on stock fraud.  William Lambert, The
Justice . . . and the Stock Manipulator, LIFE, May 9, 1969, at 32, 35.  Attorney General
John Mitchell gave the article to Chief Justice Earl Warren.  Fortas resigned from the
Court nine days after the article appeared.  Lambert won the George Polk award for
the article.  The story of the agreement and the resignation is told in ROBERT SHOGAN,
A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT (1972) and LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS (1990).  Depend-
ing on your perspective, the Fortas contract is one of the nearest examples of a white-
collar-crime pirate’s agreement in modern history.
The successful use of RICO against urban street gangs begins in the early 1990s.
Matthew Purdy, Using the Racketeering Law to Bring Down Street Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1994, at A1; see, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1365 (2d Cir. 1994)
(considering application of Juvenile Delinquency Act to RICO for Asian street gang
engaged in extortion, armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder).  It continues. See,
e.g., United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding prosecu-
tion of member of street gang La Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 under RICO and mur-
der under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) and the imposition of life sentence). But see United
States v. Nascimenito, 491 F.3d 25, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding a RICO prosecution
of non-economic activity against vigorous challenges on commerce grounds; “[w]e
add only that while this case may venture near the outer edge of conduct encom-
passed by the RICO statute, Stonehurst’s activities do not cross that line”). See gener-
ally Jessica M. Vaughn & Jon D. Feere, Taking Back the Streets: ICE and Local Law
Enforcement Target Immigrant Gangs, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 4–5 (2008)
(“The most notorious [street gang] is MS-13 . . . . The history of MS-13 is . . . unique,
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public criminal investigation are a pale image of its public twin where
law enforcement has extraordinary techniques to gather pre-indict-
ment evidence of sophisticated crime (e.g., informants, wiretaps,
grand juries, and plea-bargaining to switch insider witnesses, etc.).382
and its proclivity for violence is . . . unprecedented, but many of the activities, traits,
and mind-sets of its members are fairly typical of other immigrant gangs.  MS-13 is
considered by law enforcement to be the fastest-growing and most violent street gang
in the United States.  Wherever MS-13 goes, violence follows.  Gang members have
carried out beheadings and grenade attacks in Central America and have hacked peo-
ple with machetes in cities along the East Coast in the United States.  According to
the FBI, MS-13’s motto is, ‘Mata, Viola, Controla,’ or, ‘Kill, Rape, Control.’  By some
accounts, MS-13 has ‘mushroomed into the size of a small army.’  The FBI estimated
in 2005 that there were approximately 10,000 ‘hardcore’ members of MS-13 in the
United States.  Estimates of the number of gang members in Central America and
Mexico range from 50,000 up to 300,000 members.  A significant percentage are [sic]
part of MS-13.  The exact meaning and origin of the gang’s name are unclear.  The
name ‘Mara Salvatruchas’ has been translated as meaning a ‘gang’ (mara) of ‘street-
tough Salvadorans’ (salvatruchas).  The ‘13’ represents the letter ‘M’ which indicates
an allegiance to the Mexican Mafia, the southern California prison gang.”).  Gang
prosecutions under RICO also now focus on prison gangs. See, e.g., United States v.
Stinson, No. 07-50408, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17979 (9th Cir., Aug. 26, 2011)
(upholding convictions under § 1962(d) and the imposition of life sentences); Tori
Richards, Aryan Brotherhood Leaders are Convicted in Murders, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/us/29aryan.html?pagewanted=print (“[The]
trial testimony painted a picture of a ruthless cadre of villains who routinely ordered
assassinations of rivals and their own member for such perceived ills as disrespect,
homosexuality or failing to follow orders . . . . A parade of former Aryan Brotherhood
member testified about life in the gang and how they used methods like lip reading,
invisible ink or lawyer mail privileges to pass messages that ordered killings.”).
382 JEFF COEN, FAMILY SECRETS (2009) and ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE LAST GOD-
FATHER (2006) graphically bring out the indispensable role that these crucial tech-
niques uniquely play in sophisticated investigations, particularly the role of plea
bargaining to switch insider witnesses.  In fact, criminal RICO prosecutions did not
begin with regularity until around 1975, but since then, they are running at the rate
of about 125 per year.  Roughly thirty-nine percent are in the organized crime area
(not Mafia alone, but also drugs, gambling, labor racketeering, etc.), while forty-eight
percent have been in the white-collar crime area (corruption of government, general
fraud in the private sector, securities and commodities fraud, etc.).  Thirteen percent
fall into other categories (violent groups, including terrorists, white-hate, anti-Semitic,
etc.). See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposal for Reform: “Mother of God–Is This the End
of RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 1020 (1990).  These modern successes in the organ-
ized crime area were not characteristic of those prosecutions that came before the
innovations of 1968 (e.g., wiretapping) and the early 1970s (e.g., witness protection
program, RICO, sentencing guidelines, etc.).  Consider a statement of President Rich-
ard M. Nixon supporting the enactment of RICO: “[n]ot a single one of the Cosa
Nostra Families has been destroyed.”  President Richard M. Nixon, Statement in Justi-
fication, S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 45 (1969) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 91-105, at 2 (1969)
(reporting out the Organized Crime Control Act)).  Then, the estimated number of
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Private civil investigation is at an almost disabling disadvantage when
it must fathom the existence and character of a wide variety of kinds
of “enterprise(s).”  As if that were not enough, it must also determine
the contours of a particular “pattern,” which include possibly many
types of criminal acts (e.g., violence, the provision of illegal persons,
goods, and services, corruption, and fraud).  Significantly, too, they
include offenses aimed at third parties, not all of whom are of a mind
“to get involved,” precisely the issue faced in any criminal investiga-
tion, but without the added benefit of pre-charge compulsory process;
the private investigation must take place before access to even the lim-
ited character of modern civil discovery.383  Typically, the most sophis-
made-members (not counting associates) was 3,000 to 5,000. Id. at 36.  As of 1999,
the estimated number is 1,150, 750 of which reside in New York City.  Rick Hampson,
Death of the Mob, USA Today, July 28, 1999, at 1A (reporting current data on the
various families, etc.).  Most of the families in cities, outside of NYC and Chicago—to
the degree that they even exist—are “little more than street gangs;” in fact, the Ameri-
can Mafia, previously a national problem, is now largely “a two-city phenomenon . . . .”
Id. The mob is still involved in organized crime, but it no longer possesses its vice-like
grip on labor unions, including its traditional redoubts, the Teamsters, Laborers,
Longshoremen, and the Hotel and Restaurant Employees. Id. The ubiquitous skim is
gone from places such as the Las Vegas casinos.  In short, while the sun is still in the
sky, it is in fact twilight for the mob, as it was in the 1960s. See generally, JAMES B.
JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB (1994) (showing the downfall of organized crime);
JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., GOTHAM UNBOUND (1999); JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS,
UNIONS, AND FEDS (2006).  For the general history of the Mafia and its prosecutions in
the United States, but in New York City in particular, see THOMAS REPPETTO, AMERI-
CAN MAFIA (2004); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, BRINGING DOWN THE MOB (2006); SELWYN
RAAB, FIVE FAMILIES (2005).  The tools and successes of private enforcement are as
ineffective as public enforcement prior to the 1970s, and they are slowly declining in
light of the tightening of the limitations on civil RICO and the rising standards of
federal civil pleading. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White-Collar
Crime: The Ironic Demise of Civil RICO, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1993) (demonstrating
this decline).
383 Even then, as Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham says it well:
The rules of civil procedure adopted in 1938 implemented a profound
change in the role of pleading in defining issues for trial.  In the main, the
complaint became an ignition point for discovery.  Issues were to be
“defined” by discovery, not pleading.  Our reverential treatment of the large
achievements of the 1938 rules may not have fully counted its price, or at
least the price over time seems to have gone up as pretrial process dwarfs
actual trials.  We do not fully understand the extent of these difficulties or
their cause.  It does remain clear that ready access to the discovery engine all
the while has been held back for certain types of claims.  An allegation of
fraud is one.  Rule 9(b) demands a larger role for pleading in the pre-trial
defining of such claims.
That said, the requirement for particularity in pleading fraud does not
lend itself to refinement, and it need not in order to make sense.  Directly
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 146 22-MAY-13 9:20
1726 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
put, the who, what, when, and where must be laid out before access to the
discovery process is granted.  So today we neither set springs for the
unwary nor insist on “technical” pleading requirements.  We remind that
this bite of Rule 9(b) was part of the pleading revolution of 1938.  In short,
we apply the rule with force, without apology.  At the same time, we read
Rule 9(b) as part of the entire set of rules, including Rule 8(a)’s insistence
upon “simple, concise, and direct” allegations.
Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997).
Under Rule 9(b), while each person need not make a false representation, the
pleader must distinguish between the roles various individuals play in a “fraudulent
scheme.”  Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore
v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989)).  Pleading fraud
in a “pattern” with particularity in reference to the conduct of third parties, how-
ever—either as a perpetrator or as a victim—is problematic.  Circuit court decisions
reflect varying attitudes on pleading fraud against third parties who do not join the
RICO claim for relief, sometimes within the same circuit. Compare Vicom, Inc. v. Har-
bridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 778 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Rule
9(b) requires the delineation of roles, but that the court will relax the rule when the
pleader makes allegations of fraud against a third party or where the defendant
uniquely has the information), with Miller v. Gain Fin., Inc., 995 F.2d 706, 709 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that under Rule 9(b), the court requires particularity in the
pleading of details of third party transactions and requires more than a statement that
a third party engaged in “‘similar business transactions’ with ‘similar results’”); accord
Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986, 989 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that under Rule 9(b), the court requires the pleading of the details of the
claim for relief).
Pleading a “pattern” is even more challenging when the pleader must plead it
with particularity under Rule 9(b).  If the pleading standards were not taxing enough,
substantively, the decisions often contradict each other (sometimes within the same
circuit) on whether pleading patterns involving multiple victims is even possible.  The
decisions confuse “standing” to plead another as a victim in a “pattern” for liability
purposes, that is, solely to establish the existence of the pattern, not to recover dam-
ages for the injury to the victim, where a pleading of facts about another does not
implicate prudential considerations or case and controversy concerns.  If the pleader
sought to recover another’s damages, of course, he would lack “standing” to recover
such damages, and his pleading would raise prudential considerations or case and
controversy concerns, but that is not the pleading faced by the courts. Compare How-
ard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 366 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (“[T]he plaintiff only has standing if . . . he has
been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.”)))
(holding that only acts directed at plaintiff  are available for liability for “pattern”),
with Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
three forgeries in thirteen months, only one of which was aimed at plaintiff, were
sufficient for a “pattern”); accord Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335,
1347 (2d Cir. 1994) (dictum) (indicating that injuries against others could be
counted to form a pattern); Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal
Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he injury which confers standing on a
RICO plaintiff is injury flowing from the commission of the predicate act, not injury
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ticated RICO litigation also cuts across several states.  Out-of-state
investigations require either or both the employment of national
investigative agencies and counsel in other states, multiplying invest-
ments of time and money.  Finally, after the investigation concludes,
with the research completed on the relevant circuits’ RICO jurispru-
dence, often a counter-intuitive and contradictory body of law, draft-
ing a claim for relief faces exacting standards of detailed factual
pleading (“plausible” under Rule 8; particularity under Rule 9(b)).
For example, the first tendency of most plaintiffs’ attorneys—without
solid experience in RICO litigation—is to sue the deepest pocket,
which usually is the “enterprise,” while RICO commonly precludes it.
That tendency alone accounts for the continued presence of enter-
prise-person issues frequently appearing in the reported civil RICO
decisions.  The multi-part test for “pattern” under H.J., Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.384 makes abundant sense on reflection, given
the various functions “pattern” plays in the contours of the three sub-
stantive standards of RICO, but it is as if it were a good wine: you have
to cultivate a refined judgment about it; it is hardly intuitive.  Reading
more than a few cases is necessary to acquire the connoisseur’s cogni-
tion for “pattern.”  As wine experts are not legion, so, too, neither are
RICO experts.  That factor alone accounts for the presence of pattern
issues still frequently appearing in reported cases.  Nevertheless, while
these factors are formidable, they are hardly insuperable.  Putting to
one side the required financial resources, the principal limiting factor
in developing a complex RICO complaint is time—time to come to
the conclusion that the injury is possibly cognizable under RICO, time
to conduct an adequate pre-complaint factual investigation, time to
do legal research, and, finally, time to draft a complaint that will pass
muster under the inevitable and vigorous challenges under Rules
12(b) and 9(b).  A private litigant faces those substantial hurdles in
bringing a sustainable civil RICO with its four-year term (currently of
flowing from the pattern of such acts.”); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d
806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that you can count injuries against others in estab-
lishing a “pattern”).  The decisions also split between the D.C. Circuit and the Sec-
ond, Third, and Seventh Circuits on whether a victim must plead a complete
“pattern” against himself or whether he need only plead a “pattern” against himself
and others. Compare Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local
Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff must establish
a pattern against himself), rev’d. on other grounds, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en
banc), with Terminate Control Corp., 28 F.3d at 1347 (allowing a pattern against himself
and others); Town of Kearney, 829 F.2d at 1268 (permitting a pattern against himself
and others); and Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 819 F.2d at 809 (holding that a pattern
against himself and others is permissible).
384 492 U.S. 229, 236–49 (1989).
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an uncertain accrual), while public authorities, with infinitely more
resources and far more powerful investigative tools, face a five-year
term (a pure event plus the set number).  In sum, a pure Clayton Act
rule would grievously hobble private civil RICO.  To be reasonably
workable, the Court would have to retool the Clayton Act rule pru-
dently with concepts of discovery, separate accrual, etc.  Then, of
course, it would not be the Clayton Act rule.  In fact, it would make
more sense for the Court to leave in place the federal discovery rule,
modified by the separate accrual doctrine, as the lower courts admin-
ister it now.
One additional point requires mention.  Unless the Court adds a
special qualification, the statute of limitations could begin to run
under the pure Clayton Act rule or the discovery rule before a plain-
tiff could bring a civil claim under RICO, a fundamental objection to
any rule.  That said, at least one circuit court articulates a way around
this troubling defect in each of the present rules.  In Limestone Develop-
ment Corp. v. Village of Lemont,385 Judge Posner, writing for the court,
did not in fact confront a situation where the plaintiff discovered his
injury more than four years before the defendant committed enough
predicate acts to constitute a pattern.386  Nevertheless, as Judge Pos-
ner suggested, even if it were the case, the plaintiff would still be able
to recover for his initial injury under RICO, because of the “continu-
ing violation” doctrine.387  The court began its analysis by terming the
“continuing violation” doctrine misnamed.  According to Judge Pos-
ner, “[t]he office of the . . . doctrine is to allow suit to be delayed until
a series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be
brought.  It is thus a doctrine not about a continuing, but about a
cumulative, violation.”388  As an example, Judge Posner used a sexual
harassment claim: “The first instance of a coworker’s offensive words
or actions may be too trivial to count as actionable harassment, but if
they continue they may eventually reach that level and then the entire
series is actionable.”389  Once the plaintiff can sue, the victim can
recover for each of the instances of harassment that make up the
claim for relief, regardless of when they occurred.390  Judge Posner
suggested that this principle applies to RICO.391  Thus, by relying on
the “continuing violation” doctrine, a RICO plaintiff would not have
385 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008).
386 Id. at 802.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 801 (citation omitted).
389 Id.
390 See id.
391 Id. at 801–02.
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to sue until enough predicate acts accumulate to form a cognizable
pattern.392  When that occurs, the plaintiff could recover for each
injury that resulted from that pattern, even if the plaintiff had discov-
ered them more than four years before he filed his claim for relief.393
In sum, the option outlined in Limestone Development delays, in effect,
the accrual of a RICO claim for relief until a cognizable pattern of
racketeering in fact occurs, thus demonstrating that with knowledge,
sensitivity, creativity, and a little bit of tinkering, a court can make any
accrual rule workable.  The only problem with Judge Posner’s emi-
nently workable and imaginative suggestion is that it looks too much
like the injury-and-pattern discovery rule squarely rejected by the
Court in Rotella.
Prior to Rotella, four circuits applied the injury-and-pattern dis-
covery rule of accrual for civil RICO.394  After Rotella, in Taylor Group
v. ANR Storage Co.,395 the Sixth Circuit adopted the injury discovery
rule.  Noting that it used to apply the injury-and-pattern discovery
rule, the court merely adopted the discovery rule without providing
an underlying rationale.396  In Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Barnett
Bank, N.A.,397 the Eleventh Circuit “assume[d], without needing to
decide, that the statute of limitations period starts from the date of
discovery of the injury.”398  While this language leaves open the possi-
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See, e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 238 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Assoc. of Commonwealth Claimants v. Moylan, 71 F.3d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir. 1995),
aff’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 179 (1997)); Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d
614, 619–20 (6th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000); Bath v.
Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir. 1990), abrogated by
Rotella, 528 U.S. 549; Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d
1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Rotella, 528 U.S. 549.
395 24 F. App’x 319, 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (barring RICO claims based upon alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations of the amount of money plaintiffs could receive for
allowing their property to be used as a storage reservoir because the claim was filed
seven years after the limitations period accrued).
396 Id. at 325 n.1.  The Sixth Circuit previously argued for a liberal accrual rule.
See, e.g., Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 238–42 (6th Cir. 1992)
(emphasizing the need for a discovery rule—either the injury-and-pattern or the
injury-discovery rule—because a straight injury rule could destroy a plaintiff’s claim if
they never discover their injury).
397 252 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2001).
398 Id. at 1251. The analysis in the appeal turned on when the plaintiff should
have known of the injury, implying that “should have known” is an element of the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule.  Moreover, the district courts are adopting the injury-discovery
rule. See Bocciolone v. Solowsky, No. 08-20200-CIV, 2009 WL 936667, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 6, 2009); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Paragon Labs., Inc., No. 06-60873-CIV, 2006 WL
3709619, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2006).
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bility of adopting the pure Clayton Act rule, the court’s failure to men-
tion it suggests its preference for the injury discovery rule.  In
addition, earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions stress the need for a more
expansive discovery rule to “properly advance[ ] the broad remedial
nature of civil RICO.”399
The remaining two circuits have not yet adopted a new accrual
rule.  The Eighth Circuit has not considered the question, but the dis-
trict courts are following the injury discovery rule.400  In Dummar v.
Lummis,401 the Tenth Circuit found it “unnecessary . . . to choose
between the two rules,” because in the appeal before it both the injury
and its discovery occurred simultaneously.402
D. Tolling of Civil Statutes of Limitations
1. Tolling
“Tolling doctrines stop the statute of limitations from running
even if the accrual date has passed.”403  While statutes of limitation tip
399 Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc., 906 F.2d at 1555 (adopting the injury-and-pat-
tern discovery rule because of the expansive nature of RICO and because the rule
delays accrual until the civil plaintiff discovers that they can bring a RICO claim),
abrogated by Rotella, 528 U.S. 549.
400 See, e.g., Bendzak v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 970, 979–80
(S.D. Iowa 2006) (noting the lack of a ruling by the appellate court following Rotella,
but adopting the injury-discovery rule given its relationship with the injury-and-pat-
tern discovery rule that was previously applied by the Eighth Circuit).
401 543 F.3d 614 (10th Cir. 2008).  Its statement about not choosing was but an
echo of its holding two years earlier in Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226,
1234 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The statute of limitations for a RICO action is four years.
While the Supreme Court has not settled upon a definitive rule for when the limita-
tions clock starts running, it has announced two possibilities: either when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of his injury (the injury-discovery rule); or when the
plaintiff was injured, whether he was aware of the injury or not (the injury-occurrence
rule).  We need not choose between these rules today because the result is the same
no matter which rule is applied.” (citations omitted)).
402 Dummar, 543 F.3d at 621.  The appeal concerned the estate of Howard
Hughes, the billionaire recluse who lived in Las Vegas, NV.  The plaintiff alleged that
he was entitled to a portion of the Hughes estate. Id. at 616.  He claimed that in late
1967 he picked up a semiconscious and bloodied man on the side of a Nevada road
who identified himself as Howard Hughes. Id. at 617.  After the billionaire’s death in
1976, the plaintiff received a handwritten “will” from Hughes that identified him as a
one-sixteenth beneficiary of the billionaire’s estate. Id.  Thirty years after a trial that
invalidated the will, but after receiving information regarding misconduct related to
the first trial, Dummar filed the suit.  Id.  His claim for relief was time-barred. Id. at
621.
403 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990). Cada is an
enormously important decision.  The Supreme Court knows of it, and it frequently
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the balance in favor of defendants, tolling doctrines reset the balance
when circumstances beyond the plaintiffs’ control prevent them from
filing suit within the limitations period.  Thus, in the civil RICO con-
text, even though the four-year period accrues and four years pass,
one of two doctrines, grounded in equity, can save the claim for relief
from time-barring: (1) equitable estoppel and (2) equitable tolling.404
cites it.  In fact, as of February 16, 2013, the Court itself had cited Cada five times;
lower court decisions and other legal materials have cited it 2389 times.  It has graced
five separate Supreme Court cases, three times in the majority opinion, once in a
dissent, and once in both the majority opinion and the dissent. See Holland v. Flor-
ida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2561, 2570 n.2 (2010) (referring to Cada’s statement that a court
“‘must . . . distinguish between the accrual of the plaintiff’s claim and the tolling of the
statute of limitations’” and concluding that Cada relies “on a distinction between
accrual rules and tolling that we have since disregarded” (quoting Cada, 920 F.2d at
450)); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (citing
Cada for equitable tolling doctrine); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 401–02 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a ‘plaintiff because of disability, irremediable lack of
information, or other circumstances beyond his control just cannot reasonably be
expected to sue in time,’ courts have applied a doctrine of ‘equitable tolling.’  The
doctrine tolls the running of the limitations period until the disabling circumstance
can be overcome . . . [which] is why the limitations period does not run against a
falsely arrested person until his false imprisonment ends.  His action has certainly
accrued because . . . he can file his claim immediately if he is able to do so.” (citations
omitted)); Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 184 (1997) (“[The statute of
limitations had run] unless [the plaintiffs’s] claim had accrued within the four years
prior to filing . . . or unless some special legal doctrine nonetheless tolled the running
of the limitations period or estopped [the defendant] from asserting a statute of limi-
tations defense.” (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396–97; Bailey v.
Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349–50 (1874); Cada, 920 F.2d at 450–51)); United States v.
Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991) (“Principles of equitable tolling usually dictate that
when a time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event,
the time remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations
period whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.” (citing Cada, 920 F.2d 446)).
Even discounting Cada’s citations in the district courts of the Seventh Circuit, the
sheer number of citations is impressive.  Typically, the courts of appeals and the dis-
trict courts cite it, follow it, or distinguish it.  That said, two circuit courts of appeals
disagree with it, the Third and the Ninth Circuits. See William A. Graham Co. v.
Haughey, 646 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 456; Socop-Gonzales v.
INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
404 Other tolling doctrines delay or extend the period of a statute of limitations
under federal or state law.  Often, no difference exists, because, as a default rule, in
the absence of directions from Congress, federal claims for relief adopt state tolling
laws. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975).  State law
is merely a guide, however, and “considerations of state law may be displaced where
their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of
action under consideration.” Id. at 465.  Thus, plaintiffs toll the statute of limitations
for (1) duress, see, e.g., Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 404–05 (2d Cir. 1995)
(denying plaintiff’s pleading for duress tolling in a case alleging assault and battery,
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The tolling doctrines provide an avenue to prevent injustice on a case-
by-case basis.405  Courts argue, however that the use of the doctrines
“must be guarded and infrequent,” because “[t]o apply equity gener-
ously would loose the rule of law to whims about the adequacy of
excuses, divergent responses to claims of hardship, and subjective
notions of fair accommodation.”406  While important, to what degree
the Court should use them to avoid the difficult issues surrounding
accrual in RICO claims for relief remains an open question.  Indeed,
apparently, the lower courts do not fully understand the doctrines,
nor have the appellate courts fully developed them.
Moreover, the greatest confusion is not in substance, but in labels
or classification.407  In Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,408  Judge Posner
false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, because defen-
dant’s conduct did not “constitute[ ] a continuation of the underlying tort,” as
required by state law); see also R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074, 1086 (N.J. 2009) (stating
that duress usually requires more than a single threat by the defendant at the time of
the injury); (2) incompetence, see, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 677 S.E.2d 600, 601 (S.C.
2009) (tolling the statute of limitations only when incompetence prevents timely fil-
ing); Commonwealth v. Stacey, 177 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Ky. 2005) (allowing for tolling if
the incapacitation preventing a timely filing was “both beyond the petitioner’s control
and unavoidable despite due diligence”); (3) infancy, see, e.g., Shelnut v. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 9 So. 3d 359, 366 (Miss. 2009) (tolling statutes of limitation until the
child is no longer a minor); and (4) incarceration, see, e.g., Rose v. Hudson, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 3d. 248, 255–56 (Ct. App. 2007) (tolling the statute of limitations for up to two
years if the claimant is incarcerated).  Such incapacities have deep roots. See HOL-
LAND, 292 supra note 42 (“[The period of running] may be interrupted, or prevented
from running by various causes, such as the minority, imprisonment, or absence from
the country of the person who would otherwise be affected by it.”)
405 See, e.g., Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560–61 (2000) (explaining how “equitable princi-
ples of tolling” can remedy the occasional civil RICO case where the plaintiff is unable
to plead fraud with particularity or where the plaintiff was unaware of the required
pattern element of the RICO claim).
406 Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Rotella, 528
U.S. at 561 (“The virtue of relying on equitable tolling lies in the very nature of such
tolling as the exception, not the rule.”).  The concomitant vice of the exception to the
rule is its reliance on the judgment of district courts to apply the exception and not
the general rule when they are arguably generally inhospitable to complex litigation
and in particular to RICO.
407 Cada, 920 F.2d at 452 (“Many cases . . . fuse the two doctrines, presumably
inadvertently.”).
408 Id.
In Jay E. Hayden Foundation v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382 (7th Cir.
2010), Judge Posner writes a mini treatise on the relation between RICO, its period of
limitations, and various tolling doctrines.  For this reason, it warrants careful analysis.
A foundation created by Jay Hayden, the estates of his mother, and another woman
brought suit under RICO against a bank, two law firms, and seven persons connected
with either the firms or the bank.  Id. at 383.  Not sued was Robert Cochonour, the
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principal offender in the swindle (the bank, the law firms, and the individuals were at
least in a conspiracy with him), who eventually went to prison over the looting of
Hayden’s estate. Id. Cochonour, the executor (and subsequently an Illinois state
judge), plead guilty to looting the estate of more than $100,000 between 1985 and
1990, for which he went to prison (probably the reason he was not sued; by the time
he got to prison, he was in all likelihood penniless). Id. at 384. While the fraud
began in 1985, the plaintiffs argued that they, suitably diligent, did not learn of it
until May 5, 2004, four years before they filed suit; but if the court rejected that argu-
ment, the plaintiffs also argued that the defendants prevented them from obtaining
information essential to the filing of a complaint that would withstand dismissal. Id.
The time-bar arguments required the court to assess the period of limitations, the
point of accrual, and the contours of equitable estoppel.  The defendants argued in
the alternative, assuming the court rejected their time-bar arguments, that the com-
plaint did not plead a valid association-in-fact enterprise, a point not necessary to
resolve if the complaint was time-barred.
First, the court found that the defendants could raise the running of the period
of limitation, an affirmative defense that the defendants must usually plead and
prove, on the face of the complaint, “if it is plain,” under a Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss. Id. at 383 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214–15 (2007)).  The period of
limitations was four years. Id. (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)).  The court did not explicitly decide at first whether
the point of accrual was discovery, actual or reasonable, or event; it went immediately
to equitable estoppel. Id. at 385.  Recognizing that a “plaintiff [prevented by the
defendant] from obtaining information that he needs . . . to be able to file a com-
plaint that will withstand dismissal is forbidden[ ] under . . . equitable estoppel[ ] to
plead the statute of limitations for the period in which the inquiry was thwarted,” id.
(citing Cada, 920 F.2d at 450–52) (other citations omitted), “[b]ut if the obstructive
behavior occurs after the plaintiff’s inquiry has reached the point at which he has
discovered[, or by exercise of reasonable diligence would have discovered,] that he
has a claim . . . , the defendant’s obstructionism has no causal significance, and so is
not a ground for an estoppel.” Id. (citations omitted).  So, too, the defendant’s
behavior has no significance if it was ineffectual in preventing the plaintiff from learn-
ing the truth. Id.  The court then recognized a split in the circuits on estoppel and
due diligence as a defense where the defendant’s conduct was deliberate. Id.  (Some
think that it makes a difference on due diligence and do not permit the deliberate
defendant to raise the plaintiff’s lack of due diligence; they reason that if the defen-
dant’s conduct is deliberate and the plaintiff’s conduct is only negligent, it is not a
defense, “just as a plaintiff’s contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional
tort.” Id. at 585–87 (referring to Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of Chicago, 275 F.3d
593, 597 (7th Cir. 2001))).  The court then recognized that the Court in Klehr, 521
U.S. at 193–96, required due diligence for RICO, even though the defendant’s con-
duct was deliberate, because, the Court taught, RICO protects not only private rights,
but serves “important public purposes.” Id. at 385–86.  Rightly, as a lower court, the
court did not second-guess the appropriateness of the Court’s balancing of the plain-
tiff’s negligence against the defendant’s deliberate conduct, and how it struck the
balance against a plaintiff whose enforcement role Congress had favored. See supra
notes 29, 42.  The court then observed:
The plaintiffs mistakenly contend that a limitations period does not
begin to run until the precomplaint investigation is complete, which may
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not have been until 2005, three years before they sued.  Actually it starts
running when the prospective plaintiff discovers (or should if diligent have
discovered) both the injury that gives rise to his claim and the injurer or (in
this case) injurers.  The plaintiffs had discovered or should have discovered
these things by the summer of 2003.  Armed with the information obtained
by then they should have been able to complete well within the four-year
statutory period an investigation that would have unearthed enough facts to
enable them to file a suit that would withstand dismissal.  They could then
have used pretrial discovery to beef up their claim.  A plaintiff is not
required to have collected, before he files suit, all the evidence he needs in
order to win the suit.  Otherwise the civil procedure rules would have to
authorize precomplaint discovery rather than just pretrial discovery. . . .
[T]he injury arising from the first predicate act to injure the plaintiff . . .
starts the limitations period running, rather than the injury from the last
predicate act, which might occur decades after the first.  And the victim
doesn’t have to know he’s been injured by a RICO violation, which is to say
by a pattern of racketeering activity (that is, a series of predicate acts).  The
scope and nature of his legal claims are what he has four years to discover, or
more (through invocation of tolling doctrines) if he really needs it.  For
remember that it’s the discovery of the injury (and injurer), not of the facts
that establish a particular legal theory, that starts the limitations period run-
ning; the limitations period is the time allowed to the plaintiff for determin-
ing the specific violation upon which to base a suit. . . . [W]e said that the
defendants’ obstructive behavior may have prevented the plaintiffs from
obtaining enough information before 2005 to know they’d sustained a legal
injury and by whom it had been inflicted.  But that did not automatically
give them four more years to sue.  Tolling doctrines need not extend the
date on which the statute of limitations begins to run; for as soon as the
tolling events cease—in a case of equitable estoppel, as soon as the defend-
ants’ obstructive behavior ceases—the plaintiffs should get to work and file
suit as soon as is practicable, in order to minimize the inroads that dilatory
filing makes into the policies served by statutes of limitations. . . .
In a RICO case . . . the plaintiff should not be entitled to an automatic
extension of the statute of limitations by the length of the period of conceal-
ment by the defendants.  The injury on which the present suit is based
occurred many years before the statute of limitations would have run had it
not been for that concealment, for otherwise the plaintiffs would have dis-
covered the fraud; and it is discovery that starts the limitations period run-
ning.  To litigate a claim so long after the events giving rise to it is bound to
be difficult because of lost evidence and faded memories, and the difficulty
would be needlessly augmented had the plaintiff no duty of alacrity once the
facts that the defendants had improperly concealed are at last in the open.
By 2005 the plaintiffs knew so much that they did not need three more years
to complete their precomplaint investigation and file suit.
Id. at 386–88 (citations omitted).
Unnecessarily, “for the sake of completeness,” the court went on—always a bad
idea—to deal with the RICO enterprise issue. Id. at 388.  Until that point, the court’s
decision was impeccable, but now that changes.  First, the court rightly commented
that Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009), made problematic the Seventh
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did yeoman service for the law in a cogent opinion that reviewed the
doctrines and marked off the content, differences, and labels between
equitable estoppel and equitable tolling.  Cada involved a potentially
time-barred claim for relief in which the defendant Baxter Healthcare
Circuit’s extensive jurisprudence sharply distinguishing between a conspiracy and an
enterprise and insisting on a substantial degree of structure in an association-in-fact
enterprise. Id. (citing, inter alia, Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d
673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Yet expressing Posner’s evident disappointment with the
decision, the court sullenly observed, “But . . . Boyle . . . throws all in doubt.” Id.
“[While] Boyle requires . . . ‘purpose, relationship[,] . . . and longevity’ . . . [t]he only
difference the Court suggested between . . . a minimal RICO enterprise and a conspir-
acy is that conspiracy ‘is an inchoate crime that may be completed in the brief period
needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.’’’ Id. at 388–89 (citing Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246).
Glumly, the court then conceded that the facts before it met the Boyle test, “if Boyle is
taken at face value . . . .” Id. at 389.  How else, one wonders, should a lower court take
a Court’s considered opinion?  Surely, Judge Posner was aware that the Supreme
Court knew precisely what it did when it rejected the Bledsoe line of case requiring an
“ascertainable structure” as a surrogate for an organized crime limitation. See supra
note 46.  The court again should have said only enough to decide the appeal.
Unwisely, the court then commented, “the RICO offense is using an enterprise to
engage in a pattern of racketeering activity . . . [, an] element . . . conspicuous by its
absence from this case.” Id. (citations omitted).  It went on:
Conceivably the defendants who were officers of the bank that is alleged
to have assisted Cochonour in his fraud were using the bank (an enterprise)
to commit fraud—but that is not alleged.  The enterprise alleged is the con-
spiracy led by Cochonour, who was not using an entity separate from himself
(as the bank officers were), for he was the leading conspirator—yet he is not
even a defendant.
A bank could be accused of fraud without also being accused of con-
ducting itself through a pattern of racketeering activity.  The defendants did
not use the conspiracy (the enterprise); they were the conspiracy.
Id.  On the contrary, an association-in-fact can be both a conspiracy and an enterprise.
That is, after all, the point of Boyle.  The evidence that showed one showed the other
between Turkette and Boyle. See supra note 46.  They used the “enterprise” by engag-
ing in the conspiracy.  Moreover, the court failed to recognize that the estate that the
conspiracy looted was—albeit not alleged—itself an “enterprise.” Cf. Handeen v.
Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding bankruptcy estate is an enter-
prise).  I would have to look at the complaint to see if in fact the plaintiffs plead the
enterprise well, but Judge Posner shows so little inclination to give the plaintiff’s com-
plaint the benefit of a liberal construction, even under Twombly or Iqbal, that I have
no faith in his opinion at this point.  In sum, he would have been better off if he did
not write more than he had to write to resolve the appeal.  As in Field Marshal Mont-
gomery’s “Operation Market Garden” in World War II, the additional analysis was “a
bridge too far.”  Each of us has a bad day once in a while.  Even Homer nodded. See
HORACE, ARS POETICAL, 359 (trans. A.S. Kine, 2005), available at http://www.poetryin
translation.com/PITBR/Latin/HoraceArsPoetica.htm (last visited March 12, 2013).
(“And yet I’m displeased too when great Homer nods.”).
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fired Cada, allegedly in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act.409  The district court granted summary judgment.410  The
court of appeals affirmed, but only after dealing with “fascinating and
important questions regarding statutes of limitations generally and
the age discrimination statute of limitations in particular.”411  Cada
was the manager of Baxter’s “creative services” department, the princi-
pal function of which was to create the catalog of Baxter’s drug prod-
ucts, the so-called “armamentarium.”412  He reported to Jim Becks on
the catalog project, but otherwise to Jim Stauner.413  Baxter promoted
Becks to vice-president in 1987, and he secured a comprehensive
report from Cada on the project.  In connection with the president
and other vice presidents, he used it to decide to reorganize the pro-
ject, but not to retain Cada in charge of it.414  Becks met with Cada to
inform him of the reorganization and to tell him that he assumed
Cada planned to retire because he was approaching 65.  Cada
responded that he did not plan to retire.415  Becks then told Cada that
Baxter would let him go two weeks after his replacement came on
board, probably in July.  Cada contended he did not believe Becks
had the authority to fire him and that he was not sure that Becks
planned to fire him or sought to urge his early retirement.416 Immedi-
ately after the meeting, Cada did two things: he went to human
resources and obtained outplacement and benefit forms, which he fil-
led out a few days later, and he tried to see Stauner, whom he consid-
ered his supervisor.417  He was unable to see him until May 22 and
when he did, he confirmed that Baxter had fired him and that he
(Stauner) could do nothing about it.418  On July 7, Cada’s replace-
ment appeared, a young woman whom Cada considered relatively
inexperienced.  Cada filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission a complaint on March 4, 1988, which was more than 300
days after his meeting with Becks on May 5, 1987, but less than 300
days after his meeting with Stauner on May 22, 1987.419  The adminis-
trative statute of limitations was 300 days.420
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This relatively simple set of facts raised a relatively complex set of
issues.  First, what was the point of “accrual,” that is, the point from
which the 300-day period started to run, the decision by Baxter to fire
Cada,421 Becks’ meeting with Cada, or Staumer’s meeting with Cada?
Second, if it were the meeting with Becks, that is, beyond the 300-day
period, could Cada’s complaint survive under the doctrines of “discov-
ery,” “equitable estoppel,” or “equitable tolling?”  In turn, Judge Pos-
ner considered each doctrine.  According to the Cada opinion, the
Court settled the point of accrual in Delaware State College v. Ricks422 at
the date of the discriminatory conduct, not the termination of
employment.  Thus, the 300-day period started to run, arguably, on
the date that Becks met with Cada and fired him.423  In that vein, Bax-
ter argued that a reasonable person would have known that he fired
him (Cada) at the Becks meeting.424  Responding, Cada said he sin-
cerely believed that Becks did not have authority to fire him or he did
not know it was discriminatory until he met his replacement.425  The
court rejected this line of analysis, holding that the plain fact of
adverse action governed for the point of accrual, not how the action
421 The court did not consider the decision to fire him, but in terms of its consid-
eration of the other issues, it would have rejected it, because Baxter did not communi-
cate it to Cada.  That said, Cada was mistaken to the degree it analyzed the accrual
date of the running of the period of limitations as opposed to the tolling of the period
under the discovery doctrine, which tolls the period, but it does not postpone the
running of the period of limitations.  The matter is usually one of semantics, but it is
determinative in other situations. See infra note 428.
422 449 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980) (“The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the
protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also pro-
tect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment deci-
sions that are long past.”).  In Ricks, the plaintiff argued that discrimination motivated
the college not only in denying him tenure, but also in terminating his employment;
in effect, he claimed a “continuing violation” of the civil rights laws; thus, the limita-
tions periods did not commence to run until his one-year “terminal” contract expired.
Id. at 257.  The Court found that the complaint did not support his argument; moreo-
ver, mere continuity of employment—without more—was, the Court found, insuffi-
cient to prolong the life of a claim for relief for employment discrimination. Id.  If
Ricks intended to complain of a “discriminatory discharge,” as well as a “discrimina-
tory” denial of tenure, he should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that
continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employ-
ment. Id.  Nevertheless, the complaint alleged no facts supporting his argument;
thus, his claim for relief for a “discriminatory act” under the civil rights statutes
accrued at the point of the “discriminatory” denial of tenure, not the end of his
employment contract.  Id. at 259.
423 Cada, 920 F.3d at 449.
424 Id.
425 Id.
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appeared to a reasonable person or Cada individually.426  In fact,
Becks had authority to fire Cada, and he fired him in the meeting.427
Nevertheless, pinpointing the day of the adverse action was only the
beginning of the court’s analysis.  To see if it should bar Cada’s claim
for relief, it then turned to the “discovery rule” and the two tolling
doctrines.  In terms of “accrual,”428 in accord with general federal
426 Id. (“The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the defendant takes
some action, whatever the plaintiff knows or thinks. Ricks does not hold that the
statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the handwriting is on the wall.  The
point was not that when Ricks was denied tenure he knew his days were numbered.
The point was that the denial of tenure was an adverse personnel action forbidden if
done for discriminatory reasons; it was irrelevant that the full consequences of the
action were not felt till later, when Ricks, unprotected by tenure, was let go upon the
expiration of his employment contract.”).
427 Id. at 450 (“Becks was authorized to fire Cada and . . . he did so at the May 5
meeting.  By Cada’s own version of the meeting of May 22 with Stauner, Stauner
merely made clear at that meeting that Becks had been acting within his actual
authority when he fired Cada.  The May 5 meeting was the equivalent of the tenure
vote in Ricks.  It was the making and communication to Cada of the decision to fire
him effective within a few weeks after Cada’s replacement came on board.”).
428 Id. at 450.  Here is a point of controversy.  Posner’s language is salient.  He
comments:
We must first distinguish between the accrual of the plaintiff’s claim and
the tolling of the statute of limitations, then between two doctrines of tolling,
last between different kinds of information that Cada may or may not have
possessed.  Accrual is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to
run.  It is not the date on which the wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs,
but the date—often the same, but sometimes later—on which the plaintiff
discovers that he has been injured.  The rule that postpones the beginning
of the limitations period from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the
date when he discovers he has been injured is the “discovery rule” of federal
common law, which is read into statutes of limitations in federal-question
cases . . . in the absence of a contrary directive from Congress.  The discovery
rule is implicit in the holding of Ricks that the statute of limitations began to
run “at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks.”  If
Cada did not discover that he had been injured, i.e., that a decision to termi-
nate him had been made, until May 22, the statute of limitations did not
begin to run till that day and his suit is not time-barred.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (2010)
(“[T]he ‘discovery rule’ . . . [is] a doctrine that delays accrual of a cause of action
until the plaintiff has ‘discovered’ it.”).
In Graham Co. v Haughey, 646 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2011), Judge Smith, however,
rightly argues that Posner (and the Supreme Court by implication) has it “back-
wards.” Id. at 149 (“[A]ccrual is defined in terms of the objective existence of a viable
cause of action, not in terms of whether the limitations clock has started . . . [, that is,]
a running clock is not the sine qua non of accrual.”).  In Graham, the court was not
concerned with “claim-accrual” for the period of the running of a statute of limita-
tions, but “claim-accrual” for the period of time from which pretrial interest runs.
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common law, in absence of direction from Congress, the injury-discov-
ery rule applied to determine the date of accrual.429  The plaintiff
filed the claim in Cada 300 days beyond the accrual date, and he knew
or should have known of the time and place of his adverse action; the
discovery-injury rule was of no help.  Thus, the application, if appro-
priate, by the court of one of the two tolling doctrines was crucial to
keeping his claim for relief alive.430
According to Cada, a court uses the doctrine of “equitable estop-
pel” when the defendant’s actions prevent the plaintiff from suing in
The different perspective led the court to engage in more precise and more persua-
sive analysis.  The court stated that “[g]iven the unimportance of the difference
between tolling and delayed accrual to the outcomes of . . . [many decisions on the
statute of limitations] and the consequent failure of so many courts to recognize the
distinction, . . . [their discussion is] nonbinding obiter dicta.” Id. The court
continued:
Accrual happens at the moment when events fulfilling all the elements
of a cause of action have transpired. . . . [K]nowledge of an invasion of one’s
rights is not something that a plaintiff must prove to prevail. . . . In order to
defer accrual, the discovery rule would have to add an additional component
to the substantive definitions of the claims to which it applies.  That simply
cannot be right.  Rules regarding limitations periods do not alter substantive
causes of action.  Accordingly we do not think the discovery rule should be
read to alter the date on which a cause of action accrues.
Since it cannot be an accrual doctrine, the discovery rule must instead
be one of the legal precepts that operate to toll the running of the limita-
tions period after the cause of action has accrued, as sundry cases have
stated. . . .
To cast the discovery rule as changing the date of accrual, so as to delay
the onset of interest charges, would warp its fundamentally plaintiff-friendly
purpose.  The rule . . . is grounded in the notion that it is unfair to deny
relief to someone who has suffered an injury but who has not learned of it
and cannot reasonably be expected to have done so.  Treating the discovery
rule as altering the date of accrual would turn it in a means for defendants
to protect themselves from having to fully compensate plaintiffs’ losses and
disgorge their own wrongful gains. . . [, allowing them in effect] to benefit
from an interest-free loan. . . .
We hold that the “accrual” of a cause of action occurs the moment at
which each of its component elements has come into being as a matter of
objective reality . . . .
Id. at 149–50 (citations omitted). Graham, not Cada, correctly states the rationale and
the operation of the discovery rule on the date of accrual.
429 Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.  Thus, Posner’s statement of the discovery rule is
imprecise.
430 Id. (“Tolling doctrines stop the statute of limitations from running even if the
accrual date has passed.”).
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time.431  The doctrine, therefore, bars the defendant from using the
statute of limitations as a defense.432   Plaintiffs benefit from equitable
estoppel against the defendant in two fact-patterns: (1) speaking: if
the defendant tells (words or conduct) the plaintiff he will not plead
the statute of limitations as a defense; or (2) conduct: if the defendant
fraudulently conceals an element of the claim for relief from the
plaintiff.  Each fact-pattern represents a subset of the doctrine of
“equitable estoppel.”  Additionally, either the defendant may conceal
431 Id.  “Equitable estoppel” is a doctrine in equity that is not limited to the con-
text of the statute of limitations.  Nevertheless, in the context of the statute of limita-
tions, “fraudulent concealment” by the defendant—a subset of the set “equitable
estoppel”—enables the plaintiff to gain a tolling of the statute of limitations.  In terms
of equitable principles, a defendant is “estopped” by his fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions or conduct from pleading the statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff is
untimely in filing his action because of the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations
or other conduct in reference to the plaintiff.
In his COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Justice Joseph Story traces the
roots of the principles of equity in American jurisprudence to English and Roman
materials.  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 4–25 (Jairus W. Perry ed., 12th ed. 1877). As a standard
of right or wrong conduct in equity’s eyes, illustrative of those principles, he affirms
that “where once a fraud had been committed . . . the person who committed the
fraud [is] precluded from deriving any benefit from it . . . .” Id. § 193 at 192.
Broadly, no man can benefit from his own wrong. See, e.g., New York Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (Field, J.) (“It would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money payable on the
death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken.  As well might he recover insur-
ance money upon a building that he had willfully fired.”); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E.
188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a murderer cannot inherit from his victim and
listing as “fundamental maxims of the common law” that “[n]o one shall be permitted
to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime . . . [u]nder the
civil law, evolved from the general principles of natural law and justice by many gener-
ations of jurisconsults, philosophers, and statesmen, one cannot take property by
inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered.”); see also
Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975) (“‘[N]o
man may take advantage of his own wrong.  Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, this
principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases in both law and equity
courts and has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of
limitations.’” (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33 (1959)
(Black, J.))). Reeb was termed a “seminal case” by Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
745 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 1984).  The Third, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
follow Reeb. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1389 (3d
Cir. 1994); Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1531–32 (11th
Cir. 1992); Vaught, 745 F.2d at 410–12; Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683
F.2d 344, 345 (10th Cir. 1982).
432 See Cada, 920 F.2d at 450–51.
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the claim for relief actively or the fraud itself may act as self-conceal-
ing fraud.433
The Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of “fraudulent
concealment” in Bailey v. Glover.434  In Bailey, an assignee in bank-
ruptcy brought a claim for relief to set aside fraudulent conveyances
made by the defendant.  The defendant allegedly avoided payment on
a debt by fraudulently filing for bankruptcy, despite his considerable
wealth.435 The assignee filed the suit after the two-year limitations
period accrued.436  The Court, however, equitably found it “unreason-
able”437 not to toll the limitations period when “the fraud has been
concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself . . . until the
fraud is discovered by . . . the party suing . . . .”438  To be sure, suits
deserve “speedy dispositions,”439 and those who participate in bank-
ruptcy transfers deserve not to be “harassed”440 by suits filed long after
the settlement of the estate.  Nevertheless, defendants cannot benefit
from a limitations period by fraudulently concealing their wrongdo-
ing.  To hold otherwise would “make the law which was designed to
prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure.”441
Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel protects the plaintiff’s right
433 Id.
434 88 U.S. 342, 343 (1874).
435 Id. at 342–343.
436 Id. at 344.
437 Id. at 345.
438 Id. at 349–50.
439 Id. at 346, 347 (“[Bankruptcy law envisions] speedy sales, reasonable com-
promises, and efforts to adjust differences . . . [; instead] the estate is wasted in profit-
less litigation . . . and [on] the fees of the officers who execute the law.”).
440 Id. at 347 (“[Bankruptcy law tells you that] no suit [filed] two years after the
cause of action [is valid, and participants] shall . . . [not be] harassed by suits when
the cause of action has accrued more than two years . . . [afterwards].  Within that
time the estate ought to be nearly settled up and . . . discharged, and we close the
door to all litigation not commenced before it has elapsed.”).
441 Id. at 349, 347–48 (“[W]hen the object of the suit is to obtain relief against a
fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered
or becomes known to the party injured by it. . . . In suits in equity where relief is
sought on the ground of fraud, the authorities are without conflict in support of the
doctrine that where the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts
of the guilty party in concealing the facts from the other, the statute will not bar relief
provided suit is brought within proper time after the discovery of the fraud. . . .
[W]here the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until
the fraud is discovered . . . .”).
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to file a claim for relief in the same way statutes of limitation protect a
defendant’s right to repose.442
Equitable estoppel based upon fraudulent concealment assumes
that the plaintiff has discovered, or should have discovered, his
injury.443  For equitable estoppel to apply in this situation, therefore,
the defendant must mislead the plaintiff actively to believe that he will
not use the statute of limitations defense.  As such, the plaintiff’s
untimely claim must result from the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on
the defendant’s concealment.444  Where the defendant does not
actively mislead the plaintiff, but the fraud is self-concealing, the
plaintiff can still plead fraudulent concealment, and he gets the bene-
fit of equitable estoppel.
Traditionally, the two forms of fraudulent concealment affected
how long courts tolled the statute of limitations.  When a defendant
takes active steps to mislead the plaintiff, he commits an intentional
tort.  As such, the statute of limitations tolls until the plaintiff discov-
ers—not should have discovered—the fraud; on the other hand, in
the case of a self-concealing fraud—when the defendant does not
actively conceal from the plaintiff the crucial information—the statute
of limitations tolls until the plaintiff discovered or should have discov-
ered the fraud.445  Thus, when the defendant commits no intentional
442 See id. at 349–50 (“[Statutes of limitation] were enacted to prevent frauds; to
prevent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired
the evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had been satisfied,
transferred, or extinguished, if they ever did exist.  To hold that by concealing a
fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as
the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to
make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made
successful and secure. . . . [I]n construing this statute of limitation passed by the
Congress of the United States as part of the law of bankruptcy, we hold that when
there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming to the
knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has
been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself, the statute does not begin
to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to, the party suing, or those
in privity with him.” (emphasis removed)).
443 Cada, 920 F.2d at 451.
444 See id.; see also, e.g., Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2002)
(distinguishing equitable estoppel, which requires active steps to prevent the plaintiff
from bringing a claim, from equitable tolling, which does not require active efforts
from the defendant).
445 See Davenport v. A.C. Davenport & Son Co., 903 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1990),
overruled on other grounds by Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th
Cir. 1990), for the following explanation of equitable tolling:
Under the federal doctrine of equitable tolling two types of fraudulent
behavior toll the running of the statute of limitations in securities actions.
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tort, the plaintiff cannot sleep on his rights—due diligence is
required.446
Following the Court’s decision in Klehr,447 a plaintiff in a civil
RICO suit no longer can rely on either form of fraudulent conceal-
In the first type, the statute may be tolled “where the fraud goes undiscov-
ered even though the defendant does nothing to conceal it.”  Here, how-
ever, the plaintiff’s due diligence in attempting to discover the fraud is
imperative.  In the second type, the statute of limitations is tolled if the fraud
remained undisclosed because the defendant took additional affirmative
steps after committing the fraud to keep it concealed.  Here the plaintiff is
relieved from his obligation to use due diligence to discover the fraud.
Where active concealment exists, the statute is tolled until there is actual
discovery of the fraud.
The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint do not provide a basis
for tolling the limitations statute under either type of federal equitable toll-
ing.  Plaintiffs fail the first test because their amended complaint contains no
allegations that the plaintiff made inquiries or otherwise exercised due dili-
gence to determine the “true value” of the A.C. Davenport stock or verify any
other alleged fraudulent representations made in connection with the 1978
stock redemption.  The amended complaint’s allegation of due diligence
based upon “the self concealing nature of the fraud, her lack of sophistica-
tion, and the fact that the people upon whom she would reasonably depend
to ferret out the fraud were themselves the perpetrators . . .” is insufficient to
satisfy the rule’s due diligence requirement.  The plaintiff’s lack of sophisti-
cation is irrelevant to our inquiry.  “The statute begins to run when a reason-
able person would have appreciated the need for further inquiry.”  An
objectively reasonable person would have appreciated the need long before
1984.
Since the plaintiff fails to allege due diligence, the remaining tolling
exception requires her to plead active concealment of the fraud. . . . Plain-
tiff’s allegation that Miller’s and Kravets’ “ongoing subsequent failure to dis-
close facts material to the sale of plaintiff’s stock while continuing to act in a
fiduciary capacity . . . [lulled the] plaintiff so as to prevent her from uncover-
ing the defendant’s fraudulent acts” is insufficient to trigger the “active con-
cealment” tolling rule.  While the plaintiff’s allegation appears to be based
on Illinois decisions holding that the silence of a fiduciary constitutes con-
cealment, the federal doctrine of equitable tolling does not ascribe to this
rule and clearly requires the defendants to take “additional affirmative steps
after committing the fraud to keep it concealed.”  Since the plaintiff fails to
allege either “due diligence” or “active concealment” federal equitable toll-
ing will not preserve her claim.
Id. at 1142 (alternation in original) (citations omitted).
446 Thus, a close relationship exists between a plaintiff performing “due diligence”
and when a plaintiff “should have discovered” his injury.  For the injury-discovery rule,
when the court determines that the plaintiff did not perform “due diligence,” it is
typically only another way of saying that the plaintiff “should have discovered” his
injury. See generally Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 256 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 624 (3d Cir. 1993)).
447 Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
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ment unless he exhibits due diligence in trying to discover the facts
composing his claim for relief.  In Klehr, the plaintiffs—dairy farm-
ers—purchased silos from the defendants.448  Through advertise-
ments, the defendants claimed the silos stored cattle feed to produce
“healthier cows, more milk, and higher profits.”449  In reality, the silos
malfunctioned, resulting in lost profits for the plaintiffs.450  Addition-
ally, plaintiffs claimed that they filed suit twenty years after purchasing
the silo, because the defendants verbally misrepresented the quality of
the feed and installed a device that hid the moldy feed character.451
While these actions qualified as active fraudulent concealment, the
Court held that a civil RICO plaintiff had to display “reasonable dili-
gence” to toll the limitations period.452  The Court narrowed the use
of fraudulent concealment for civil RICO by imposing a requirement
of “due diligence” upon plaintiffs, even when the defendant actively
conceals the injury, because (1) antitrust precedent supported the
due diligence requirement, and (2) similar to the antitrust provisions,
civil RICO claims for relief seek to encourage investigation by private
prosecutors, not only to punish defendants.453  Whatever the reason,
448 Id. at 183.
449 Id. at 183–84.
450 Id. at 184.
451 Id.
452 Id. at 194.
453 Id. at 194–95.  In fact, the law needs a substantial reformulation of the “reason-
able discovery” or “due diligence” rules.  The Court itself ought to undertake this
formidable task.  It can only be adumbrated here.  Because these rules were judicial
creations, they are subject to reformulation by the court that formulated them, argua-
bly as a general matter, but certainly in the area of RICO.  With details that need not
tarry us, traditionally, at common law, “a plea of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is, if supported, fatal to his right of action,” HOLLAND, supra note 42, at 137.
Along with “assumption of the risk” and “the fellow servant rule,” these concepts were
inartfully termed by Prosser, in the sexist language of the times, as the “three wicked
sisters.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at
573 (5th ed. 1984).  Thus, early American courts privileged the interest of entrepre-
neurs to the detriment of those whom they injured, in particular employees. See gener-
ally, MORTON J. HOWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 85–108
(triumph of negligence over ownership as the principle immunity/liability), 201–09
(triumph of contract over ownership as the principle of immunity/liability) (1977).
So, too, the use of  “reasonably know” or “due diligence” as a mechanism to uncondi-
tionally limit suits for various types of liability, significantly for intentional behavior, as
in RICO, through the use of time-bars, in effect, makes contributory negligence a
fatal bar to intentional, reckless, or negligent unlawful behavior, similarly privileging
the interests of perpetrators over the interests of victims.  The result is indefensible, as
so baldly stated.  Ironically, the rules of admiralty, from the beginning and until now,
reflect a regime of comparative fault.  Compare II JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 505–25 & 516 n.a (tracing the history of maritime law from its earliest
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the result disadvantages “negligent” plaintiffs under civil RICO when
defendants who have committed an intentional fraud and actively mis-
represented elements of the claim, making it harder to plead equita-
ble estoppel based upon fraudulent concealment.  To be sure, a court
has to reach a balanced decision.  Nevertheless, how negligent conduct
can offset intentional conduct is not explained by the Court.  The
Court recognizes that it wants to encourage the enforcement of the
statute, but every time an offender walks scot-free, the incentive to
engage in RICO conduct goes up, hardly a good result.  The Court
exacts a high price from deterrence of RICO conduct to pay for
encouraging private enforcement.  It looks more like discouraging
needed civil RICO litigation.
While the misleading actions of the defendant trigger equitable
estoppel, the plaintiff’s own actions determine if equitable tolling is
appropriate.  Equitable tolling “permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of
the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to
obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.”454  Sig-
nificantly, unlike equitable estoppel in the statute of limitations con-
origins in Roman law down to the time of Alexander Hamilton, as a leader of the
American bar; describing the Roman “spirit of equity, in all its purity and simplicity
. . . [.as] pervad[ing] those ancient institutions.”) (Legal Classics Library reprinted ed.
1986) (1827) with United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 412 U.S. 397, 441 (1975)
(altering the an old rule of arbitrary allocation in favor of an allocation proportionate
to comparative degree of fault).  Surely, that approach could be adapted to the issue
of accrual and delayed suit.  At a minimum, “reasonable” discovery or “due diligence”
ought to mean more than merely negligent behavior; the standard ought to be raised
to at least reckless conduct.  Moreover, a showing of substantial prejudice in fact,
relating to the delay, ought to be required of the defendant before the court stops
dead a plaintiff’s suit for intentional behavior of a RICO dimension.  We can learn
from Roman law. See HOLLAND, supra note 42, 137 (“The question [of contributory
negligence] is treated in the Digest not as causation but as one of set-off, in which the
negligence of the plaintiff balances that of the defendant”) (emphasis added)).
Mutatis mutantas, the concept of set-off where the conduct of the plaintiff, however
minimally at fault, does not flatly bar his suit, but is a set-off against the conduct of the
defendant, however maximally at fault, moves in the direction of more complete jus-
tice between the parties.  The one-size-fits-all legal rules take hold for considerations
of efficiency only in a scheme of winner-take-all, hardly a scheme of justice.  Instead,
we need a return to a balance of the interests between the victim, the perpetrator, and
society, sensitively evaluated by the court and the jury on a case-by-case basis rather
than simply decided on a winner-take-all legal rule.  It is time for a return to a more
equitable form of justice.
454 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)).  The Court in Holmberg spoke to
the issue:
If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right
which it created, there is an end of the matter. . . . The rub comes when
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 166 22-MAY-13 9:20
1746 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
Congress is silent . . . . Congress has usually left the limitation of time for
commencing actions under national legislation to judicial implications. . . .
The present case concerns not only a federally-created right but a fed-
eral right for which the sole remedy is in equity. . . . We have the duty of
federal courts, sitting as national courts throughout the country, to apply
their own principles in enforcing an equitable right created by Congress.
When Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of remedial
details, it can hardly expect them to break with historic principles of equity
in the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights.
Traditionally and for good reasons, statutes of limitation are not con-
trolling measures of equitable relief.  Such statutes have been drawn upon by
equity solely for the light they may shed in determining that which is decisive
for the chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcus-
ably slept on his rights so as to make a decree against the defendant unfair.
“There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into
action the powers of the court.”  A . . . court may dismiss a suit where the
plaintiffs’ “lack of diligence is wholly unexcused; and both the nature of the
claim and the situation of the parties was [sic] such as to call for diligence
. . .”  A suit in equity may fail though “not barred by the act of limitations
. . . .”
Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.  Equity has
acted on the principle that “laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of
time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be
enforced—an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or rela-
tions of the property or the parties.”  And so, a suit in equity may lie though
a comparable cause of action at law would be barred.  If want of due dili-
gence by the plaintiff may make it unfair to pursue the defendant, fraudu-
lent conduct on the part of the defendant may have prevented the plaintiff
from being diligent and may make it unfair to bar appeal to equity because
of mere lapse of time.
Equity will not lend itself to such fraud and historically has relieved
from it.  It bars a defendant from setting up such a fraudulent defense, as it
interposes against other forms of fraud.  And so this Court long ago adopted
as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by
fraud and “remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence
or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the
fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on
the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge
of the other party.”
This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.  If
the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing
suit under § 16, the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners
had discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged
deception by Bache which is the basis of this suit.
327 U.S. at 395–97 (citations omitted).
The Fifth and Seventh Circuit question, however, whether Holmberg’s decision to
read equitable tolling into every federal statute of limitations remains viable in light of
cases requiring courts to apply state tolling provisions as well. See Smith v. City of
Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express
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text, a plaintiff pleading equitable tolling does not have to show
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.  A plaintiff arguing for the
application of the equitable tolling doctrine knows—or should
know—of his or her injury, but “cannot obtain information necessary
to decide whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdo-
ing by the defendant.”455  In addition, another important distinction
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975)) (“Without expressly overruling Holmberg or
commenting on its continued vitality, Johnson and subsequent cases have held that,
when a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations, it should borrow any appli-
cable state tolling provisions as well . . . .”); see also Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d
459, 464 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) (questioning the continued validity of Holmberg in light of
cases requiring courts to apply state equitable tolling provisions in § 1983 claims);
FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he continued vitality of Holm-
berg . . . is in doubt . . . .” (citing Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 466 U.S. 478 (1980);
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Smith v. City of Chicago Heights,
951 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992))).
455 Cada, 920 F.2d at 451.
In civil RICO ligation, procedural problems also complicate filing timely RICO
claims using equitable tolling.  When the predicate acts are fraud-based, courts often
dismiss civil RICO claims, because of a failure to comply with Rule 9(b) (requiring a
party to plead fraud with particularity). See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the
alleged fraud).  Pleading fraud with particularity also applies to fraud in the conceal-
ment.  Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 624–27 (3d Cir. 1993).  In addition, a plain-
tiff may have to establish for his pattern that the defendant committed fraud against
others unrelated to him.  Circuit courts here disagree. Compare Vicom, Inc. v. Har-
bridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 778 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Rule
9(b) requires the delineation of roles, but it may be relaxed when alleging fraud
against a third party or information uniquely in hands of the defendant), with
Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing
the need to read Rules 8 and 9 in harmony amidst the backdrop of Rule 8’s demand
for “simplicity in pleading”), and New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d
286, 290–92 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Rule 9(b), but holding that a court may deter-
mine whether discovery is necessary in civil RICO cases involving mail or wire fraud
when necessary information is in the exclusive control of the defendant), with Farlow
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 989–90 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
plaintiffs must know their claim before filing in order to protect defendants from “the
threat of treble damages and injury to reputation” (quoting Cayman Exploration Co.
v. United Gas Pipe Line, 873 F.2d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1989))).  Should the RICO
plaintiff fail to plead fraud with particularity, they may also violate Rule 11 and face
sanctions.  At the same time, a tension exists between equitable tolling and FED. R.
CIV. P. 15 (amending and supplementing pleadings), making it difficult for civil
RICO plaintiffs either to file a civil RICO claim or benefit from equitable tolling.  If a
plaintiff files suit without a civil RICO allegation with the aim to add the allegation
after discovery, they run the substantial risk that a court will deny their motion to
amend under the FED. R. CIV. P. 15.  On the other hand, waiting to file suit until facts
underlying the RICO claim emerge risks the running of the limitations period.  Fur-
ther, if the court finds that the plaintiff slept on his rights or did not perform due
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between the two doctrines—that equitable estoppel involves a decep-
tive party and that equitable tolling deals with “two innocent par-
ties”—affects, significantly, how long courts will extend the limitations
period.456  Equitable estoppel tolls the statute of limitations for the
amount of time the defendant fraudulently conceals his intention to
plead the statute of limitations defense; otherwise, “the defendant
would obtain a benefit from his inequitable conduct . . . .”457  Equita-
ble tolling, on the other hand, tolls the statute of limitations, not
because of any wrongdoing by the defendant, but because the plaintiff
lacks necessary information to bring a claim.  According to Cada, the
doctrine “gives the plaintiff extra time if he needs it.”458  To benefit
from the equitable tolling doctrine, therefore, the plaintiff must
“bring suit within a reasonable time after he has obtained, or by due
diligence could have obtained, the necessary information.”459  In
other words, if a plaintiff discovers the information necessary to file a
claim against the defendant shortly after the statute of limitations
began to run, he might not benefit from the equitable tolling doc-
trine—“the negligence of the party invoking the doctrine can tip the
balance against its application . . . .”460  This sliding-scale rule encour-
ages swift action on the part of the plaintiff for the same reasons, so
diligence, the statute of limitations will not equitably toll.  Accordingly, filing a com-
plaint too early without the RICO claim risks a denial of a Rule 15 motion for leave to
amend; nevertheless, filing too late forces the RICO plaintiff into the complexities of
statutes of limitations and equitable tolling.
In Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001), the court
sets out procedural issues relating to “inquiry notice,” which has an objective and a
subjective component, that is, the allocation of the burden of coming forward with
the necessary evidence.  The court first considers the objective component.  Inquiry
notice arises when the plaintiff has sufficient information to alert him of “storm warn-
ing” of culpable activity. Id.; see also Benak ex rel Alliance Premier Growth Fund v.
Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir 2006) (citing In re NAHC, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1325 (3d Cir. 2002)).  The defendant has the burden of
coming forward with evidence to show the existence of the “storm warnings.” Mat-
thews, 260 F.3d at 252.  This saddles an investor, for example, with responsibilities like
reading prospectuses, reports, and other information related to his investments. Id.
It also assumes knowledge of publically available news articles and analysts’ reports.
Benak, 435 F.3d at 400.  Then, the court considers the subjective component.  In the
face of these storm warnings, the plaintiff had the burden to come forward with evi-
dence to show that he exercised reasonable diligence, but he was unable to find and
avoid the storm. Mathews, 260 F.3d at 252; Benak, 435 F.3d at 400.
456 Cada, 920 F.2d. at 452.
457 Id.
458 Id. (emphasis added).
459 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
460 Id.
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Cada says, that statutes of limitation exist in the first place: “certainty,
accuracy, and repose.”461
In Cada, neither tolling doctrine saved the plaintiff’s late claims.
No fraudulent concealment by the defendant existed to justify estop-
ping Baxter from pleading the statute of limitations.  In fact, the con-
cealment alleged by Cada—“the reorganization of the creative services
department . . . [as] a ruse to conceal the plan to fire him because of
his age”—simply covered up the substantive wrong, and it was not an
attempt to misdirect Cada into thinking Baxter would not plead the
statute of limitations.462  Additionally, Cada did not file his claims
within a reasonable time upon gathering the necessary information to
file suit; thus, equitable tolling afforded him no relief.463
Despite the apparently unequivocal distinction made by Cada
between the two tolling doctrines,464 many circuits confuse the termi-
nology; thus, they add one more wrinkle to an already tangled statute
of limitations labyrinth.465  For example, in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein,
Sedran & Berman,466 the Third Circuit read Cada correctly, but
retained its own terminology (“equitable tolling” for “equitable estop-
pel”) and blends the tolling doctrines with the discovery-event rule.467
Oshiver involved claims of discriminatory failure to hire when a law
461 Id.
462 Id. at 451.
463 Id. at 453 (refusing to apply equitable tolling to the late-filed claim because the
plaintiff received all the information necessary to make the claim eight months before
the limitations period ran out—an unreasonable amount of time in the
circumstances).
464 Circuits do often make the key distinction between the two tolling doctrines.
See, e.g., Chung v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 278–79 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
two doctrines, although functionally similar, ‘have distinct criteria’—the former
revolving around the conduct of the defendant and the latter around the circum-
stances of the plaintiff.” (citing Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159
F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086,
1095 (6th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between the active steps by the defendant
required for equitable estoppel and due diligence but lack of awareness for equitable
tolling); see also Pecoraro v. Diocese of Rapid City, 435 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2006)
(outlining the proper elements for equitable tolling); Schrader v. Royal Caribbean
Cruise Line, Inc., 952 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1991) (defining equitable estoppel
properly).
465 See, e.g., Stark v. Dynascan Corp., 902 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1990) (talking
inadvertently about “equitable tolling” when the defendant engages in fraudulent
concealment, i.e., equitable estoppel, prior to Judge Posner’s seminal clarification of
the two doctrines in Cada).
466 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).
467 Oshiver comes well before the Judge Smith’s exhaustive and persuasive analysis
in William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 2011), of the discovery
doctrine and the theories of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling.
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firm hired a male attorney as an associate after dismissing the plain-
tiff—a female attorney—on the condition that “the firm would con-
tact her if either additional hourly work or an associate position
became available.”468  The plaintiff filed her claim after the 300-day
limitations period; thus, she needed the discovery-event rule or one of
the two tolling doctrines to pursue her claim.469  The Third Circuit
rejected her “discovery-event” argument, stating that she failed to
“exercise reasonable diligence” (“reasonably” she should have known
of her claim).470  Nevertheless, it muddied the water by insisting on
calling “equitable estoppel” an instance, in Cada’s lexicon, of “equita-
ble tolling.”471  While the court accurately defines the discovery-event
rule,472 it mistakenly qualifies it as a tolling doctrine that tolls the
accrual date until discovery of the injury.473  Additionally, the court
mistakenly applies “equitable tolling” in three circumstances:  “(1)
where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the
plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordi-
nary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in
the wrong forum.”474
Thus, the court incorrectly uses the term “equitable tolling” as an
umbrella doctrine that includes “equitable estoppel.”  This misappli-
cation of both the discovery-event rule and the two tolling doctrines is
representative of the confusion among circuits and underscores the
need for authoritative clarification, which can only come from the
Supreme Court.475
468 38 F.3d at 1384.
469 Id. at 1385.
470 Id. at 1386, 1391.
471 Id. at 1387 (observing that the doctrine of “equitable tolling” may excuse the
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations when it appears (1) the
defendant actively misleads the plaintiff on the reason for her discharge and (2) the
deception caused the failure to comply with the statute of limitations).  Following
Cada’s lexicon this is “equitable estoppel.” See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920
F.2d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 1990).
472 Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1385 (“[T]he accrual date is not the date on which the
wrong that injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date on which the plaintiff discovers
that he or she has been injured.”).
473 Id. at 1386 (“[T]he discovery rule functions to delay the initial running of the
statutory limitations period . . . .” (emphasis added)).  In fact, the discovery does not
toll or delay accrual, it is simply an accrual rule to determine when the statute of
limitations begins to run.  While accrual and tolling are closely connected, the Third
Circuit erroneously equates them.
474 Id. at 1387.
475 See also, e.g., Rx.com v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 322 F. App’x 394, 398
(5th Cir. 2009) (confusing equitable tolling with equitable estoppel by applying equi-
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In addition to the two equity-based tolling doctrines—equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel—the RICO plaintiff’s claim may toll
during parallel criminal litigation.  RICO encourages private prosecu-
tions; thus, tolling the statute of limitations during parallel criminal
proceedings minimizes the burdens of private litigation by making
available the benefits of the government’s litigation.  The government
has access to superior evidence gathering tools (e.g., grand jury sub-
poenas, immunity techniques, electronic surveillance, etc.); when it
uses them, it can develop evidence of the inside working of associa-
tions-in-fact, illicit or licit, and their machinations, whether organized
crime or white-collar crime.  Criminal investigations can also affect
civil investigations by enforced delay.  Traditionally, courts determine
whether to stay civil proceedings by evaluating a number of equitable
factors: (1) the extent to which the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights would be implicated; (2) the potential prejudice to plaintiffs if
the civil trial is delayed; (3) the burdens on the defendant from civil
proceedings; (4) the efficient use of judicial resources; (5) the inter-
ests of non-parties in the civil litigation; and (6) the public interest in
the outcome of both civil and criminal proceedings.476  Thus, courts
stay civil proceedings on a case-by-case basis when justice so
requires.477
Accommodation is crucial between criminal and civil justice.
Delaying the running of the statute of limitations while criminal inves-
tigations run their course is salient.  The need is pressing in the RICO
area given the complexity of criminal and civil RICO investigations.
The remedy is manifest.  For example, because RICO borrows the stat-
table tolling when a “plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of
action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights” (quoting
United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930–31 (5th Cir. 2000))); Vistamar, Inc. v.
Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2005) (purporting that the two doc-
trines are distinct, but applying equitable tolling when the defendant actively misleads
the plaintiff); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (labeling both
doctrines as equitable tolling by applying them both as a result of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct and when circumstances made it impossible for the plaintiff to file
a timely claim) (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir.
1996))); Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1532 (11th Cir.
1992) (confusing the definition of equitable tolling as a doctrine that triggers upon
wrongful action by the defendant that induces the plaintiff to delay filing suit); Rich-
ardson v. Frank, 975 F.2d 1433, 1435, 1437 (10th Cir. 1991) (using the terms inter-
changeably with no distinction between the doctrines).
476 See, e.g., Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324–25 (9th Cir.
1995).
477 See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970) (“Federal courts have
deferred civil proceedings pending the completion of parallel criminal prosecutions
when the interests of justice seemed to require such action . . . .”).
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ute of limitations period from the Clayton Act, courts should similarly
incorporate its tolling and suspension provisions.478  As the Court
stated in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.479 “[i]n virtually all stat-
utes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is
interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of
application.”480  Thus, RICO’s period of limitations should also
include its tolling provisions—specifically those relating to staying civil
proceedings during parallel criminal prosecutions.481
Additionally, RICO case law persuasively argues for the adoption
of the Clayton Act statutory tolling provisions regarding parallel crimi-
nal proceedings, an issue not yet faced by the Court.  In Agency Hold-
478 See, e.g., Pension Fund-Mid-Jersey Trucking Indus. v. Omni Funding Grp., 687
F. Supp. 962, 965 (D.N.J. 1988) (absorbing for civil RICO the Clayton Act’s tolling
provision that tolls its civil suit for one year following the pendency of a parallel crimi-
nal proceeding).
479 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
480 Id. at 464.  In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, 501 U.S. 350
(1991), superseded by statute on unrelated grounds, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, the Court faced the
issue of determining the appropriate period of limitations for the implied claim for
relief under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b)).  It borrowed the express statute of limitations in securities statutes for §§ 9
and 18 of the Act.  In reaching its judgment, it found that each was “an integral ele-
ment of a complex web of regulations . . . intended to facilitate” related goals. Id. at
360.  In fact, the Court thought that the “scheme” of a period of limitations (one year
discovery) and repose (three year period) “represent[ed] an indivisible determina-
tion by Congress as to the appropriate cut off point for claims under the statute.” Id.
at 362 n.8.  Similar comments are appropriate here for civil RICO on the period of
limitations under the Clayton Act and its integral tolling provisions.
481 See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Provision of § 5(b) of Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. § 16(b)) Suspending Statute of Limitations on Private Antitrust Actions During
Pendency of Government Antitrust Proceedings, as Applicable to Those Other than Defendants
in Government Proceedings, 9 A.L.R. FED. 803 (1971); Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation,
What Constitutes Termination of Pendency of Government Antitrust Proceedings Within Mean-
ing of § 5(b) of Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 16(b)), Suspending Statute of Limitations on Private
Antitrust Actions During Pendency of Government Proceedings and for One Year Thereafter, 9
A.L.R. FED. 823 (1971).
While RICO arguably absorbed the tolling provisions of the Clayton Act when it
borrowed the four-year period of limitations, it does not follow that civil RICO must
also adopt the unalloyed Clayton Act’s injury-occurrence accrual rule.  The policy
rationales supporting the relevant tolling provisions apply equally to the aims and
rationales behind both antitrust claims and RICO private claims for relief.  As to
accrual rules, RICO’s pattern requirement, and the different character of the predi-
cate crimes involved for RICO and for antitrust claims for relief, persuasively argue
against the full absorption of the Clayton Act in the accrual context. See supra notes
338–352 and accompanying text.
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ing Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,482 the Court applied the four-
year statute of limitations period to RICO claims, because of the Act’s
close relation with the antitrust statute:
Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of “private attorneys gen-
eral” on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial
resources are deemed inadequate . . . . Moreover, both statutes aim
to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff
show injury “in his business or property by reason of” a violation.483
Given the close nature of the two statutes and their similar aims,
it makes eminent good sense that RICO claims for relief should toll in
the same manner as antitrust claims for relief during parallel criminal
prosecutions.  Not only do the parallels between RICO and the Clay-
ton Act lend themselves to the absorption of the relevant tolling provi-
sion, but also the policy rationales behind the tolling provisions in the
Clayton Act strongly resemble the important considerations that
accompany civil RICO suits.  In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.
v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,484 the Court examined the underlying
policies behind the provision of the Clayton Act that tolls the statute
of limitations for one year following the termination of parallel gov-
ernment proceedings.485  With that tolling provision, “Congress
meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull
from government antitrust actions.”486  While government actions are
“necessarily restricted to the requirements of due process,”487 delay
does not necessarily harm private actions.  Thus, because “private anti-
trust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws,”488 public policy favors tolling the statute of limi-
tations for the pendency of government proceedings plus one year for
private prosecutors to take advantage of such proceedings.  Private
prosecutors similarly use RICO claims as a powerful weapon against
malefactors, and they need the benefit, if any, of the government’s
proceedings.
482 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
483 Id. at 151.
484 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
485 Id. at 317–18.
486 Id. at 317.
487 Id. at 318 (quoting Emich Motors Gorp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U. S. 558, 569
(1951)).
488 Id.
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2. Laches
Laches is a doctrine in equity that bars a plaintiff’s claim if the
plaintiff’s tardiness unjustly prejudices the defendant.  A party raising
the laches defense must prove “(1) lack of diligence by the party
against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party
asserting the defense.”489
Historically, in line with the rule of nullum tempus occurit regi, the
doctrine of laches was not applicable to the United States unless oth-
erwise directed by Congress.  The Court first discussed the rationale
behind adopting this rule in United States v. Thompson.490  In that case,
the government sued the defendant—the superintendent of Indian
affairs in Minnesota—for converting over $10,000 of federal money
into personal profit.  The government did not file the case within the
six-year statute of limitations period established by the Minnesota state
statute.491  While the lower court barred the suit in favor of the defen-
dant, the Court was “at a loss to imagine the reasoning by which the
result announced was reached.”492  The Court went on to explain that
as “[t]he king was held never to be included” in statutes of limitation
or laches, so too, does the national government fall outside its
scope.493  First, the government serves to protect the public interest;
thus, “the public should not suffer by negligence of his servants.”494
Additionally, if the United States was subject to the varied statutes of
limitations of each state, “[t]he government of the Union would in
this respect be at the mercy of the States.”495  As such, the Court held
that the national government, unless otherwise specified by Congress,
falls outside the scope of statutes of limitation or laches.496
489 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); see also United States v.
Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying the defense of laches
because the claim may have satisfied the first element of laches—unjustifiable delay—
but did not satisfy the second—prejudice to the defendant from the unjustifiable
delay).
490 98 U.S. 486 (1878).
491 Id. at 486.
492 Id. at 488.
493 Id. at 489.
494 Id.
495 Id. at 491.
496 Id.; see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands, 461 U.S.
273, 294 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (reciting the history and rationale behind
the nullum tempus occurrit regi principle).  The Ninth Circuit considers Block abro-
gated, albeit on unrelated grounds. See Fadem v. United States, 52 F.3d 202, 206 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that the statements in Block . . . that the QTA’s statute of
limitations is jurisdictional in nature have no continuing validity after the Court’s
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Nevertheless, the Court allowed for an exception to the general
rule that the government is immune from the doctrine of laches or
statutes of limitation.  In United States v. Beebe,497 the Court reaffirmed
its earlier stance on the rule,498 but weakened its force by “justly and
wisely” applying laches against the United States.499  In Beebe, the gov-
ernment filed suit on behalf of private citizens that failed to bring suit
themselves, to set aside an allegedly fraudulently obtained patent.500
The government’s role in the case was not to protect a public right or
interest, but a private right between two citizens.501  In such circum-
stances, courts can and should subject the government to equitable
doctrines, including laches.  Accordingly,
[W]hen the government is a mere formal complainant in a suit, not
for the purpose of asserting any public right or protecting any pub-
lic interest, title, or property, but merely to form a conduit through
which one private person can conduct litigation against another pri-
vate person, a court of equity will not be restrained from administer-
ing the equities existing between the real parties by any exemption
of the [g]overnment designed for the protection of the rights of the
United States alone.502
The policy behind immunizing the government from a laches or
a statute of limitations defense is based upon the courts’ protection of
a public right in the hand of the government.  If the government
seeks to protect a private right, the public would not suffer from the
negligence of governmental officers; thus, it removes the rationale
and the rule for the doctrine exempting the sovereign from the
defense of laches or statutes of limitation.503
decision in Irwin.” (citing Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 89 (1990)))).
497 127 U.S. 338 (1888).
498 Id. at 344 (“The principle that the United States are not bound by any statute
of limitations, nor barred by any laches of their officers, however gross, in a suit
brought by them as a sovereign Government to enforce a public right, or to assert a
public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt.” (citing United States v.
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886))).
499 Id. at 348.
500 Id. at 342.
501 Id. at 346.
502 Id. at 347.
503 See also United States v. Insley, 130 U.S. 263, 265–66 (1889) (rejecting a plea to
apply laches against the government because the United States held the land in dis-
pute for public purposes; thus, supporting the exception in Beebe that applying laches
is appropriate when “the case [does] not involve any question of governmental right
or duty.” (citations omitted)).
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Over one hundred years later, the Court still applies the same
principle with relation to the statute of limitation and laches.  In
United States v. Summerlin,504 the Court reaffirmed its position that
neither a statute of limitations nor a laches defense applies against the
government when acting in its sovereign capacity.  There, the govern-
ment, through the Federal Housing Administrator, became the
assignee of a claim against the administratrix of J.F. Andrew’s
estate.505  Mr. Andrew executed a promissory note under the National
Housing Act, and upon default, the note found its way to the Federal
Housing Administrator.  After Mr. Andrew’s death, the administratrix,
by publication, gave notice to creditors to bring claims against the
estate within eight months, as is required by state law.506  The govern-
ment, however, filed its claim eleven months after the administratrix
published the notice.507  Despite the late filing, the Court reversed the
lower court’s holding that the government’s claim was too late.508
The Court held that not only is it “well settled that the United States is
not bound by state statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of
laches,” but that “[t]he same rule applies whether the United States
brings its suit in its own courts or in a state court.”509  So long as the
government “becomes entitled to a claim, acting in its governmental
capacity,”510 then neither statutes of limitation nor laches bars the
claim.511
504 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
505 Id. at 414–15.
506 Id. at 415–16.
507 Id.
508 Id. at 418.
509 Id. at 416 (citing Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U.S. 219, 222–23 (1924)).
510 Id. at 417.
511 The Court also reaffirmed the principle in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of
Univ. and Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 290 (1983), stating that “[t]he judicially-created
rule that a sovereign is normally exempt from the operation of a generally-worded
statute of limitations has retained its vigor because it serves the public policy of pre-
serving the public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negli-
gence of public officers.”  The Court did hold, however, that this principle does not
apply to states, and states “must fully adhere” to generally worded statutes of limita-
tions. Id.
For further discussion of the nullum tempus occurit regi doctrine, see United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947), superseded on other grounds by statute, Submerged
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (applying the nullum tempus doctrine in a dispute
over land under the Pacific Ocean off the California coastline; “[t]he Government,
which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be
deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for pri-
vate disputes . . . .”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 129, 132 (1938)
(championing the doctrine, because of its preservation of public rights where the
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While most circuits, as required, continue to adhere to the
Court’s doctrine,512 other circuits question the breadth of the nullum
tempus occurit regi principle and argue for a more limited rule.  In
Farmers Home Administration v. Muirhead,513 for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit advocates for a more narrow use of the principle that immunizes
the government from the equitable defense of laches.  In that case,
defendants executed promissory notes in favor of the Farmers Home
Administration (“FmHA”)—a nationwide federal loan program.514
After sending two notices of acceleration and a demand for payment,
the FmHA initiated foreclosure proceedings.515  The Fifth Circuit
held statutes of limitations—state or federal—and the defense of
laches not to run against the federal government.  Despite this ruling,
that court commented on its disagreement with the principle in the
context of federal loan programs.516  The Fifth Circuit argued that the
nullum tempus rule “is far more appropriate to essential sovereign
United States sought to recover a deposit from a foreign government with a New York
bank after the local six year statute of limitations passed).
512 See, e.g., Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1199
(9th Cir. 2008) (stating that negligence of government officers cannot result in the
government losing valuable rights held for the people (citing United States v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947), superseded on other grounds by statute, Submerged Lands Act,
ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953))); United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng’g Co. of Utah, 81
F.3d 922, 931 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the principle that the government is not only
immune from “suit” but from legal proceedings in law or equity unless it so consents);
United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1345–46 (4th Cir.
1994) (applying the “‘great principle of public policy’ protecting the public interest
from official negligence” when the government acts as a litigant prosecuting false
claims in addition to when it acts in its administrative capacity (quoting Brock v.
Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986))); United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425,
1426–28 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding the long-standing federal common law rule that
the United States is not bound by laches or statutes of limitation unless otherwise
explicitly directed by Congress in a foreclosure action by the United States on behalf
of the Farmers Home Administration); Dole v. Local 427, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers, 894 F.2d 607, 608–10 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that no statute of
limitations applies to suits filed by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of the United
States under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, so long as the suit
was brought for a public purpose or by the Secretary in his governmental capacity);
United States v. Brown, 835 F.2d 176, 180 (8th Cir. 1987) (following the Court’s deci-
sion in Guaranty Trust that “laches cannot be asserted against the sovereign” (citing
Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938))); United States v. Hughes
House Nursing Home, Inc., 710 F.2d 891, 895 (1st Cir. 1983)) (“A virtually unbroken
line of authority . . . holds that a private defendant cannot assert laches against the
government.”).
513 42 F.3d 964 (5th Cir. 1995).
514 Id. at 964–65.
515 Id.
516 Id. at 967.
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functions than to the federal government’s role as a lender to veter-
ans, small business owners, farmers, and disaster victims among
others.”517  The court argued that public policy supports running the
statute of limitations and allowing for the defense of laches against the
federal government in its role as lender.  In these circumstances, the
court posited, the new rule would encourage the government to act
promptly, and it could not enforce ancient mortgages.518  While the
Fifth Circuit adhered to the ancient principle, it introduced a more
limited view—exemption from the statute of limitations and defense
of laches only for essential sovereign functions.  How the essential sovereign
functions doctrine will modify laches in the RICO context remains
unknown, but the doctrine is spreading to other circuits,519 and it may
mark the end of the broad reign of nullum tempus occurit regi.
More significant, other decisions move beyond dicta, squarely
break with precedent, and restrict the government’s exemption from
laches.  The Seventh Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v. P*I*E
Nationwide, Inc.,520 for example, holds that laches applies to suits by
the government.  “Following dictum in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC . . . laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be
applicable to suits by government agencies as well as by private par-
ties.”521  In United States v. Administrative Enterprises, Inc.,522 the Seventh
Circuit suggests the application of laches to the government is a “com-
pletely unsettled” question,523 a dubious proposition at best in light of
the unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions from the founding of
the United States.  The case involved a summons issued by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service that the United States sought to enforce three
and a half years after its issuance.524  The summons was not subject to
a statute of limitations; thus, the appellants had to rely on the doctrine
of laches.525  While the court denied the defense, because the alleged
517 Id.
518 Id.
519 See, e.g., United States v. Peoples Household Furnishings, Inc., 75 F.3d 252, 257
(6th Cir. 1996) (questioning the ancient policy considerations behind the federal
common law rule exempting the federal government from statutes of limitations and
the defense of laches in certain contexts; “[w]e doubt that the foundations of the
republic would crumble if the government were now to be held to the same timeta-
bles as everyone else in suing to renew its money judgments.”).
520 894 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1990).
521 Id. at 894 (citing EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)).
522 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
523 Id. at 672.
524 Id. at 671.
525 Id. at 672.
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unjustifiable delay did not prejudice the defendant,526 it introduced a
new exception to the nullum tempus doctrine: prejudicial instances of
egregious delay.527  The court relied in the main on its own earlier
rulings to buttress its new exception.528  While the Seventh Circuits
continues the tradition of the Fifth Circuit in swimming against the
expansive doctrine exempting the government from the defense of
laches, the overwhelming majority of circuit court decisions continue
to follow the federal common law supported now by centuries of
precedent.
E. Case Study: Time-bars in Florida Under RICO
Famously, Justice Holmes argued in dissent in Black & White Taxi-
cab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.529 that “a
general common law” did not exist.  Only the law of a particular juris-
diction was “law.”  He wrote:
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called
common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of
that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to
what it may have been in England or anywhere else.  It may be
adopted by statute in place of another system previously in force.
But a general adoption of it does not prevent the State Courts from
refusing to follow the English decisions upon a matter where the
local conditions are different.530
Without passing on the general cogency of Justice Holmes’s positiv-
ist’s predilections, his point that you need to look at a body of law
within a particular jurisdiction ultimately to evaluate how legal ideas
work themselves out makes eminent good sense.  The best state juris-
diction to examine to see how the RICO idea and time-bars interact is
Florida.
Florida was one of the first to enact RICO-type legislation and to
make a major effort to implement it.  The legislature enacted the leg-
islation in 1977.  It included in its statute provisions that not only pro-
526 Id. at 673.
527 Id.; see also Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278–79 (2d
Cir. 2005) (applying laches against the government based upon the exceptions out-
lined by the Seventh Circuit).
528 Id.; see Martin v. Consultants & Adm’rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1090–91 (7th Cir.
1992); NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893–94 (7th Cir. 1990); In re
Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lindberg Corp., 882 F.2d
1158, 1163–64 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942–43 (7th Cir.
1988).
529 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
530 Id. at 533–34 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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vided for a period of limitations, but also for the point of accrual.
When it passed its RICO legislation, it also passed theft and fencing
legislation that contain similar provisions providing a period of limita-
tions and point of accrual.  In addition, though remarkably few know
it, the Florida legislation, not federal RICO, served as the principal
model for most of the subsequent state RICO legislative efforts.531  In
1986, the Florida legislature revisited its state RICO legislation.  In
response to criticisms from the business community, it removed the
private civil RICO claim for relief for damages and placed it in sepa-
rate legislation; it took similar action with the civil remedies for theft.
The new legislation is the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act.532
The result is two similar statutes, but not an identical item of RICO-
type legislation.
Florida RICO’s statute of limitation provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil
action or proceeding under this act may be commenced at any time
within 5 years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this act
terminates or the cause of action accrues.  If a criminal prosecution
or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to
punish, prevent, or restrain any violation of the provisions of this
531 The Florida Legislature drafted Florida RICO not only to follow the federal
model, but also to improve on it.  In fact, Florida RICO is a superior embodiment of
the concepts behind RICO to RICO itself.  It is anything but a carbon copy.  Senator
Edgar Dunn was the moving force in that project of codification and reform when I
worked for him in 1977.  Thus, Florida RICO, not RICO, became the template for
drafting state RICO legislation after 1977, most of which I consulted on with people
in an attorney general’s office or the legislature itself.  For six state RICO statutes that
have special provisions for a statute of limitations (not all do) that apply this reform
language to criminal and civil actions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1505(f) (2007);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1356(H) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(8) (West 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.725(11) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-206(h) (2010); and
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.88(1) (West 2005).  For the six states/territories that use the
same language to determine the period of limitations for RICO civil actions, see
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.159s (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-9 (2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.34(J) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1409(E) (West Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605(9) (LexisNexis 2008);
and V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 30-607(h) 1996.
532 1986 Fla. Laws 2033.  Originally, Florida placed the limitations provision in a
single section of its RICO statute.  In 1986, the legislature transferred Florida RICO’s
civil damages provisions to another portion of the Florida code by the Civil Remedies
for Criminal Practices Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 772.101–772.19 (West 2011).  Conse-
quently, similar language now appears and applies to criminal actions under Florida
RICO at § 895.05(10) (West 2000) and applies to civil actions at § 772.17.  Ironically, I
taught at the law school at Florida State University that summer in Tallahassee, a
walking distance from the legislature, and helped in the design of the reform
legislation.
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act, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this sec-
tion with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (6)
[aggrieved person for equity] or subsection (7) [state for threefold
damages] which is based in whole or in part upon any matter com-
plained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding shall be
suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or pro-
ceeding and for 2 years following its termination.533
The Florida legislature in its Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal
Practices Act provided for a similar provision.  It provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a civil action or pro-
ceeding under this chapter may be commenced at any time within 5
years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this act termi-
nates or the cause of action accrues.  If a criminal prosecution or
civil action or other proceeding is brought or intervened in by the
state or by the United States to punish, prevent, or restrain any
criminal activity or criminal conduct which forms the basis for a civil
action under this chapter, the running of the period of limitations
prescribed by this section shall be suspended during the pendency
of such prosecution, action, or proceeding and for 2 years following
its termination.534
Florida Civil Theft Act had a similar, but not identical, provision.
It provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil
action or proceeding under ss. 812.012–812.037 [theft] or s.
812.081 [trade secrets] may be commenced at any time within 5
years after the cause of action accrues; however, in a criminal pro-
ceeding under ss. 812.012–812.037 [theft] or s. 812.081 [trade
secrets], the period of limitation does not run during any time
when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or is with-
out a reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the
state, but in no case shall this extend the period of limitation other-
wise applicable by more than 1 year.  If a criminal prosecution or
civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to
punish, prevent, or restrain any violation of the provisions of ss.
812.012–812.037 [theft] or s. 812.081 [trade secrets], the running
of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to
any cause of action arising under subsection (6) [aggrieved person]
or subsection (7) [state cause of action for threefold damages]
which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of
in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding shall be suspended
533 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(10) (West 2011).
534 Id. § 772.17.
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during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or proceeding
and for 2 years following its termination.535
Florida law contains several relevant general provisions for stat-
utes of limitations.536  Section 95.11, “Limitations other than for the
recovery of real property,” in relevant part, provides:
Actions other than for the recovery of real property shall be com-
menced as follows:
. . .
(3) Within four years.—. . .(j) A legal or equitable action founded
on fraud. . . .
(4) Within two years.—. . .(d) An action for wrongful death. . . .
(6) Laches.—Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced
within the time provided for legal action concerning the same sub-
ject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to
be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or
her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is
injured or prejudiced by the delay.  This subsection shall not affect
application of laches at an earlier time in accordance with law.537
In addition, § 95.031, “Computation of time,” in relevant part,
provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere
in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun
under any statute of limitation runs from the time the cause of
action accrues.
(1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting
the cause of action occurs. . . .
(2)(a) An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3) [including
constructive fraud] must be begun within the period prescribed in
this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving
rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been dis-
covered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from
any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an
action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years
after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of
the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.538
The state Supreme Court is also an important source of general
principles applicable to statutes of limitation in its jurisprudence,
including the relation of the statutory provisions to common law doc-
trines, the status of common law doctrines, and the court’s view of the
535 Id. § 812.035(10).
536 See, e.g., id. § 95.11.
537 Id.
538 Id. § 95.031 (West Supp. 2012).
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purpose of statutes of limitations.  This view provides a backdrop to
each interpretation of the statutes of limitations and the various toll-
ing doctrines in Florida jurisprudence.  Significantly, the court in
Davis v. Monahan,539 held that because the legislature expressly pro-
vided for the common law “delayed-discovery” rule for particular stat-
utes of limitations, the common law rule did not apply to other claims
for relief.  The court was not impressed with precedent from other
jurisdictions.540  To be sure, the court acknowledged it recognized a
“delayed discovery” doctrine to claims for relief arising out of child-
hood sexual abuse and repressed memory.541  But, so the court
explained, that was because of “the unique and sinister nature of
childhood sexual abuse, as well as the fact that the doctrine is applica-
ble to similar cases where the tortious acts cause the delay in discov-
ery.”542  In addition, the court in Major League Baseball v. Morsani543
recognized the application of “equitable estoppel” to claims for relief
filed outside of the statute of limitations.  Observing that statutes of
limitations “impose a strict time limit for filing legal actions,”544 it
noted, however, that several legal doctrines, including equitable estop-
pel, could deflect them.545  The court began by commenting that at
common law no fixed limits circumscribed filings lawsuits; thus, limita-
tions were a creature of statute.546  It then noted that the prime pur-
pose of the statutes was to protect defendants from “stale” claims.547
It reasoned that the antiquity of the claim would unfairly place the
defendant at a grave disadvantage where the plaintiff carelessly slept
on his legal rights and left the defendant to shield himself with only
“tattered or faded memories, misplaced or discarded records, and
missing or deceased witnesses [where] the quest for truth might elude
539 832 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2002). Davis casts considerable doubt on the sweeping
language in Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that Florida
courts have “broadly adopted” the discovery principle) that would extend, without
qualification, the doctrine to “breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negli-
gence, fraud, and violations of [the Criminal Remedies for Criminal Practices Act.]”
Id. at 909.
540 Davis, 832 So. 2d at 711–12 (dismissing the respondent’s reliance on cases
from Iowa, Nebraska, and New York).
541 Id. at 709 (citing Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1185–86 (Fla. 2000)).
542 Id. at 712.  The court also acknowledged that the legislature enacted a statute
to deal with the situation in FLA. STAT. ANN § 95.11(7) (West 2002).
543 790 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2001).
544 Id. at 1074.
545 Id.
546 Id.
547 Id. at 1075.
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even the wisest court.”548  In addition, it said, the Florida statutes artic-
ulate “an exclusive list” of conditions that can toll the running of the
statutes of limitations.549  Nevertheless, the court recognized that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel was a “fundamental tenet of Anglo
American jurisprudence for centuries.”550  “Equitable estoppel,” it
observed, “is based on principles of fair play and essential jus-
tice . . . .”551  “It differs from other legal theories that may operate to
deflect the statute of limitations.”552  They include accrual (e.g.,
delayed discovery), tolling (e.g., absence from the state of the defen-
dant), equitable tolling (e.g., the blameless ignorance of the plaintiff
and lack of prejudice of the defendant), and waiver (e.g., intentional
relinquishment of a known right).  According to the court, “Tolling
operates [to deflect] the statute of limitations; equitable estoppel
operates on the party.”553  In addition, “The common law remains in
effect . . . unless the statute specifically says otherwise.”554  The court
commented that the legislature did not expressly modify the doctrine.
Moreover, the policies of limitation and estoppel are congruent.  Lim-
itations deal with unfair surprise and stale claims.  Estoppel acts to
prevent a person from profiting from his own wrong; he could hardly
claim surprise if his own conduct prevented the plaintiff from filing
suit.  Authority supports the application of the doctrine.  Thus, the
court held that it remains the law in Florida.555
548 Id. at 1075 (quoting Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 36 (Fla. 1976)).
549 Id.
550 Id. at 1076 (quoting Lord Coke, saying that “estoppel” comes from the French
word estoupe that means to “closeth up [a man’s] mouth to allege or plead [other-
wise]” (citing LANCELOT FEILDING EVEREST, EVEREST AND STRODE’S LAW OF ESTOPPEL 1
(3d ed. 1923))).  The court also held that the doctrine became the law of Florida as
part of the common law background as of July 4, 1776 when the common law was
adopted by the Florida Legislature in 1829. Id.
551 Id.
552 Id.
553 Id. at 1077.
554 Id. at 1078.
555 Id. at 1080.  Two other opinions of the court require brief mention.  In Lane v.
State, 337 So.  2d 976, 977 (Fla. 1976), the court held that because the statute of
limitations is a substantive (not procedural) matter, the statute in effect at the time of
the crime governed (not at the time of charge).  In Eaddy v. State, 638 So. 2d 22,
24–25 (Fla. 1994), the court held that the defendant may waive a statute of limita-
tions.  Because the court only instructed the jury on first-degree murder, it faced a
“Hobson’s choice”: convicting him or acquitting him.  The enhanced risk of an
unwarranted conviction for first-degree murder was constitutionally unacceptable. Id.
at 25.  In short, the defendant had the right to waive the statute on the lesser-included
offense, and the lower court denied it. Id.
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Turning to the district courts of appeal and the lower federal
courts interpreting Florida RICO, the Civil Remedies for Criminal
Practices Act, or the theft act, the decisions themselves are remarkable
only in the lack of number since 1977.  On the whole (one excep-
tion), the decisions are straightforward, workmen-like, and unremark-
able applications of the statutory language, precisely what you should
expect to find.  They dealt with equitable tolling, the discovery rule,
time of accrual, burden of proof, trebling, retroactivity, the relation of
the statutes to other statutory limitations rules, notice in theft litiga-
tion, suspension during criminal proceedings, and the doctrine of
continuing offenses and torts.  Six decisions warrant individual atten-
tion, in particular, because they favorably contrast with the less
impressive work of the federal courts.  How each court handled them
is instructive.
First, in Senfeld v. The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.,556 the Third
District upheld conversion and civil theft claims.  The court found
that conversion “is an unauthorized act which deprives another of his
property permanently or for an indefinite time,” and “[w]here a per-
son having a right to possession of property makes a demand for its
return,” and the person having it declines to turn it over, a conversion
occurs.557  Concededly not carefully drawing a distinction between
equitable tolling and the discovery rule, the court held that where the
plaintiff was in blameless ignorance of the conduct of the defendant,
the period had not run on the conversion claim.558  Turning to the
theft claim, the court rejected arguments that because the legislature
premised the claim on a crime, the criminal point of accrual (the time
of the theft) applied, that a conviction had to precede the civil claim,
that the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt (not prepon-
derance), that only a jury (not the court) could treble the damages
(trebling was a ministerial act), and that the a period of limitation,
enacted in 1977, could not apply to a 1975 conversion, the statute of
limitation was applicable, and the court affirmed the judgment.559
In State v. Guthrie,560 the Second District mindlessly read the theft
act without regard to the general provision for limitations that
absence from the state tolled the period, necessitating the amend-
ment of the theft act.
556 450 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
557 Id. at 1160–61 (citation omitted).
558 Id. at 1162.
559 Id. at 1162 (reading the statute to achieve its remedial goals under FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 812.037 (West 2002)).
560 567 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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In Seymour v. Adams,561 the Fifth District faced a classic landlord-
tenant dispute that involved a theft claim where the lower court
granted summary judgment to the property owner.  These materials
can pass over the property owner law.  On the theft claim, the lower
court granted summary judgment to the property owner, because the
tenant did not make a demand for $200, and he did not allege a crimi-
nal state of mind.562  Significantly, the court found that the demand,
while required by the statute, was timely if made within the period of
limitations, on an amendment accompanied by compliance with the
notice.563
In Ziccardi v. Strother,564 the Second District held that the five-year
limitations period in the 1986 amendment to Florida RICO that cre-
ated the Criminal Remedies for Criminal Practices Act was “remedial,”
and that a court could apply it to conduct that occurred in 1979.565
Nevertheless, the five-year period did not save the plaintiff’s claim,
because it was for conduct that occurred in 1979, and she did not file
her claim for relief until 1987.566  That said, because the state filed
criminal charges against one of the defendants in 1979, and the state
did not resolve them until 1988, plaintiff’s period of limitations under
the statute tolled until two years after 1988; thus, she filed it timely
against the criminally charged defendant.
In O’Malley v. Mounts,567 the Fourth District faced a writ of prohi-
bition against a prosecution for grand theft and RICO for the theft of
corporate bonds with intent to defraud and an organized scheme to
defraud.  The thefts occurred in October 1983, and May 1984, but
thereafter ended.  The state filed its prosecution in July 1989, charg-
ing grand theft and racketeering.568  The state sought to circumvent
the running of the five-year period of limitation by characterizing the
561 638 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
562 Id. at 1049.
563 Id. at 1049 n.9 (holding that pre-suit notice requirements for malpractice are
subject to correction on amendment accompanied by compliance with the notice if
within the period of limitations (citing Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d
446, 448 (Fla. 1990))).
564 570 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
565 Id. at 1320–21.
566 Id. at 1321–22.
567 590 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
568 Id. at 437–38.
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theft and racketeering as “continu[ing]” offenses.569  The attempt
failed.570
Last, in Huff Groves Trust v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co.,571 the
Fourth District faced a civil theft claim for failure to pay the proper
amount for fruit processed during growing seasons between 1988 and
1994.572  Recognizing that growers had to file their claims from when
the conduct terminated or the cause of action accrued under
§ 772.17, and while failing to focus its decision on “conduct . . . termi-
nates” or “cause of action accrues” (defined under § 95.031(1) as
“when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs”), the
court recognized that the five-year period ran from the “last pay-out to
any of the plaintiffs.”573  The last payout occurred in April 1995.  The
five-year statute ran out in April 2000.  The growers filed their suit in
August 2000.  While unnecessary under the law now, the court dis-
cussed the discovery rule, finding, however, that the plaintiffs had
ample notice that the payouts were deficient well before August
1995.574
Turning to the federal court decisions that deal with Florida
issues, the work of the judiciary stands in sharp and unfavorable con-
trast.  The opinions reflect an atmosphere of result-oriented resolu-
tions rather than the routine application of unremarkable legal
569 Id. at 438.  The classic example of a “continuing tort” rightly not barred by the
statute of limitations until the conduct or its effects end is State Department of Environ-
mental Protection v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So.2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).  The
Department challenged Fleet for its “continuing injury to groundwater caused by the
. . . seepage of hazardous substances disposed and discharged on commercial prop-
erty in the 1980s.” Id. at 513.  Fleet defended on statute of limitations grounds.  The
court fully recognized that the statute “begins to run when the last element of the
cause of action accrues.” Id. at 514 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.03(1) (1995))
(emphasis added).  The claim for relief was for a failure to abate an imminent hazard-
ous substances exposure in violation of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.726 (1995). Id.  Fleet
held the burden of proof on the statute of limitations. Id. (noting that it is “elemen-
tary” that the burden of establishing statute of limitations bar is on the party raising
the defense (citing Petroleum Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 248 So. 2d 196, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971))).  Under the court’s view, little did it matter when Fleet abandoned the
property, because the initial disposal was not the gravamen of the claim for relief, but
the continuing, but abatable nuisance, and, as such, the statute of limitations, where a
continuing invasion does exist, “does not begin to run until the wrongful invasion . . .
that constitutes the violation ceases.” Id.  Otherwise, the statutory scheme “to abate
pollution . . .  would be wholly frustrated.” Id.
570 Id. at 438 (relying on State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162, 167 (Fla. 1973), which held
that larceny was not continuing offence).
571 829 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
572 Id. at 924.
573 Id.
574 Id. at 925.
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principles, the opposite of what youone should expect to find.  They,
too, warrant individual attention, so that the performance of the fed-
eral judiciary stands out.  In Armbrister v. Roland International Corp.,575
the district court faced homebuyer fraud litigation involving interstate
land sales.  Buyers dealt with sales representatives using direct mail
and telephone solicitations.  Most never saw their homes or land.  The
buyers alleged that the salesmen misrepresented the character and
value of their purchases as part of a scheme to defraud.576  First, deny-
ing summary judgment on the claims, but limiting discovery to the
statute of limitations (a prudent move in any massive litigation like
RICO), the court, after discovery, held that the statute of limitation
ran on, among other claims, civil conspiracy, civil theft, RICO, and
Florida RICO.  The court found that the period for civil conspiracy, as
an intentional tort, was four years under § 95.11(3) (o).577  Incredibly,
the court ran the claim from the first payment, because that was the
point of injury, ignoring the continuing injuries inflicted by the subse-
quent payments; it held that the statute begins to run when injury
“first appears, not when it recurs.”578  The court should have recog-
nized the doctrine of separate accrual.579  To support its holding, the
court mischaracterized Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County;580 it is
inapt; it involved a leaking roof where the school board sustained the
entire injury when the roof first leaked.581  It has nothing to do with
separated injuries sustained over time.  The court also misused Phillips
v. Amoco Oil Co.;582 it is also inapt; it dealt only with the discovery rule
in the context of an employment contract.  It says nothing about con-
tinuing injury.  Neither opinion includes the court’s most telling line:
“first appears, not when it recurs.”  In fact, the court conspicuously
ignores Isaacs v. Deutsch,583 which holds where payments are at issue,
575 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
576 Id. at 806.
577 Id. at 809 (citing Newberger v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 751 F.2d 1162, 1165 (11th
Cir. 1985); Faulk v. Allen, 12 So.2d 109, 110 (Fla. 1943)).
578 Id.
579 For duty of support, see Isaacs v. Deutsch, 80 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1995) (“[I]n
the case of an obligation payable by instalments [sic], ‘the statute of limitations runs
against each instalment [sic] from the time it becomes due; that is, from the time
when an action might be brought to recover it.’”  (quoting 34 AM.  JUR. Limitations of
Actions § 142 at 114 (1941))).
580 435 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1983).
581 Id. at 806–07.
582 799 F.2d 1464, 1468–69 (11th Cir. 1986).
583 80 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1995).  The doctrine of Isaacs remains good law.
Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 809 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(“[T]he alleged fraud was an ongoing fraud. . . . [E]ach yearly premium payment by
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 189 22-MAY-13 9:20
2013] rico  time-bars 1769
the statute runs from each payment, not against the series.  The court
next turned to the possibility of tolling, but it painfully confused
“equitable estoppel” (focusing on the conduct of the defendant) and
“equitable tolling” (focusing on the conduct of the plaintiff).584  It
confused “fraudulent concealment” (a form of equitable estoppel)
with “equitable tolling.”585  No matter, concluding that plaintiffs did
not exercise any due diligence after signing the contracts, the court
denied each of the plaintiffs’ efforts to postpone on any ground the
running of the period of limitations.586  When the court turned to
the appellants resulted in consequent injury to them by virtue of their reliance on the
representations of Union Central.” (emphasis omitted)).
On the other hand, arguably, because the buyers “should have known” of the
fraud at the beginning, when they made subsequent payments, the payments were not
because of the fraud, but because of the buyers’ own gullibility.  That said, I remain
unpersuaded. See, e.g., United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Posner, C. J.) (“[The law, if it distinguishes the savvy from the guidable,] would invite
con men to prey on people of below-average judgment or intelligence, who are any-
way the biggest targets of such criminals and hence the people most needful of the
law’s protection—and most needful or not are within its protective scope. . . . ‘Taking
advantage of the vulnerable is a leitmotif of fraud.’ . . . It would be very odd for the
law to protect only those who, being able to protect themselves, do not need the law’s
protection.  In fact picking on the vulnerable normally makes your conduct more
rather than less culpable, earning you a heavier sentence.” (citations omitted));
accord, United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1167 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[Scheme to
defraud does not] ‘differentiate between schemes that will ensnare the ordinary pru-
dent investor and those that attract only those with lesser mental acuity[,]’ . . . or that
‘[t]he negligence of the victim in failing to discover a fraudulent scheme is not a
defense to criminal conduct.’” (citations omitted)).
584 See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450–52 (7th Cir. 1990).
585 Armbrister, 667 F. Supp. at 809–10.
586 Id. at 810. At one time, the Eleventh Circuit held that a scheme to defraud
required the making of a misrepresentation “reasonably calculated to deceive persons
of ordinary prudence and comprehension.”  United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550,
1558–60 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing a mail fraud conviction where the deception was
easily discovered from “readily available external sources”). Brown is another way of
saying that the statute does not apply to those who need it, and that the statute does
apply to those who do not need it. See generally, Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a
Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credu-
lous Gull? 99 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1999).  In Brown, the court faced defendants that
sold their homes at significantly higher prices than independently built homes in the
same neighborhoods.  Defendants targeted customers in “snowbelt” states who were
encouraged to visit defendants’ communities at defendants’ expense. Brown, 79 F.3d
at 1553–54.  The court reversed, holding that the government presented insufficient
evidence that defendants devised a scheme “reasonably calculated to deceive persons
of ordinary prudence and comprehension” because the buyers could have acquired
information about comparable house prices. Id. at 1558–59. The court observed,
“[t]he government tries to draw a distinction; they say these men were convicted for
deceptions about these high prices.  For us, at least in the context of home sales and
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plaintiffs’ civil theft claim, the court found that the period was five
years, but still found that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely, because
of their lack of due diligence.587  Similarly, when the court turned to
plaintiffs’ RICO claim for relief, it recognized that the period was four
years, but following antitrust law, it held that the claim for relief
accrued on injury.588  That made the claims untimely, if the court ran
the period from the first payment and ignored the subsequent pay-
ments, (whether discovery applied, because of its analysis on the other
claims).589  Finally, when it turned to Florida RICO, it candidly recog-
nized that § 895.05(10) “clearly” contained “alternative limitations
periods . . . .”590  It declined to construe it and held that because it
had dismissed the federal claims, it could decline to assert pendent
jurisdiction of over Florida RICO.591
of the openness of the Florida real estate market, this distinction is a distinction with-
out meaning.” Id at 1562.  It also quoted with approval Simms v. Biondo: “ ‘[T]he doc-
trine of caveat emptor applies to real estate transactions such that a buyer has a duty to
satisfy himself or herself of the quality of a bargained purchase price without trusting
a seller [and] facts which are accessible as a matter of public record bar a claim of
justifiable reliance necessary to sustain a cause of action for fraud.’” Id. at 1560 (quot-
ing Simms v. Biondo, 816 F. Supp. 814, 820, 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).  Brown reflects a
terribly misguided opinion of obviously gullible “snow-birds” and manifestly culpable
Florida “home sales representatives.”  Did Brown really mean to say that no ordinary
person should ever trust a Florida salesperson of real estate?  Surely, some pride
themselves on telling the truth.  In brief, no reason exists to let the morals of a few set
the standard for the many.  In part, caveat emptor gave us the Great Recession of 2008
and the Great Depression of 1929. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting fraud in securities statute is designed to curtail the “phi-
losophy of caveat emptor”); MAX RADIN, THE LAWFUL PURSUIT OF GAIN, 54 (photo.
reprint 1976) (1931) (“[C]aveat Emptor . . . is bad Latin, and from the Roman point
of view, worse law.”).  Fortunately, the Eleventh Circuit thought better of Brown, later
overruled it, and held that the mail fraud statute prohibits “any scheme or artifice to
defraud,” no matter how fanciful.  United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1169 (11th
Cir. 2009).  Lamentably, that misguided philosophy animated Armbrister’s fact-finding
and its application of the law.
587 Armbrister, 667 F. Supp. at 822.
588 Id. at 824 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
339 (1970)).
589 Id. at 824.
590 Id. at 825 (“[A] criminal or civil action or proceeding . . . may be commenced
at any time within 5 years after the conduct . . . terminates or the cause of action
accrues.” (citing FLA. STAT. §895.05 (10) (1985))).
591 Id. After Armbrister, the court in Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rental-A-Car, 814
F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Fla. 1992), adopted by 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
faced a multi-count complaint under RICO, Florida RICO, and civil theft; it upheld
the RICO claim as timely, but it applied Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett
Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554 (1lth Cir. 1990), that adopted the injury-and-pattern discov-
ery rule.  As such, it is not of interest here.  In addition, it dealt with issues largely
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In contrast, in Perera v. Wachovia Bank,592 the court sensitively
faced an outrageous bank theft of $187,871.10 by a bank officer where
the bank incredibly did not make good on the customer’s losses.  Dur-
ing a thirty-year relationship with the bank, the plaintiff opened sev-
eral certificates of deposit (CDs).  In August 2008, he learned from
the FBI that his account representative stole his funds in February
2001.593  The bank learned of the theft in 2005, but unbelievably did
not inform the plaintiff.594  The government filed a criminal case
against the representative in January 2010.  After continuing delays by
the bank, it finally flatly denied plaintiff’s claim.  He then filed his
theft claim in December 2009.595  The bank did not deny the theft,
but even after it had delayed the matter, it defended on statute of
limitations grounds.  The court rightly found that the character of the
theft and its subsequent cover-ups by the bank amounted to a “contin-
uing tort,” similar in character to churning of investment accounts.596
As such, the bar of the statute of limitation did not limit plaintiff’s
claim for relief.  In the alternative, the court also considered “equita-
ble tolling” that applies when the defendant misleads or lulls the
plaintiff into inaction.597  (Under Cada’s and Davenport’s lexicon, the
doctrine is that of “equitable estoppel;” “equitable tolling” focuses on
the conduct of the plaintiff, not the defendant.)598  Here, too, the
court held that the bank’s conduct prevented plaintiff from filing his
action and tolled the statute of limitations.  On the merits of the
claim, the court held that civil theft included the conversion or misap-
bypassed by more recent developments touching on notice and fact pleading, see,
e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 670 (2009) (“plausibility” pleading), Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (“plausibility” pleading), that need not
tarry these materials, and several substantive RICO issues (scienter, pattern, enter-
prise); several RICO and Florida RICO questions it dealt with as if the two statutes
were largely “identical,” Colonial Penn, 814 F. Supp. at 1095 (a problematic judgment
at best): injury, pattern (again), conspiracy, constitutional (vagueness), Florida
RICO’s single contract limitation, civil theft (criminal state of mind) limitations and
relation back.  These issues are not germane here.
592 No. 09-23773, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33618 (S.D. Fla. March 15, 2010), adopted
by No. 09-23773, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33759 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2010).
593 Id. at *2.
594 Id.
595 Id. at *3.
596 Id. at *8, *10 (citing Laney v. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d
1347, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Holt, 92 So. 2d 169, 170
(Fla. 1956) (continuing tort))).
597 Id. at *10.
598 See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450–52 (7th Cir. 1991).
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propriation of CDs599 and upheld plaintiff’s civil theft and conversion
claims for relief; the statute of limitations barred neither of them.600
The contrasts in how these two courts handled the claims for relief
before them stand out sharply and unfavorably to Armbrister as well as
the laudable work of the District Courts of Appeal in Florida.601
Strangely, Florida courts, while recognizing it, did not construe at
length the alternative accrual points—“after the conduct . . . termi-
nates or the cause of action accrues”—from which to run the period
of limitations in FLA.  STAT. § 895.05(10).  Unhappily, other state
courts have construed it, but unwisely missed its controlling signifi-
cance.  Georgia adopted RICO legislation modeled on Florida RICO.
The courts in Georgia have construed its statute reflecting the Florida
language.  The Georgia court inexcusably reached an indefensible
result, and they are staying the course.602  Other states (including
Florida) that followed the Florida lead in adopting the language
should not follow the Georgia lead in misinterpreting it.  Several
aspects of the application of the alternative points are material here.
The statute applies to criminal and civil claims; it also applies to con-
tinuing offenses and continuing torts.  Any construction of the statute
must accommodate each of these functions to reflect accurately the
Legislature’s intent.  The Georgia court, however, focused on only
599 Perera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33618, at *12 (upholding an injunction under
the civil theft statute, FLA. STAT. § 812.035(6), preventing a legal co-owner from with-
drawing funds where plaintiff had an equitable claim for the full amount of the
account (citing Tinwood N.V. v. Sun Banks, Inc., 570 So. 2d 955, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (“An embezzlement whereby defendant lawfully obtains possession of the
plaintiff’s funds and thereafter converts said funds to his own use will justify an action
for civil theft.” (citations omitted)))), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Lucas, 600
So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1992); see also Miles Plastering & Assocs., Inc. v. McDevitt & St. Co.,
573 So. 2d 931, 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding civil theft does not lie for
action brought by subcontractor on construction project against general contractor
for payment of services rendered because uncertain or unspecified amount of money
alleged to be owed and no identifiable account or piece of property from which the
money is to be paid).
600 Perera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33618, at *15–16.
601 See Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T-22C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19430, at *60
& n.22 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 1992) (“[I]t is clear that the plain language of Section
772.17 of CRCPA provides for alternative methods of calculating the statute of limita-
tions. . . . To accept the Defendants’ position, the Court must conclude not only that
the sale of the Telron II investment constituted the last ‘predicate act,’ but also that
the point in time at which the conduct in violation of CRCPA terminated and at
which the cause of action accrued is exactly the same.  Given the facts of this case, the
Court is unable to accept Defendant’s argument.”), rev’d on other grounds, 18 F.3d 899
(11th Cir. 1994).
602 My analysis here follows that of John E. Floyd, the preeminent authority on
state RICO statutes. See ABA RICO SUMMARY, supra note 13.
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one aspect of the statute (civil limitations), and it mistakenly followed
inapt federal law not even construing similar legislative language.
Georgia Code § 16-14-8 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil
action or proceeding under this chapter may be commenced up
until five years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this chapter
terminates or the cause of action accrues.  If a criminal prosecution or
civil action is brought by the state to punish or prevent any violation
of this chapter, then the running of this period of limitations, with
respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (b) or (c) of
Code Section 16-14-6 which is based upon any matter complained of
in such prosecution or action by the state, shall be suspended dur-
ing the pendency of the prosecution or action by the state and for
two years thereafter.603
Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc. was the first decision to interpret the
relevant language in Georgia RICO.604  Plaintiff was a student at
Anneewakee, a corporation created specifically for the operation of
the youth treatment center, known as “Anneewakee;” he was there
between 1972 and 1975; he was thirteen years-old when Anneewakee
discharged him; he became eighteen years-old on August 15, 1981.605
603 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-8 (2011) (emphasis added).
604 426 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), following, Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987); see also Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v.
Barnett Bank of Fla., 906 F.2d 1546, 1554–55 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that RICO
accrues on discovery of injury and pattern), overruled by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,
556–57 (2000).
605 Blalock, 426 S.E.2d at 166. The age of majority in Georgia is eighteen. GA.
CODE ANN. § 39-1-1 (a).  Plaintiff’s minority excused his filing while he remained a
minor. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-90 (a) (entitling a person who is a minor when his
claim for relief arises to bring an action within the same statute of limitation after
reaching the age of majority).  That translated into his having five years from, not
1973, when the sexual abuse ended, as to him, but from 1981 (then plus five or 1986);
his claim for relief was not filed until 1990; thus, his claim for relief was untimely, no
matter how you read the statutory issue of “terminates or accrues” (whether discovery
applied).  But if the conduct by Anneewakee staff continued, as to other students, until
at least, say, 1987, his claim was timely, if he can count from, not when the conduct
terminates at to him (1973 plus his majority (1981) plus five (1986)), but from the
termination of the corporation’s conduct as to anyone in the same pattern of conduct
(1987 plus five or 1992), because he filed in 1990.  This alternative method of count-
ing played no role in the court’s decision.  Nevertheless, his claim for relief would
have been timely, had the court read the statute through the lens of Keystone Ins. Co.
v. Houghton. 863 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is the continuing nature of the
violation that is the very essence of a RICO claim . . . .” (quoting Cnty. of Cook v.
Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 434 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1986))); see also id. at 1131 (“It is the
continuing nature of the violation which distinguishes a RICO claim from claims aris-
ing simply from a predicate act and which requires the rule we announce.” (citing
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He filed his claim for relief on July 9, 1990.  Plaintiff alleged that,
during his enrollment, the staff of the corporation sexually and physi-
cally abused him.606  Anneewakee moved for summary judgment
because the five-year statute of limitation for Georgia RICO barred his
claims.  The court observed:
We do not agree with appellant’s argument that the legislature
intended that the statute of limitation begin to run from the time
that the racketeering activity terminates.  We conclude that the
more reasonable construction of OCGA § 16-14-8 is that the statute
of limitation begins to run when the civil RICO cause of action accrues,
which we interpret to mean when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should
have discovered, that he has been injured and that his injury is part of a
pattern.607
The test adopted by the court from the Eleventh Circuit in Bivens
is the injury-and-pattern-discovery rule, one of the tests, albeit
rejected, for the accrual of RICO.608
United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that RICO is a
continuing offense), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978)))); id at 1132 (“By analogy
the last predicate act of a pattern of racketeering activity is an appropriate place for
civil RICO causes of action to accrue. . . .  ‘[T]he principles of conspiracy law ought
clearly to apply, and so long as any of the predicate acts occur within the limitations
period, a defendant should have to answer for all of his related and continual acts of
harm.’” (quoting Berger, 648 F. Supp. at 435)); id at 1126 (“[T]he accrual period . . .
run[s] from the time when the plaintiff knew or should have known of [his] last
injury or the last predicate act which is part of the same pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.  The last predicate act need not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be
part of the same ‘pattern.’”).  To be sure, the Supreme Court rejected Keystone’s last-
predicate-act rule in Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997).  Thus, the
rule for accrual in the Third Circuit is now injury-discovery (knows or should have
known) plus four years.  Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2000).  But
the Georgia court was (and any other state court is), free, if it wants, not to follow
federal law—a course that should depend solely on cogent reasoning and the relevant
statutory language—and free to read the Georgia statute in light of Keystone, because
of its powerful and persuasive reasoning and the language of the statute, ignoring a
Supreme Court that still has not made up its mind on the point of accrual for RICO.
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 n.2 (2000) (“We do not . . . settle upon a final
rule.”).
606 Blalock, 426 S.E.2d at 166.
607 Id. at 167 (emphasis added) (citing Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett
Bank of Fla., 906 F.2d 1546, 1554–55 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled by Rotella, 528 U.S. at
554).
608 Bivens, 906 F.2d at 1554–55.  The Court subsequently rejected the test in
Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554.  The Georgia courts of appeals, however, blindly continue to
follow the injury-and-pattern-discovery rule despite Rotella.  Cochran Mill Assocs. v.
Stephens, 648 S.E.2d 764, 769–70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing with approval the Bla-
lock’s injury-and-pattern discovery language); accord S. Intermodal Logistics, Inc. v.
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Blalock’s analysis is mistaken for two reasons.  First, Blalock says it
took guidance from “several federal decisions” that had considered
the question when the statute of limitations for RICO begins to run.609
A problem with this approach is that the decisions do not interpret a
similar statutory provision to that which Georgia borrowed.610  The
Georgia legislature enacted Georgia RICO in 1980, when federal deci-
sions on the application of a statute of limitations to federal civil
RICO did not exist.  In fact, five years after the legislature enacted
Georgia RICO, an American Bar Association task force described the
state of the law at that time on the application of a statute of limita-
tions for civil RICO claims as “confused, inconsistent, and unpredict-
able.”611  Indeed, the Supreme Court did not apply the four-year
statute of limitations from the Clayton Act to federal civil RICO claims
for relief in Malley-Duff until 1987,612 well after the enactment of Geor-
gia RICO.  The Court in Malley-Duff sought a uniform statute of limita-
tions and borrowed the antitrust provision, because “[federal] RICO
itself includes no express statute of limitations for either civil or crimi-
nal remedies . . . .”613  Thus, none of the Court’s analysis is relevant to
the Georgia RICO, because it contains the express statute of limitations
that federal RICO lacked.  Consequently, such inapt general observa-
tions (that Georgia RICO reflects federal RICO) are beside the point
on this issue.614
D.J. Powers Co., 555 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).  That Blalock’s mistaken
rule, inapt rationale, and inconsistency with the statutory text call for a re-examina-
tion are beyond serious debate.  Perseverance in error is the opposite of a virtue. See
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Art. Q. 137, art. 1 (1274) (“[T]o persist
long in something good until it is accomplished . . . [is] special virtue.”).
609 Blalock, 426 S.E.2d at 167 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Bivens Gardens, 906 F.2d at 1554–55).
610 The general rule is that borrowed statutes reflect the legislative intent of the
jurisdiction from which the language came.  Metro. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558,
572 (1887).
611 ABA TASK FORCE ON CIVIL RICO, REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 391 (1985).
612 Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 150–53.
613 Id. at 155.
614 To the Blalock court’s credit, it “acknowledge[d] that the Georgia RICO statute
is considerably broader than the federal RICO statute and that federal circuit court
opinions regarding the federal statute, while instructive, do not control our construc-
tion or application of the Georgia RICO statute.” Blalock, 426 S.E.2d at 167 (citing
Dover v. State, 385 S.E.2d 417, 419–20 (Ga. 1989)).  Nevertheless, it turned around
and said that because “we have found no Georgia cases which address when the stat-
ute of limitation for civil RICO actions begins to run, we are guided by several federal
decisions which have considered the question.” Id.  How that non sequitur follows
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Second, Blalock violates the fundamental rule of statutory inter-
pretation that requires not reading any of a statute’s language as
meaningless.615 Blalock’s interpretation of § 16-14-8 violates this rule,
because it leaves “after the conduct in violation of a provision of this
chapter terminates” without any meaning, based upon no more than
its ipse dixit that the statute of limitations begin to run when the civil
RICO claim for relief accrues is a “more reasonable construction” of
§ 16-14-8.616  It fails to explain why, the crucial question.
Courts elsewhere easily interpret identical language in state RICO
statutes to reach results opposite to Blalock.  The Ohio RICO statute
contains the following provision:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law providing a shorter
period of limitations, a civil proceeding or action under this section
may be commenced at any time within five years after the unlawful
conduct terminates or the cause of action accrues or within any
longer statutory period of limitations that may be applicable.617
Federal courts interpreting this provision have no difficulty con-
cluding that its plain language creates alternative points from which
the statute of limitations begins to run, one of which is the point at
strains the rules of basic logic.  The plain language of the statute controls.  Looking
for case authority when you do not need it is a fool’s errand.
615 The Georgia Supreme Court repeatedly teaches that “[t]he fundamental rules
of statutory construction require us ‘to construe a statute according to its terms, to
give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes
some language mere surplusage.’”  Blue Moon Cycle, Inc. v. Jenkins, 642 S.E.2d 637,
638 (Ga. 2007) (quoting Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 587 S.E.2d 24, 26 (Ga.
2003)).
616 Blalock, 426 S.E.2d at 166.  A federal district court marked its objection to the
Blalock analysis, but did not act on it in Southern Intermodal Logistics, Inc. v. D.J. Powers
Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1356 n.38 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (“[Arguably,] § 16-14-8’s plain
language provides for an alternative limitations period, one that begins when the
RICO violation terminates. . . . Blalock rejected this argument, albeit without explana-
tion.  [Plaintiff argues that the] Georgia Supreme Court would not follow Blalock and
instead would apply the alternative limitations according to the statute’s plain terms.
The Georgia Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari in Blalock.  Thus, until the
Georgia Supreme Court overrules Blalock, this Court is bound to follow that decision.”
(citations omitted)).
617 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.34(J) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis added).  In
1986, I worked with State Senator Eugene Watts, a master artisan in legislative lan-
guage.  He demanded, to use his words, “the toughest and most comprehensive
[RICO] Act in the nation” and “state-of-the-art legislation.”  State v. Schlosser, 681
N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ohio 1997).  I did what he told me to do.  Whether he got what he
asked for is for others to judge.
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which the unlawful conduct terminates.618  In short, Blalock should
not bind a trial court in Georgia (or any other state court, trial or
appeallate).
Moreover, because of an intervening amendment, and a Georgia
Supreme Court decision applying the amendment, Blalock’s prece-
dential status is problematic. Blalock was decided five years before the
1997 amendments to § 16-14-2(b) that added a requirement that
“[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial
purposes embodied in its operative provisions.”619  After Blalock, the
Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the liberal construction provision
in a manner that shows the flaws in Blalock’s analysis:
If a different interpretation were called for, though, it would be error
to give a more restrictive meaning to the term, thus limiting the remedial
purposes of the Act and violating the liberal construction impera-
tive of the legislature, as “the purpose of the RICO Act is to provide
compensation to private persons injured or aggrieved by reason of
any RICO violation.”620
618 Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp.
2d 801, 809 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (“Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.34(K) gives the statute of
limitations for the state RICO claim. . . . Section 2923.34(K) provides that . . . a civil
proceeding or action under this section may be commenced at any time within five years
after the unlawful conduct terminates or the cause of action accrues. . . . Under the first
possible limitations period, Plaintiff Funds’ claim under the Ohio Pattern of Corrupt
Activity Act . . . is timely if brought ‘within five years after the unlawful conduct termi-
nates.’ . . . [P]laintiffs show evidence that the defendants’ alleged unlawful conduct
has not ended and is ongoing.”); Baker v. Pfeifer, 940 F. Supp. 1168, 1181 (S.D. Ohio
1996) (“Section 2923.34(K) provides two possible events that may trigger the running
of the limitations period—the termination of the unlawful conduct or the accrual of
the cause of action.”).
619 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-2(b) (2011).
620 Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone (Williams General II), 632 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Ga.
2006) (quoting Williams General Corp. v. Stone (Williams General I), 614 S.E.2d 758,
760 (Ga. 2005) (emphasis added)).  Thus, Blalock violated the liberal construction
mandate by adopting a more restrictive interpretation of § 16-14-8.  That said, Wil-
liams General II illustrates a generally unnoticed interpretation problem with taking
federal or other state decisions and simply applying them to the Florida RICO provi-
sions.  If a statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls; interpretation is not
necessary.  United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (“In determining the
scope of a statute, we look first to its language.  If the statutory language is unambigu-
ous, in the absence of ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that lan-
guage must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” (citing Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))).  In fact, “[t]he strict-con-
struction principle is merely a guide to statutory interpretation.  Like its identical
twin, the ‘rule of lenity,’ it ‘only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to
be used to beget one.”  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.10 (1985)
(“Petitioner invokes ‘the rule of lenity’ for decision in this case.  But that ‘rule,’ as is
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Blalock did not attempt to analyze the language in Georgia RICO
providing “until five years after the conduct in violation of a provision
of this chapter terminates . . . .”  Because Blalock looked at the statute
of limitations provision only in the context of a civil case, it also did
not consider that the General Assembly chose to apply the same
accrual provision  to both criminal and civil violations of the Georgia
RICO statute.
Given federal law at the time Georgia enacted its RICO statute,
the legislature could easily see the benefit621 of (1) codifying a limita-
tions provision for criminal and civil RICO cases, (2) adopting the five
year period of limitations the federal courts use, (3) recognizing that
RICO’s “pattern requirement” makes it a continuing offense, and (4)
following federal law in concluding that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the conduct in violation of the statute, that is,
the acts of racketeering activity, end.  The language in § 16-14-8, that a
criminal action or criminal proceeding under Georgia RICO “may be
commenced up until five years after the conduct in violation of a provision
of this chapter terminates,” is the explicit language envisioned by Tous-
sie.622  The conclusion is inescapable: Georgia RICO (and Florida
RICO) is—where the pattern continues over time—a continuing-
crime offense (and a continuing tort).  As read by the courts, the stat-
true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambi-
guity; it is not to be used to beget one. . . . The rule comes into operation at the end
of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an
overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.  That is not the function of
the judiciary.” (citing Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961))).  Moreo-
ver, “[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant
application of that rule [of lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).  More to the point, the crucial
language discussed here setting alternative dates is not ambiguous in context of its
effort to blend criminal and civil actions and the traditional concepts of “continuing
offenses” and “continuing torts.”
621 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379
(1982) (“[It] is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like
other citizens, know the law.” (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696–97 (1979))) .
622 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).  Federal courts recognize
RICO’s pattern element makes it a continuing offense within the meaning of Toussie.
See, e.g., United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (“RICO, however, is
a continuing offense under the Toussie definition.  It criminalizes a ‘pattern’ of activ-
ity that can include predicate acts separated in time by as much as ten years.  There-
fore, the nature of the offense is such that Congress must have intended it to be a
continuing one, and thus an exception to the normal start of the limitations
period.”); supra note 57.
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ute of limitations for crimes and torts must reflect this fundamental
insight.
CONCLUSION623
Most people can easily enough grasp the basic idea behind time-
bars in the law.  The enterprise of law, whether criminal or civil, has as
its purpose “justice.”  This much is beyond serious dispute.  The over-
all meaning of “justice” remains, of course, in contention.  Fortu-
nately, however, ultimate questions, always near the surface of legal
issues, do not require final resolutions to make practical judgments.
Agreement on the details is more often easier to secure than agree-
ment about a grand design.  At first glance, a time-bar involves two
points in time: the time of the event, and the time of the initiation of
the legal proceedings looking into the event.  As the these two points
in time separate more, the practical ability of any legal body accurately
to resolve disputes about the facts making up the event—a necessary
precondition to giving each person his or her due—becomes more
and more problematic.  This, too, is beyond serious dispute.  Facts
come out in court only through witness testimony or the introduction
of other evidence.  Memories fade.  Participants and other relevant
persons die or become unavailable.  Documents are mislaid, lost, or
stolen.  Physical evidence deteriorates.  Ultimately, “justice”—however
defined in the final analysis between the two parties—requires truth
in fact-finding, and truth here simply means relative accuracy in the
reconstruction of what happened, when, where, to whom, how, and
why.  Accordingly, at some point, the passage of time itself defeats
“justice.”  This much, too, is beyond serious dispute.  Thus, the need is
manifest for general624 rules framed in terms of time, permitting and
not permitting litigation to proceed.  Yet, these rules must reflect a
623 This conclusion only treats general conclusions about time-bars and makes an
assessment, for good or for ill, of the performance of legislatures and the judiciary.
The conclusions of this piece on particular issues of law appear annexed to its
consideration of them, whether under RICO, exclusively in the footnotes, or whether
under time-bars, primarily in the text and in the footnotes.  They need not appear
here as well.
624 Thomas Aquinas insightfully observes, “[s]ince the lawgiver cannot have in
view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happen most fre-
quently. . . . No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case and
therefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suita-
ble for the end he has in view.” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-I, Q. 96,
art. 6 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.) (1274), in 20 GREAT BOOKS,
supra note 5, at 235.  The maxim of the law is jus constitui oporet in his quae ut plurimun
accident, non quae ex inopinato (the law ought to be made with a view of the case that
happens most frequently, and not to those that are unexpected).
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sensivity to justice case-by-case.  Currently, too, many of these rules,
generally crafted to resolve issues abstractly, as they operate on the
legal side of the law are not as sensitive to justice case-by-case as the
parallel equity principles are when they deal with delay.
Up until this point, the legal journey goes relatively easily.  Then,
vigorous advocates for the parties get involved in working out the
details of the law.  They want a judge to fix precisely the metric of this
far and no farther, a question of painting dawn or dust, not high noon
or midnight.  They insist on black and while lines where only grey
paint adheres to the canvas.  They focus on the particulars of when
you start the time-bar and when you stop the time-bar.  They doggedly
push for bright lines that assuredly fix the limits of liability.  Yet having
insisted on hard and fast lines, they then argue that if a court applies
an unequivocal line mechanically, it gives mechanical answers that do
not satisfy a discriminating sense of “equity.”  Accordingly, they prop-
erly argue for the need to develop tolling rules that focus sensitively
on first the conduct of the complainant.  For example, has he acted
with due diligence in bringing his claim or has he slept on his rights to
the detriment of the defending party?  If not, what consequents
should follow?  Should his negligence set off the intentional conduct
of the respondent?  If so how: mechanically or with sensitivity to the
balance of the equities?  Next, how shall we look at the conduct of the
respondent?  For example, did he hide, in a special way, beyond the
typical cover-up of misbehavior, his offending conduct to the detri-
ment of the complainant?  Alternatively, did he gull the complainant
to wait and not to file his complaint on time and now seek to use the
induced delay to his inequitable advantage?  Thus, advocates properly
raise compelling notions of fair play that mitigate the harshness of the
mechanical results.
In working with time-bars in the law, it takes only a short period
of discussion for an attentive participant to see that the interests
involved in framing and applying them are hardly simple; they are
complex and triangular: the complaining party, the responding party,
and society itself, represented by the legal body that must resolve the
dispute justly and with equity.  The interests, too, involved differ in
criminal and civil justice.  In addition, time-bars take on a different
hue when a representative of the sovereign or the people is one of the
parties to the dispute.  In brief, a journey that started out relatively
straightforward ends up intricate beyond the patience of those who do
not spend considerable time doing technical work.
That said, what stands out in the development of the law in area
of time-bars is that when we identify the interests carefully, the devilish
details are, as Pound says, not much more than a matter of the balanc-
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ing of the various interests, as best as experienced humans can
resolve.625  In fact, the rules that comprise the details of time-bars are
not matters of logic that have right and wrong answers.626  That you or
625 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN CITY 18 (1922) (“[I]n crim-
inal law, as everywhere else in law, the problem is one of compromise; of balancing
conflicting interests and of securing as much as may be with the least sacrifice of other
interests.”).
626 The number of binding precedents at the Supreme Court level in the area of
time-bars will never reach a full harvest.  The issue is narrow and by definition excep-
tional.  Rightly, other matters more easily draw the attention of the Court.  Accord-
ingly, “[i]t is almost as important that the law should be settled . . . as that it should be
settled correctly.”  Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865).  Misera
est servitus ubi lex est vaga aut incerta (It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or
uncertain).  That also means that the Justices must often turn to matters outside of
legal precedents for guidance, as, say, theories of right and wrong. JOHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 302 (2d ed. 1927 ) (“When a case comes
before a court for decision . . .  there may be no stature, no judicial precedent, no
profession opinion, no custom bearing on the question involved, and yet the court
must decide the case somehow. . . .  [It] must . . . determine what the law ought to be;
[it] must have recourse on the principles of morality.”).  Yet, should the theory reflect
“sentiment” or “reason”? Compare BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 43 (1921) (noting “sentiment of justice”), with LON L. FULLER, THE LAW
IN QUEST OF ITSELF 65, 122–23 (1940) (“The facts most relevant to legal study [are]
moral facts.”).  The connection between law and morality, too, is more pervasive than
Gray concedes, if we credit, as we should, ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 63 (1926)
(“[I]n truth, there are continual points of contact with morals at every turn in the
ordinary course of judicial administration.”).  What does moral theory teach us, not
about the grand questions of the law, but issues of practical administration in the law
in, say, the area of time-bars? RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 63
(2001) argues little (“[M]oral theories . . . it seems to me [are] . . . spongy and arbi-
trary.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 348 (1990) (“I am skep-
tical that moral philosophy has much to offer law in the way of answers to specific
legal questions or even in the way of general bearings. . . . [W]hen it comes to specific
cases, it lets us down.”).
On the contrary, Aristotle rightly teaches, “[P]recision is not to be sought for
alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. . . . [We can
only] look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject
matter admits . . . .” ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5,
at 339–40.  In a similar fashion, John Finnis aptly observes:
Here, as elsewhere, the sceptic [sic] is a disappointed absolutist, and we
must reject the sophistical dilemma, ‘all or nothing’.  In particular, we must
beware of the (often unconscious) legalism which supposes that if there is
no uniquely correct solution to a moral problem, no solution to that prob-
lem is objectively right (or wrong).  The language of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
must not lure us into assuming that for every problem or situation there is
one solution or choice which is the right one.
JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 77 (1983).  Thus, in each instance, legal (or
moral) reasoning does not necessarily move by way of deduction from demonstrated
premises to demonstrated conclusions, that is, one logically correct conclusion.
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I might have drawn a particular line at a different point is largely
beside the point.627  In fact, those legislators and judges whose job it is
to cultivate this small garden in the law have—overall—done well, as
Moral (or legal) reasoning is, as Cicero says, about “wisdom,” the “art of living.” CIC-
ERO, ON MORAL ENDS 17 (Julia Annas ed., Raphael Woolf trans., 2001) (45 B.C.).
Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica draws a helpful distinction between the ways
in which different kinds of reasoning proceed.  The first is “as a conclusion from
premises” (conclusiones ex principiis); the second is as “by way of determination of cer-
tain generalities” (sicut deterinationes quaedam aliquorum communium). ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-I, Q. 95, art. 2, in 20 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at
227–28.  Aquinas’s Latin determinatio is usually translated “determination.”  Its primary
meaning, however, is “the marking off or fixing of a boundary.”  OXFORD LATIN DIC-
TIONARY 530 (1982).  In a legal context, it best translates as “to make a judgment.”
Aquinas calls the first way as “like to that by which, in the sciences, demonstrated con-
clusions are drawn from principles.” Id. The second is “like that whereby, in the arts,
common forms are determined to something particular; thus, the craftsman needs to
determine the common form of a house to the shape of this or that house.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also id., at Reply to Obj. 4 (“[T]he judgment[s] of expert and
prudent men [are based on particular points of natural law] . . .  in so far, that is, as
they see at once what is the best thing to decide.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[W]e ought
to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older peo-
ple or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because
experience has given them an eye they see aright.” (citing ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean
Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 5, at 393) (emphasis added))).  Here the Justices
of the Court have to do the best they can with whatever they have available to them to
help them to decide questions with a range of possible resolutions.  They have to
make judgments of this or that, where it could easily be that or this.  In sum, the
justices must settle the baroque details of the questions of time-bars one way or the
other, as much as anything, so that parties know where they stand, and they can move
on.  “Precision and certainty are often of more importance to the rules of law, than
their abstract justice.”  M’Gruder v. Bank of Wash., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 598, 602
(1824).  Justice Johnson’s remark is especially true of the details of time-bars.
627 When it comes to drawing lines in the law, Justice Frankfurter said it well in 10
E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 584–85 (1945):
[W]e cannot escape the duty of drawing lines.  And when lines have to be
drawn they are bound to appear arbitrary when judged solely by bordering
cases.  To speak of drawing lines in adjudication is to express figuratively the
task of keeping in mind the considerations relevant to a problem and the
duty of coming down on the side of the considerations having controlling
weight.  Lines are not the worse for being narrow if they are drawn on
rational considerations. . . .  That is what is meant by a question of
degree. . . .  But for drawing the figurative line the basis must be something
practically relevant to the problem in hand.
Cardozo’s thoughts, too, are apt here: “I sometimes think that we worry ourselves
overmuch about the enduring consequences of our errors.  They may work a little
confusion for a time.  In the end, they will be modified or corrected or their teachings
ignored.  The future takes care of such things.” BENJAMIN CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921).
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they work, not with questions of high policy, but with the practical
necessity of line drawing in a narrow, but important area of the
administration of justice—time.  To have done well here is what we
expect of them.  They deserve our respect and gratitude, even when
we find—respectfully—fault in particular judgments.
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